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Abstract 
 
A review of the adult attachment literature revealed previous research findings to 
demonstrate attachment-based baseline differences in the well-being factor of life 
satisfaction but not to consider moderating factors nor fluctuations in life satisfaction 
experience. Furthermore, social cognitive processes highlighted within the subjective 
well-being literature, namely those captured within social comparison theory, have 
rarely been examined within an adult attachment perspective. The current thesis sought 
to address these gaps through investigating the predictive influences of moderating and 
mediating factors in associations between adult attachment and well-being. Across 5 
studies, individuals’ relationship experiences (namely relationship status, satisfaction, 
and status-changing events), social comparison tendencies (both within general and 
relationship- and partner-specific contexts), and social-comparison ranking perceptions 
were each examined. Findings revealed that relationship experiences indeed appeared to 
moderate individuals’ attachment-based feelings of subjective well-being, with greater 
anxiety in particular suggestive of more maladaptive cognitive and affective experience 
(Study 1). Social comparison tendencies, both general and interpersonally-oriented, 
were also identified to differ on the basis of anxiety and avoidance, with adverse 
comparison habits found to partially mediate associations between anxiety and both life 
satisfaction and self-esteem (Studies 2 and 4). Lastly, attachment-based differences in 
social-ranking perceptions were identified (Study 5), with anxiety found to interact with 
relationship status while an interaction between anxiety, ranking perceptions and 
relationship length as predictor of life satisfaction was found to be approaching 
significance. 
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Chapter 1. Literature Review 
 
Attachment theory 
In his original theory, Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1979, 1980) put forward that all 
humans are born with a biologically programmed system evolved to allow for the 
formation of an emotional bond to a primary caregiver. Activated in times of perceived 
threat, this system promotes behaviours in the infant, such as crying, clinging, and 
proximity seeking, that elicit caregiving behaviours from an attachment figure, such as 
holding and cuddling, providing both comfort and protection. It is through these 
reciprocal caregiver-infant interactions that an attachment relationship develops and is 
the basis on which an infant develops a trust in their caregiver’s availability and 
reliability to be used as a “secure base” (Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969) from which to 
explore their environment and return to in times of perceived threat.  
Key to the type of attachment relationship that develops is the nature of the 
caregiver’s responsiveness to their infant’s attachment signals. Through their work 
involving extensive home observations and the use of the strange situation, Ainsworth 
and colleagues (Ainsworth, Bell, & Strayton, 1971; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Hall, 
1978) were able to identify that when the caregiver is repeatedly and consistently 
responsive to their child’s attachment needs, that child will develop a fundamental trust 
in their caregiver’s availability, that is, they will develop a secure attachment 
orientation. However, caregiving styles that deviate from the above-described 
consistency in sensitivity whereby the caregiver is limited or changeable in their 
responsiveness are said to prohibit the development of a secure attachment orientation. 
Here, Ainsworth et al. (1978) put forward that the infant would be unable to develop that 
same trust in their caregiver and would instead develop one of two insecure attachment 
orientations: one of either anxious-ambivalence/resistance or avoidance. 
These attachment outcomes can be understood through differences in what 
Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) termed internal working models: internalised 
representations that develop in response to interpersonal experiences, with those 
experiences with early primary caregivers being the most influential and enduring across 
the life course. According to Bowlby (1973), within each individual there exist two 
complementary internal models that govern how individuals interpret, relate to, and 
ultimately behave in their relationships across the lifespan. The first, the model of self, 
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comprises cognitions of how acceptable and worthy of love an individual believes 
themselves to be, while the second, model of other, consists of the type and level of 
responsiveness to attachment needs that is to be expected from significant others. 
Subsequent to Bowlby’s original theorising, research within the social and 
personality tradition suggested that the internal working models individuals form in 
infancy are carried into adulthood and impact on later romantic relationship functioning. 
In their seminal article, Hazan and Shaver (1987) applied Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) 
tripartite classification of security, avoidance, and anxious-ambivalence in identifying 
patterns of behaviours and feelings experienced in adult romantic relationships. What 
they found was a differential similarity in attachment-related classifications as those 
identified within the developmental literature, as well as theoretically-relevant 
differences in emotional involvement, suggesting that individuals’ internal working 
models do indeed endure into adulthood and shape their interpersonal experiences. 
But under what conditions do the different attachment orientations emerge during 
infancy? Ainsworth et al. (1978) put forward that in cases where the infant can rely upon 
a caregiver who is consistently responsive and sensitive to their needs, that infant 
develops the positive models that characterise secure attachment, namely, a positive 
model of self as worthy of love and a positive model of others as accepting and 
available. In cases where a caregiver limits their responsiveness to their infant, that 
infant develops an avoidant, deactivating attachment strategy (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988) 
whereby rejection of attachment needs is anticipated and so attention is defensively 
turned away from feelings of distress, eliminating need for comfort. What develops here 
is a less congruous set of internal working models in which a defensive positive model 
of self compensates for the negative model of others as unavailable; in other words, the 
lack of trust in others’ responsiveness manifests a positive self-regard achieved through 
self-reliance and denial of attachment-related needs. In adulthood, avoidant individuals’ 
deactivating strategy results in a disregard of potential threats to relationships, an 
emotional distancing from interdependence and a downplaying of need for intimacy (see 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005, for review). 
Lastly, in cases where a caregiver is responsive to their infant but inconsistently 
so, the infant relies upon an anxious-ambivalent, hyperactivating strategy (Cassidy & 
Kobak, 1988) in which attention is chronically turned towards their caregiver’s 
behaviours, vigilant for signs of availability, and display heightened and exaggerated 
distress in order to elicit a response to their attachment needs (Carlson & Sroufe, 1995; 
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Weinfield, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 1999). The internal working models that 
develop from experiences such as these include a negative model of self but a positive 
model of other. Here, the caregiver’s inconsistent responsiveness inhibits the 
development of feelings of autonomy within the infant, such that they perceive 
themselves negatively as unable to reliably influence positively-viewed others i.e. those 
perceived as able to respond but do not due to insufficiencies on the infant’s part 
(Ainsworth & Bell, 1974; Sroufe, Fox, & Pancake, 1983; see Weinfield et al., 1999). In 
adulthood, anxious individuals’ hyperactivation of the attachment system results in an 
increased vigilance and greater sensitivity to perceiving potential threats to relationships 
(Simpson, Ickes, & Grich, 1999) leading to maladaptive behaviours intended to ensure 
chronic availability of partners, such as controlling and coercive behaviours. The lack of 
confidence and autonomy development from inconsistent caregiver responsiveness in 
infancy also leads anxious individuals to demonstrate insecurity over independence 
within their relationships (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007) and over-reliance on partners 
for self-validation (with negative partner feedback indicative of rejection adversely 
impacting upon them (e.g., Hepper & Carnelley, In Press) and positive partner 
behaviours proving beneficial for self- and partner-esteem (e.g., Alfasi, Gramzow, & 
Carnelley, 2010; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2006). 
While much research was carried out using the tripartite classification system in 
investigating adult attachment patterns, acknowledging the limitations of such 
categorical assessment further research suggested a dimensional consideration of 
attachment would provide a more meaningful insight into attachment-related processes 
and hence put forward that adult attachment styles emerge from two underlying 
dimensions: anxiety, concerning the extent to which individuals worry about 
abandonment and rejection; and avoidance, concerning the extent to which individuals 
limit intimacy with others (e.g., Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Fraley, Waller, & 
Brennan, 2000). From both these underlying dimensions and the internal working 
models of self-other can four attachment styles be identified in which individuals can 
differ in the extent to which they endorse each one: secure, preoccupied, dismissing-
avoidant, and fearful-avoidant (Bartholomew, 1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; 
Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994).  
The self-other models for the secure and anxious/ambivalent (corresponding to 
preoccupied) styles are equivalent to those in Bartholomew and Horowitz’ four-category 
conceptualisation, with the former characterised by low anxiety and avoidance and the 
4 
 
latter characterised by high anxiety/low avoidance. With its low anxiety and high 
avoidance, dismissing corresponds to Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) tripartite avoidance. 
However the fourth, fearful-avoidance, is characterised by high anxiety, high avoidance, 
and negative models of both self and other, that is, a negative sense of self as unworthy 
of love and a negative expectation of others as unavailable and rejecting. In adulthood, 
both avoidant styles experience discomfort with intimacy and closeness in their 
relationships and maintain distance from others but the bases for each differ as a product 
of their interactions with anxiety. With their high anxiety, fearful individuals desire 
closeness with others but fear rejection and so their avoidance serves as a protective 
function for their negative expectations (Bartholomew, 1990). With their low anxiety, 
dismissing individuals feel discomfort with intimacy as it infringes upon the autonomy 
and independence they desire; here, distancing behaviours stem not from fear but rather 
from need for self-reliance (Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998).  
While the above internal working models and associated anxiety and avoidance 
dimensions have been shown to be moderately stable and enduring into adulthood (see 
Fraley, 2002), they have also been shown to change across time, as well as across 
different relationships, and hence controversy exists in their actual structural nature and 
stability. Davila and Cobb (2004) draw attention to Bowlby’s (1969) original 
proposition that changes in attachment style can occur due to reorganisation of working 
models in response to interpersonally significant events and outline three models that 
might account for observed differences and changes in attachment style: the life stress 
model, the social-cognitive model, and the individual-difference model. The life-stress 
model echoes that of Bowlby’s (1969) original theorising and suggests that changes in 
degree of attachment security are a result of significant life events or changes in life 
circumstance. The findings testing this model are mixed, however. For example, 
Kirkpatrick and Hazan (1994) found that individuals who experienced romantic 
relationship dissolution were more likely to become insecure than others, while Baldwin 
and Fehr (1995), Davila, Burge, and Hammen (1997), and Scharfe and Bartholomew 
(1994) all found no such associations. Along with limited support, a further limitation of 
this perspective lies in its suggestion of attachment security changes in response to life 
events as being permanent and hence does not account for either fluctuations in security 
or differences across relationships. 
The social-cognitive model has received greater support within the adult 
attachment literature. This model suggests that any observed changes or variability in 
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attachment orientation are due to what Davila and Cobb (2004) describe as “changing 
states of mind” (p. 145), such that individuals have several internal working models and 
that individuals’ current level of attachment security hinges on which of these models 
are most accessible to them at the time. Major proponents of this perspective are Collins 
and Read (1994). Noting that infants often have different attachment relationships with 
each of their parents (e.g., Bridges, Connell, & Belsky, 1988, Fox, Kimmerly, & 
Schafer, 1991; Lamb, 1978; Main & Solomon, 1990; Main & Weston, 1981), they put 
forward that internal working models are too complex to be conceptualised as a singular 
pair of self-other models and suggested instead that individuals’ internal working 
models should be thought of as a network comprising several interconnected models that 
are hierarchical in structure. At the top of the hierarchical network is an individual’s 
generalised attachment representations of self and other. Connected to this are domain-
specific models that correspond to particular types of relationships (such as romantic or 
familial relationships) and lastly connected to these are relationship-specific models that 
develop as a result of new interpersonal experiences with specific attachment figures. 
Collins and Read (1994) argue that which model within the network is activated at a 
given time depends on the strength and specificity of the model, as well as how the 
characteristics of the situation match, but that stronger models, that is, ones that are 
based on greater experience and are applied most often, should be the most accessible. 
The advantage of considering internal working models as structured in this way lies in 
its applicability to observations of both attachment variability across relationships as 
well as changes over time. In considering attachment variability (e.g., Ross & Spinner, 
2001), different self-reported attachment orientations reflect activation of either domain- 
or relationship-specific working models. In examining change in security over time, for 
example, within a long-term relationship (e.g., Duemmler & Kobak, 2001), models 
based upon experiences within the current relationship become more accessible over 
time due to repeated assimilation and integration of new experiences, resulting in the 
model becoming more central and densely interconnected within the network and hence 
impacting upon the individual’s general attachment orientation. Lending support to 
Collins and Read’s (1994) view of a hierarchical structure, studies examining adult 
attachment variability and stability have identified that individuals can indeed endorse 
more than one attachment style across relationships. For example, Baldwin, Keelen, 
Fehr, Enns, and Koh-Rangarajoo (1996) found participants to report experiencing 
relationships fitting different attachment patterns and could be primed to have increased 
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temporary access to particular attachment models, influencing their preference towards 
hypothetical partners who shared their primed attachment orientation. Using a similar 
priming focus, Rowe and Carnelley (2003) found that individuals in their study could be 
primed with a secure orientation as evidenced by recalling more positive attachment-
related words and through reporting greater endorsement of positive and lesser 
endorsement of negative interpersonal expectations in comparison to other primed 
orientations. La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, and Deci (2000) also found variability in 
attachment patterns across different relationships, including parents, romantic partners, 
and close friends. Rowe and Carnelley (2005) also found evidence in support of the 
notion of hierarchically-structured sets of working models, while Overall, Fletcher and 
Frisen (2003), testing the propositions put forward by Collins and Read (1994) directly, 
also found evidence to support a hierarchical structure over the structural 
conceptualisations of a single global working model and multiple but independent 
working models. 
The final model described by Davila and Cobb (2004) is that of the individual-
difference model which puts forward that certain dispositional and situational 
characteristics (such as parental divorce or psychopathology) result in some individuals 
being more susceptible and vulnerable to attachment security fluctuations. In this way 
this perspective sees attachment fluctuation as a characteristic of attachment insecurity; 
adverse conditions inhibit the development of stable models of self and others and the 
resulting lack of clarity of beliefs about self and expectations of others is what accounts 
for changes in security across relationships and time. Support for this model comes from 
two recent studies: Davila et al. (1997) found that individual vulnerability factors were 
associated with change in self-reported attachment patterns and were better predictors 
than were life events. Davila and Cobb (2003) also found dispositional factors such as 
psychopathology and personality pathology were associated with lack of clarity in 
internal working models of self and other, and that this in turn was associated with 
decreases in levels of security over time. 
In sum, while each of the above three models describing attachment structure and 
resulting variability have received empirical support, the lack of consistency in these 
findings prevents a clear-cut understanding of the structural nature of individuals’ 
internal working models. However, within the adult attachment literature, researchers 
have generally concentrated on examining generalised attachment orientations, 
employing self-reported measurement applicable to general feelings of anxiety and 
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avoidance and not feelings specific to any given relationship. Within this literature, the 
anxiety and avoidance dimensions and associated attachment styles have been 
consistently found to predict differences in relationship experiences.  
Adult attachment and relationship experience 
Studies examining differences in relationship experience generally point to the 
pattern of secure individuals reporting more positive relationship experiences and those 
fitting insecure attachment classifications reporting more negative experiences. In their 
original paper, Hazan and Shaver (1987) found secure individuals to report their most 
important relationship experience as happy, friendly and trusting in which they were 
able to accept and support their partner. Avoidant individuals described themselves as 
experiencing fear of intimacy in their relationships, which were characterised by 
emotional highs and lows, as well as feelings of jealousy. Lastly, anxious-ambivalent 
individuals were characterised by obsessive preoccupation, desire for reciprocation and 
union, emotional highs and lows, and extreme sexual attraction and jealousy.  
On the basis of the above differences in relationship experiences it logically 
follows that differences in levels of satisfaction derived from those experiences should 
emerge. Indeed, individuals with a secure attachment style consistently report greater 
relationship satisfaction than those with either anxious or avoidant attachment styles 
(Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney, 2002; Jones & Cunningham, 1996; Pistole, 1989; 
Simpson, 1990; Stackert & Bursik, 2003; Tucker & Anders, 1999). Further highlighting 
security as enabling more satisfying relationship experiences, Mikulincer and Erev 
(1991) found secure individuals to report the greatest intimacy in their relationships over 
their avoidant and anxious-ambivalent counterparts. Collins (1996) additionally found 
preoccupied individuals to explain relationship events more negatively and to report 
carrying out behaviours that were independently rated as more likely to lead to conflict, 
while Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, and Kashy (2005) found individuals high in anxiety 
to report greater daily conflict, as well as greater conflict escalation, than would be 
expected on the basis of their partners’ reports. Carnelley, Israel and Brennan (2007) 
further found that individuals high in anxiety reported greater negative mood to partner 
feedback, providing further evidence of a greater negativity in interpersonal interactions. 
Extending across several types of relationships, Pietromonaco and Feldman Barrett 
(1997), Tidwell, Reis, and Shaver (1996) and Kafetsios and Nezlek (2002) all identified 
differences in cognitive reactions to day-to-day interpersonal interactions. Their findings 
indicate secure individuals report feeling happier in their interactions and perceive others 
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to be more responsive and understand them more compared to dismissing individuals 
and to perceive less rejection than those reporting as preoccupied, who were identified 
as reporting lower self-esteem after interactions than secure. In addition to more positive 
relationship perceptions, secure individuals have been found to report more trust towards 
their partners and have a higher accessibility of positive trust-related memories 
(Mikulincer, 1998a; Simpson, 1990), as well as reporting greater relationship 
interdependence and commitment (Simpson, 1990). 
In sum, secure individuals generally report more positive relationship experiences 
than anxious and avoidant individuals. They are not immune, however, from the 
relationship tensions and difficulties reported by their insecure counterparts, but differ in 
their ability to use more adaptive responses and strategies that limit stress and maximise 
opportunities for emotional rewards (see Feunderling, 1998). Secure individuals adopt 
more constructive strategies in coping with the violation of trust than insecures 
(Mikulincer, 1998a). Anxious individuals meanwhile are found to respond to 
hypothetical partner transgressions by endorsing relationship-threatening attributions, 
experiencing emotional distress, and endorsing behavioural intentions likely to result in 
conflict (Collins, Ford, Guichard, & Allard, 2006). Additionally, Sharpsteen and 
Kirkpatrick (1997) found anxious-ambivalent individuals to report greater chronic 
feelings of jealousy than secure individuals. However in typical jealousy episodes, while 
both secure and anxious individuals experienced anger, anxious individuals were less 
likely than secure to direct their feelings of anger associated with jealousy towards their 
partners, instead experiencing non-targeted feelings of irritability. Suggested by 
Sharpsteen and Kirkpatrick (1997) as being a potential result of feelings of inferiority 
and fear, this non-confrontational style of reaction to jealousy can be attributable to 
anxious individuals’ preoccupation with maintaining a positive attachment relationship 
with partners and therefore deeming more confrontational approaches as detrimental to 
that aim. 
As strategies for coping with negative relationship-related feelings vary as a 
function of attachment orientation, so too do strategies of conflict and conflict 
resolution. Secure individuals are found to employ constructive means of resolving 
conflict and disagreement. Pistole (1989) found secure individuals to be more likely than 
insecure individuals to use a mutually-focused integrating strategy to resolve conflict. 
Avoidant individuals meanwhile were found to favour compromising strategies that 
allow for resolution without direct addressing of conflict-related distress. With their 
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preoccupation with maintaining favour with their partners, anxious-ambivalent 
individuals were reported to rely on obliging strategies that focus on their partners’ 
needs. Indeed, research consistently finds attachment security to be associated with more 
constructive means of resolving conflict, employing compromising and integrating 
strategies (Levy & Davis, 1988; O’Connell Corcoran & Mallinckrodt, 2000) and 
demonstrating greater mutuality (Feeney, 1994). Attachment anxiety and avoidance 
meanwhile are associated with less constructive conflict styles (Carnelley, 
Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994), negative escalation and withdrawal (Creasy & Hesson-
McInnis, 2001; Creasy, Kerhsaw, & Boston, 1999), dominating behaviours (Levy & 
Davis, 1988) and distress (Feeney, 1994; see Pietromonaco, Greenwood, & Feldman 
Barrett, 2004, for review). 
Adult attachment and relationship dissolution 
A negative relationship event that is central to activation of the attachment system 
(and indeed central to Bowlby’s conceptualisation of attachment theory as a whole) is 
that of relationship dissolution. In his original theorising, Bowlby (1980) put forward 
that the attachment system serves as a psychobiological motivator to maintain proximity 
to, and thus prevent separation from, others able to protect them and hence ensure their 
survival to reproductive age. He discussed in-depth the normative response to separation 
and loss of an attachment figure and outlined three stages individuals must progress 
through; those of protest, despair, and detachment/reorganisation. Although his original 
writing was concerned with caregiver-infant dyads, Bowlby (1969) noted that adults 
display similar patterns upon separation from significant others and so considered adult 
pair-bonding to follow similar theoretical patterns to the infant experience of loss. 
Protest responses are those that are carried out with the intention of either 
preventing separation from a caregiver or re-establishing a connection once separation 
has occurred. In infancy and childhood, feelings of anxiety and anger arise, promoting 
behaviours such as vigorous crying, aggressive behaviour, and proximity seeking. This 
stage is characterised strongly by intermittent but prolonged fear and distress that cannot 
be alleviated by the comforting efforts of non-attachment figures and which can last 
over a number of days (see Kobak, 1999, for review). Although such a debilitating 
response in which all attentional, behavioural, and emotional resources are focused on 
the lost caregiver might seem maladaptive, the evolutionary grounding emphasised by 
Bowlby (1969) highlights this post-separation reaction as actually highly adaptive: by 
using all available resources to locate and re-establish contact with a caregiver, the 
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infant is increasing their chance of survival into adulthood and therefore their 
reproductive fitness (Fraley & Shaver, 1999; see Simpson, 1999, for discussion on 
evolutionary perspectives). 
The intense feelings of fear, anger and distress associated with protest are after a 
time replaced by the feelings of sadness and hopelessness that characterise the second 
stage of separation, despair. This stage commences at the point at which the infant 
recognises that the caregiver is lost to them and that separation appears permanent. 
Certain behaviours such as intermittent crying and hostile behaviour might emerge 
during this phase (Fraley & Shaver, 1999), but the predominant behaviours and feelings 
characterising this stage comprise diminished physical involvement and disengagement 
in social environments, as well as profound sadness akin to mourning (Bowlby, 1973). 
Although the final stage was originally described as being that of detachment, 
subsequent thinking suggests the term reorganisation more accurately describes the 
processes taking place. The infant at this point engages in their social environment once 
more, no longer rejecting caregiving attempts made by available others and shows signs 
of interest in daily activities. The limitation of considering this as detachment lies in the 
failure to capture the cognitive reorganisation of working models to adjust to the 
attachment figure’s absence, as well as the finding that attachment relationships can be 
re-established if the caregiver thought to be lost returns. Indeed, this final stage has been 
argued to not represent detachment at all but rather a defensive suppression of the 
attachment related cognitions and emotions deemed futile due to their failure to elicit the 
attached figure (Fraley & Shaver, 1999).  
The above describes the normative processes put forward by Bowlby (1969, 1973, 
1980) that are expected in separation from attachment figures in infancy; as the research 
carried out by Ainsworth et al. (1971, 1978) discussed earlier suggests, however, the 
nature of a caregiver’s interactions with their infant and the subsequent attachment 
relationship that develops brings about deviations in reactivity and response to 
separation and loss.  
In the brief separations observed in the Strange Situation, infants classified as 
secure were found to explore their environment using their mother easily as a secure 
base. Upon the mother’s departure, some infants became distressed but not excessively 
so and were quickly comforted at reunion, returning to exploration and play shortly 
thereafter. Others were not distressed by the separation and demonstrated positive 
behaviours such as smiling and initiating interactions with their mothers upon her return. 
11 
 
Secure infants were also found to respond positively to the stranger in the room, some 
finding comfort in them in their mother’s absence but always demonstrating preference 
towards the mother (Weinfield et al., 1999). Avoidant infants meanwhile showed little 
inclination of relying on their mother as a secure base, demonstrated little to no 
emotional reactivity upon the mother’s departure and maintained distance from her upon 
her return. Avoidance of eye contact was frequently observed, as well as an attentional 
focus on toys; in cases where the mother attempted to establish a connection through 
picking up the infant, that infant would arch away to avoid such contact. Lastly, 
anxious-ambivalent (or resistant) infants were found to become distressed upon entering 
the room (that is, before the mother’s departure) and often failed to engage in 
exploratory behaviours. Upon separation, the infants became deeply distressed and could 
not be calmed by the stranger. Reunion with the mother produced ambivalent behaviours 
whereby contact was sought but was accompanied by angry punishing behaviours; 
distress was not easily attenuated (Weinfield et al., 1999; see Solomon & George, 1999, 
for a summary).  
From the above it becomes clear that differences exist in the emotional experience 
of separation across attachment, with secure infants showing moderate levels of distress, 
are soothed easily, and can even use others as a source of comfort in the caregiver’s 
absence. Avoidant infants show minimal distress and a lack of interest in engaging in 
comfort-seeking behaviours, while anxious infants experience heightened emotionality 
that interferes with ability to be comforted. Research carried out on adult romantic 
relationship separation has identified similar patterns, further supporting Bowlby’s 
(1969) contention of attachment continuity into adulthood. In their naturalistic study 
examining couples’ airport separations, Fraley & Shaver (1998) found women high in 
avoidance carried out withdrawal behaviours at separation, minimising contact with 
their partners, while women high in anxiety reported increased distress. In examining 
differences in response to relationship break-up, studies have consistently found 
theoretically-linked post-dissolution emotions and behaviours. Barbara and Dion (2000) 
found preoccupied attachment, and Pistole (1995) found that individuals with fearful 
along with preoccupied attachment styles, reported more negative experiences after 
relationship dissolution than their secure counterparts. Feeney and Noller (1992) found 
attachment ambivalence to be associated with post-relationship upset, while finding also, 
along with Simpson (1990), a negative association between attachment avoidance and 
post-dissolution distress. Additionally, Sprecher, Felmlee, Metts, Fehr, and Vanni 
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(1998) reported fearful-avoidance to be associated with both initial distress at 
relationship dissolution and also distress subsequent to that. Further research has 
examined associations between attachment and relationship dissolution beyond purely 
emotional experience and into the nature and characteristics of such experience. Pistole 
(1996) reported feelings of self-reproach to be associated with preoccupied attachment, 
consistent with the conceptualisation of this orientation as characterised by negative 
feelings of self coupled with positive regard of others. Furthermore, blaming the partner 
was associated with fearful-avoidance, explainable by the associated negative 
expectations of others as rejecting being confirmed. Lastly, Davis, Shaver, and Vernon 
(2003) found associations between attachment anxiety and distress behaviours, such as 
physical/emotional distress, guilt and blame, and protest reactions such as anger and 
hostility, preoccupation with partner, interference with daily activities, and wanting to 
get the partner back. On this latter point in particular, Dutton and Winstead (2006) found 
similarly, with anxious attachment identified as a significant predictor of post-
relationship unwanted pursuit behaviours. Attachment avoidance meanwhile was most 
associated with the coping behaviour of preferring to rely on the self rather than seeking 
comfort from friends and family (Davis et al., 2003). 
Adult attachment and affect regulation 
From the above it becomes clear that in addition to determining levels of comfort 
with intimacy and independence in relationships, a further consequence of variations in 
anxiety and avoidance, and hence attachment orientations, is that of emotional 
experience, regulation, and reactivity. Indeed, fundamental to Bowlby’s (1973) 
theorising was the pivotal role of early attachment experiences in determining 
differences in emotion-regulation strategies, such as the aforementioned deactivating 
and hyperactivating strategies (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988) employed in infancy and 
childhood. Furthermore, these different emotion-regulating strategies are suggested to 
endure across the lifespan, determining individuals’ emotional tendencies across a 
variety of social contexts. In terms of general levels of affect, attachment security is 
associated with more positive and less negative mood than either of the insecure 
attachment styles (e.g., Barry, Lakey, & Orehek, 2007; Simpson, Collins, Tran, & 
Haydon, 2007; Van Buran & Cooley, 2002; Wei, Russell, Mallinckrodt, & Zakalik, 
2004). While such studies have found direct associations between attachment orientation 
and mood, recent research has found evidence to suggest that the link between insecure 
attachment and negative mood, as well as interpersonal problems, can be explained by 
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differences in emotionality, specifically emotional reactivity for anxiety and emotional 
cutoff for avoidance (Wei, Vogel, Ku, & Zakalik, 2005).  
Individuals with an anxious attachment orientation are found to be more 
emotionally reactive to negative situations than their secure counterparts. Specifically, 
anxious individuals are less able to suppress negative affect and to inhibit emotional 
spreading (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995), demonstrate hyper-vigilance towards the 
source of stress (Mikulincer, Orbach, & Iavnelli, 1998) and experience heightened 
distress even in low-threat situations (Meyer, Oliver, & Roth, 2005) compared to secure 
individuals who report moderate emotional defensiveness but with easy access to 
negative thoughts without risk of emotional spreading (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). 
Studies examining neurological correlates support these findings, with anxious 
individuals demonstrating greater late positive potential (LPP) amplitudes reflecting the 
increased engagement and commitment of attentional resources associated with an 
increased emotional response (Zilber, Goldstein, & Mikulincer, 2007). Similarly, 
Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, and  Mikulincer, (2005) found attachment anxiety 
to be positively correlated with greater activation of emotion-related areas of the brain 
and negatively correlated to activation of emotion-regulating areas of the brain, 
supporting the notion that anxiety reflects greater emotionality with poorer regulation 
ability (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005 for a review). Indeed poorer emotion regulation 
is an affective proclivity consistently found to characterise attachment anxiety (e.g., 
Mikulincer, 1998b; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). For example, anxious individuals’ 
cognitive responses to negative stimuli is found to be affect-congruent and thus 
maintains negative thought (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004) compared to secures’ affect-
incongruent strategies that serve to maintain positivity. 
This focus on amplified emotional experience within anxious individuals contrasts 
greatly from the deactivating strategies adopted by those high in attachment avoidance. 
As suggested earlier through infant defensive denial of attachment needs, avoidant 
individuals in adulthood demonstrate high levels of emotional suppression and 
defensiveness (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997), implementing restrictive control of 
emotions (Kotler, Buzwell, Romeo, & Bowland, 1994) and have low accessibility to 
negative memories (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). Further associated with this 
orientation is distancing coping strategies in stressful (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; 
Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993), relationship-threatening (Meyer et al., 2005; 
Radecki-Bush, Farrell, & Bush, 1993), and separation (Fraley & Shaver, 1998) 
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situations, as well as inhibition of accessibility to representations of attachment figures 
in response to attachment-related threat (Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002).  
Support seeking can be seen as an additional method of emotion regulation; in 
infancy, activation of the attachment system in response to perceived threat should lead 
to normative behaviours of seeking comfort from primary caregivers to attenuate 
feelings of distress. In adulthood, the proximity seeking behaviours in infancy translate 
into disclosure of distress and seeking and accepting emotional reassurance from 
significant others (see Collins & Feeney, 2000). Secure individuals, compared to both 
anxious and avoidant individuals, perceive themselves as having a larger support 
network (Priel & Shamai, 1995), higher levels of emotional and instrumental support 
from significant others (Florian, Mikulincer, & Bucholtz, 1995; Ognibene & Collins, 
1998) and in times of stress and anxiety, use these significant others as a source of 
support and help (Larose, Bernier, Soucy, & Duchesne, 1999; Mikulincer & Florian, 
1995; Mikulincer et al., 1993; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992). Findings of support-
seeking in anxious individuals, however, are inconsistent, with some studies reporting 
preference for support-seeking behaviours and others identifying no such patterns (see 
Feeney & Collins, 2004). Avoidant individuals meanwhile are less likely to seek support 
(Simpson et al., 1992). Instead they show signs of distress when confronted with 
support-seeking situations in which the level of psychological distance they are 
comfortable with may be compromised (e.g., Rholes, Simpson, & Grich Stevens, 1998; 
Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999), reflecting their general feeling of discomfort with the 
intimacy required in emotional dependency. 
Implicit in the notion of seeking support from others is the assumption of co-
occurring self-disclosure; in order to seek others to attenuate feelings of distress and 
anxiety one must be able and willing to communicate those feelings to them. With their 
comfort with and desire for intimacy, both secure and anxious individuals have been 
found to demonstrate greater self-disclosure to partners (e.g., Mikulincer & Nachshon, 
1991; Pistole, 1993) than avoidant individuals. Furthermore, while secure and anxious 
individuals respond positively to similarly high-disclosing, and therefore high-intimacy, 
partners, avoidant individuals respond negatively, reporting less inclination to 
reciprocate disclosure and also liking such partners less (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). 
While the above studies demonstrate differences in interactional behaviour with 
attachment figures in response to attachment system activation, further research suggests 
that in the physical absence of attachment figures, internalised representations can serve 
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as a substitute. In their study examining Israeli ex-prisoners’ retrospective accounts of 
imprisonment, Solomon, Ginzburg, Mikulincer, Neria, and Ohry (1998) found those 
reporting as secure relied upon positive memories of, as well as imagined positive 
interactions with, attachment figures as a form of symbolic support during their time in 
prison. Within laboratory settings, secure individuals have been shown to demonstrate 
greater accessibility to internalised representations of attachment figures in threatening 
situations (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000; Mikulincer et al., 2002) 
and to experience increased positive affect as a result of this accessibility (e.g., 
Mikulincer et al., 2001; Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001) 
suggesting attachment security to reflect an adaptive cognitive bias that enables self-
regulatory coping in the absence of significant others. Insecure individuals meanwhile 
have been shown to experience increased levels of distress upon activating internalised 
representations of significant others in stressful situations (McGowan, 2002), 
highlighting attachment insecurity as a deviation from normative cognitive and affective 
processes that should optimise psychological well-being. 
Adult attachment and subjective well-being 
Researchers within the subjective well-being (SWB) literature have long argued 
the importance of affective experience, emphasising positive and negative affectivity as 
being two interrelated but separable components (Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; Diener, 
1994; Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995) that individuals often use as a basis for forming 
evaluations of overall well-being (e.g., Schwartz & Strack, 1991; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & 
Triandis, 1998) . While both positive and negative affect are found to be related to well-
being, the former has been identified as a stronger predictor than the latter (e.g., Lucas, 
Diener, & Suh, 1996; Suh et al., 1998). However, important to note is that it is not 
necessarily the intensity of emotional experience that is predictive of subjective well-
being but rather both the hedonic balance (that is, the ratio of positive to negative affect) 
as well as the frequency of positive and negative affect experienced that predicts well-
being (Diener, Colvin, Pavot, & Allman, 1991; Diener, Sandvick, & Pavot, 1990; 
Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & 
Adahi, 2002; Suh et al., 1998).  
The affective profiles for each attachment orientation outlined above suggests that 
with their low anxiety and avoidance, secure individuals experience the greatest 
subjective well-being over their insecure counterparts due to their favourable hedonic 
balances (that is, increased positive and decreased negative affect, see Mikulincer, 
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Shaver, & Pereg, 2003) resulting from emotion-regulation strategies that serve to 
minimise distress and maintain positivity (e.g., Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004). With both 
high anxiety and avoidance associated with negative mood (e.g., Barry et al., 2007), 
individuals fitting the fearful-avoidant attachment orientation experience the poorest 
subjective well-being due to their negative affective experience outweighing their 
positive (e.g., Horppu & Ikonen-Varila, 2001). As earlier described, preoccupied 
individuals’ high anxiety ensures a greater tendency towards negative interpretation 
(e.g., Collins, 1996) and as a response to this their hyperactivating affective bias results 
in greater frequency of negative affect (e.g., Meyer et al., 2005). However this bias, 
coupled with their low avoidance, does not deny them positive emotional experience; 
Shaver and Mikulincer (2003, as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005) reported anxious 
individuals to respond to positive partner behaviours with security-related feelings as 
well as happiness and love. From this, while their subjective well-being should be lower 
than secures, their well-being is higher than that experienced by their fearful-avoidant 
counterparts due to their positive affect providing a certain level of counterbalance to 
their negative. Lastly, those fitting the dismissing-avoidant categorisation do report 
lower mood than secures (e.g., Barry et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2004) but with their high 
avoidance, the defensive nature of their orientation in which feelings of distress are 
defensively denied cognitive attention leads to a more favourable hedonic balance than 
their high anxiety counterparts (who experience heightened feelings of distress). 
However, their well-being should be considered lower than secure individuals since the 
basis of their hedonic balance is a result of a defensive denial of negative experience 
rather than the active experience of positive affect reported by secures (and deemed 
more instrumental as a well-being predictor (Lucas et al., 1996; Suh et al., 1998)).  
 Taken together, as would be expected on this basis, affective disorders are most 
associated with attachment insecurity and a major association in subjective well-being 
found within the attachment literature is that between attachment insecurity and 
depression. This is not to say that depression stems from adverse affective proclivities, 
but rather adverse experiences in infancy that lead to attachment patterns characterised 
by maladaptive affect-regulatory practices provide the right circumstances for affective 
disorders to arise. For example, Bifulco et al. (2006) found attachment insecurity to 
mediate the relationship between childhood neglect and risk for developing an affective 
disorder. Indeed, both attachment anxiety and avoidance have been found to relate to 
depression and depressive symptoms (e.g., Carnelley et al., 1994; Eng, Heimberg, Hart, 
17 
 
Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2001; Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997; Murphy & Bates, 
1997; Permuy, Merino, & Fernandez-Rey, 2009; Van Buran & Cooley, 2002). More 
recent work has examined the nature of this relationship and identified several mediating 
factors; Tasca et al. (2009) identified both emotional reactivity as a mediator between 
anxiety and depressive symptoms and emotional deactivation as a mediator for 
attachment avoidance, emphasising the impact of emotional experience on subjective 
well-being. However, cognitive mediators have also been identified. Williams and 
Riskind (2004) identified cognitive vulnerabilities to partially mediate between 
attachment insecurity and depressive symptoms, while Roberts, Gotlib, and Kassel 
(1996) found dysfunctional attitudes and decreased self-esteem to mediate between 
attachment insecurity and increasing depressive symptoms over time. 
Significant in determining well-being, the issue of decreased self-esteem in 
attachment insecurity has been examined extensively within the adult attachment 
literature. From a theoretical standpoint, individuals high in anxiety, whose internal 
working models of self dictate negative self views, should experience decreased self-
esteem compared to those whose models of self are more positive. Consistent with this 
conceptualisation, individuals high in attachment anxiety (that is, those with negative 
self models) report lower self-esteem than those low in anxiety (Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991; Bylsma, Cozarrelli, & Sumer, 1997; Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney & 
Noller, 1990; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997). However, while secure and 
dismissing-avoidant individuals (with their positive self-models) report similarly higher 
self-esteem, the differing bases for these two orientations means a differentiation 
between the two must be made. As discussed earlier, in infancy, secure individuals form 
positive self models as worthy of love as a direct result of consistent and dependable 
caregiver responsiveness to attachment needs. Avoidant individuals develop defensive 
positive views of self as a response to inadequate caregiver responsiveness, that is, in the 
absence of early support they favour self-reliance as a means of maintaining positive 
self-regard. In this sense, secure individuals report ‘true’ higher self-esteem whereas 
dismissing-avoidant individuals report defensive higher self-esteem as a coping 
mechanism against their insecurity. Brennan and Morris (1997) provide some support 
for this contention, finding in their study that attachment security was associated with 
self-liking while attachment dismissing-avoidance was associated with self-competency. 
Similarly, Brennan and Bosson (1997) reported dismissing-avoidant individuals to be 
averse to partner feedback as a means of self-validation, while Mikulincer (1998b) 
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found evidence to suggest that avoidant individuals’ positive self-view was related to 
attempts to validate their sense of self-reliance, further suggesting their self-esteem to be 
based on a defensive cut-off and independency from others. Additionally, the defensive 
nature of their self-esteem appears fragile, such that dismissing individuals deny 
themselves acknowledgement of personal deficiencies (Mikulincer, 1995, 1998b) and 
will defensively project any flaws onto others (Mikulincer & Horesh, 1999) in order to 
maintain their self-regard. Taken together, these findings all provide support for the 
notion that while both secure and dismissing-avoidant individuals report higher self-
esteem, the latter’s appears to be a surface projection borne from a self-protective denial 
of insecurity.  
Adult attachment and life satisfaction 
While SWB researchers have emphasised the importance of positive and negative 
affect in predicting subjective well-being, they have also drawn attention to cognitive 
factors (e.g., Suh et al., 1998). The issue of self-esteem discussed above highlights a 
cognitive evaluation relevant to individual well-being, however one that is considered 
central in the well-being literature is individuals’ global evaluations of their satisfaction 
with life. Indeed, as suggested earlier, researchers conceptualise subjective well-being as 
divided into three interrelated but distinct and separable (e.g., Diener, 1994, Diener, Suh, 
Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Huebner, 1991c) components comprising the aforementioned 
positive and negative affectivity (Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; Diener et al., 1995), as 
well as a cognitive-judgmental evaluation of global satisfaction with life (Andrews & 
Whithey, 1976; Bradburn, 1969; Diener & Diener, 1996; see Lucas et al., 1996).  
Life satisfaction is defined as an individual’s evaluative summary of the quality of 
his or her life as a whole (Heller, Watson, & Ilies, 2006) that is linked to, but can 
transcend, judgments of factors both interpersonal (such as family and friends) and 
intrapersonal (such as mood states) in nature (Gilman & Huebner, 2003; Huebner, 
1991b). Shin and Johnson (1978) emphasise the role of individuals’ a priori chosen 
criteria as a basis for their evaluations, suggesting cognitive-judgmental assessment of 
satisfaction to be an outcome of comparisons against personally-defined standards and 
ideals (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffon, 1985). The subjective focus on internal 
standards results in external and hence objective factors having little weight in 
determining life satisfaction outcomes. Although heuristically counterintuitive, research 
consistently finds only modest associations at most between life satisfaction and factors 
such as age, education, and income/socioeconomic status (e.g., Andrews & Withey, 
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1976; Huebner, 1991a, 1991b, 2004; Wilson, Henry, & Peterson, 1997; see Diener & 
Diener, 1996 for review). It is with subjective factors such as personality where stronger 
associations are found. For example, research has identified Big Five factors (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987) extraversion, neuroticism, and conscientiousness (e.g., Hayes & Joseph, 
2003) as well as self concept and esteem  (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener et al., 
1985; Leung & Leung, 1992) to be predictive of life satisfaction. Recent years, however, 
have seen the emergence of empirical examination of life satisfaction on the basis of 
adult attachment orientation. With research identifying the earlier described differences 
in the affective components of well-being across attachment orientation, it logically 
follows that differences should emerge on the cognitive-judgmental component of life 
satisfaction also. 
As would be expected, research investigating associations between adult 
attachment and life satisfaction has generally found attachment security to relate to 
higher life satisfaction. In their study investigating links between attachment working 
models and psychological adjustment, Cozarelli, Hoekstra, and Bylsma (2000) found 
that individuals with more positive models of self reported higher satisfaction than those 
with more negative models of self. Similarly, both Kim, Carver, Deci, and Kasser (2008) 
and Hinnen, Sanderman, and Sprangers (2009) found attachment anxiety and avoidance 
correlated negatively with life satisfaction. Hwang, Johnston, and Smith (2009) 
investigated psychosocial adjustment in individuals with physical disabilities and found 
individuals fitting a secure attachment classification reported the highest satisfaction 
while those fitting a fearful-avoidant attachment classification reported the lowest. 
However, no group differences were found for preoccupied and dismissing-avoidant 
classifications. Whilst these studies concentrated on attachment orientation as 
conceptualised in terms of anxiety and avoidance dimensions, Armsden and Greenberg 
(1987), Nickerson and Nagle (2004), and Wilkinson and Walford (2001) measured 
attachment in terms of facets such as trust, communication, and alienation. Here, the 
positive aspects of peer and parent attachment relationships (that is, trust and 
communication) were predictive of greater satisfaction with life.  
But what might account for the observed differences in life satisfaction judgments 
across attachment orientation? While the above studies have established that there is a 
relationship, the theoretical exploration of why this relationship exists has been light, 
focusing on highlighting attachment co-correlates that predict life satisfaction, such as 
neuroticism, and well-being co-correlates that relate to attachment, such as self-esteem. 
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However there is much in attachment theory itself and related cognitive processes that 
might account for the reported findings. 
One possible explanation has its basis in the social cognition literature and 
emphasises the importance of cognitive self-structure and complexity as a determinant 
of subjective well-being. Recognising the long-held assertion that self-cognitions play 
an instrumental role in mental health processes (e.g., Beck, 1976; Higgins, Klein, & 
Strauman, 1985; Kuiper & Derry, 1981), Linville (1985, 1987) put forward her self-
complexity model to account for differences in vulnerability to adverse life 
circumstances and stresses. According to this model, knowledge of the self is organised 
into multiple cognitive structures, or self-aspects, that are arranged into a larger 
associative network and that individuals differ in both the number and degree of 
distinctiveness between these structures. Accordingly, an individual is considered to 
have greater self-complexity when their definition of self is based on a greater number 
of self-aspects that are highly distinct from one another, while an individual is 
considered to have lower self-complexity when their definition of self is based on fewer 
self-aspects that are more enmeshed and poorly distinguished. The relevance this has for 
subjective well-being lies in what Linville (1987) calls the “Spillover Process” (p. 664); 
when a negative situation or event is encountered, the self-aspect that most strongly 
relates contextually to it becomes activated, leading to the negative cognitions and affect 
that have arisen as a result of that encounter to become associated with that self-aspect. 
Not only does this have potential negative implications for the directly-relevant self-
aspect but also for others that are associated to it within the network; when closely 
related, the negative cognitions and affect affecting one self-aspect ‘spill over’ and 
impact on others, influencing the inferences the individual makes regarding their 
content. For the individual who is highly differentiated and therefore has greater self-
complexity, a negative event occurring in one aspect of their lives is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on their overall well-being due to the distinctiveness of each of their 
numerous self-aspects inhibiting cognitive and emotional ‘spillover’. For the individual 
who is less differentiated and therefore has lower self-complexity, a negative event 
occurring in one aspect of their lives is likely to have a greater impact on their overall 
well-being due to having fewer less clearly defined and hence overlapping self-aspects 
that allow for easier cognitive and emotional spreading. 
Mikulincer (1995) explored the concept of self-complexity within the context of 
adult attachment orientations and identified secure individuals’ self-structure to 
21 
 
comprise highly differentiated positive self-schema (or self-aspects), whereas anxious-
ambivalent individuals’ self structure was characterised by negative self-schema that 
were poorly differentiated and hence such individuals were suggested to have a self-
representation based on only a few highly-related entangled self-attributes. Avoidant 
individuals meanwhile showed highly differentiated positive self-schema similar to 
secures but, in keeping with the notion of the maintenance of positive self-regard 
through defensive non-processing of negative traits, they also demonstrated low 
accessibility to negative self-aspects and low integration (that is, fragmented, less well-
connected self-aspects). 
With regards to life satisfaction, while generally having more positive relationship 
experiences than negative, should they arise, secure individuals’ greater self-complexity 
should serve as a protective buffer against any negative events and situations from 
having a significant impact on their overall well-being. Negative emotions in response to 
any setback experienced should be moderate and confined to affecting the relevant 
aspect due to a highly distinctive associative network inhibiting negative emotional 
spreading into other life domains, protecting feelings of global satisfaction. With 
anxious individuals’ lower self-complexity, fewer, less distinct self-aspects that overlap 
with one another result in the intense negative feelings typically experienced in response 
to perceived adverse situations to spread into other domains. This emotional spreading 
would lead not only to the affective escalation that characterises this orientation 
(Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995) but also to impairment to overall satisfaction due to this 
spillover colouring the cognitions and feelings of associated self-aspects. This becomes 
particularly problematic for anxious individuals’ subjective well-being when one 
considers their propensity to interpret interpersonal interactions more negatively 
(Collins, 1996), to report experiencing greater levels of relationship conflict and tension 
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2005) and to be vulnerable and sensitive to signs of rejection 
(Downey, Bonica, & Rincón, 1999). For the anxious individual, the feelings of 
worthlessness confirmed by perceived rejection from a negative interpersonal experience 
is likely to spread feelings of worthlessness to other self-aspects, impacting significantly 
on their global satisfaction with life.  
The life satisfaction profile for attachment avoidance on the basis of self-
organisation is less clear-cut. As described above, avoidant individuals’ level of self-
complexity resembles that of secures and so the impact of negative situations on their 
life satisfaction should be minimal, both due to self-aspect distinctiveness preventing 
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spillover and also due to emotion-regulating strategies that inhibit and suppress any 
feelings of distress that ordinarily would arise. However, the organisation of their self-
aspects is less coherent than secures, with fragmented self-aspects leaving such 
individuals unable to make connections between aspects and integrate them into a 
cohesive whole (Mikulincer, 1995). Outside the framework of attachment, cognitive 
fragmentation and differentiation has been identified as relating to psychological 
maladjustment (e.g., Bigler, Neimeyer, & Brown, 2001; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & 
John, 1993) and so on this basis, avoidant individuals may have a baseline level of life 
satisfaction that is lower than secures but that which is less vulnerable to decrements 
than their high anxiety counterparts. 
The above consideration of self-structure provides a possible explanation for why 
differences should exist in the relationships between adult attachment orientations and 
life satisfaction. However, to consider it as the only antecedent to this relationship would 
be to oversimplify the complex processes described by attachment theory, which 
emphasise not only differences in cognitive organisation as an instrumental influence on 
various well-being factors but also the differences in cognitive and affective processes 
that emerge as a result. 
Research by Lyubormirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof (2006) suggests that a further 
possible reason for why individuals’ attachment orientations have an impact on their life 
satisfaction could lie in attachment-related differences in cognitive and behavioural 
processing of negative experiences. In their article they draw attention to research 
finding beneficial effects of writing and talking about negative experiences (e.g., 
Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Murray & Segal, 1994) and adverse effects of simply 
thinking about such experiences (see Lyubormirsky & Tkach, 2004). They argue that the 
act of openly talking or writing about one’s negative experiences, which requires 
analysis and understanding of the experience as well as labelling of emotions in order to 
create a narrative of it, allows for the organisation and integration of the experience, 
paving the way for either emotional resolution or acceptance (e.g., Pennebaker & 
Graybeal, 2001; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) and ultimately improved well-being. The 
act of merely thinking about one’s experience meanwhile does not require the same 
attentional resources in creating a coherent narrative. Instead, thought is disordered 
without analysis or attempt to label emotions and can lead to intrusive, repetitive, and 
prolonged negative rumination, the effects of which can be deleterious to subjective 
well-being (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994) through prolonging 
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negative mood, exaggerating negative thoughts and memories, and leading to more 
negative expectations for the future (e.g., Lyubormirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998; Lyubormirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubormirsky & Tkach, 2004; 
Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003). In testing the relationship between 
differences in processing negative experiences and life satisfaction directly, 
Lyubormirsky et al. (2006) found that participants who either wrote or talked about their 
worst life experience reported higher subsequent life satisfaction than participants who 
only thought about their worst experience, providing support for the contention that the 
active cognitive organisation afforded by putting words to thought, either in written or 
oral form, is instrumental in maintaining well-being.  
When considering the link between adult attachment and life satisfaction on this 
basis, the adult attachment research discussed earlier has identified that individuals 
fitting a secure orientation use others as a means of attenuating feelings of distress by 
seeking support and disclosing their thoughts and feelings to them (e.g., Larose, et al., 
1999; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; Mikulincer et al., 1993; Simpson et al., 1992). This 
open disclosure echoes that described by Lyobormirsky et al. (2006) and suggests that 
secure individuals’ higher life satisfaction may be attributable, at least partially, by their 
preference for openly discussing problems, allowing for emotional resolution provided 
by the co-occurring analysis and enhanced understanding of their negative experience. 
Individuals high in anxiety have been shown to demonstrate ruminative thinking (Brown 
& Phillips, 2005; Saffrey & Ehrenberg, 2007), a cognitive tendency detrimental to well-
being through disordered cyclic thoughts preventing emotional resolution and closure. It 
is through the labelling of emotions and structured analysis of events that understanding 
and subsequent resolution is achieved, which in turn is the predecessor to general well-
being and satisfaction. With anxious individuals’ thought processes tending to deny 
them such emotional closure, this too might partially explain why high anxiety 
individuals’ life satisfaction is lower than their more secure counterparts’. For avoidant 
individuals meanwhile who are characterised by an aversion to personal disclosure as 
well as defensive denial of attention to sources of distress, while the non-processing 
could be viewed as less maladaptive than the ruminative processing strategies argued to 
be favoured by anxious individuals, it is itself more maladaptive than the open 
disclosure typically demonstrated by secure individuals. As such avoidant individuals 
should report life satisfaction experiences lower than secure individuals but higher than 
anxious individuals. 
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A final cognitive perspective comes from Simpson and Rholes (2004). Based on 
Beck’s (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Weissman & Beck, 1978) work on 
examining depression, Simpson and Rholes outlined a diathesis-stress process model in 
which two constructs were proposed as determinants of well-being: dysfunctional 
relationship attitudes and perceptions of relationship deprivation. They argued that 
individuals high in attachment anxiety may apply unrealistically high and too-stringent 
conditions for attaining happiness in their relationships, which reality simply cannot 
meet, as well as make personal well-being too heavily contingent upon actualising these 
conditions. With the empirical findings of anxious individuals as less willing to 
compromise on their partner standards (Tolmacz, 2004) and as basing much of their 
well-being on perceptions of relationship quality (e.g., Campbell et al., 2003) supporting 
this model, it would appear on this basis that such individuals are particularly 
susceptible to experiencing lower life satisfaction. Referring back to Shin and Johnson’s 
(1978) emphasis on a priori chosen criteria as a comparative basis for individuals’ 
evaluations of satisfaction with life, anxious individuals’ unrealistic and too heavily 
depended upon standards may prevent them from experiencing the life satisfaction that 
others with more flexible and realistic standards are able to (i.e. secure and avoidant 
(Tolmacz, 2004)) due to current circumstances inevitably falling short. 
In sum, the affective and cognitive processes that characterise secure attachment 
suggest that such individuals should experience the greatest satisfaction with life. Their 
positive self-regard and positive yet achievable expectations of others ensure more 
rewarding relationship experiences characterised by the high intimacy and independence 
they desire. Their self-complexity and open addressing and evaluation of any negative 
experiences they encounter, meanwhile, prevents exacerbation of feelings of distress 
both through containing the negative affective repercussions to the relevant issue and 
through analysis that leads to emotional resolution, allowing for the maintenance of 
favourable hedonic balances shown to be instrumental to subjective well-being. The 
high anxiety that characterises both preoccupied and fearful-avoidant attachment 
orientations ensures greater frequency of negative affect due to negative interpretation of 
interpersonal interactions and experiences, which in part may be accountable to both 
their hypervigilance towards signs confirming negative expectations as well as their 
unrealistic, inflexible, and hence unattainable relationship and partner standards. The 
after-effects of their negative interpretations are particularly detrimental to well-being 
because of both the importance they place on their relationships as well as the suggested 
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emotional spreading into other life domains as a result of less complex and distinctive 
self-representations that in turn they are cognitively ill-equipped to emotionally resolve. 
Lastly, the life satisfaction of individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant attachment 
orientation should be lower than secure but higher than their anxious counterparts. 
Although they do share secure individuals’ greater self-complexity, the benefits of a 
more complex self-representation are hindered by a fragmented structure in which there 
is a lack of accessibility and connections between self-aspects. Both their dismissal of 
the importance of interpersonal relationships to them and their cognitive denial of 
distress should limit the negative impact of any negative experiences on global 
satisfaction but similarly their dismissal should limit the emotional benefits they get out 
of positive experiences also. Furthermore, their suggested lack of analysing and 
searching for meaning of such results means they remain unresolved but, due to their 
defensive nature, remain outside of cognitive awareness also. This contrast from anxious 
individuals’ ruminative tendencies that focus on negative thought should afford them 
more favourable hedonic balances, but only to the extent that they are characterised by a 
greater absence of negative affect rather than active experience of positive and so should 
fall short of the subjective well-being and global satisfaction experienced by secures. 
Social comparison theory 
A social cognitive process that has been highlighted as an important determinant 
of subjective well-being and global life satisfaction is that of social comparison (see 
Diener & Fujita, 1997). The important role comparisons play in shaping individuals’ 
perceptions of their social realities has long been recognised within the social 
psychology literature (Hyman, 1942; Sherif, 1935), however, it was Festinger’s (1954) 
seminal article in which a comprehensive theoretical framework was established that 
paved the way for thorough examination of the nature, function, and outcomes of 
comparison processes. 
In his original social comparison theory, Festinger (1954) put forward that in cases 
of uncertainty, there exists in each individual a drive to evaluate his or her opinions and 
abilities. He argued that whilst the preferred sources from which to judge such attributes 
are those of an objective, non-social nature, when such sources are deemed unavailable, 
individuals will evaluate themselves by determining their relative standing in 
comparison to similar others. Although researchers have subsequently expanded upon 
these propositions by emphasising the importance of emotions in social comparison 
processes (e.g., Brickman & Bullman, 1977; Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Schachter, 1959; 
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Tesser, 1988; Wills, 1981), in the nearly six decades since Festinger’s work, the basic 
tenets of the theory still receive empirical support. 
One important advancement in early social comparison research concerning 
emotions was that of Schachter’s (1959) work examining need for affiliation. He 
suggested that feelings of fear that arise from stress provoke individuals’ need to 
affiliate with others. In testing this need, Schachter conducted an experiment in which 
participants were divided into one of two conditions, a high-threat condition in which 
fear was primed through the suggestion of receiving painful electric shocks, and a low-
threat condition in which pain was downplayed. It was found that nearly two-thirds of 
the high-threat participants wished to wait with others for their turn to participate, while 
only one-third of the low-threat participants wished the same, suggesting that need for 
affiliation (and therefore desire for social comparison) may be a product of the 
uncertainty inherent in stressful situations. This study, and many more following it (e.g., 
Buunk, Schaufeli, & Ybema, 1994; Gerard, 1963; Gerard & Rabbie, 1961; Mills & 
Mintz, 1972) focused on conceptualising affiliative behaviours as intertwined with and 
representing social comparison processes. However research by Buunk (1995) suggests 
a distinction must be made. While social comparison concerns a desire to seek out 
information on the opinions and situation of others, affiliation suggests a desire to share 
one’s own perspective and experiences with others in a similar position. Indeed, Hill 
(1987) put forward four different affiliation motivations: positive stimulation, 
concerning the provision of positive affective and cognitive stimulation; attention, in 
which self-enhancement through others’ attention is the focus; emotional support; and 
social comparison. Although affiliation and social comparison in Buunk’s (1995) study 
were found to be highly correlated, desire for social comparison was found to be 
stronger than need for affiliation, further suggesting the two processes to be related, as 
suggested by Hill’s conceptualisation (1987), but distinct.  
While Schachter’s (1959) work paved the way for research considering emotional 
antecedents to affiliation, many more researchers have concentrated their efforts on 
examining the cognitive and emotional antecedents and consequences of the comparison 
principles explicitly detailed by Festinger (1954). Inherent in Festinger’s (1954) original 
theory was a focus on the comparisons individuals choose to make and the individuals 
they choose to compare against, with little regard for instances in which situations might 
impose comparison information upon the individual (Wood, 1989). Subsequently, much 
of the early research carried out within the social comparative framework focused its 
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scope on this very issue (e.g., Gordon, 1966; Hakmiller, 1966; Thornton & Arrowood, 
1966). For example, a common experimental methodology in early research involved 
rank-ordering in which participants, after having completed a particular measure such as 
personality (Gruder, 1971; Wheeler, 1966) or ability testing (Wheeler, Koestner, & 
Driver, 1982), were given the opportunity to compare their scores with others’. The 
general findings within this type of research is that, when given a choice, individuals 
will compare with others’ scores that are close to, and slightly higher than, their own. 
This notion of similarity (in the above studies, similarity in scores) has been 
challenged in recent years, with researchers questioning the ambiguity involved in 
determining “similarity” and the comparison targets who fall within this definition 
(Goethals & Darley, 1977; Suls, 1986). Drawing upon research by Kruglanski and 
Mayseless (1990) and Suls, Martin, and Wheeler (2000), Kaplan and Stiles (2004) 
highlighted that research does indeed find variability and diversity in degrees of 
similarity between comparison targets and those choosing to compare against them. For 
example, Kruglanski and Mayseless (1987) found that under conditions of fear of 
invalidity, individuals tended to compare more with disagreeing, and hence dissimilar, 
others. Goethals and Nelson (1973) also found a preference for dissimilar others when 
seeking targets to compare against judgments of students’ academic success. However, 
while these studies suggest that dissimilar others may serve as sources of comparative 
information, there does appear to be a cut-off point. Highlighting Festinger’s (1954) 
postulations that extremely dissimilar others are incomparable because the traits under 
scrutiny differ to the extent of making any comparisons meaningless, Mettee and 
Riskind (1974) found that promoting an initially comparable target to a higher, 
incomparable level of ability removed them as a comparison target and hence removed 
them as a threat to the self, increasing their likeability in doing so. However, it appears 
even extremely dissimilar others who exemplify desirable characteristics and 
demonstrate enviable success can serve as comparison targets when the factor of 
relevance is considered. Lockwood and Kunda (1997) found that high achieving others 
induced inspiration when achievements were deemed self-relevant and attainable and led 
to self-deflation when achievements appeared unattainable. This would appear to 
suggest that even others who on the surface seem dissimilar can be cognitively 
interpreted by the comparer as having qualities that can establish a connection of 
similarity of some kind. Furthermore, research by Brown, Novick, Lord, and Richards 
(1992) suggests that dissimilarity does not hinder comparisons but rather changes their 
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nature, such that dissimilarity may bring about contrastive comparisons whereas 
similarity may bring identification. 
Social comparison motivations 
In sum, the above findings suggest that individuals are not purely passive victims 
of imposing comparison information, nor subject to rigid and inflexible comparison 
norms, but rather that a number of motivational factors can drive comparison 
behaviours. Festinger (1954) characterised individuals as driven by a desire for accuracy 
in the comparisons they make, emphasising awareness of potential negative 
consequences of holding inaccurate opinions and appraisals as motivation. However, 
research subsequent to his postulations, including those discussed above, has suggested 
further motives behind comparison choices. Thornton and Arrowood (1966) put forward 
two different motives to guide individuals’ comparisons, self-evaluation and self-
enhancement, while a third, self-improvement, has also been considered (see Wood, 
1989). Self-evaluation captures that which was described by Festinger (1954) such that 
accurate appraisal is key and positive, similar examples of those who exemplify the trait 
under evaluation are sought as comparison targets (Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Self-
improvement meanwhile suggests desire to seek information that will enable progression 
to a higher level of competency or ability; here, ideal targets for comparison should be 
those that are deemed superior to the self that may serve as reference point to aim for. 
Lastly, self-enhancement describes the motive of maintaining and enhancing favourable 
self-views as influencing comparison choices and suggests individuals to be selective in 
choosing comparison targets that are most suited to improve feelings of self-esteem (see 
Wood, 1989). This self-enhancing tendency was exemplified in particular by an early 
study carried out by Hakmiller (1966) in which participants who were given false 
feedback suggesting them to be highly hostile towards their parents chose to compare 
themselves with others they believed to have received feedback indicating greater 
hostility than their own. More recently, research by Pyszczynksi, Greenberg, and La 
Prelle (1985) identified that in addition to self-enhancement motives, expectancy 
outcomes also influence individuals’ comparison behaviours. In their study examining 
responses to social sensitivity test feedback, Pyszczynski and colleagues found 
individuals demonstrated greater interest in comparison information if others were 
anticipated to have performed poorly on a task whereas they demonstrated little to no 
interest if others were expected to have performed well. 
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This latter motive of self-enhancement formed the basis of Wills’ (1981) 
influential downward comparison theory, which suggested that individuals can increase 
their subjective well-being through comparisons with perceived less fortunate others. 
Wills further suggested that since individuals either temporarily or chronically low in 
self-esteem would be in the greatest need of self-enhancement, such individuals would 
be more likely to use downward comparisons to increase well-being. This work was an 
important advancement in social comparison research, as by highlighting the importance 
of individual differences in social comparison tendencies, it hinted at a more complex 
process than that first put forward by Festinger (1954). Furthermore, this article marked 
the departure of examining the tenets of Festinger’s classic self-evaluation motive in 
which accurate self-appraisal was key, to what Wheeler (1991) termed “neo-social 
comparison theory” in which self-enhancement and its emotional sequelae were the 
focus. 
Although early research revealed some findings in support of Wills’ downward 
comparison theory (e.g., Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Wilson & Benner, 1971), so too is 
there more recent evidence incongruent with its postulates. The findings from this 
research would appear more in line with the selective affect-cognition priming model 
(Bower, 1991; Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990). Similar in principle to Beck’s (1967, 
1976) cognitive model of depression, this theory suggests that, such is their maladaptive 
cognitive bias, individuals low in subjective well-being and with negative self-
perceptions will make upward comparisons, that is, comparisons to perceived better-off 
others, reinforcing their feelings of inferiority. In their diary study examining 
individuals’ naturalistic social comparisons, Wheeler and Miyake (1992) found that it 
was individuals high in self-esteem who were more likely to make downward 
comparisons rather than those low in self-esteem. Similar to this, Miyake (1993), as 
cited by Wheeler (2000) found low self-esteem individuals to make more upward 
comparisons. In Vohs and Heatherton’s (2004) study, when participants’ self-image was 
under threat, those with low trait self-esteem made more upward comparisons, while 
those with high trait self-esteem made more downward social comparisons. Similar 
support comes from studies examining the impact of mood on comparison choices. For 
example, Wood, Michela, and Giordano (2000) found that individuals experiencing sad 
moods demonstrated an upward comparison bias (the affective and cognitive 
consequences of which would serve to prolong and maintain negative mood) but when 
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feeling happier demonstrated a tendency toward downward comparison (permitting the 
maintenance of positive affect and evaluation).  
Social comparison outcomes 
While the above research has focused on comparison choices, an area of research 
that has emerged in more recent years is that of examining individuals’ affective and 
cognitive-evaluative responses to social comparison information imposed on them by 
situational factors. Although studies looking at comparison choices have also looked 
into the affective and cognitive consequences of social comparisons (e.g., Olson & 
Evans, 1999; van der Zee et al., 1998; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), the primary focus of 
research investigating involuntary comparisons is specifically that of how individuals 
react to such information. Much research within this field contends and finds evidence to 
suggest that when comparing to perceived better-off others, individuals’ self-evaluations 
and subjective well-being decrease (Diener & Fujita, 1997; Gibbons, 1986; Smith & 
Insko, 1987; Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 1990; Tesser, 1988; Wood, Taylor, & 
Lichtman, 1985). For example, highlighting the cognitive responses to social 
comparison information, a particularly notable study carried out by Morse and Gergen 
(1970) found that individuals encountering a well-dressed and organised applicant 
interviewing for the same job reported decreased self-esteem, whereas individuals 
encountering a job applicant who was poorly dressed and disorganised reported 
increased self-esteem. Similarly, Marsh and Parker (1984) found that children in high-
ability schools tended to have lower self-esteem than those in low-ability schools. In 
examining the affective consequences of social comparisons, meanwhile, research 
generally finds upward comparisons to increase negative mood and to decrease positive 
(e.g., Buunk, van der Zee, VanYperen, & Nico, 2001; Olson & Evans, 1999). 
Highlighting that the negative consequences of upward comparisons are not limited to 
declines in affective well-being but can influence behaviour, Salovey and Rodin (1984) 
found individuals who received negative feedback on a personality test not only 
experienced feelings of jealousy and negative mood in response to hearing of another’s 
success, but also denigrated them and reported little desire for friendship with them. 
Tesser and Smith (1980) found that under conditions of high relevance, individuals gave 
competitors harder clues for a word-identification task when they had been 
outperformed by them, while Klein (2003) found individuals were more likely to help 
others upon receiving feedback that was more positive compared to others’. 
31 
 
 Implicit in the conclusions from the above studies of negative consequences of 
upward and positive consequences of downward comparisons is that individuals will 
primarily contrast themselves from others. By contrasting from perceived worse-off 
others, individuals come to see themselves as superior, and by contrasting themselves 
from perceived better-off others, individuals will come to see themselves as inferior, 
resulting in the reported respective positive and negative outcomes. However, as 
suggested by some of the inconsistencies reported in aforementioned studies, evidence 
frequently emerges to challenge this assumption, suggesting that the affective, 
evaluative, and behavioural consequences of social comparison information are not 
intrinsic outcomes restricted to resulting from either a single upward or downward 
direction but rather that both upward and downward comparisons can each produce 
positive and negative affective and evaluative responses. Buunk, Collins, Taylor, 
VanYperen, and Dakof (1990) examined cancer patients’ comparisons and found 
upward comparisons (in this instance, comparisons to other cancer patients whose health 
would be perceived as being better than their own) evoked positive affect nearly as often 
as downward comparisons. Proposed by the authors as potentially indicating upward 
comparison targets to be an encouraging and inspiring example in stressful situations, 
this finding suggests that the assumption of contrastive processes as default in 
individuals’ comparisons may be overly simplistic.  
Building upon Buunk et al.’s (1990) study, plus propositions put forward by 
Mettee and Smith (1977), Brickman and Bullman (1977), Taylor and Lobel (1989), 
Tesser (1988) and Heider (1958), Buunk and Ybema (1997) put forward their 
identification-contrast model. According to this model, individuals are motivated to 
identify with others perceived as being in a better position than they are and so focus on 
the similarities that may suggest their elevated position to be attainable. In keeping with 
Gilbert and colleagues’ (Gilbert, 1990; Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995) thinking, they 
argued this upward identification to be an adaptive phylogenetic disposition that allowed 
for appraisal of one’s competitors with the aim of reaching a higher social standing and 
ultimately social prestige. In addition to upward identification, Buunk and Ybema 
(1997) also suggested that individuals are motivated to avoid identifying with those 
perceived as being in a worse position than their own and so contrast themselves from 
them, focusing on their differences instead. However, implied in their model is that there 
is potential for individuals to identify with downward targets or to find themselves 
contrasting from upward targets. Indeed, Buunk and Ybema (1997) highlight research 
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that is suggestive of this pattern (e.g., Swallow & Kuiper, 1987; van der Zee et al., 
1998). Should they occur, downward identification and upward contrast should produce 
negative evaluations and affect, while identification with upward targets and contrasting 
from downward targets should evoke positive evaluations and affect. While not directly 
testing these contentions, research supporting this line of thought is plentiful (Brown et 
al, 1992; Buunk et al., 1990; Cash, Cash, & Butters, 1983; Collins, 1996; Lockwood & 
Kunda, 1997; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). 
Individual differences in social comparison 
As suggested by Wills’ (1981) downward comparison theory and Bower and 
colleagues’ selective affect-cognition priming model (Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990), 
social comparison processes are not universal and invariable but, as with most 
psychological processes, are subject to deviation on the basis of individual differences. 
Central to both propositions is self-esteem and so as would be expected, a considerable 
body of research has emerged investigating this very issue (see Buunk & Mussweiler, 
2001, and Wheeler, 2000). As discussed earlier, consistent with the affect-cognition 
priming model, individuals with low self-esteem have more often been found to make 
more upward comparisons than downward compared to their high self-esteem 
counterparts (e.g., Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). However, self-enhancing strategies in low 
self-esteem individuals have been identified; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, 
& Gaus (1994) found evidence to suggest that low self-esteem individuals can engage in 
self-enhancing social comparisons without experimental provocation, but, importantly, 
only when circumstances have provided them with enough confidence that doing so is 
psychologically “safe” with little risk of negative consequences. In their study, 
psychological “safety” was provided through feedback suggesting their greater potential 
for career success than others and led to low self-esteem individuals to make a greater 
number of social comparisons compared to those reporting higher self-esteem. This 
suggests that low self-esteem individuals are capable of employing self-enhancing 
comparison tactics but also accounts for why studies generally don’t find evidence of 
this motive; low self-esteem individuals’ goals of self-protection against undesirable 
outcomes outweigh their desire for gains in self-esteem (Wood et al., 1994) and might 
prevent them from making self-enhancing comparisons in more naturalistic contexts 
because the uncertainty inherent in reality leaves the probability of attaining desired 
favourable outcomes questionable. In sum, individuals with low self-esteem tend to 
focus on better-off others, as evidenced by their reports of more often making upward 
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comparisons, which in turn should reinforce unfavourable self-evaluations due to their 
own traits under scrutiny falling short of their comparison targets’. Their ability to use 
self-enhancing comparisons, meanwhile, is undermined by their focus on self-protection 
and so while there may be opportunities to increase feelings of self-esteem, their 
anticipation of negative outcomes prevents them from doing so. With regards to the 
affective consequences of social comparison, Giordano and Wood (as cited in Wheeler, 
2000) found that low self-esteem individuals responded with more negative affect to 
upward comparisons than their higher self-esteem counterparts. However, research by 
Aspinwall and Taylor (1993) suggests low self-esteem individuals can benefit when 
confronted with downward comparison information. In their study examining the impact 
of naturalistic threats on social comparisons, they found that low self-esteem individuals 
who had experienced an academic setback responded well to exposure to downward 
comparison information, reporting better self-adjustment and more positive future 
expectations. However, the aforementioned research that suggests a focus on upward 
comparison information (see Wheeler, 2000) means that low self-esteem individuals 
may deny themselves access to this source of self-enhancing information. Taken 
together, research appears to suggest that low self-esteem individuals are characterised 
by unfavourable social comparison tendencies resulting from a maladaptive cognitive 
bias that serves to perpetuate negative feelings towards the self. 
Another individual difference to have received empirical attention includes Costa 
and McCrae’s (1992) Big Five personality factors. Olson and Evans (1999) found 
extraversion predicted greater frequency of downward comparisons while openness and 
agreeableness were both found to predict a greater frequency of upward comparisons. 
Contrary to predictions, neuroticism did not predict comparison direction but analyses 
did show a higher score to predict a greater increase in positive affect after having made 
a downward comparison. Using Eysenck’s (1970) personality dimensions, however, 
VanderZee et al. (1996), were able to identify neuroticism as a predictor of upward 
comparison, as well as a greater need to make comparisons generally. Furthermore, 
VanderZee, et al. (1996) found individuals with greater neuroticism scores to respond 
less positively to upward comparison information, suggesting they were less able to 
identify with those perceived as being in better health. The discrepancy of findings in 
these studies may be attributable to their differing contexts, with the former examining 
general comparisons using a university student participant sample (and therefore 
representing a low-threat and stress context), and the latter two examining comparisons 
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within a higher-threat cancer patient participant sample. Furthermore, differences in 
methodology (experimental versus naturalistic event-contingent) must also be 
considered as a potential cause of this discrepancy. 
Other individual differences include narcissism (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 
2004), agentic and communal dispositions (Locke, 2003, 2005; Locke & Nekich, 2000), 
and anxiety, depression, and other maladaptive affective traits and disorders (e.g., 
Antony, Rowa, & Liss, 2005; Butzer & Kuiper, 2006; Weary, Marsh, & McCormick, 
1994). One in particular to have received a great deal of empirical attention, however, is 
Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999) social comparison orientation. In their original article 
conceptualising this orientation, they noted that the individual differences found to be 
associated with social comparison factors were those that tended to indicate uncertainty 
about the self. For example, Campbell (1990) found low self-esteem individuals to be 
characterised by a poorer self-clarity and self-certainty vulnerable to instability over 
time, as well as demonstrating less confidence in making applicability judgments of self-
descriptive characteristics. This uncertainty is similarly found in those with depression 
(e.g., Weary et al., 1994) and individuals scoring high in neuroticism (e.g., Van Der Zee 
et al., 1998). On this basis Gibbons and Buunk (1999) created a measure to assess 
comparison tendency as a personality disposition, with higher scores suggesting a 
greater propensity towards making comparisons and lower scores indicating the opposite 
trend. They found their measure – the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation 
Measure – to correlate with interpersonal orientation (Swap & Rubin, 1983), self-
consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), communal orientation (Clark, 
Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, 1987), anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), depression (e.g., Radloff, 1977), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 
1965) and neuroticism (Hendriks, 1997; Luteyn, Stearren, & VanDijk, 1985) among 
others and concluded an individual with a high social comparison orientation to be 
interpersonally oriented and sensitive to the behaviour of others with a certain level of 
self-uncertainty and a motivation to reduce it. Buunk and Mussweiler (2001) further 
define individuals high in social comparison orientation (SCO) as tending to relate their 
own circumstances to others’ and to be interested in gathering information about their 
thoughts and behaviours, while Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenberg (2001) emphasize 
high SCO individuals’ interest in basing their cognitive evaluations of self-traits on how 
they compare with others’. 
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A number of studies have examined differences in comparison behaviours on the 
basis of social comparison orientation. For example, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) found 
that individuals scoring high in social comparison orientation had a greater desire to 
look at participants’ scores on a test they themselves had completed and also to discuss 
their performance with participants they had been partnered with. In examining affective 
outcomes of social comparison, Buunk et al. (2001) found that individuals scoring high 
in social comparison orientation experienced more negative affect after encountering a 
downward comparison target, while Buunk et al. (1998, as cited in Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999) found that nurses scoring high in both social comparison orientation and 
professional burnout (that is, exhaustion, reduced perception of personal 
accomplishment, and depersonalised feelings and behaviours towards patients (Buunk et 
al., 2001)) experienced the most negative mood when confronted with a downward 
comparison target. Buunk and Brenninkmeijer (2001) meanwhile examined affective 
differences to comparison information across social comparison orientation and 
depression. They found that when presented with a bogus interview in which an 
individual described overcoming their depression through high-effort on their part, 
nondepressed high SCO individuals reacted with less negative mood change than those 
lower in SCO, but reacted with more negative mood change when presented with an 
individual overcoming their depression with low effort. In contrast, among the 
depressed, the higher individuals scored in social comparison orientation, the more 
positively their mood changed in response to a low-effort interviewee and the less 
positively their mood changed in response to one describing high effort. Buunk and 
Brenninkmeijer state that high SCO individuals tend to “relate their own situation to the 
situation of others, even when these others may at first sign not seem very similar to 
them” (p. 539). Among the depressed, they argued that hearing of another’s experience 
in which they had put effort into overcoming their depression would be daunting due to 
the feelings of defeat and hopelessness characterised by their affective disorder. 
However, among the nondepressed, their tendency to relate others’ situations to their 
own (in spite of their dissimilarity) might make them see the interviewee’s situation as 
something they themselves might encounter and so hearing that overcoming depression 
concerns an element of controllability on their part might account for their less negative 
mood change. 
Social comparison and adult attachment 
36 
 
In sum, the above findings suggest that social comparison orientation is an 
important individual difference to consider when examining individuals’ comparison 
choices as well as their cognitive and affective responses when presented with such 
information. However, an individual difference largely ignored within the social 
comparison literature is that of adult attachment orientation. This gap is surprising given 
the interpersonal focus of both theories in which perceptions of self and other are central 
to the processes described by each. Indeed, there is much in attachment theory that 
suggests individuals’ social comparison tendencies should deviate on this basis. 
Findings by Mikulincer et al. (1998), for example, are indicative of adult attachment as 
instrumental in individuals’ evaluations of their degrees of similarity to others, with 
attachment anxiety found to relate to overestimation of self-other similarity and 
attachment avoidance found to relate to underestimation.  
From the above review, there are three main distinguishable aspects of social 
comparison that may deviate on the basis of adult attachment orientation: that of 
propensity to engage in comparison; that of the nature of comparisons made; and that of 
the affective and cognitive reactions to comparison information. 
Comparison tendency. Returning to Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999) discussion, one of the 
defining characteristics of a greater propensity towards social comparison is that of an 
interpersonal orientation. Specifically, it is the individual who has a strong interest in the 
thoughts and feelings of others, who is influenced by others’ moods and opinions of 
them, and has a greater interest in mutual self-disclosure, who would be expected to 
make a greater number of comparisons and be most cognitively and affectively 
influenced by the information garnered in this way (see Buunk & Gibbons, 2006).  On 
this basis, one would expect individuals low in attachment avoidance, that is, 
preoccupied and secure, to demonstrate a greater orientation and receptivity towards 
social comparison information than those high in avoidance. Both secure and 
preoccupied individuals are characterised by comfort with, and desire for, intimacy in 
their relationships (Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 
1991), and demonstrate affiliative behaviours through disclosing thoughts and feelings 
to others while similarly feeling comfortable with others’ self-disclosure to them 
(Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Pistole, 1993). However, with regards to interpersonal 
orientation, there is an important difference between these two attachment classifications 
that should suggest a differentiation in social comparison orientations and that is their 
differing levels of anxiety. Indeed, preoccupied individuals should demonstrate a greater 
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interest in social comparison on the basis of their high anxiety; by their very nature, they 
place greater importance on both the quality of their relationships and their acceptance 
by others than secure individuals, manifesting as chronic vigilance in attention towards 
the availability of positively-viewed others from whom they seek the validation of self 
that they themselves cannot achieve autonomously. Relevant to this, Buunk and Gibbons 
(2006) further suggest that individuals high in social comparison orientation may be 
higher also in their levels of conformity (as indicated by low scores on Big Five trait 
openness to experience). For the preoccupied individual who desires acceptance by 
others, similarity of opinions, thoughts, and behaviours may indicate a potential avenue 
towards such approval; social comparison may therefore reflect a cognitive strategy in 
which relative standing is examined to determine conformity to social group norms and 
ultimately the possibility of the acceptance they strive for. 
There are further reasons, however, to believe preoccupied individuals should 
demonstrate a greater social comparison orientation than their secure and avoidant 
counterparts. While the above concentrates on interpersonal factors, cognitive self-
structure and perceptions might additionally provide theoretical support for this 
proposed relationship. In addition to interpersonal orientation, Gibbons and Buunk 
(1999) highlighted self-uncertainty as characteristic of those with an interest in social 
comparison. Indeed, uncertainty was a social comparison prerequisite defined by 
Festinger (1954) himself; in his original article he asserted that it is under such 
conditions of uncertainty specifically that the drive for comparing with others arises. For 
individuals who have a less clear and certain sense of self, the need for clarity on 
opinions and abilities is greater than for the individuals whose self-identities are more 
concrete. As discussed earlier, individuals high in attachment anxiety have been found to 
have less clearly defined self-structures that are characterised by negative, poorly 
differentiated, and overlapping self-schema (Mikulincer, 1995). More recent research 
has found further evidence to support this (Wu, 2009), identifying that anxious 
attachment tendencies were negatively related with self-certainty and self-concept 
clarity. Such individuals should therefore be prone to making social comparisons and 
basing self-evaluations on the information gleaned this way. 
A further perspective comes from Stapel and Tesser’s (2001) article on self-
activation. Drawing upon self-awareness and identity research in which activation of 
self-constructs has been found to lead to increased cognisance of social norms (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1990; Higgins, 1996) and 
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that self-descriptions often include self-other differentiation (e.g., McGuire & McGuire, 
1988), Stapel and Tesser put forward their self-activation hypothesis. According to their 
hypothesis, the goal of social comparison is to acquire information about the self and 
therefore desire to engage in social comparison should be greater when self-related 
cognitions are activated and more salient to the individual. As such, comparison 
information is more greatly sought after and attended to during instances of heightened 
self-awareness. Across five studies, Stapel and Tesser were able to identify that: 
individuals who demonstrated greater self-activation (as identified through performance 
on a first-person pronoun identification task) scored higher in social comparison 
orientation; that thinking about the self (through listing self-descriptive and defining 
characteristics) led to a higher social comparison orientation score; and that self-
activation impacted on social comparison scores independent of self-uncertainty, 
supporting its importance as a comparison antecedent. With regards to adult attachment, 
as earlier discussed, individuals high in anxiety are described as having hyperactivated 
attachment systems (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988) in which models of self and other are 
chronically accessible. This continual vigilance towards others as relating to an ever 
cognisant self echoes the activation described by Stapel and Tesser (2001), as well as the 
greater awareness of self in the presence of others described by Buunk and Gibbons 
(2006) and suggests that highly anxious individuals (preoccupied and, to a lesser extent, 
fearful-avoidant) may predispose themselves, through their hyperactivation, to drawing 
comparisons between themselves and others in their social environments.  
Interestingly, Stapel and Tesser (2001) also reported that lesser interest in social 
comparison was observed for participants with low levels of self-activation. This finding 
may provide a basis, in addition to lower interpersonal orientation, for predicting 
dismissing-avoidant individuals’ comparison orientations. With their highly-
differentiated, multi-faceted, and distinct self-schema suggesting a high level of self-
clarity (Mikulincer, 1995), and their deactivating strategy of inhibition and defensive 
denial of attachment working models of self and other (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988) 
paralleling the low self-activation described by Stapel and Tesser (2001), dismissing-
avoidant individuals should show little orientation towards social comparison. 
Taken together, with their high anxiety and low avoidance, individuals with a 
preoccupied attachment classification should demonstrate the greatest social comparison 
orientation. Their less-clear and negative self-schema suggest that not only may they 
perceive themselves as having a greater need for attaining clarity in self-evaluation, but 
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their chronic self-activation should provide greater opportunity for social comparisons to 
arise. Furthermore, their strong interpersonal orientation and desire for acceptance 
should increase their interest in considering their standing on opinions, feelings, and 
abilities relative to others. Although fearful individuals report similarly high anxiety, 
their higher level of attachment avoidance suggests a lesser interpersonal orientation 
than their preoccupied counterparts; their anxiety manifests not as the affiliative, 
intimacy- and acceptance-seeking behaviours of preoccupied individuals but as a self-
protective emotional distancing which may inhibit, though not entirely prevent, others 
from being used as a viable source of comparative self-evaluation. Secure individuals 
meanwhile should demonstrate a lower social comparison orientation compared to their 
high anxiety counterparts. Although they share preoccupied individuals’ interpersonal 
orientation, their greater self-certainty and higher self-activation threshold should 
provide fewer circumstances in which they need to compare with others. Lastly, with 
their low anxiety and high avoidance prescribing low interpersonal orientation, 
increased self-certainty, and decreased self-activation, dismissing-avoidant individuals 
should be the least interested in and susceptible to engaging in social comparisons. 
Comparison direction and identification/contrast. In reviewing the social comparison 
literature examining individuals’ differences in comparison direction, the research 
supporting Bower and colleagues’ (Bower, 1991; Forgas et a., 1990) selective affect-
cognition priming model outweighs that supporting Wills’ (1981) downward 
comparison theory. That is, individuals low in subjective well-being, either through 
negative self-perceptions or chronic decreased mood, are characterised by maladaptive 
comparison habits that reinforce self-negativity. Specifically, such individuals report 
making a greater number of upward comparisons to perceived better-off others than 
downward comparisons to perceived worse-off others. Indeed, a number of individual 
difference variables that encapsulate negative self-perceptions, such as low self-esteem, 
depression, and neuroticism identify this very relationship. One of the fundamental 
tenets of attachment theory concerns the perceptions of self and other captured by 
Bowlby’s (1969, 1973, 1980) conceptualisation of internal working models. To 
recapitulate, individuals’ working models of self (that is, feelings of worth and 
lovability) and models of other (anticipated responsiveness and acceptance by others) 
deviate on the nature of attachment-related experiences in infancy and childhood and 
determine feelings of anxiety and avoidance as well as the positivity and negativity of 
self-other cognitions. Relating to social comparison theory, with their negative models 
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of self, both preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals should demonstrate an 
upward-comparison tendency, while with their more positive models of self, secure and 
dismissing-avoidant individuals should demonstrate the opposite trend, thus maintaining 
their respective negative and positive self-perceptions. This notion of self-consistency 
maintenance, be it positive or negative, is one that has been previously addressed within 
the adult attachment literature. For example, in their review of partner preference on the 
basis of attachment orientation, Holmes and Johnson (2009b) found that in studies 
examining actual partner matching (e.g., Collins, Cooper, Albino, & Allard, 2002; 
Collins & Read, 1990; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994; Simpson, 1990), as opposed to those 
examining attraction to hypothetical partners (e.g., Baldwin et al, 1996; Chappell & 
Davis, 1998; Frazier, Byer, Fischer, Wright, & DeBord, 1996; Klohnen & Luo, 2003; 
Latty-Mann & Davis, 1996), patterns of complementarity emerged. That is, individuals 
were found to be matched with partners whose attachment orientations confirmed their 
attachment-related expectations. In the case of anxious individuals, avoidant partners 
confirm negative expectations of others as distant with limited responsiveness to 
attachment needs. For avoidant individuals, meanwhile, anxious partners confirm 
expectations of others as clingy and overly-dependent. Suggested to be in keeping with 
self-consistency theory (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Swann, 1983; Swann & Read, 1981), 
which describes individuals to have a strong desire to maintain a consistent social reality 
and self-image, individuals’ observed tendencies to remain in relationships that may be 
detrimental to well-being was suggested to be attributable to the psychological safety 
found in predictable interpersonal experiences. Although this perspective differs from 
the selective affect-cognition priming model to the extent that the former comprises an 
element of controllability on the individual’s part rather than the vulnerability to a self-
disserving and automatic cognitive bias encapsulated by the latter, both emphasise a 
proclivity for consistency in self-perceptions and suggest anxious individuals may more 
frequently compare upward while non-anxious individuals may more frequently 
compare downward.  
Comparison outcomes. The final aspect to be considered within the framework of 
attachment theory is that of affective outcomes to social comparison information. As 
highlighted earlier, research generally finds that comparison with upward targets 
produces an increase in negative affect, while comparison with downward targets 
produces an increase in positive (e.g., Buunk et al., 2001; Olson & Evans, 1999). 
Suggesting contrastive processes to be taking place, these changes in mood are 
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described as being a product of, and therefore representing, comparison-induced self-
evaluations: when the comparison other is perceived as inferior to the individual, 
favourable self-evaluations and affect emerge; when the comparison is perceived as 
superior, unfavourable evaluations and affective reactions emerge.  
As reviewed earlier, individuals with differing attachment orientations have affective 
profiles that differ greatly from one another. With their moderate affective reactivity, 
individuals with secure attachment orientations experience both positive and negative 
affect, but without the latter escalating beyond easy resolution. Although such 
individuals would not be expected to engage in social comparisons as frequently as their 
high-anxiety counterparts, when faced with upward comparison targets that have the 
potential to be detrimental to subjective well-being, secure individuals’ positive models 
of self  in which validation of self is achieved and maintained autonomously should 
serve as a cognitive buffer against such adverse comparison information influencing 
their self-evaluations and should therefore limit its negative affective impact. 
Conversely, when downward comparisons are made, secure individuals may experience 
an increase in positive affect but only to a moderate extent due to such information 
being consistent with the positive view of self already held. Individuals high in 
attachment anxiety, meanwhile, should be characterised by more intense affective 
responses due to comparison information being given greater weight in self-evaluation 
and due to the affective escalation that is said to characterise such individuals. With their 
greater self-uncertainty also this too should produce a greater vulnerability to the 
information gathered from social comparisons and as such would similarly produce a 
greater affective reaction. For individuals high in attachment avoidance, affective 
reactions to social comparisons made would be expected to be minimal. The greater self-
certainty and therefore lesser reliance on others, as well as defensive denial of affective 
attention would see reactions to social comparison information be cognitively inhibited 
and therefore produce limited responsiveness. 
To date, no study has examined the relationship between adult attachment and 
social comparison orientation, comparison direction tendencies, or affective outcomes. 
The scant research conducted thus far has focused on differences in the nature of self-
other comparative similarity across attachment rather than the three aspects listed above 
per se. In examining differences in contrast and assimilation of traits and attributes, 
Gabriel, Carvello, Dean, Tippin, and Renaud (2005) predicted that, due to high intimacy 
goals, non-avoidant individuals (that is, secure and preoccupied) should perceive 
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themselves as more similar to relationship partners over time and that, due to low 
intimacy goals, avoidant individuals (dismissing and fearful) should perceive themselves 
as less similar. Their findings supported these hypotheses, suggesting individuals high in 
avoidance may contrast from others as an additional method of maintaining 
psychological distance from them, while individuals low in avoidance may identify with 
others to establish an emotional connection through similarity. In their study examining 
social rank systems, Irons and Gilbert (2005) found secure adolescents to rate 
themselves as neither superior nor inferior in comparison to others, but identified the 
surprising finding that, while they reported greater submissiveness, anxious-ambivalent 
adolescents were similar to secures rather than reporting themselves as inferior. Instead, 
it was avoidant adolescents who rated themselves as inferior to others. Further found in 
this study, however, was that for both insecure attachment styles, the social rank 
variables of social comparison and submissive behaviour mediated the relationship 
between adolescents’ attachment insecurity and well-being factors depression and 
anxiety, suggesting that insecure individuals may be predisposed to viewing their social 
world as competitive and their position within it as being inferior to their peers’. 
However, not all studies examining adult attachment and social comparison have found 
associations; while Schwartz, Lindley, & Buboltz Jr (2007) found associations between 
attachment and the affiliation factors of emotional support, attention, and positive 
stimulation, they found none for social comparison. Gilbert, McEwan, Hay, Irons, and 
Cheung (2007) reported similarly in their study examining social rank evaluations across 
individuals with bipolar disorder.  
Relationships and social comparison 
On the basis of the above studies, despite solid theoretical grounding, there seems 
to be inconsistent support for adult attachment as predictor of social comparison 
orientation, with the findings of research that has found associations to paint an unclear 
picture. However, Smith LeBeau & Buckingham (2008) examined social comparisons 
within a romantic relationship context and found strong evidence to suggest adult 
attachment should be afforded greater empirical examination. Specifically, they found 
attachment anxiety and to a lesser extent attachment avoidance to both be positively 
correlated with relationship social comparison orientation (an individual difference 
similar in principle to Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999) measure of general comparison 
orientation but with a focus on interpersonal relationships only) and that such an 
orientation leads to increases in relationship insecurity, which in turn leads to decreases 
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in relationship satisfaction over time. Outside the framework of attachment, the issue of 
comparisons both within and across relationships, and the effects therein, is one that has 
been examined extensively within the social comparison literature. Research has focused 
on the evaluative and affective consequences of social comparisons in several domains, 
such as academic and occupational issues (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk et al., 
2001; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), possessions (Ogden & Venkat, 2001), social life 
(Buunk, Groothof, & Siero, 1997), physical attractiveness (Brown et al., 1992; Cash et 
al., 1983; Patrick, Neighbours, & Knee, 2004; Trampe, Stapel, & Siero, 2007; van den 
Berg & Thompson, 2007), and health (Buunk et al., 1990; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Van 
der Zee et al., 1998; Ybema & Buunk, 1995), but the research domain of romantic 
relationships is one that has been the focus of much work. Indeed, research has 
demonstrated that individuals often perceive their romantic relationships to be an 
extension of the self (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) and play a fundamental role 
in determining well-being (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; Demir, 2008; Diener, 
Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000; Gove, Hughes, & Style, 1983; Lee, Seccombe, & Shehan, 
1991; Waite, 1995) and so it logically follows that such an issue should be subject to 
thorough empirical examination. 
Studies showing that individuals use social comparisons to evaluate both their 
relationship standards and relationship quality are rife (e.g., Surra & Milardo, 1991; 
Wayment, 2005; Wayment & Campbell, 2000). For example, proposing that speaking 
with others about marriage might “influence the marital reality” (p. 410) for couples, an 
early study carried out by Titus (1980) found that a third of men and nearly two-thirds of 
women in her sample discussed their marriage in a comparative manner, as well as 
finding that in over half the couples included in the study, at least one member of each 
made comparisons.  
The research on comparisons within an interpersonal context can be divided into 
two areas, those of studies examining relational comparison processes and outcomes 
(that is, comparisons within relationships), and those of studies examining referential 
comparisons (whereby others’ relationships are used as a reference point for evaluation). 
Within relationships, comparison issues of social exchange and equality, as well as 
performance, predominate (e.g., Buunk, Klewer, Schuurman, & Siero, 2000; Buunk & 
VanYperen, 1991; see VanYperen & Buunk, 1994 for review). In performance research, 
Tesser and colleagues (e.g., Beach et al., 1998; Tesser, Millar & Moore, 1988) 
consistently find that outperformance by a significant other on a self-relevant task 
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represents a threat to self-evaluation while outperformance on a self-irrelevant task is 
beneficial. In issues of social exchange and equality, Buunk and VanYperen (1989) 
examined relationship input across gender and found that women reported feeling 
deprived while men reported feeling advantaged, suggesting that the comparisons couple 
members make within their relationships reflect general perceptions of greater female 
input than male. The differences in relationship satisfaction that also emerged in their 
study, such that men who perceived equality reported higher satisfaction than those who 
reported inequality of any kind while women who perceived equality reported higher 
satisfaction than those who felt deprived only, emphasises the importance of comparison 
processes in determining perceptions of relationship quality and resultant well-being.  
In examining general referential relationship perceptions (that is, examination 
across relationships), research has found a tendency for individuals to perceive their 
relationship as better than most others’ (Buunk, 2001; Buunk, Oldersma, & de Dreu, 
2001; Buunk & van der Eijnden, 1997; Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995; Van Lange, 
Rusbult, Semin-Goossens, Görts, & Stalpers, 1999). Indeed, much relationship research 
finds that individuals are highly motivated to see both their partners and relationships as 
positively as possible, sometimes to the extent of idealisation (e.g., Bradbury & 
Fincham, 1990; Hall & Taylor, 1976; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996a, 1996b; 
Rusbult, Van Lange, Wildschut, Yovetich, & Verette, 2000). Said to serve the function 
of increasing individuals’ confidence in their commitment to their relationship, 
particularly in times of uncertainty and doubt, such beliefs have been associated with 
relationship satisfaction and well being (Murry et al., 1996a, 1996b) and have been 
found to predict relationship longevity (Rusbult et al., 2000). However, this research on 
perceived superiority speaks of general comparisons against ‘most others’ or of ‘the 
typical adult’; while informative, it is beneficial to consider comparison behaviours 
towards ‘actual’ others in which others’ relationships are a target for specific 
comparison. 
In their study investigating affiliative tendencies, Buunk, VanYperen, Taylor, and 
Collins (1991) found that greater marital dissatisfaction and uncertainty was associated 
with greater desire to affiliate with others. They further identified that those with the 
greatest marital dissatisfaction demonstrated upward affiliative choices. Similar in 
principle to Buunk et al.’s (1990) study in which cancer patients were found to benefit 
from upward comparisons, it may be that for couple members under the stress caused by 
perceived marital problems, speaking with others about their issues could be viewed as 
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providing opportunity to increase feelings of relationship-improving efficacy through 
sharing their marriage experiences with others’ deemed to be functioning more 
desirably. Also focusing on perceived marital problems, Frye and Karney (2002) found 
strategic differences in social comparison cognitions. In keeping with research reporting 
general perceived superiority, they found a tendency for individuals to perceive their 
relationship as better than others’. Furthermore, highlighting that motivations drive 
individuals’ comparison tendencies, they reported that individuals in their sample 
engaged in more favourable temporal comparisons (that is, comparing current situation 
to past and projected future situations) with regards to more severe and threatening 
relationship problems. In their study investigating the impact of marital dissatisfaction 
and uncertainty on affective responses to upward and downward comparisons, Buunk et 
al. (1990) found that the greater the marital dissatisfaction, the more often individuals 
felt worse after making a comparison, irrespective of its direction. While greater marital 
uncertainty also led to negative affect after downward comparison, upward comparison 
had an even greater negative impact on affect, suggesting that mere exposure to 
comparison information is enough to cause individuals to be aware of their own 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction, regardless of whether this information is coming from a 
perceived better-off or worse-off couple. However, it should be noted that this study 
required participants to retrospectively report on their comparison tendencies and so the 
results of this study may have been subject to bias. Stone et al. (1998) highlight the 
difficulty of retrospective recall in accurately capturing individuals’ cognitions. 
Research employing prospective or experimental methodology may therefore more 
accurately determine individuals’ affective and evaluative responses than those requiring 
retrospective recall. 
The findings of experimental research are generally in keeping with the contention 
of contrastive processes in comparison. In focusing on positive relationship cognitions, 
Buunk et al. (2001) found that engaging in downward social comparison resulted in 
individuals reporting greater relationship satisfaction than simply thinking about the 
positive characteristics of their current relationship. In their study presenting individuals 
with descriptions of either successful or unsuccessful marriages, Buunk and Ybema 
(2003) found that marital evaluation was lower after comparison with an upward target 
and higher after comparison with a downward target. Buunk (2006) investigated 
affective outcomes to marital comparisons and found that after reading about a 
successful marriage in which both partners worked hard to achieve their success, 
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individuals who were higher in social comparison orientation experienced more positive 
affect, whereas reading about a successful marriage that was characterised by low effort 
produced more negative affect.  
Social comparison and life satisfaction 
In sum, the results of the above studies provide support for the importance of 
studying social comparison and its effects on the individuals who make them. The 
benefits of engaging in favourable relationship comparisons appear to go beyond those 
afforded by simply thinking about the positive qualities encompassed by a current 
relationship experience. Indeed, when considering the results of the general social 
comparison research reviewed here, the consistent finding is that individuals’ affective 
and cognitive well-being can be greatly influenced by the comparisons they make and 
how they cognitively interpret the information presented to them in this way. The 
research reviewed thus far has focused on affective and evaluative consequences of 
social comparisons. While both outcomes are relevant to well-being, the research 
investigating the cognitive-judgmental factor outlined in the subjective well-being 
literature, namely that of life satisfaction, is scarce. 
 Frieswijk, Buunk, Steverink and Slaets (2004a) examined the effect of social 
comparison on the life satisfaction of frail and older individuals. Participants in their 
study were presented with a bogus interview of either a positive description of low 
frailty or negative description of high frailty, providing opportunity for either upward or 
downward comparison. They found that downward comparison had a more positive 
effect on life satisfaction, such that the individuals who had read the high-frailty 
interview reported themselves to be more satisfied with their lives than those who had 
read the low-frailty version. Frieswijk and colleagues (2004b) further examined life 
satisfaction among frail older individuals, focusing on the identification-contrast 
processes put forward by Buunk and Ybema (1997). Here, they found that older 
individuals with greater frailty were less motivated to contrast from a downward 
comparison target, instead demonstrating preference for identifying with and hence 
seeing similarities between themselves and such targets. 
Current series of work 
The above literature review has highlighted an existing gap in the current adult 
attachment literature regarding both life satisfaction and social comparisons. While 
studies investigating attachment-based differences in life satisfaction have found 
evidence to suggest that differing levels of security and insecurity predict baseline 
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differences in life satisfaction, there has been little further exploration of additional 
factors that might produce further differences in life satisfaction experience. As such, the 
first step of the current series of studies was to examine more in-depth the experience of 
satisfaction with life on the basis of individuals’ feelings of anxiety and avoidance 
through considering the roles of interpersonal circumstances. Specifically, given the 
centrality of interpersonal processes in attachment theory the aim was to explore how 
relationship status and, for those in relationships, relationship satisfaction moderate the 
associations between attachment orientations and well-being in the form of life 
satisfaction. The review of the existing adult attachment literature also revealed that 
consideration of variation in life satisfaction had not previously been examined; research 
outside the framework of attachment has utilised diary study methodologies to 
investigate changes in life satisfaction across time and indeed found evidence to suggest 
that intra-individual variations in life quality perceptions do exist (Heller et al., 2006). 
As such while previous research examining baseline differences in life satisfaction have 
been highly informative, a further aim of the current series of work was to examine how 
attachment may predict differences in changes to life satisfaction (as well as additional 
well-being factors highlighted within the subjective well-being literature as relevant, 
namely, positive and negative mood as well as self-esteem) in response to changes in 
interpersonal circumstance. As such it was hoped that a more thorough examination of 
the life satisfaction experienced on the basis of anxiety and avoidance would contribute 
to the existing literature by providing more insight into how adult attachment can 
influence individuals’ experience of well-being. 
With social comparison suggested within the subjective well-being literature to 
play an important role in life satisfaction (e.g., Diener & Fujita, 1997), an additional aim 
was to explore the role of attachment-based differences in social comparison tendencies 
in predicting differences in satisfaction with life. However, as identified within the 
review of the social comparison literature, empirical attention on attachment and social 
comparison is slight and as such before social comparison’s role in well-being could be 
explored, attachment-based social comparison tendencies were required to be 
investigated. Specifically, as highlighted earlier, there is currently no research 
examining general tendencies to engage in social comparison, comparison direction 
typically engaged in, and the nature of identification or contrast processes evidenced. 
Furthermore, no research has explored affective response to comparison information 
within an attachment theoretical perspective and as such a further aim was to explore 
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how individuals’ anxiety and avoidance predict differences in affective reaction to 
naturalistic comparisons as captured using diary study methodology. With general 
comparison tendencies as listed here revealed, the gap concerning the role of social 
comparison tendencies as mediator between adult self-reported attachment and life 
satisfaction could then be explored. 
The next step in the current work series was then to further explore attachment-
based social comparisons by focusing on interpersonally-oriented social comparisons 
(that is, those made on romantic partners and relationships). This topic has been 
examined once in previous research by Smith LeBeau and Buckingham (2008), who 
found that attachment anxiety and avoidance both positively correlated with relationship 
comparison orientation. However, the current work sought to expand upon this study by 
utilising a measure that allowed for the testing of specific partner and relationship traits 
that may be subjected to comparative scrutiny. With the measure used by Smith LeBeau 
and Buckingham (2008) unable to test for specific types of interpersonal comparisons, a 
new measure was to be created using the work of Fletcher and colleagues (Fletcher & 
Simpson, 2000; Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas, 2000; Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, & 
Giles, 1999) on partner and relationship ideal standards. To inform predictions of 
attachment-based differences in comparison of partner and relationship traits, however, 
first examination of the importance placed on such traits was to be examined. While one 
study (Arseth, Kroger, & Martinussen, 2009) has previously examined endorsement of 
interpersonal ideals on the basis of security, preoccupation, and dismissing- and fearful-
avoidance (see Chapter 4 for more thorough exploration of this study, as well as partner 
and relationship ideal standards research), certain limitations in the attachment 
assessment used was sought to be addressed before obtaining results to be used as a 
basis for theoretical predictions. 
Similarly as for general social comparisons, the next step of the current series was 
to then explore the role of interpersonal social comparison tendencies (that is, tendency 
to compare one’s own relationship to others, directional tendencies as well as orientation 
towards identification and contrast) in understanding the association between adult 
attachment and life satisfaction as well as relationship satisfaction. 
The final aim of the current work series was on exploring the role of social 
comparison in providing insight into the findings obtained on adult attachment and 
changes in life satisfaction in response to interpersonal experiences by considering 
social comparison in the form of social ranking perceptions (that is, the positivity or 
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negativity of perception of self in comparison to social others). Specifically the final 
goal was to explore the potential mediating role of social ranking for the association 
between attachment and life satisfaction, as well as how interactions between 
attachment, social ranking, and time (that is, length of current relationship and length of 
time since a last relationship) interact with one another to predict differences in life 
satisfaction experience. 
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Chapter 2. Study 1: Adult Attachment, Relationship Experience, and 
Well-Being: Correlational and Longitudinal Analyses 
 
Referring back to empirical examination of the link between adult attachment and 
life satisfaction, the research thus far has focused on examining baseline levels of life 
satisfaction only, as well as focusing on direct links without consideration of moderating 
variables. Given the centrality of interpersonal relationships in attachment theory, as 
well as the above discussed research suggesting cognitive and affective well-being to be 
intrinsically linked to interpersonal processes, the aim of the current study was, across 
four parts, to examine how individuals’ attachment orientations interact with current 
relationship experiences to predict differences in subjective well-being. Study 1A 
examined the impact of individuals’ attachment anxiety and avoidance on life 
satisfaction, as well as examined the moderating effect of individuals’ current 
relationship status (that is, being in a romantic relationship versus not). Study 1B 
focused on individuals currently in a relationship and explored the impact of their 
relationship satisfaction on their feelings of overall life satisfaction. Study 1C examined 
changes in well-being, including self-esteem and positive/negative mood in addition to 
life satisfaction, as changes in relationship status occur (that is, when individuals either 
enter into a new relationship or leave a current one). Lastly, Study 1D examined changes 
in individuals’ well-being in the weeks subsequent to having experienced a relationship 
status change. 
Study 1A: Adult Attachment, Relationship Status, and Life Satisfaction 
As described above, the focus of Study 1A was an exploratory examination of the 
impact of relationship status (in this instance, a simple dichotomised definition of being 
in a relationship versus not) on the cognitive well-being factor of life satisfaction. Before 
examination of this association could be carried out however, the baseline differences 
established in previous research needed to be confirmed.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater attachment anxiety and avoidance will predict lower life 
satisfaction, such that those fitting the secure attachment orientation will report the 
highest satisfaction, followed by dismissing-avoidant, then preoccupied, with those 
fitting the fearful-avoidant attachment orientation reporting the lowest. 
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As discussed earlier, there are several theoretical reasons to support the above 
hypothesis. To summarise, with their more favourable hedonic balances (that is, greater 
experience of positive affect than negative affect), positive models of self and other, the 
adaptive cognitive strategies employed when dealing with negative situations (both as 
they’re encountered and in retrospective examination), and ability to actualise their 
attachment goals of high intimacy and independence with ease, secure individuals 
should hold more positive views of the quality of their lives and subsequently evaluate 
them more favourably. With their similarly favourable hedonic balances and positive 
models of self (due to their defensive nature of limited processing of negative cognitive 
and affective experiences), dismissing-avoidant individuals are anticipated to report life 
satisfaction that is greater than their insecure counterparts but that which is lower than 
secures. Preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals’ high anxiety ensures greater 
experience of negative affect (both in frequency due to their tendency toward negative 
interpersonal interpretation and in experience due to emotional spreading) and 
maladaptive cognitive strategies akin to rumination preventing emotional and evaluative 
resolution. Their similar anxiety also results in both attachment styles to place great 
importance on their interpersonal relationships when it comes to well-being and it is on 
this basis that preoccupied individuals are anticipated to report higher life satisfaction 
than fearful-avoidant individuals. Preoccupied individuals’ low avoidance allows them 
to pursue the relationship experiences they desire (that is, high intimacy and low 
independence); fearful-avoidant individuals, with their high avoidance, instead maintain 
an emotional distance from others to protect against the rejection they anticipate and 
hence deny themselves the ability to actualise their high-intimacy relationship needs and 
as such are expected to report the lowest life satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant difference between the life satisfaction reported 
by individuals currently in relationships and those currently not in relationships, with the 
former group anticipated to report high life satisfaction over the latter. 
 
Previous research has established that individuals’ relationships are important 
factors in the consideration of subjective well-being (e.g., Campbell, Converse, & 
Rodgers, 1976; Demir, 2008; Diener, Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000; Gove, Hughes, & 
Style, 1983; Lee, Seccombe, & Shehan, 1991; Waite, 1995), with Kamp Dush and 
Amato (2005) suggesting the findings of increased well-being in committed 
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relationships to be a result of increased opportunity for support and integration. 
Consistent with this established trend, it is anticipated in the current study that 
individuals currently in a relationship will report greater life satisfaction than those who 
are not. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Relationship status will moderate the association between attachment and 
life satisfaction.  
 
While it is anticipated that general levels of life satisfaction should match those 
predicted in Hypothesis 1, it is anticipated that there will be differences within 
attachment dimensions across relationship status. Specifically, it is anticipated that for 
low-avoidance individuals, being in a relationship should predict greater life satisfaction 
than not being in a relationship. To consider this more in the context of attachment 
classifications, this pattern is applicable to individuals fitting secure (low 
anxiety/avoidance) and preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) attachment 
classifications; both ‘groups’’ comfort with closeness and desire for intimacy should 
result in increased life satisfaction when in a relationship due to that relationship 
providing stable access to the means to gratify their attachment-related intimacy needs. 
However, with high-anxiety individuals’ subjective well-being perceptions being more 
heavily reliant on relationship experiences (e.g., Campbell et al., 2005), it is anticipated 
that those fitting a preoccupied attachment classification will report a greater difference 
in life satisfaction scores across relationship status than secures. 
For high levels of attachment avoidance, individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant 
attachment classification (high anxiety/avoidance) who are currently in a relationship are 
anticipated to report increased life satisfaction over those who are currently not in a 
relationship. However, this increase is expected to be to a lesser extent than their low-
avoidant (secure and preoccupied) counterparts. Previous research has identified that 
high anxiety individuals experience decreased relationship satisfaction and demonstrate 
a negative predisposition in interpreting others’ behaviours (e.g., Campbell et al., 2005; 
Kafetsios & Nezlak, 2002; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 
1996). Furthermore, fearful-avoidant individuals’ interpersonal behaviours are governed 
by their negative models of self and other, which, as discussed earlier, manifests as an 
anticipation of disapproval and rejection by their significant others. As such, one might 
expect that being in a relationship presents fearful-avoidant individuals with regular 
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opportunities for negative interpersonal interpretation and expectation and therefore 
should result in reported decreased life satisfaction over those not in relationships. 
However, such individuals do desire closeness with others (e.g., Bartholomew & 
Horowitz, 1991; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000); while their feelings of 
avoidance may be conflictual to this desire, a relationship still presents the potential to 
actualise their intimacy needs and therefore it is anticipated that for those fitting into this 
attachment classification, individuals in a relationship should report slightly higher life 
satisfaction than those who are not. Lastly, dismissing-avoidant individuals are not 
anticipated to report different levels of life satisfaction on the basis of being in a 
relationship or not. With their high avoidance and low anxiety, this orientation is 
characterised by a downplaying of attachment relationships; being in a relationship 
should therefore have little influence in evaluations of overall life satisfaction and hence 
there is not expected to be a difference in this well-being factor across the two 
relationship statuses. 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 14,628 participants completed an initial set of measures posted online. Of 
these participants, 10,302 were female (70.4%) and 4,322 (29.5%) were male; 4 
participants did not specify. Participant age ranged from 18 to 85 (M = 30.7, SD = 9.63). 
The majority of participants resided in either the United Kingdom or the United States of 
America (totalling 43% and 30% respectively). Of the remaining sample, 4.6% resided 
in Canada, 1.7% India, 1.4% Brazil, and 1.3% from each of Singapore, Australia, and 
France; the remaining 14% were spread internationally. For relationship-related 
variables, 91.3% participants identified themselves as heterosexual, with 2.8% reporting 
as homosexual, 5.3% as bisexual, and 0.5% classifying themselves as “Other”. Sixty-six 
percent of the sample reported themselves to be in a relationship at the time of the study 
while 33.8% reported being out of a relationship. Of those in not in relationships, 4,480 
(30.6%) reported themselves as single, 126 (0.9%) as separated from a spouse, 283 
(1.9%) as divorced, and 34 (0.2%) as widowed. Of those in relationships, 3,008 (20.6%) 
reported themselves as in a relationship but not co-habiting, 2,471 (16.9%) as in a 
relationship and co-habiting, 568 (3.9%) as engaged, and 3,591 (24.5%) as married. 62 
participants (0.4%) reported themselves as “Other”. 
Measures 
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The current study was part of a larger study comprising several personality, well-
being, and interpersonal measures. The following measures were utilised for Study 1A. 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire. Questions included those of gender, age, sexual orientation, relationship 
status, relationship length if applicable, and countries of residence and origin. 
Adult Attachment. Attachment was measured using the Experiences in Close 
Relationships – Revised (Fraley et al., 2000) scale. The ECR-R is a dimensional 
assessment of attachment with 18 items measuring anxiety (e.g., “I worry a lot about my 
relationships”, “I find that my partners don’t want to get as close as I would like”) and 
18 items measuring avoidance (e.g., I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants 
to be very close”, “I don’t feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners”). 
Participants are required to rate on a Likert-type scale the extent to which they agree 
with each item, ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”). The scale 
has been shown in previous work to have good reliability (e.g., Fraley et al., 2000; 
Sibley & Liu, 2004). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for each of anxiety and 
avoidance was .93. 
Life Satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed using Diener et al.’s (1985) 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS). The scale consists of 5 items describing 
satisfaction with life as considered as a whole (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to my 
ideal”, “I am satisfied with my life”). Participants are required to indicate the extent to 
which they agree with each item, ranging from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly 
Agree”). Previous research has established the SWLS to have high reliability (e.g., 
Shevlin, Brunsden, & Miles, 1998; Vasser, 2008); Chronbach’s alpha for the current 
study was .88. 
Procedure 
The current study was carried out online in order to garner as large a sample as 
possible. Participants could access the study via both Heriot-Watt University’s web 
pages and the Family and Personal Relationships Laboratory (FPRL) web pages. In the 
weeks prior to study commencement, media attention was utilised to raise awareness of 
previous research carried out within the laboratory and individuals were provided with 
information on where to go should they wish to find out more about current research. If 
interested in taking part, participants provided informed online consent and completed 
the measures, which, due to the online nature of the study, were completed in the same 
order. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The means and standard deviations for all variables of interest are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
Life satisfaction 
Relationship satisfaction 
3.97 
2.99 
22.65 
25.76 
1.24 
1.12 
6.71 
2.84 
 
Means and standard deviations for anxiety and avoidance are generally consistent 
with those established in previous research (see Fraley, 2010). The mean for life 
satisfaction was found to be slightly higher than levels reported in previous research 
(e.g., Hwang et al., 2009; Perrone, Webb, & Vance, 2007); although the life satisfaction 
variable in the current study is summed, a mean was calculated (M = 4.53, SD = 1.34) in 
order to compare with previous research scoring in this manner. This too supported the 
finding of slightly elevated life satisfaction being reported in the current study (e.g.,  
Heller et al., 2006; Hinnen et al., 2009; Kuppens, Realo, & Diener, 2008). 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were first calculated to examine the relationship 
between adult attachment dimensions and life satisfaction. Table 2 presents the results of 
these analyses. 
 
Table 2. Correlations between Attachment Dimensions and Well-Being 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Anxiety - .46*** -.44*** -.53*** 
2. Avoidance  - -.38*** -.31*** 
3. Life 
Satisfaction 
  - .58*** 
4. Self-Esteem    - 
***p = < .001 
 
 
Consistent with previous research, there were significant negative correlations 
between life satisfaction and attachment anxiety (r = -.44, p <.001) and avoidance (r = -
.38, p <.001), suggesting that as feelings of attachment anxiety and avoidance 
(independently) increase, feelings of overall satisfaction with life decrease. 
Attachment, Relationship Status, and Life Satisfaction 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that greater attachment anxiety and avoidance would 
predict lower life satisfaction. Using multiple linear regression to test this hypothesis, 
life satisfaction was regressed onto the two attachment dimensions on the first step and 
their interaction term (anxiety*avoidance) on the second step. The interaction term was 
created using the methods outlined by Aiken and West (1991) in which variables of 
interest are mean centred before being subject to analysis. The results of the above 
regression equation are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Life Satisfaction 
Attachment B SE B β R² Change F Change 
Anxiety -1.81 .04 -.33***   
Avoidance -1.38 .05 -.23*** .23 2211.44*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .08 .04 .02* .00 5.72* 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
The model at the first step was significant (F = 2211.44 (2, 14520) p < .001) as 
well as at the second step (F = 1476.68 (3, 14517) p <.001), which accounted for 23.4% 
of the variance (R²). As attachment anxiety and avoidance increase, life satisfaction 
decreases. Figure 1 presents their interaction (with slopes analyses presented in Table 4).  
 
 
Figure 1. Attachment Orientations as Predictors of Life Satisfaction. 
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Table 4. Simple Slopes Analyses for Life Satisfaction Differences 
Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -29.66*** 
Secure and Preoccupied -31.73*** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -20.04*** 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -22.17*** 
***p < .001 
Interpreting the results in the context of attachment orientation classifications, 
individuals fitting a secure attachment classification (low anxiety/low avoidance) report 
the highest life satisfaction, followed by dismissing-avoidant (low anxiety/high 
avoidance), and preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance). Individuals fitting a fearful-
avoidant classification (high anxiety/high avoidance) report the lowest life satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 1 was therefore supported. 
The second hypothesis predicted levels of life satisfaction on the basis of 
relationship status, such that individuals in a relationship would report higher life 
satisfaction than those not in a relationship. Relationship status was dummy-coded, with 
0 representing individuals not in a relationship and 1 representing those who were. An 
independent t-test was performed; the results revealed there was a significant difference 
in life satisfaction reported across the two groups (t = -27.70, df = 7245.81, p <.001). 
Individuals currently in relationships reported higher life satisfaction (M = 23.63, SD = 
6.40) than those currently not in relationships (M = 20.22, SD = 6.83), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that relationship status would moderate the relationship 
between attachment and life satisfaction. To test for this, life satisfaction was regressed 
onto the anxiety and avoidance dimensions at the first step, their two-way interaction 
term, relationship status and its two-way interactions with anxiety and avoidance at the 
second step, and then a final three-way interaction between each of the variables at the 
third step. The results are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Adult Attachment, Relationship Status, and Life Satisfaction 
Attachment B SE B β R² 
Change 
F Change 
Anxiety -1.83 .09 -.34***   
Avoidance -.77 .09 -.13***   
Relationship Status .74 .13 .05*** .24 1483.65*** 
Anxiety*Status .20 .10 .03*   
Avoidance*Status -.83 .11 -.11***   
Anxiety*Avoidance -.07 .06 -.01 .00 19.42*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance* Status .16 .08 .03* .00 4.18* 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
 
The model at the third step was significant (F = 647.33 (7, 14512) p <.001) (with 
the models at the first (F = 1483.65 (3, 14512) p < .001) and second (F = 754.36 (6, 
14512) p < .001) steps also significant) and accounted for 23.8% of the variance (R²). 
Figure 2 presents the three-way interaction (with Table 6 presenting simple slopes 
analyses results).  As hypothesised, individuals fitting a secure attachment classification 
(low anxiety/avoidance) reported the highest life satisfaction overall, followed by 
dismissing-avoidant, preoccupied, and then fearful-avoidant. With regards to differences 
across relationship status, for secure-orientation individuals, there appears to be minimal 
difference in life satisfaction reported between those in a relationship and those who are 
not. For fearful-avoidant and preoccupied individuals, however, being in a relationship 
sees a greater satisfaction with life than when not in a relationship. Lastly, individuals 
fitting a dismissing-avoidant classification report a lower satisfaction with life when in a 
relationship compared to their single counterparts, suggesting that such individuals 
appear to assess the overall quality of their lives as being better when they are out of a 
relationship than when they are in. 
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Figure 2. Attachment Orientation and Relationship Status as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction. 
 
Table 6. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment, Relationship Status, and Life 
Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
Secure 1.80 
Dismissing-avoidant -2.50* 
Preoccupied 6.33*** 
Fearful-avoidant 5.87*** 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
 
Study 1B: Adult Attachment, Relationship Satisfaction, and Life Satisfaction 
The focus of Study 1B was on participants who were currently in a relationship, 
with the aim to examine the impact of attachment and its interaction with relationship 
satisfaction on individuals’ feelings of life satisfaction. The following hypotheses were 
made: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater attachment anxiety and avoidance will both be predictive of 
decreased relationship satisfaction, such that those fitting a secure attachment orientation 
will report the highest relationship satisfaction, followed by dismissing-avoidant and 
then preoccupied, with those fitting the fearful-avoidant attachment orientation reporting 
the lowest. 
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Research has consistently found evidence of secure individuals reporting greater 
relationship satisfaction than insecure individuals (e.g., Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney, 
2002; Simpson, 1990), explainable through experiencing greater intimacy (Mikulincer & 
Erev, 1991), trust, and commitment (Simpson, 1990) in their relationships, as well as 
interpreting interpersonal interactions more positively (e.g., Kafetsios & Nezlak, 2002; 
Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 1996). High-anxiety individuals 
experience feelings of chronic jealousy and insecurity in their relationships (e.g., 
Sharpsteen & Kirkpatrick, 1997) and perceive greater conflict (Campbell et al., 2005). 
Furthermore such individuals respond to negatively-perceived partner behaviours in a 
more conflictual manner (e.g., Collins et al., 2006) and adopt less constructive strategies 
in resolving disagreements (Carnelley et al, 1994). High avoidance, meanwhile, has 
been found to be associated with emotional distancing in relationships and their 
surrounding interpersonal processes (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2005). The current study therefore expected to replicate the findings of previous 
research examining differences in relationship satisfaction. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater relationship satisfaction will predict increased life satisfaction. 
 
Much research has provided evidence to support the psychological benefits of 
rewarding interpersonal experiences. Demir (2008) found romantic relationship quality 
to be predictive of happiness, with emotional security and companionship to be the 
strongest predictors. The findings of Diener et al. (2000) and Kamp Dush and Amato 
(2005) also seem to suggest that the increased commitment in marriage (and perhaps 
then the associated emotional security such commitment affords) is associated with 
increased happiness also. Conversely, unsatisfying relationships have been shown to be 
detrimental to well-being, with instances emerging where remaining in such a 
relationship can be more deleterious to well-being than leaving a marriage or being 
unmarried (Williams, 2003). As such, it is expected that as relationship satisfaction 
increases, the well-being construct of life satisfaction will also increase. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Relationship satisfaction will moderate the association between 
attachment and life satisfaction. 
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While it is expected that general levels of relationship satisfaction will replicate 
those identified by analyses testing Hypothesis 1, it is anticipated that there will be 
differences produced by the attachment dimensions’ interactions with experienced 
relationship satisfaction. Specifically for anxiety, it is anticipated that for high-anxiety 
individuals, being in a satisfying romantic relationship would see greater life satisfaction 
than for those being in a dissatisfying romantic relationship while for low-anxiety 
individuals, regardless of whether their romantic experiences are satisfying or not their 
levels of life satisfaction would be expected to be similar. The basis for the above 
reasoning lies in the findings of Study 1A; for high-anxiety preoccupied- and fearful-
type individuals, being in a romantic relationship saw a greater life satisfaction reported 
over their single counterparts whereas for low-anxiety secure-type individuals, 
relationship status so no significant difference in life satisfaction reported. These 
findings appeared to support the notion that high-anxiety individuals place greater 
importance on their relationship-related experiences for their well-being perceptions (in 
this instance, life satisfaction) that has been suggested in previous research (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 2005). Therefore, consistent findings for differences in relationship 
satisfaction experienced were expected to be produced here. 
For avoidance, it was anticipated that a similar pattern to that predicted on the 
basis of anxiety would emerge; high-avoidance individuals reporting lower relationship 
satisfaction would report a decreased life satisfaction over their low-avoidance 
counterparts. Many sources of relationship dissatisfaction, such as relationship conflict, 
involve increased intimacy; in the case of conflict, the disclosure of feelings and the 
need for resolution over interpersonal distress requires a compromise on the emotional 
distance high-avoidance individuals desire. Because low-avoidance individuals do not 
share this same aversion to such intimacy-provoking situations it was therefore reasoned 
that high-avoidance individuals in dissatisfying relationships would report decreased life 
satisfaction over those low in attachment avoidance. 
Method 
Participants 
The same overall participant sample as employed in Study 1A was utilised for the 
current study. A subsample was created comprising participants who reported currently 
being in a relationship only. After excluding those not currently in a relationship, the 
sample consisted of 10,419 participants, 7,451 (71.5%) of whom were female and 2,968 
(28.5%) were male; 3 participants did not specify. Age ranged from 18 to 85 (M = 
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31.49, SD = 9.75). The vast majority of this sample identified themselves as 
heterosexual (9,549; 91.6%), with 262 (2.5%) identifying themselves as homosexual, 
564 (5.4%) as bisexual, and 44 (0.4%) as “Other”.  Most participants resided in the 
United Kingdom (4784) or United States (3067), with 491 (4.7%) residing in Canada, 
160 (1.5%) in Ireland, 158 (1.5%) in Australia, 145 (1.4%) in Spain, 130 (1.2%) in 
Brazil, 121 (1.2%) in France, with the remaining sample being spread internationally. 
Measures 
Relationship Satisfaction. Relationship satisfaction was measured using the 
satisfaction subscale of the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (Spanier, 1976). Sample questions 
include “How often do you discuss or have you considered divorce, separation, or 
terminating your relationship?” and “In general, how often do you think that things 
between you and your partner are going well?” 
Due to the present study utilising a sub-sample of the previous one, the 
information on adult attachment, life satisfaction, and demographic measures can be 
found in Study 1A. 
Procedure 
Data for this study were collected simultaneously to Study 1A; participants 
accessed the study web pages online, provided consent to take part and completed the 
measures in a fixed order. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The means and standard deviations for attachment anxiety, avoidance, relationship 
satisfaction, and life satisfaction are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment anxiety 2.81 1.15 
Attachment avoidance 2.73 .10 
Relationship satisfaction 25.76 2.84 
Life satisfaction 23.63 6.40 
 
As in the sample utilised in Study 1A, attachment anxiety and avoidance were 
consistent with what has been previously reported (see Fraley, 2010), with life 
satisfaction being slightly elevated over that which has been reported in previous 
research (e.g., Hwang et al., 2009; Perrone, et al., 2007). 
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Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the associations 
between attachment anxiety, avoidance, relationship satisfaction, and life satisfaction. 
Table 8 presents the results of these analyses.  
 
Table 8. Correlations between attachment dimensions, relationship status, and life 
satisfaction 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Anxiety - .45*** -.30*** -.41*** 
2. Avoidance  - -.28*** -.34*** 
3. Relationship    
    satisfaction 
  - .25*** 
4. Life 
satisfaction 
   - 
***p < .001 
 
 
Significant associations were found between each of the variables; consistent with 
previous research, attachment anxiety and avoidance were both found to correlate 
negatively with relationship satisfaction. Life satisfaction, meanwhile, was found to 
correlate negatively with both attachment anxiety and avoidance and to correlate 
positively with relationship satisfaction.  
Adult Attachment, Relationship Satisfaction, and Life Satisfaction 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that greater attachment anxiety and avoidance would 
predict decreased relationship satisfaction. To test this, relationship satisfaction was 
regressed onto attachment anxiety and avoidance at the first step, and their interaction 
term at the second step. The overall model was significant (F = 455.82 (3, 10393) p < 
.001) and accounted for 11.6% (R²) of the variance. Attachment anxiety (β = -.22, p < 
.001) and avoidance (β = -.19, p <.001) were both significant predictors of relationship 
satisfaction. Consistent with previous research then, as attachment anxiety and 
avoidance increase, relationship satisfaction decreases. Their interaction was also 
significant (β = -.04, p < .001) and is presented in Figure 3 (with simple slopes analyses 
presented in Table 9). 
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Figure 3. Attachment as Predictor of Relationship Satisfaction. 
 
 
Table 9. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Relationship Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -12.49*** 
Secure and Preoccupied -26.16*** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -16.62*** 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -10.08** 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
 
Interpreting the results in the context of attachment orientation classifications, 
individuals fitting a secure attachment classification (low anxiety/low avoidance) report 
the highest relationship satisfaction, with individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant 
classification reporting the lowest satisfaction. Individuals fitting dismissing-avoidant 
(low anxiety/high avoidance) and preoccupied (high anxiety/low-avoidance) report 
similar levels of relationship satisfaction. Hypothesis 1 was therefore partially 
supported; greater anxiety and avoidance were predictive of increased relationship 
satisfaction, with their interaction suggesting secure individuals to report the highest and 
fearful-avoidant the lowest. Where Hypothesis 1 was not supported was in the similar 
levels of relationship satisfaction reported by individuals fitting preoccupied and 
dismissing-avoidant classification; although the latter appear to report slightly higher, 
the difference between these two groups (as presented visually) is minimal.  
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that greater relationship satisfaction would predict greater 
life satisfaction. A simple linear regression was performed in which life satisfaction was 
regressed onto relationship satisfaction. The model was significant (F = 715.18 (1, 
10383) p <.001) and accounted for 6.4% of the variance. As predicted, greater 
relationship satisfaction predicted increased life satisfaction (β = .25, p <.001), 
supporting Hypothesis 2. 
The final hypothesis predicted relationship satisfaction to moderate the earlier-
established (Study 1A) association between adult attachment and life satisfaction. 
Multiple linear regression was performed in which life satisfaction was regressed onto 
attachment anxiety, avoidance, and their two-way interaction, relationship satisfaction 
and its two way interactions with anxiety and avoidance, and lastly the three-way 
interaction. As in Study 1A, interaction terms were created in accordance with the 
guidelines suggested by Aiken and West (1991). The overall model was significant (F = 
441.41 (7, 10382) p <.001, with the models at the first (F = 1020.01 (3, 10382) p < .001) 
and second (F = 514.94 (6, 10382) p < .001) steps also significant) and accounted for 
22.9% of the variance (R²). Table 10 presents the results. 
 
Table 10. Attachment, Relationship Satisfaction, and Life Satisfaction 
 B SE B β R² 
Change 
F Change 
Anxiety -1.53 .06 -.28***   
Avoidance -1.48 .07 -.23***   
Relationship Satisfaction .21 .02 .09*** .23 1020.01*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .20 .05 .03***   
Anxiety*Satisfaction .03 .02 .02ª   
Avoidance*Satisfaction .05 .02 .03** .00 7.85*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance*Satisfaction .01 .01 .01 .00 .44 
ªp = .09 
**p = .01 
***p < .001 
 
 
Each of the anxiety, avoidance, and relationship satisfaction variables 
independently predicted life satisfaction, with the two former predicting decreased and 
the latter predicting increased satisfaction. While the interaction between anxiety and 
relationship satisfaction was not significant, avoidance’s interaction with satisfaction 
was; to aid in its interpretation, the interaction is presented in Figure 4 (with slopes 
analyses presented in Table 11). Individuals scoring high in attachment avoidance and 
66 
 
reporting low relationship satisfaction report the lowest life satisfaction, while those 
scoring low in avoidance and high in relationship satisfaction report the highest. Slopes 
analyses revealed each of the tested slopes were significantly different to one another. 
 
 
Figure 4. Attachment Avoidance and Relationship Status as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction 
 
Table 11. Simple Slopes Analyses for Avoidance and Relationship Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
High Avoidance/High Satisfaction and 
Low Avoidance/High Satisfaction 
 
-15.01*** 
High Avoidance/Low Satisfaction and 
Low Avoidance/Low Satisfaction 
 
-19.79*** 
High Avoidance/High Satisfaction and 
High Avoidance/Low Satisfaction 
 
9.47*** 
Low Avoidance/High Satisfaction and 
Low Avoidance/Low Satisfaction 
 
5.22** 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
As can be seen from Table 10, the three-way interaction was not significant and so 
did not support Hypothesis 3. 
Study 1C: Adult Attachment, Relationship Status Change, and Well-Being 
The focus of the third part of Study 1 (C) was on investigating changes in well-
being as individuals experience changes in their relationship experiences. Specifically, 
the aim of the current study was to examine the impact of attachment on several 
cognitive and affective well-being factors as individuals either enter into a new 
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relationship or experience the termination of a current one. The well-being literature, as 
earlier discussed, identifies life satisfaction as a major cognitive well-being factor (e.g., 
Andrews & Whithey, 1976; Bradburn, 1969; Diener & Diener, 1996; Lucas et al., 1996) 
along with positive and negative affectivity (Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; Diener et al., 
1995) and as such all three were considered in the current study. Self-esteem is also a 
widely-investigated factor with regards to empirical examination of well-being. While 
the subjective well-being literature does not include perceptions of self as a facet of the 
tripartite factors of affective positivity and negativity and cognitive life satisfaction, it is 
argued here that it is a cognitive well-being factor that is relevant to consider when 
investigating cognitive reactions to changes in interpersonal circumstance. As earlier 
discussed, intrinsic to the feelings of anxiety and avoidance that are conceptualised in 
attachment theory are differences in perceptions of self and other, which are understood 
through consideration of internal working models (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Previous 
research has found evidence to suggest that interpersonal events can indeed influence 
levels of attachment security, with loss found to be associated with increases in 
insecurity (Davila & Sargent, 2003). Inherent in these changes in security, therefore, are 
changes in perceptions, or working models, of self. While not considered to be 
interchangeable, the concepts of self-esteem and model of self are both reflective of 
evaluations of self-worth, with lower ratings on each descriptive of decreased well-being 
towards the self. As such, this line of thought formed the basis for the reasoning for 
inclusion of self-esteem in the current study as an additional well-being factor that may 
be susceptible to change on the basis of differences in attachment-based feelings and 
changes in interpersonal circumstance. 
The following hypotheses were made: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Attachment anxiety will predict changes in well-being factors life 
satisfaction, positive and negative mood, and self-esteem upon leaving a current 
relationship. Specifically, it is predicted that greater scores in attachment anxiety will 
predict a greater decrease in life satisfaction, greater decreased positive and increased 
negative moods, and a greater decrease in self-esteem. Individuals high in attachment 
anxiety are characterised by greater emotional reactivity than their low anxiety 
counterparts, place greater importance on their relationships and demonstrate over-
reliance on romantic partners for validation of self. Furthermore, the research discussed 
earlier indicating that such individuals have a cognitive self-structure comprising fewer, 
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overlapping self-aspects suggests that a setback in one aspect of their lives, in this 
instance a relationship breakdown, should have a greater impact not only because the 
negative feelings that arise from this experience ‘spill over’ into other aspects, but 
because of the importance placed on this in conceptualising and validating the self.  
Attachment avoidance meanwhile is not anticipated to predict changes in life 
satisfaction or self-esteem, but is anticipated to predict changes in positive and negative 
mood. As indicated in previous sections, individuals high in attachment avoidance are 
characterised by a downplaying of the importance of their interpersonal experiences, a 
defensive non-processing of affective experience, and a highly differentiated cognitive 
self-structure suggesting negative experiences in one aspect of their lives to remain 
isolated from, and therefore ineffectual to, other aspects in their associative network. As 
such, a relationship breakdown is not anticipated to impact on cognitive well-being on 
the basis of levels of avoidance. However, a defining characteristic of highly-avoidant 
individuals is their cognitive denial of affective experience; high avoidance has been 
identified within the attachment literature as being associated with defensive emotional 
cut-off and suppression (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997; Kotler et al., 1994; Wei et al., 
2005). In the case of experiencing a relationship ending then, as avoidance increases it is 
hypothesised that, due to such defensive affective denial practices, increase in negative 
mood and decrease in positive mood should decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Length of, and satisfaction with, the terminated relationship will moderate 
the association between attachment anxiety and changes in well-being. It was reasoned 
that inherent in longer romantic relationships is increased commitment and investment 
(notions captured in interdependence theory (e.g., Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult & Buunk, 
1993)) and therefore the termination of a relationship with increased commitment and 
investment would represent a greater loss for the individual and therefore have a greater 
impact on well-being than a shorter-term relationship with less investment overall. 
When considering the additional role of attachment anxiety in predicting differences in 
changes in well-being, it was predicted that individuals high in anxiety would have a 
stronger cognitive and emotional response to a relationship breakdown due to the greater 
importance placed on their relationships as well as the general greater reactivity that 
characterises their orientations. Considered together then, it was anticipated that high-
anxiety individuals who had experienced a termination of a longer-term relationship 
would experience the greatest decreases in well-being with low-anxiety individuals who 
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experienced the loss of a shorter-term relationship reporting the smallest decrease in 
well-being. 
With regards to relationship satisfaction, it was anticipated that romantic 
relationships that were viewed by participants to be highly satisfying would predict 
greater decreases in well-being following a breakdown than those viewed as 
dissatisfying. A highly satisfying relationship that is a source of gratifying and 
emotionally rewarding experiences would represent a greater loss compared to a 
dissatisfying relationship that instead may be a source of emotional tension and 
discontentment. Furthermore, the termination of a more satisfying relationship may be 
an unexpected event due to satisfying interpersonal experiences being an atypical 
precursor to relationship dissolution. The addition of consideration of attachment 
anxiety would produce the same expected patterns as stated above for relationship 
length, and as such it was expected that individuals high in anxiety who described their 
relationships as satisfying would report the greatest decrease in well-being with low-
anxiety individuals describing their relationships as dissatisfying reporting the smallest 
decrease. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Attachment anxiety will predict changes in well-being factors life 
satisfaction, positive and negative mood, self-esteem, and feelings of attachment 
security and insecurity upon entering a new relationship. Specifically, it was predicted 
that lower scores in attachment anxiety would predict a greater increase in life 
satisfaction, greater increased positive and greater decreased negative moods, and a 
greater increase in self-esteem. Given the importance high anxiety individuals place on 
their relationships, it may at first seem counterintuitive to predict that it should be low-
anxiety individuals whose well-being benefits more from a new relationship 
commencing. However by the very nature of their insecurity, high anxiety individuals 
derive less from their interpersonal experiences, reporting their interactions to be less 
satisfying overall through perceiving others to be less responsive to them and 
understanding them less than what secure individuals report (e.g., Kafetsios & Nezlak, 
2002; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 1996). Further to this, a 
new romantic relationship is anticipated to lead to the activation of self and other models 
ensuring that the resultant negative feelings of lovability and of anxieties over partner 
interest and responsiveness become more salient. 
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Similar to Hypothesis 1, attachment avoidance was not anticipated to predict 
differences in changes in cognitive well-being for the same reasons of downplaying of 
the importance of interpersonal experiences as highlighted in Hypothesis 1. Avoidance 
was, however, hypothesised to predict differences in changes in positive and negative 
mood, with increases in avoidance anticipated to predict lesser increase in positive and 
lesser decrease in negative moods. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Satisfaction with the new relationship will moderate the association 
between attachment anxiety and changes in well-being. Specifically it was anticipated 
that the main effect of a new relationship that is providing satisfying experiences should 
see a greater increase in cognitive and affective well-being than a new relationship 
providing dissatisfying experiences. The further main effect of attachment anxiety 
would see differences in well-being change in the form of high-anxiety producing a 
smaller increase in well-being (due to the adverse cognitions and affective reactivity and 
experience that characterises such an orientation) than low-anxiety. When considered 
together, it was anticipated that low-anxiety individuals entering into a new relationship 
that was viewed positively (i.e. satisfying) would report the greatest increases in well-
being and individuals high in anxiety entering into a dissatisfying relationship would 
report the smallest increases. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants of Studies 1A and 1B were given the option of continuing their 
participation beyond the immediate set of measures by completing additional measures 
once a week for up to 24 weeks. Of the original 14,628 participants, 7,446 agreed to 
complete the weekly measures. Of these participants, 5,540 (74.3%) were female and 
1,920 (25.7%) were male with age ranging from 18 to 79 (M = 31.5, SD = 9.91). 
Because the current study sought to identify the influence of attachment orientation on 
changes in well-being as changes in relationship status occur, two subsamples of 
participants who had experienced a relationship status change needed to be selected, one 
subsample for those who had entered into a new relationship during the 24-week period, 
and one subsample for those who had left a relationship. For each subsample, two data 
entries were included for each participant: the data entry in which participants had first 
reported a relationship status change and the data entry immediately prior to it. The 
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nature of the weekly measures required participants to report their feelings of well-being 
experienced for the past week. The current study was interested in examining immediate 
feelings surrounding a relationship change only and as such only participants who had 
reported a relationship status change within that one-week time frame were included. 
Participants who reported a relationship status change beyond this period of time were 
therefore not included. 
The final sample for having left a relationship during the 24-week time period 
comprised 342 participants, 247 (72.2%) of whom were female and 95 (27.8%) were 
male. Age ranged from 18 to 71 (M = 29.8, SD = 10.4). Two hundred and ninety-nine 
(87.4%) identified themselves as heterosexual, 12 (3.5%) as homosexual, and 31 (9.1%) 
as bisexual. The majority of this sample resided within the United Kingdom (116, 
33.9%) and United States (113, 33%). Of the remaining sample, 18 resided in Canada 
and Brazil each, with the rest being spread internationally. 
The final sample for having entered into a relationship during the 24-week time 
period comprised 380 participants, 270 of whom were female (72.2%), 104 of whom 
were male (27.8%). Six participants did not specify their gender. Age ranged from 18 to 
70 (M = 29.7, SD = 9.9). Three hundred and forty-four participants (92%) identified 
themselves as heterosexual, 9 (2.4%) as homosexual, 20 (5.3%) as bisexual, and 1 
(0.3%) as “Other”; 6 participants did not specify. The majority of the sample resided 
within the United Kingdom (149, 39.8%) and United States (124, 33.2%) with the 
remaining sample being spread internationally. 
Measures 
Adult Attachment. Attachment was measured using the Relationship Questionnaire 
(RQ; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). The RQ is a widely-used self-report measure 
consisting of four items providing prototypical descriptions of each of secure, 
preoccupied, fearful-avoidant, and dismissing-avoidant attachment orientations. 
Participants are first required to indicate which one of the four prototypes best represents 
how they feel in their relationships before then indicating on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from 1 “Does not describe me at all” to 7 “Describes me perfectly”) the extent 
to which each is descriptive of their feelings. From these ratings, anxiety and avoidance 
dimensions are calculated (as recommended by Bartholomew (2008)) using the 
following formulae: 
Attachment anxiety = (Preoccupation + Fearful-avoidance) – (Security + Dismissing-
avoidance) 
72 
 
Attachment avoidance = (Fearful-avoidance + Dismissing-avoidance) – (Security + 
Preoccupation) 
In the current study, participants were asked to indicate the extent each of the 
descriptions reflected their feelings for the past week. As such, the wording of each 
description was rephrased slightly (e.g., “...I find it difficult to trust others completely...” 
was rephrased to “I have found it difficult to trust others completely...”). 
Life satisfaction. In assessing life satisfaction longitudinally on a week-by-week 
basis, the SWLS was used but with instructions that were altered slightly, instructing 
participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each item for that week. The 
wording for each of the items was also slightly rephrased to better capture feelings of 
satisfaction for that week (e.g., “In most ways my life has felt close to my ideal”, “I have 
felt satisfied with my life”). For the relationship dissolution subsample, Cronbach’s 
alpha was .92 both pre- and post-relationship status change. For the relationship entry 
subsample, Cronbach’s alpha was also .92 both pre- and post-relationship status change. 
Mood. The current study utilised the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in order to measure mood. The PANAS is a 
20-item Likert-type measure in which participants must indicate the extent to which they 
have experienced each affective item within a specified time-frame. In the current study, 
participants were asked to indicate their affective experience for the past week. The 
PANAS consists of two scales, positive and negative affect, with example positive items 
including “Excited”, “Strong”, and “Inspired” and example negative items including 
“Nervous”, “Upset”, and “Hostile”. For the positive scale, Cronbach’s alphas in the 
relationship dissolution sample were .92 pre-relationship change and .93 post-
relationship change, while the alphas for the negative scale were .90 and .89. For the 
relationship entry sample, positive scale alphas were .92 for both pre- and post-
relationship change and were .90 and .89 for the negative scale. 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(1965). This scale consists of 10 Likert-type items in which participants must respond to 
each on a four-point scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). 
Example items include “At times, I think I am no good at all” and “All in all, I am 
inclined to feel that I am a failure”. Due to the longitudinal nature of the study in which 
participants were required to complete the measure on a weekly basis, the wording of 
each item was changed slightly to allow consideration for feelings of self-esteem over 
the week period (for example, “At times, I have felt I am no good at all”). For the 
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relationship dissolution sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .93 pre-relationship change and 
was .92 post-relationship change. For the relationship entry sample, the alphas were .93 
and .92. 
Relationship Satisfaction Relationship satisfaction was measured each week using 
a 4-question measure created by Buunk et al. (2001) derived from the satisfaction 
subscale of Rusbult’s (1983) relationship questionnaire. Similar to the SWLS, 
instructions were phrased to consider responses as applying to the past week. Responses 
for each question ranged from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Very much”), with example 
questions including “In general, how satisfying have you felt your relationship to be?” 
and “How has your relationship compared to your ideal?”. For the relationship 
dissolution sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .94; for the relationship entry sample, 
Cronbach’s alpha was .93. 
Procedure 
Participants who agreed to take part on a weekly basis beyond having completed 
the initial measures reported in Study 1A provided their e-mail address. They were 
informed that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and 
that their contact information and data would be kept in a strictly confidential manner. 
Participants were contacted weekly (on the same day each week) via the e-mail 
addresses they provided to remind them when they were due to complete their weekly 
set of measures. As in the previous studies, measures were presented to participants and 
completed in a fixed order. 
Results 
Adult Attachment, Exiting a Relationship, and Well-Being 
Individuals’ attachment anxiety and avoidance were calculated using the 
attachment ratings reported the week their status change was first reported; it was 
reasoned that individuals’ attachment-related feelings at that time would dictate their 
cognitive and affective reactions to their change in interpersonal circumstances. 
Paired t-tests were performed to compare pre- and post-relationship dissolution 
well-being scores. As can be seen in Table 12, lower life satisfaction, self-esteem, and 
positive mood, as well as greater attachment anxiety, avoidance, and negative mood 
were reported by participants having just experienced a relationship termination. 
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Table 12. Pre- and post-relationship change values (leaving a relationship) 
(Variable) Pre-relationship 
status change 
Post-relationship 
status change 
t 
Anxiety -1.81 ± 4.78 -1.28 ± 4.86 -2.35* 
Avoidance -0.19 ± 3.80 0.20 ± 3.68 -2.26* 
Life satisfaction 21.06 ± 7.57 19.50 ± 7.55 5.62*** 
Self-esteem 20.35 ± 6.36 19.40 ± 6.61 3.87*** 
Positive mood 3.16 ± 0.87 2.89 ± 0.91 6.95*** 
Negative mood 2.14 ± 0.86 2.23 ± 0.93 -2.23* 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that, upon exiting a current relationship, greater scores in 
attachment anxiety would predict a greater decrease in life satisfaction, positive mood, 
and self-esteem and a greater increase in negative mood while greater avoidance would 
predict a lesser increase in negative and decrease in positive moods.  
Before testing this hypothesis, individuals’ well-being change scores were 
calculated by subtracting the scores they had reported the week previous to exiting their 
relationship from the scores reported in the first week of reporting having left that 
relationship.  
Change in life satisfaction was the first well-being factor to be examined. Pre-
relationship life satisfaction was entered at the first step while attachment anxiety, 
avoidance, and their interaction term were entered at the second step. The overall model 
was significant (F = 24.52 (4, 340) p < .001, with the model at the first step also being 
significant (F = 31.02 (3, 340) p < .001) and accounted for 21.7% of the variance 
(Adjusted R²).  Attachment anxiety (β = -.31, p <.001) significantly predicted change in 
life satisfaction whereas attachment avoidance (β = .03, p = .54) did not. However, the 
anxiety*avoidance interaction was significant (β = .10, p <.05) with a significant F 
change (F change = 4.15, p <. 05) and is presented in Figure 5 (with slopes analyses 
presented in Table 13).  
 
75 
 
 
Figure 5. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Change in Life Satisfaction 
(Relationship Exit) 
 
Table 13. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Change in Life Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -3.59** 
Secure and Preoccupied -6.77** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied 1.54 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -0.71 
**p < .01 
 
 
As suggested in the above Figure, individuals fitting a secure attachment 
classification (low anxiety and avoidance) experienced the smallest decrease in life 
satisfaction subsequent to a relationship break-up, with individuals fitting a dismissing 
(high avoidance/low anxiety) classification reporting similarly. Individuals fitting a 
preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) attachment classification reported the greatest 
decrease in life satisfaction, suggesting that, for such individuals, relationship break-up 
has the most negative impact on their overall satisfaction with the quality of their lives 
(slopes analyses however indicated that the fearful-avoidant and preoccupied ‘groups’’ 
trajectories did not significantly differ and similarly for the secure and dismissing-
avoidant ‘groups’).  
Next, self-esteem change was entered as the dependent variable and was regressed 
onto anxiety, avoidance while controlling for baseline self-esteem (first step) and their 
interaction term (second step). The model at the second step was significant (F = 26.49 
(4, 340) p <.001; F change = 8.10, p < .01) and accounted for 23.1% of the variance 
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(Adjusted R²). Anxiety (β = -.36, p <.001) and its interaction with avoidance (β = .14, p 
<.01) were significant predictors, while avoidance was not (β = -.07, p = .17). Figure 6 
presents the interaction, with Table 14 presenting the results of slopes analyses.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Change in Self-Esteem (Relationship 
Exit) 
 
Table 14. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Change in Self-Esteem 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -3.81** 
Secure and Preoccupied -7.94*** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied .27 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -2.78* 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
 
The above results suggest a similar pattern for self-esteem change as with life 
satisfaction; individuals fitting a preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) attachment 
classification reported the greatest decrease in self-esteem subsequent to a current 
relationship ending, with high-anxiety/avoidance (fearful) individuals reporting 
similarly. Slopes analyses revealed these two sets of change scores to not significantly 
differ from one another. 
Next positive mood change was regressed onto pre-relationship positive mood, 
attachment anxiety, avoidance (first step), and their interaction term (second step). The 
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model at the second step was significant (F = 24.58 (4, 341) p <.001), as well as at the 
first (F = 32.04 (3, 340) p < .001) and accounted for 21.7% of the variance (Adjusted 
R²). The F change however was not significant (F change = 1.32, p = .25); neither 
attachment avoidance (β = -.07, p = .16) nor its interaction with anxiety (β = .06, p = 
.25) were significant predictors of change in positive mood, however attachment anxiety 
significantly predicted change in positive mood (β = -.34, p <.001), suggesting that 
higher scores in anxiety predict a greater decrease in positive mood upon experiencing a 
relationship breakdown (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Attachment Anxiety as Predictor of Change in Positive Mood 
(Relationship Exit) 
 
The model at the first step for the negative mood change was significant (32.08 (3, 
340) p < .001), and similarly at the second step (F = 24.66 (4, 340) p <.001) accounting 
for 21.7% of the variance (Adjusted R²). However the F change was not significant (F 
change = 2.09, p = .15), with a non-significant finding for the interaction between 
anxiety and avoidance consistent with this (β = -.07, p = .15). However, both attachment 
anxiety (β = .32, p <.001) and avoidance (β = .09, p = .05) were significant independent 
predictors (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Change in 
Negative Mood (Relationship Exit) 
 
 Hypothesis 1 was therefore partially supported. As attachment anxiety increases, 
relationship dissolution brings about more negative feelings regarding the self and 
overall satisfaction with life, and more negative and less positive moods. As attachment 
avoidance increases, meanwhile, relationship dissolution appears to bring about a greater 
increase in negative mood only. 
Hypothesis 2 put forward that satisfaction with, and length of, the terminated 
relationship would moderate the association between changes in attachment anxiety and 
well-being. For the former, anxiety, relationship satisfaction, and their interaction term 
were entered separately into the regression equation for each of the well-being factors, 
with the pre-relationship breakup well-being score entered as a control. Table 15 
presents results. 
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Table 15. Attachment anxiety, relationship satisfaction, and well-being factors 
(relationship exit) 
Well-being (Adjusted 
R²) 
Model B SE B β R² 
Change 
F Change 
Life Satisfaction Anxiety -.35 .05 -.33***   
(20.7%) Satisfaction -.04 .17 -.01 .22 30.90*** 
(F = 23.14 (4,340) p 
<.001) 
Anx*Sat -.01 .03 -.02 .00 .11 
Self-esteem Anxiety -.36 .05 -.38***   
(21.3%) Satisfaction -.18 .15 -.06 .22 31.81*** 
(F = 24.04 (4,340) p 
<.001) 
Anx*Sat -.02 .03 -.04 .00 .77 
Positive Mood Anxiety .-.05 .01 -.34***   
(23.1%) Satisfaction -.07 .02 -.16** .24 35.51*** 
(F = 26.56 (4,340) p 
<.001) 
Anx*Sat -.00 .00 -.00 .00 .00 
Negative Mood Anxiety .05 .01 .32***   
(22.4%) Satisfaction .06 .02 .13** .23 33.56*** 
(F = 52.48 (3,340) p 
<.001) 
Anx*Sat -.00 .00 .05 .00 1.19 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
As can be seen in the above Table, none of the interactions between anxiety and 
relationship satisfaction was a significant predictor of changes in well-being upon exiting 
a current relationship. Relationship satisfaction was also found not to be an independent 
predictor of changes in life satisfaction or self-esteem, however it was found to predict 
changes in positive and negative mood. Figures 9 and 10 present the results, 
demonstrating that for individuals reporting high relationship satisfaction, a relationship 
break-up brings about a greater decrease in positive mood and greater increase in negative 
mood. 
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Figure 9. Relationship Satisfaction as Predictor of Change in Negative Mood 
(Relationship Exit) 
 
 
Figure 10. Relationship Satisfaction as Predictor of Change in Positive Mood 
(Relationship Exit) 
 
Lastly, length of relationship was not found to be a significant predictor of 
changes in any of the well-being factors and as such, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Adult Attachment, Entering a Relationship, and Well-Being 
Paired t-tests were performed to compare pre- and post-relationship entry well-
being scores. As can be seen in Table 16, greater life satisfaction, self-esteem, and 
positive mood, as well as lower anxiety, avoidance, and negative mood were reported by 
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participants having just entered into a new relationship. Feelings of avoidance, however, 
did not change significantly. 
 
Table 16. Pre- and post-relationship change values (entering into a relationship) 
 Pre-relationship 
status change 
Post-relationship 
status change 
Mean 
difference 
t 
Anxiety -1.82 ± 4.88 -2.57 ± 4.44 -.75 3.52*** 
Avoidance -.26 ± 3.49 -.32 ± 3.49 -.06 .41 
Life 
Satisfaction 
21.16 ± 7.37 22.58 ± 7.22 1.42 -5.76*** 
Self-esteem 20.20 ± 6.21 21.02 ± 6.01 .82 -3.65*** 
Positive Mood 3.12 ± 0.89 3.33 ± .87 .21 -5.75*** 
Negative 
Mood 
2.05 ± 0.84 1.96 ± .77 -.09 2.27** 
Mean ± Standard Deviation 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that lower scores in attachment anxiety would predict 
greater increases in life satisfaction, greater increased positive and greater decreased 
negative moods, and a greater increase in self-esteem upon entering into a new 
relationship. Greater scores in attachment avoidance meanwhile were hypothesised to 
predict lesser increase in positive and lesser decrease in negative moods only.  
As in the relationship exit data, individuals’ attachment anxiety and avoidance 
scores were calculated using the attachment ratings reported the first week the change in 
relationship status was reported. Individuals’ well-being change scores were calculated 
by subtracting the scores they had reported the week previous to entering a relationship 
from the scores reported in the first week of having entered a new relationship.  
Firstly, life satisfaction was examined. Pre-relationship change life satisfaction 
was entered as a control on the first step with attachment anxiety and avoidance, and 
their interaction term (anxiety*avoidance) was entered on the second.  The overall 
model was significant (F = 25.60 (4, 379) p <.001) and accounted for 20.6% of the 
variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β = -.21, p <.001) and avoidance (β = -
.17, p <.001) were significant predictors of change in life satisfaction upon entering a 
new relationship; their interaction term however was not (β = -.03, p = .60).  
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Figure 11. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Change in Life 
Satisfaction (Relationship Entry) 
 
Examination of the above Figure suggests that, independently, while both high and 
low levels of anxiety and avoidance predict an increase in life satisfaction upon entering 
a new relationship, scoring high on either attachment dimension brings about a lesser 
increase. 
The model for self-esteem change was also significant (F = 39.55 (4, 379) p 
<.001), accounting for 28.9% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β 
= -.37, p <.001) and avoidance (β = -.14, p <.01) were significant predictors while their 
interaction was not. For individuals high in attachment anxiety, entry into a new 
relationship saw little change in self-esteem, while for individuals low in anxiety a new 
relationship saw a greater increase. Conversely, while both high and low avoidance 
scores appear predictive of an increase in self-esteem, the latter predicts a greater 
increase than the former. 
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Figure 12. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Change in Self-
Esteem (Relationship Entry) 
 
Next, positive mood change was examined with the model found to be significant 
also (F = 34.25 (4,379) p <.001), accounting for 26.0% of the variance. Similar to both 
life satisfaction and self-esteem, anxiety (β = -.29, p <.001) and avoidance (β = -.11, p 
<.05) were both significant predictors of changes in positive mood upon entering into a 
new relationship but their interaction term was not.  
 
 
Figure 13. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Change in 
Positive Mood (Relationship Entry) 
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Examination of the above Figure suggests that, similar to changes in life 
satisfaction, both high and low levels of anxiety and avoidance predict an increase in 
positive mood upon entering into a new relationship, scoring high on either dimension 
brings about a lesser increase. 
Lastly, the model for negative mood was significant (F = 43.3 (4, 379) p <.001) 
and accounted for 30.9% of the variance. Attachment anxiety was identified as the sole 
significant predictor of change in negative mood (β = .26, p <.001) and is presented in 
Figure 14. For individuals high in attachment anxiety, a new relationship commencing 
saw little change to their negative mood, while a decrease was evidenced for individuals 
low in anxiety. 
 
 
Figure 14. Attachment Anxiety as Predictor of Change in Negative Mood 
(Relationship Entry) 
 
Attachment Anxiety, Relationship Satisfaction, and Well-Being. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted satisfaction with the new relationship to moderate the 
association between attachment anxiety and changes in well-being (life satisfaction, 
positive and negative mood, and self-esteem). Both attachment anxiety and relationship 
satisfaction scores were entered along with their interaction term into the regression 
equation. All betas, p values, R² and F change values are presented in Table 17. For each 
of the above listed well-being factors, while attachment anxiety and relationship 
satisfaction each predicted changes in well-being upon entering a relationship, their 
interactions did not. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported and relationship 
-0.2 
-0.18 
-0.16 
-0.14 
-0.12 
-0.1 
-0.08 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0 
Low Anxiety High Anxiety 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
M
o
o
d
 C
h
an
ge
 
85 
 
satisfaction did not moderate the association between attachment anxiety and changes in 
well-being.  
 
Table 17. Attachment anxiety, relationship satisfaction, and well-being factors 
(relationship entry) 
Well-Being 
(Adjusted R²) 
Model B SE B β R² 
Change 
F 
Change 
Life Satisfaction Anxiety -.20 .05 -.18***   
(25.6%) Satisfaction 1.06 .17 .31*** .21 34.11*** 
F = 33.58 
(4,379) p <.001 
Anx*Sat -.00 .04 -.01 .00 .28 
Self-esteem Anxiety -.32 .05 -.33***   
(32.7%) Satisfaction .76 .14 .24*** .30 52.86*** 
F = 46.97 
(4,379) p <.001 
Anx*Sat .00 .03 .01 .00 .02 
Positive Mood Anxiety -.04 .01 -.24***   
(31.4%) Satisfaction .13 .02 .27*** .27 45.52*** 
F = 44.40 
(4,379) p <.001 
Anx*Sat -.00 .01 -.01 .00 .58 
Negative Mood Anxiety .03 .01 .23***   
(32.6%) Satisfaction -.07 .02 -.14** .32 57.87*** 
F = 36.90 
(3,379) p <.001 
Anx*Sat -.00 .01 .01 .00 .04 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
Study 1D: Adult Attachment and Changes in Well-being 
The focus of the final part of Study 1 (D) was on examining how attachment 
anxiety and avoidance predict differences in changes in well-being following a 
relationship status change. Whereas Study 1C focused on identifying immediate changes 
in well-being in response to a relationship either starting or ending, the current study 
sought to examine how feelings of well-being change in the weeks subsequent to these 
relationship events. Previous research examining post-relationship dissolution 
experiences has found high anxiety to be associated with increased distress (Davis et al., 
2003; Feeney & Noller, 1992; Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Sprecher et al., 1998) as well as 
feelings of self-reproach (Pistole, 1996), guilt, and blame. Furthermore, high anxiety 
individuals appear to demonstrate a preoccupation with the lost relationship and partner 
that interferes with their day-to-day activities (Davis et al., 2003), suggesting that for 
such individuals emotional recovery is a more intense and lengthy process. Attachment 
avoidance meanwhile is negatively associated with post-relationship distress (Feeney & 
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Noller, 1992; Simpson, 1990) and a coping strategy that favours self-reliance over 
seeking comfort from others (Davis et al., 2003). On these bases, the following 
hypothesis concerning relationship dissolution was made: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Subsequent to relationship dissolution, greater attachment anxiety 
will predict both lower levels of well-being (that is, decreased life satisfaction, self-
esteem and positive mood, and increased negative mood) and a slower increase in these 
well-being factors over time. While avoidance on its own is not anticipated to predict 
changes over time, its interaction with anxiety is. As such, individuals high in both 
anxiety and avoidance (fearful) are anticipated to report the lowest levels of well-being 
with minimal improvement over time; individuals low in anxiety and avoidance (secure) 
meanwhile are predicted to report the highest levels of well-being that similarly change 
little over time (that is, secure individuals’ well-being is anticipated to be resilient 
against a relationship breakdown and hence remain high, while fearful-avoidant 
individuals are anticipated to be resilient to improvement over time due to the negative 
cognitions that are encompassed by their anxiety and avoidance and hence well-being 
should remain low). Individuals high in anxiety and low in avoidance (preoccupied) are 
predicted to report similarly low well-being to fearful individuals upon initial 
breakdown but to report a gradual increase over time. Lastly, the findings of Study 1A 
suggested that individuals fitting a dismissing attachment classification (low anxiety and 
high avoidance) reported lower life satisfaction when they were in a relationship. As 
such, it is hypothesised that, subsequent to a relationship breakdown such individuals 
should report well-being that is lower than secures but that which increases at a faster 
rate than their preoccupied counterparts. 
 
Research on examining cognitive and emotional responses to new relationship 
formation is more limited. However, the following hypothesis was made: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Across the weeks subsequent to entering into a new relationship, 
greater attachment avoidance is anticipated to predict decreases in well-being. The basis 
of this hypothesis lies in the changing levels of intimacy as a relationship progresses. 
Early-stage relationships are typically characterised by physical, rather than emotional, 
closeness with couples desiring close contact and physical intimacy (e.g., Berscheid, 
1985). At this point, emotional investment in the developing relationship is limited and 
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therefore should not give rise to avoidant individuals’ discomfort with intimacy. 
However, it is as the relationship progresses that emotional intimacy needs increase 
(e.g., Reedy, Birren, & Schaie, 1981). Research has consistently identified avoidant 
individuals to react negatively to situations in which support-seeking is required, leading 
to feelings of distress and discomfort (e.g., Rholes et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999). 
Therefore, due to levels of intimacy increasing as relationships develop, greater 
avoidance is anticipated to predict decreases in well-being over time as a consequence. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Similar to the two subsamples created for Study 1C, two subsamples were created 
for the present study. For each subsample of participants who had either exited a current 
relationship or entered into a new one, participants were selected if they had completed 
at least two sets of weekly questionnaires subsequent to having reported a relationship 
status change.  
The sample for leaving a relationship comprised 355 participants, 257 (72.4%) of 
whom were female and 98 (27.6%) of whom were male. Age ranged from 18 to 71 (M = 
29.14, SD = 9.36). Three hundred and ten (87.3%) identified themselves as heterosexual, 
15 (4.2%) as homosexual, and 30 (8.5%) as bisexual. The majority of the sample resided 
within the United Kingdom (125, 35.2%) and United States (128, 36.1%). Of the 
remaining sample, 14 resided in Brazil and 20 resided in Canada, with the rest of the 
sample being spread internationally. 
The sample for entering into a new relationship comprised 361 participants, 264 
(73.1%) of whom were female and 97 (26.9%) of whom were male. Age ranged from 18 
to 71 (M = 29.88, SD = 10.17). Three hundred and twenty six (90.3%) participants 
reported themselves to be heterosexual, 8 (2.2%) as homosexual, 26 (7.2%) as bisexual, 
and 1 (0.3%) as “Other”. As previously, the majority of the sample resided in the United 
Kingdom (143, 39.6%) and United States (119, 33.0%) with the remaining sample being 
spread internationally. 
Measures and Procedure 
The data for the current study was collected simultaneously to the data collected 
for Study 1C. As such, all measures included in this earlier study were utilised for the 
current study also and in accordance with the same procedure. 
Data Analysis 
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In order to examine changes in well-being over time subsequent to a relationship 
status change, multi-level modelling (MLM) was required. Multi-level modelling is an 
analytic technique that allows for the simultaneous, but separate (Arnold, 1992) 
examination of within-person change and between-person differences in change (Singer 
& Willett, 2003). Whereas early research examining change typically relied upon the 
analytic strategy of either aggregating Level 1 data or including both levels (that is, 
Level 1 within-persons and Level 2 between-persons) in the same regression equation, 
the loss of information and accuracy (see Arnold, 1992, and West & Hepworth, 1991) in 
this limited analytic technique is addressed by MLM through its use of maximum 
likelihood estimation. Maximum likelihood estimation, or MLE, can be understood as 
the likelihood of observed data in a given sample being the result of unknown 
population parameters. The advantages of this method of statistical estimation lie in its 
asymptotic properties, such that estimates are consistent and efficient. More specifically, 
they are asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed (that is, converge on the 
unknown true values of parameters) and produce smaller standard errors than those 
produced in other statistical estimation methods (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
The nature of the data in the current study lends itself well to multi-level analysis 
due to its bi-level structure, namely, a Level 1 submodel comprising within-person 
changes in well-being, which is nested within a Level 2 submodel of between-person 
differences in attachment anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction. Examination of the 
weekly means of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive and negative moods 
suggested that a linear change model would provide the best fit for the current data. As 
such, the Level 1 submodel was structured as: 
Yij = β0i + β1iTIMEij + εij 
where Yij represents the well-being variable (either life satisfaction, self-esteem, positive 
mood or negative mood) of individual i at time j, β0i represents the intercept of the 
change trajectory, β1i represents the slope, and εij represents random error. Time in this 
instance was measured in days and was centred at the first data point in which the 
participant indicated they had changed their relationship status. 
For each parameter in the Level 1 submodel, there is an accompanying Level 2 
submodel; in the above equation, there are two parameters, the intercept (β0i) and the 
slope (β1i), and as such the Level 2 equations were structured as: 
β0i = γ00 + γ01Anxietyi + γ02Avoidancei + γ03Anxiety*Avoidancei + ζ0i 
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β 1i = γ10 + γ11Anxietyi + γ12Avoidancei + γ13Anxiety*Avoidancei + ζ1i 
where γ00 and γ10 represent the Level-2 intercepts, gamma coefficients γ01 through to γ13 
represent the effect of individual i’s attachment dimension scores on the change 
trajectories, and ζ0i and ζ1i represent random error. 
Results 
Relationship Exit 
Hypothesis 1 predicted differences in well-being changes upon exiting a current 
relationship on the basis of individuals’ anxiety and avoidance. Multi-level analysis was 
carried out individually for each of life satisfaction, self-esteem, positive mood and 
negative mood; anxiety, avoidance, and days since the relationship breakup were entered 
into the regression equation along with their two-way interactions and the final three-
way interaction. The results are presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18. Anxiety and Avoidance as predictors of changes in well-being after 
relationship dissolution 
Model Coefficient Standard Error t 
Life Satisfaction    
Intercept 20.09 .34 59.43*** 
Time .01 .00 3.66*** 
Anxiety -.36 .03 11.13*** 
Avoidance -.16 .04 -3.94*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .04 .01 3.88*** 
Time*Anxiety -.00 .00 -.62 
Time*Avoidance .00 .00 .19 
Time*Anxiety*Avoidance -.00 .00 -2.82** 
Self-esteem    
Intercept 19.86 .26 75.08*** 
Time .01 .00 3.28*** 
Anxiety -.44 .03 14.86*** 
Avoidance -.19 .04 -4.97*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .04 .01 3.58*** 
Time*Anxiety .00 .00 .12 
Time*Avoidance .00 .00 .83 
Time*Anxiety*Avoidance -.00 .00 -2.13* 
Positive Mood    
Intercept 3.00 .04 74.37*** 
Time .00 .00 1.89ª 
Anxiety -.06 .01 10.40*** 
Avoidance -.04 .01 -6.10*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .01 .00 3.84*** 
Time*Anxiety -.00 .00 -.25 
Time*Avoidance .00 .00 1.71ª 
Time*Anxiety*Avoidance -.00 .00 -3.16** 
Negative Mood    
Intercept 2.17 .04 57.57*** 
Time -.00 .00 -4.55*** 
Anxiety .06 .00 12.56*** 
Avoidance .02 .01 2.80** 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.01 .00 -3.18** 
Time*Anxiety -.00 .00 -.86 
Time*Avoidance .00 .00 1.71ª 
Time*Anxiety*Avoidance .00 .00 3.22*** 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
ªp = marginal 
 
The three-way interactions between anxiety, avoidance, and days since 
relationship breakup were significant predictors for each of life satisfaction (γ13 = -.00, 
t(1476.15) = -2.82, p <.01), self-esteem (γ13 = -.00, t(1455.02) = -2.13, p <.05), positive 
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mood (γ13 = -.00, t(1588.74) = -3.16, p <.01), and negative mood (γ13 = -.00, t(1578.56) 
= 3.22, p <.001). Figure 15 presents the trajectories for life satisfaction as predicted by 
the three-way interaction between time, anxiety, and avoidance at the time points of the 
initial breakup and 1 and 2 standard deviations subsequent to this. Table 19 presents the 
results of slopes analyses. 
 
 
Figure 15. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Time (Days) as Predictors of 
Life Satisfaction Change 
 
Table 19. Simple Slopes Analyses for Anxiety, Avoidance and Time Trajectories (Life 
Satisfaction) 
Differences t 
Secure -.08 
Dismissing-avoidant 3.53*** 
Preoccupied 3.00** 
Fearful-avoidant .41 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
 
The trajectory for individuals fitting a secure attachment classification (low 
anxiety/low avoidance) shows overall satisfaction with life to be the highest out of the 
four possible classifications and to remain steady over time. Individuals fitting 
dismissing (low anxiety/high avoidance) and preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) 
both report increases in life satisfaction over time, with the former reporting a greater 
increase over the latter. Lastly, individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification (high 
anxiety/high avoidance) remain steadily low in their life satisfaction, reporting no 
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change over time (see Table 19 for slopes analyses). Hypothesis 1 was therefore 
supported with regards to life satisfaction: individuals fitting secure and fearful 
attachment classifications, subsequent to having experienced a relationship breakdown, 
saw little change to their evaluations of the overall quality of their lives, with the former 
remaining satisfied and the latter remaining dissatisfied. For individuals fitting 
dismissing and preoccupied attachment classifications, trajectories followed the 
hypothesised patterns, with dismissing-avoidance showing a greater increase across time 
than preoccupation, suggesting the latter to have a slower rate of recovery from a 
dissolution experience. 
Next, the results for self-esteem are presented in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Time (Days) as Predictors of Self-
Esteem Change 
 
 
Table 20. Simple Slopes Analyses for Anxiety, Avoidance and Time Trajectories (Self-
Esteem) 
Differences t 
Secure -.18 
Dismissing-avoidant 2.94** 
Preoccupied 2.46** 
Fearful-avoidant .73 
**p </= .01 
***p < .001 
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The trajectories for changes in self-esteem follow similar patterns to those for 
changes in life satisfaction: individuals fitting secure and fearful-avoidant classifications 
report steady levels of self-esteem across the three time points, while dismissing-
avoidant and preoccupied individuals report increases in self-esteem as time progresses 
with the former increasing at a greater rate than the latter. The findings for self-esteem 
then provide additional support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Figure 17. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Time (Days) as Predictors of 
Positive Mood Change 
 
 
Table 21. Simple Slopes Analyses for Anxiety, Avoidance and Time Trajectories 
(Positive Mood) 
Differences t 
Secure -1.91* 
Dismissing-avoidant 3.43*** 
Preoccupied 1.86* 
Fearful-avoidant .32 
*p <.05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
Figure 17 presents the results for changes in positive mood (while Table 21 shows 
the results of slopes analyses). Individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification 
reported the lowest positive mood that remained steadily low across time. The findings 
for individuals fitting dismissing-avoidant and preoccupied classifications replicate 
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those found for life satisfaction and self-esteem, with increased positive mood reported 
across the three time points, further supporting Hypothesis 1. However, the results 
suggest that low anxiety/low avoidance (fitting a secure classification) individuals’ 
positive mood decreases across the two time points subsequent to their relationship 
having ended. 
Lastly, Figure 18 presents the results for changes in negative mood and Table 22 
the slopes analyses results. 
 
 
Figure 18. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Time (Days) as Predictors of 
Negative Mood Change 
 
 
Table 22. Simple Slopes Analyses for Anxiety, Avoidance and Time Trajectories 
(Negative Mood) 
Differences t 
Secure -.69 
Dismissing-avoidant -2.78** 
Preoccupied -5.18*** 
Fearful-avoidant .02 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
The results for changes in negative mood reinforce those found for positive mood; 
whereas individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification showed a steady low positive 
mood across time, here the results suggest a complementary pattern of reporting the 
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highest negative mood out of the four classifications, which remained steady across the 
three time points. Similarly, dismissing-avoidant and preoccupied individuals reported 
decreases in negative mood across time, with the latter reporting greater negative mood 
as well as a greater rate of decrease than the former. Secure individuals’ negative mood 
meanwhile remained steadily low. 
Taken together, the results of changes in life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive 
and negative moods supported Hypothesis 1: individuals high in both anxiety and 
avoidance (fearful-avoidant) reported the lowest levels of well-being with minimal 
improvement over time. Their satisfaction with life, self-esteem, and positive and 
negative affective experience appeared not to change from the point at which they had 
left their relationship. Individuals high in anxiety and low in avoidance (preoccupied) 
reported similar levels of well-being to fearful individuals at the point of relationship 
breakup, but differed subsequent to this point, instead showing cognitive and affective 
recovery across time. Individuals high in avoidance and low in anxiety (dismissing) 
showed similar improvements in well-being in time (although at increased rates), 
however their levels of satisfaction, self-esteem and mood showed greater general levels 
of well-being in comparison to their preoccupied counterparts. Lastly, low anxiety and 
avoidance individuals (secure) reported steady levels of increased well-being compared 
to their insecure counterparts. Positive mood appeared to be the exception to this pattern, 
however, suggesting that their positive mood decreases slightly across time.  
Relationship Entry 
Hypothesis 2 predicted differences in well-being changes upon entering a new 
relationship on the basis of individuals’ feelings of anxiety and avoidance. Replicating 
the analytic strategy adopted for the relationship exit data, multi-level analysis was 
performed for each of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive and negative mood 
individually. Anxiety, avoidance, and days since the new relationship began were 
entered into the regression equation, along with their two-way interactions and then the 
final three-way interaction. Furthermore, whether or not the individual’s relationship ran 
its entire course over the duration of the data collection was entered as a dummy-coded 
control variable (0 = relationship continued beyond the period of data collection, 1 = 
relationship was completed within the time period). The results are presented in Table 
23. 
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Table 23. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Changes in Well-Being (Relationship Entry) 
Model Coefficient Standard Error t 
Life Satisfaction    
Intercept 23.96 .41 58.88*** 
Completed -1.43 .64 -2.25* 
Time .00 .00 1.31 
Anxiety -.31 .03 -9.81*** 
Avoidance -.03 .04 -.63 
Anxiety*Avoidance .01 .01 1.68 
Time*Anxiety .00 .00 .14 
Time*Avoidance -.00 .00 -4.47*** 
Self-esteem    
Intercept 22.39 .31 73.07*** 
Completed -1.11 .48 -2.32* 
Time .00 .00 .11 
Anxiety -.36 .03 -12.50*** 
Avoidance -.19 .04 -4.91*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .00 .01 .58 
Time*Anxiety -.00 .00 -1.95* 
Time*Avoidance -.00 .00 -.77 
Negative Mood    
Intercept 1.89 .04 47.66*** 
Completed .09 .06 1.48 
Time -.00 .00 -.54 
Anxiety .05 .00 10.68*** 
Avoidance .02 .01 2.81** 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.00 .00 -1.31 
Time*Anxiety .00 .00 1.02 
Time*Avoidance .00 .00 .39 
Time*Anxiety*Avoidance .00 .00 1.90ª 
ªp = marginal 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
For changes in life satisfaction, the three-way interaction between time, anxiety, 
and avoidance was not a significant predictor, however, the two-way interaction 
between time and avoidance was (γ12 = -.00, t(1262.52) = -4.47, p <.001). Figure 19 
presents the trajectories for this interaction at the time point of the relationship having 
started and 1 and 2 standard deviations subsequent to this (with Table 24 presenting the 
results of slopes analyses). 
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Figure 19. Attachment Avoidance and Time (Days) as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction Change 
 
 
Table 24. Simple Slopes Analyses for Avoidance and Time as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction Change 
Differences t 
Low Avoidance 4.24*** 
High Avoidance -2.12* 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
For individuals low in attachment avoidance, time predicts increases in overall 
satisfaction with life. However, for individuals high in avoidance, the opposite pattern 
emerges; individuals report decreasing life satisfaction the longer they are in their 
relationships. Hypothesis 2 was therefore partially supported: attachment avoidance 
predicted a decrease in the well-being factor of life satisfaction as time in the 
relationship increased. 
The three-way interaction between time, anxiety, and avoidance for self-esteem 
was similarly not significant, however, as can be seen in Table 23, the interaction 
between time and anxiety was a significant predictor (γ11 = -.00, t(983.61) = -1.95, p 
<.05). Figure 20 presents this interaction, while Table 25 presents the results of slopes 
analyses. 
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Figure 20. Attachment Anxiety and Time (Days) as Predictors of Self-Esteem 
Change across Time 
 
Table 25. Simple Slopes Analyses for Avoidance and Time as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction Change 
Differences t 
Low Anxiety 2.02* 
High Anxiety -.98 
*p < .05 
 
For individuals low in attachment anxiety, length of time in the relationship saw 
an increase in feelings of self-esteem. While Figure 20 suggests that for individuals high 
in attachment anxiety, time in the relationship sees a slight decrease, simple slopes 
analyses showed this trajectory to be non-significant. It was hypothesised that 
attachment anxiety would not interact with time to be predictive of changes in well-
being and so this finding does not support Hypothesis 2. 
For negative mood, the model was significant (γ13 = -.00, t(1618.17) = 1.90, p 
<.05) with the three-way interaction between anxiety, avoidance, and time in the 
relationship found to be approaching significance (see Table 23). The trajectories are 
shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Time (Days) as Predictors of 
Negative Mood Change 
 
Interpreting the slopes in the context of attachment orientations, individuals low in 
both anxiety and avoidance (secure) remained steadily low in the level of negative mood 
they reported. Low anxiety/high avoidance individuals (dismissing) reported lower 
negative mood than their insecure counterparts but that which decreased across the three 
time points. Both high anxiety/high avoidance (fearful) and high anxiety/low avoidance 
(preoccupied) individuals reported similarly higher levels of negative mood upon 
entering a new relationship, however whereas preoccupied individuals’ negative mood 
decreased across time, the opposite pattern emerged for fearful-avoidant individuals, 
with the trajectory instead suggesting their negative mood to increase as they remained 
in their relationship. 
Lastly, for positive mood, none of the two-way or three-way interactions between 
anxiety, avoidance, and time was a significant predictor. For this well-being factor then, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the above series of studies was to expand upon previous work 
examining attachment-based differences in well-being experiences, namely life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, and negative and positive mood.  
Study 1A 
The findings of Study 1A identifying differences in baseline life satisfaction were 
consistent with those reported in previous research (e.g., Hinnen et al., 2009; Hwang et 
al., 2009; Kim et al., 2008); attachment anxiety’s interaction with avoidance suggested 
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that individuals fitting a secure classification experience the greatest satisfaction with 
the overall quality of their lives, followed by those fitting dismissing-avoidant and then 
preoccupied attachment classifications. Individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant 
classification meanwhile were identified as experiencing the lowest satisfaction with 
their lives. A fundamental tenet of attachment theory is that early experiences with 
caregivers determine differences in the mental (working) models individuals form 
concerning their perceptions of the lovability of self and the availability and likely 
responsiveness of others, and that these working models in turn influence interpretations 
of and behaviours within interpersonal experiences. In accordance with the theorising of 
Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991), individuals fitting a secure classification (low 
anxiety/avoidance with positive models of both self and other) perceive themselves as 
worthy of love and have positive expectations of others as accepting and responsive to 
them. With such a combination of positive perceptions regarding their own self-worth 
within interpersonal contexts and positive beliefs in the good intentions of others, secure 
individuals’ attachment profile typifies the prerequisites for optimal cognitive subjective 
well-being. Indeed, the SWB literature highlights that individuals who are able to 
actualise their goals experience the greatest subjective well-being (Cantor & Sanderson, 
2003). Research within both the developmental and adult attachment literatures speaks 
of goals of felt security (Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000; Sroufe & Waters, 
1977) that refer to aims of attaining a sense of emotional safety within relationships, and 
how goals of felt security are achieved is through creating and maintaining desired 
balances between subgoals of intimacy and independence. Within the adult attachment 
literature, for secure individuals, the combination of both perceptions of deserving and 
anticipating others’ positive regard allows them to seek out the interpersonal experiences 
they desire, that is, experiences congruent with subgoals of both high intimacy and 
independence. This enables them to pursue and achieve their goals for their 
relationships, be they familial, romantic, or friendship, which in turn should lead to 
elevated feelings of overall satisfaction with their lives. The results of Study 1A indeed 
support this contention with individuals fitting the secure classification reporting the 
highest life satisfaction over those fitting other insecure classifications. 
Individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification can be considered mirror 
opposites of their secure counterparts due to their negative models of both self and other. 
Here, such individuals perceive themselves as unlovable and unaccepted, and do not 
trust others to be receptive to them, instead anticipating them to be rejecting. This 
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combination of both negative self and other manifests as self-protective distancing 
behaviours designed as a pre-emptive defence towards expected negative response from 
others and it is this combination of negative self/other that is suggested here as 
contributing towards the lowest life satisfaction reported by individuals fitting this 
classification in Study 1A. Fearful-avoidant individuals desire intimacy in their 
relationships but deny themselves the experience of it, thus it can be argued that they 
themselves prevent the achievement of their felt-security intimacy goal, the actualisation 
of which would lead to more favourable perceptions of the overall quality of their lives. 
Instead, the negative perceptions of both themselves and the others in their social 
environments as well as self-inflicted impediment of interpersonal goals is suggested to 
leave fearful-avoidant individuals perpetually dissatisfied with their life circumstances 
and thus reporting decreased subjective well-being. Indeed, life satisfaction as measured 
and assessed by Diener et al (1985) captures sentiments reflective of how one’s life 
compares to one’s ideal and the extent to which factors important to the individual have 
been achieved, sentiments that appear incongruent with the above-described fearful-
avoidant cognitions and behaviours they typically demonstrate. 
Individuals fitting a preoccupied attachment classification reported life satisfaction 
lower than their dismissing-avoidant counterparts but higher than that reported by 
fearful-avoidant. Similar to fearful-avoidant, individuals fitting a preoccupied 
attachment classification are characterised by a negative model of self in which 
perceptions of lovability are negative in their construal. However, their perceptions of 
other differ such that others are viewed positively and as able to be responsive to them 
and it is this dynamic between negative self and positive other that creates a reliance on 
others for validation of the self. The goal of felt security for preoccupied individuals is 
achieved through maintaining a high intimacy/low independence balance via 
maladaptive strategies such as controlling and ‘punishment’ behaviours (echoing those 
displayed by anxious-ambivalent infants in the Strange Situation in which angry 
behaviour is directed toward caregivers upon reunion with them (Ainsworth et al., 1971, 
1978)). Because of their low avoidance, preoccupied individuals are able to pursue their 
subgoals of high intimacy and low independence in their interpersonal relationships. 
However, such individuals are often left with a feeling that others are reluctant to get as 
close to them as they would like (as suggested through measurement of anxiety by 
Fraley et al., 2000), perceiving more rejection in their interactions than secure 
individuals (e.g., Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997) and so while subgoals are 
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pursued, they are not always actualised. The decreased life satisfaction reported in Study 
1A then could be in part explained by both preoccupied individuals’ negative views of 
self and (perceived) difficulty in achieving high intimacy/low independence 
interpersonal goals. 
Lastly, individuals fitting a dismissing-avoidant attachment classification reported 
life satisfaction higher than their insecure counterparts but lower than that reported by 
those fitting secure. As previously discussed, such individuals have a positive model of 
self as lovable but a negative model of others in which reliability and responsiveness is 
not trusted. Early experiences of parental non-responsiveness account for such negative 
perceptions of other and their positive view of self is a defensive strategy compensating 
for this lack of caregiver attention to attachment needs. Their goals of felt security are 
achieved through high independence which allows them to maintain their valued self-
reliance and low intimacy that ensures their desired autonomy is not infringed upon. 
Similar to the above attachment classifications, it is argued that dismissing-avoidant 
individuals’ life satisfaction can be in part attributable to the ability to actualise goals (in 
this instance, intimacy and independence) that is argued within the SWB literature to be 
important in determining positive well-being. For individuals fitting the dismissing-
avoidant classification, independence can be maintained but, while level of intimacy can 
be controlled to a certain extent, situations are typically encountered in everyday life in 
which level of intimacy such individuals are comfortable with are compromised, such as 
others’ discussion of problems or emotional reactivity to personal experiences. Indeed it 
is this element of controllability in the actualising of intimacy goals, in addition to 
differences in positivity of perceptions of self, that is argued to contribute towards the 
differing life satisfaction reported between dismissing-avoidant and preoccupied 
individuals. Maintaining distance and inhibiting others’ high intimacy behaviours is 
argued to rely more on actions of the self and thus is suggested to be more easily 
(although not impeccably) achieved, while achieving high intimacy interactions with 
others is less determined by self actions than it is reliant on others’ actions that are 
generally outwith the self’s control. With independence and low intimacy therefore 
being more easily determined by self than high intimacy and low independence in 
others, it is argued that dismissing-avoidant individuals are better able to achieve their 
interpersonal goals than preoccupied individuals and hence report the more favourable 
evaluations of the quality of their lives evidenced in Study 1A. 
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As suggested within the above discussion, the pursuit and actualising of 
interpersonal goals is not argued to be the sole contributor towards the observed 
differences in levels of life satisfaction in Study 1A. Earlier discussion of the SWB 
literature highlighted that not only are cognitive (i.e. life satisfaction) factors considered 
fundamental to well-being experience but also affective (i.e. positive and negative 
mood) factors are too (e.g., Andrews & Whitby, 1976; Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; 
Diener & Diener, 1996; Diener et al., 1995, Lucas et al., 1996). In particular research 
has drawn attention to hedonic balances, that is, the ratio of positive to negative affect, 
as well as the frequencies of positive and negative affect experienced that is predictive 
of subjective well-being (e.g., Diener et al., 1991; Diener et al., 1990; Schimmack et al., 
2002; Schimmack et al., 2002; Suh et al., 1998). As summarised earlier, secure 
individuals’ affective profiles suggest they experience the most favourable hedonic 
balances due to emotion-regulation strategies that minimise distress when such a feeling 
arises and maintain positivity (e.g. Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004; Pereg & Mikulincer, 
2004). This hedonic balance in which positive affect outweighs negative could therefore 
partly account for the finding that individuals fitting a secure attachment classification 
report the highest overall satisfaction with life. With both high anxiety and avoidance 
associated with negative mood (e.g., Barry et al., 2007), fearful-avoidant individuals 
should experience the least favourable hedonic balances and therefore the lowest life 
satisfaction of the four possible attachment classifications. Dismissing-avoidant 
individuals’ defensive suppression of feelings of negative affect (such as distress) should 
see them reporting a more favourable hedonic balance than their fearful counterparts 
(and indeed reporting greater subjective well-being in the form of increased life 
satisfaction) but less favourable than secures. As argued earlier, it is this defensive 
denial of negative affective experience that is suggested as forming the basis of their 
more favourable hedonic balance in comparison to other insecure groups rather than the 
active experience of positive affect reported by the secure group. With the SWB 
literature putting forward that the experience of positive affect plays a bigger role in 
predicting subjective well-being (e.g., Lucas et al., 1996; Suh et al., 1998), dismissing-
avoidant individuals’ affective strategy that focuses on suppression of negative and 
manifests a lower positive mood than secure individuals (e.g. Wei et al., 2005), this too 
would in part account for the level of comparative life satisfaction reported by 
individuals fitting this attachment classification. Lastly, preoccupied individuals’ 
tendency to report a greater frequency of negative affect (Meyer et al., 2005) should 
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produce a less favourable hedonic balance than secure and dismissing-avoidant 
individuals. However, individuals fitting this classification do not experience purely 
negative affect (indeed it is not suggested that any individuals’ affective profile would 
be that overly simplistic), with research demonstrating such individuals report feelings 
of happiness in response to positive partner and relationship experiences (Shaver & 
Mikulincer, 2003, as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005) and generally to report 
feelings of emotional highs along with the lows (Hazan & Shaver, 1987
1
). Such feelings 
of positive affect therefore provide a certain level of counterbalance to the negative 
experienced and thus is suggested as contributing to the life satisfaction reported by 
individuals in Study 1A whose feelings of anxiety and avoidance correspond to 
preoccupied attachment. 
However, an obvious limitation in the above discussion of hedonic balances 
emerges in the form of positive and negative affect not being included in the measures 
completed by participants. The decision to not include the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) 
at the initial, cross-sectional stage of data collection for Study 1 was based on reasons of 
avoiding over-burdening participants with too many measures that might discourage 
complete participation. As such, the potential role of individuals’ hedonic balances in 
predicting differences in satisfaction with life experienced cannot be directly examined 
at this point. Future studies examining the association between adult attachment and 
baseline life satisfaction would benefit from including a measure assessing mood states, 
both positive and negative, to investigate potential interactions therein.  
Once the association between attachment and life satisfaction had been identified, 
the next aim of Study 1A was to examine the moderating effect of current relationship 
status, that is, to examine whether currently being in a relationship or not interacted with 
anxiety and avoidance to predict differences in overall satisfaction with life. The main 
effects of baseline life satisfaction as predicted by attachment that were identified 
previously were replicated here, with the second main effect of relationship status 
suggesting that general levels of life satisfaction were higher for those who were 
currently in a relationship than for those who were not. However, the interactions 
between attachment and relationship status produced interesting results: while 
individuals in relationships fitting preoccupied and fearful-avoidant attachment 
                                                             
1 ªIt should be noted here that this finding refers to anxious-ambivalence as measured within the 
tripartite conceptualisation of attachment classifications and although preoccupied attachment is viewed 
as corresponding to anxious-ambivalence, they are not considered as identical 
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classifications appeared to report higher life satisfaction than their single counterparts, 
the two ‘in a relationship’/’not in a relationship’ secure groups reported similar levels to 
one another, while dismissing-avoidant individuals in a relationship reported lower life 
satisfaction than similar individuals who were out of a relationship. 
For the individuals fitting into either of the two high-anxiety attachment groups 
(namely preoccupied and fearful-avoidant), the pattern of increased life satisfaction 
when in a relationship can be interpreted and understood via consideration of the 
attachment needs encapsulated by the feelings associated with high anxiety, as well as 
the importance placed on validation via interpersonal experiences. Theorising by 
Simpson and Rholes (2004) put forward that individuals high in attachment anxiety are 
susceptible to relying heavily on perceptions of interpersonal relationship quality in 
influencing feelings of happiness and well-being. Although this theorising was framed in 
the context of such individuals’ propensity to hold too-stringent conditions for attaining 
relationship well-being and basing happiness on the extent to which these conditions are 
being met, it is argued here that such a tendency is reflective of a broader cognitive bias 
that exists in high anxiety individuals in which a high level of importance is placed both 
on romantic partners and the relationship experiences with them. Indeed, Park, Sanchez, 
and Brynildsen (In Press) found self-worth to be reported as especially contingent on 
being in a romantic relationship for preoccupied individuals scoring high in rejection 
sensitivity. For high anxiety individuals then, simply being involved in and hence 
perceiving having the relationship that is so central to their needs should see an elevated 
life satisfaction over their high anxiety counterparts not currently engaged in a romantic 
relationship. Furthermore, for such individuals whose negative models of self impairs 
ability for autonomous self-validation, being in a romantic relationship provides 
opportunities for such validation through perceptions of being accepted by a highly 
valued other, namely a romantic partner. Here, the esteem gained from having chronic 
access to a source of acceptance should produce elevated feelings of satisfaction within 
individuals concerning their general life circumstances over similar others who are not 
involved in a romantic relationship. The pattern of increased life satisfaction for both 
preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals who are currently in a relationship 
compared to such individuals currently not in a relationship is supportive of the above 
notion. However, given their differing levels of avoidance (and hence differing models 
of other) it is perhaps surprising that individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification 
demonstrate a similar pattern of difference in life satisfaction across relationship status 
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that individuals fitting the preoccupied classification do. The similar patterns suggest 
that preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals place similar importance on their 
relationships in terms of their contributory value in influencing overall perceptions of 
life quality. Additionally, it could suggest that while preoccupied individuals can gain 
satisfaction from acceptance by others who are viewed positively and as able to respond 
to attachment needs, fearful-avoidant individuals’ life satisfaction can similarly benefit 
from acceptance by those who they anticipate to be rejecting and hence can benefit from 
acceptance that disconfirms their expectations. 
The finding that the level of life satisfaction reported by individuals fitting a 
secure attachment classification did not seem to differ whether in a relationship or not 
suggests that for such individuals, how satisfied one feels with the overall quality of 
their lives is not dependent upon being in a romantic relationship as judgements of 
quality are equally high whether they are romantically involved with a significant other 
or not. This pattern highlights the role anxiety plays in influencing the psychological 
weight given to romantic relationship experiences with regards to subjective well-being; 
for high-anxiety preoccupied and fearful-avoidant individuals, being in a relationship 
and hence experiencing both psychological and physical closeness with a significant 
other produces more favourable evaluations of life quality whereas for low-anxiety 
secures, life quality is perpetually rated highly regardless of interpersonal circumstance. 
In other words, while individuals low in anxiety and avoidance desire close relationships 
and derive satisfaction from their relationship experiences, being with a romantic 
significant other is not the source of importance for life quality judgements that it is for 
high anxiety individuals. 
Similar to individuals fitting a secure attachment classification, high 
avoidance/low anxiety (i.e. dismissing-avoidant) individuals in a relationship did not 
report increased life satisfaction over those not in a relationship. However, where these 
two attachment ‘groups’ differ is that for individuals fitting a dismissing-avoidant 
classification, being in a relationship actually saw a lower level of life satisfaction 
reported. That is, perceptions of overall life quality are more favourable for such 
individuals when not currently romantically involved with a significant other. While 
previous research has identified dismissing-avoidant individuals to derive less 
satisfaction from their relationships (e.g. Jones & Cunningham, 2005; Pistole, 1989; 
Tucker & Anders, 1999) and experience adverse feelings in interpersonal situations 
requiring emotional intimacy (e.g., Rholes et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999), the current 
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study is the first to find evidence to suggest that romantic relationships, which comprise 
psychological and physical closeness, may have deleterious effects that extend beyond 
the immediate adverse feelings experienced within that interpersonal context and can 
have broader implications for perceptions of the general quality of current life 
circumstances. As previously discussed, dismissing-avoidant individuals’ high 
avoidance manifests a discomfort with closeness and aversion to emotional dependency 
(e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991); romantic relationships present opportunities for 
exactly these circumstances, with intimacy-promoting behaviours such as self-disclosure 
and emotional support being of substantial importance to the relationship experience 
(e.g., Berg & McQuinn, 1986; Cramer, 2004a, 2004b; Hendrick, 1981; Hendrick, 
Hendrick, & Adler, 1988). It may be then that for dismissing-avoidant individuals, a 
continual ‘obligation’ to engage in behaviours that demand a compromise on their part 
on the level of closeness they are comfortable with in order to maintain a current 
relationship may contribute towards the lesser satisfaction in their overall life 
circumstances reported here. Further to this, research outside the framework of 
attachment has identified that relationships in which there exists an inequality in 
emotional dependence between partners are predictive of less positive and more 
negative relationship-related emotion (Le & Agnew, 2001). Although partner levels of 
comfort with and desire for intimacy in their relationships is not within the empirical 
scope of the current study and is in itself a complex factor, it may be that a further 
contributory source to the lower life satisfaction reported could be due to the tensions 
that may arise from their emotional distancing from and discomfort with their partners’ 
intimacy-provoking needs. 
With the nature of the data collection being as it is, however, the specific 
mechanics behind each of the above observed patterns of similarities and differences in 
life satisfaction judgements across attachment and relationship status have not been 
directly examined. The aim of Study 1A was an exploratory examination of moderating 
factors not considered previously in attachment research investigating life satisfaction 
and the discussion here should therefore be considered as providing direction for future 
research on factors to be tested for in gaining insight into the observed interactions. 
Participant and partner reports of need fulfilment, the nature of partner interaction (for 
example, instances of support-seeking and provision, self-disclosure, tensions and 
conflict), the importance placed on relationships and partners, and the role of self-
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validation through perceived partner acceptance could all be investigated for their 
explanatory potential for the above findings. 
Study 1B 
Study 1B focused on examining differences in relationship satisfaction and its 
interactions with anxiety and avoidance in predicting differences in life satisfaction. 
Consistent with previous research, individuals fitting the secure classification reported 
the greatest satisfaction with their relationships while individuals reporting attachment-
related feelings consistent with fearful-avoidance reported the lowest relationship 
satisfaction. Individuals reporting the equivalent of preoccupied and dismissing-avoidant 
classifications reported similar levels of relationship satisfaction to each other. 
Secure individuals’ comfort with closeness and ease with relying on and trusting 
others (e.g., Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 
1998a; Simpson, 1990) should see them enjoy the most gratifying relationship 
experiences over their insecure counterparts. Indeed, as earlier discussed, previous 
research has identified secure individuals to report the greatest intimacy in their 
relationships (Mikulincer & Erev, 1991) as well as greater interdependence and 
commitment (Simpson, 1990). Due to their positive model of other in which 
expectations of significant others comprise those of responsiveness to needs and 
acceptance, as well as their positive model of self of perceptions of being worthy and 
loveable, secure individuals are cognitively equipped to comfortably turn to others for 
support and indeed report greater self-disclosure (e.g., Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; 
Pistole, 1993), report receiving higher levels of emotional and instrumental support from 
significant others and also feel comfortable in using such significant others when the 
need to do so arises (Florian et al., 1995; Larose et al., 1999; Mikulincer & Florian, 
1995; Mikulincer et al., 1993; Ognibene & Collins, 1998; Simpson et al., 1992). 
Furthermore, secure individuals gain greater benefit from their interpersonal 
interactions, reporting feeling happier and perceiving others to understand them and be 
more responsive to them than insecure individuals report (e.g., Kefetsios & Nezlak, 
2002; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 1996). When negative 
interpersonal situations are encountered (such as partner disagreement or violation of 
trust) secure individuals employ constructive resolution strategies, such as mutually-
focused integrating strategies (Feeney, 1994; Levy & Davis, 1988; O’Connell Corcoran 
& Mallinckrodt, 2000; Pistole, 1989) that limit stress and upset while maximising 
opportunities for experiencing possible emotional benefits (Mikulincer, 1998) from such 
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altercations such as increased intimacy and reduction in negative emotional arousal (see 
Fruzzetti & Jacobson, 1990, for general discussion). Taken together, it is little surprising 
then that individuals fitting this profile of low anxiety/avoidance (and therefore positive 
self/other views) should find their relationship experiences the most satisfying; their 
cognitive and behavioural proclivities enable the actualisation of the needs and wants 
that are central to them for relationship well-being.  
Fearful-avoidant individuals’ high anxiety and avoidance (and related negative 
models of both self and other) manifests negative self-perceptions coupled with views of 
others as being untrustworthy and rejecting. Such is the nature of their negative 
expectations that, despite desiring closeness to a romantic partner, they do not trust their 
intentions and so maintain an emotional distance that serves to prevent them from 
achieving the gratifying experiences that would otherwise satisfy their attachment-based 
needs and wants. On this basis alone one would expect individuals fitting this 
classification to report decreased satisfaction with their romantic relationships due to 
self-implemented limitation of emotional investment. However, there is much that has 
been identified within the attachment literature which would serve to account for the 
finding of decreased satisfaction. Indeed the literature examining interpersonal 
cognitions and behaviours has identified that individuals high in anxiety tend to make 
negative dispositional attributions for others’ behaviours, and when feeling threatened 
within their relationships experience emotional distress that manifests behavioural 
actions likely to result in conflict (Collins et al., 2006). Within such conflict situations, 
high anxiety and avoidance have also been found to be associated with less constructive 
conflict styles, negative escalation and withdrawal, dominating behaviours, and distress 
(Carnelley et al., 1994; Creasy & Hesson-McInnis, 2001; Creasy et al., 1999; Feeney, 
1994; Levy & Davis, 1988). With their distrust and tendency toward negative construal 
of partner behaviours, as well as maladaptive conflict resolution styles and adverse 
interpersonal feelings resulting from negative self/other perceptions, the fearful-avoidant 
attachment classification typifies that which is highly suggestive of dissatisfying 
relationship experiences and provides insight into the observed finding that such 
individuals indeed report lower satisfaction levels with their current relationship. 
Preoccupied and dismissing-avoidant attachment profiles contrast greatly (with the 
former encapsulating desires for high intimacy and low independence and the latter 
characterised by the opposite pattern) and yet the results from Study 1B suggest that 
individuals fitting into either of these attachment classifications experience similar levels 
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of relationship satisfaction. It is argued here that the different maladaptive attachment-
influenced cognitive and behavioural approaches to interpersonal relationships exhibited 
by individuals fitting dismissing-avoidant and preoccupied classifications produce 
similarly less satisfying relationship experiences (when compared with security-fitting 
individuals’ experiences). As earlier described, avoidance has been identified in the 
attachment literature as predicting experiencing fear of intimacy in relationships (Hazan 
& Shaver, 1987) and perceptions of interpersonal interactions as less positive compared 
to secure individuals with regards to responsiveness and level of understanding of them 
(Kafetsios & Nezlak, 2002; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 
1996). Furthermore, in conflict and relationship-threatening situations, avoidance has 
been shown to be associated with compromising and defensive withdrawal (i.e. 
distancing) strategies that allow them to by-pass feelings of distress (Creasy & Hesson-
McInnis, 2001; Creasy et al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2005; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; 
Mikulincer et al., 1993; Pistole, 1989; Radecki-Bush et al., 1993), suggesting that 
sources of interpersonal tensions are not directly addressed and have the potential to 
remain unresolved. Higher-intimacy interpersonal encounters, such as support seeking, 
are also viewed unfavourably by high-avoidant individuals and can also account for the 
observed relationship satisfaction finding in Study 1B; such individuals seek support 
less (Simpson et al., 1992) and demonstrate increased stress in response to support-
seeking situations (Rholes et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999), responding negatively to 
high-disclosing partners (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). Due to the nature of romantic 
relationships, close, emotionally intimate (be they support-seeking or relationship-
threatening) encounters are typically experienced frequently and so may account for the 
observed lower relationship satisfaction reported by dismissing-avoidant-type 
individuals. 
For individuals reporting levels of high anxiety and low avoidance (that is, a 
negative model of self and positive model of other descriptive of preoccupied 
attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)), relationships are characterised by 
emotional highs and lows including obsessive preoccupation and jealousy (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987). Their hypervigilance to partners’ availability leaves them vulnerable to 
increased sensitivity to potential threats to their relationships (Simpson et al., 1999);   
This over-reliance on partner esteem and availability would account for the findings of 
previous research characterising such individuals’ relationships as rife with highs and 
lows (feelings of happiness at perceived partner acceptance and responsiveness and 
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distress at perceived partner rejection and non-responsiveness) and is a potential insight 
into the observed decreased relationship satisfaction evidenced in Study 1B. 
Specifically, such individuals’ vulnerability to negative cognitive and affective reactions 
to partners’ behaviours that do not meet their unrealistic and stringent relationship 
conditions (Simpson & Rholes, 2004) would decrease their satisfaction (and hence 
manifest the lower relationship satisfaction compared to secures identified here), but 
their positive reactions to perceived acceptance inferred from partner responsiveness 
would provide a counterbalance to the negative (and hence increase satisfaction to above 
that which was reported by their fearful-avoidant counterparts). 
The focus of Study 1B was next on examining the interactions between anxiety, 
avoidance, and relationship satisfaction in predicting differences in life satisfaction. 
While the three-way interaction between anxiety, avoidance, and relationship 
satisfaction was not significant, relationship satisfaction’s interaction with attachment 
avoidance was. Examination of this finding revealed that individuals low in avoidance 
and indicating high ratings of relationship satisfaction reported the greatest life 
satisfaction, while individuals high in avoidance indicating lower relationship 
satisfaction ratings reported the lowest life satisfaction. This finding is consistent with 
what would be expected on a theoretical basis. However, it should be noted that within 
each high avoidance/low avoidance category, the difference in life satisfaction reported 
across perceived relationship quality was slight, suggesting that feelings of avoidance 
(that is, the extent to which one is comfortable with intimacy in their relationships) 
contributes more to the level of general satisfaction with life than does the extent to 
which one finds their current relationship satisfying. 
Interestingly, while anxiety and relationship satisfaction independently predicted 
life satisfaction, their interaction did not. A possible interpretation of this lack of an 
interaction could be that for high anxiety individuals, the perceived quality of the 
relationship they are currently in does not exert an influence on how satisfied they feel 
in their lives generally, only that they are currently in a relationship (as supported by the 
significant finding of Study 1A where high anxiety individuals (both preoccupied and 
fearful-avoidant) in relationships reported increased satisfaction over their single 
counterparts). Conversely, for low-anxiety individuals, judgements regarding overall 
satisfaction with life circumstances are not dependent upon their relationship 
experiences generally (as suggested within Study 1A) and as an extension therefore are 
also not dependent upon the experiences within those relationships. 
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Study 1C 
Having examined the potential moderating effects of relationship status and 
satisfaction on attachment-based differences in ratings of life satisfaction, the next 
empirical focus in the current series of studies was to examine change in well-being. 
Specifically, the aim of Study 1C was to investigate changes in well-being as individuals 
experience changes in their relationship circumstances, either through entering into a 
new relationship or leaving a current one. While earlier studies here focused purely on 
life satisfaction as a well-being factor, the current study included feelings of self-esteem 
as well as positive and negative affect in addition to the continued focus on life 
satisfaction. A main decision to not include examination of self-esteem and positive and 
negative affect in the earlier cross-sectional work was due to the empirical attention each 
of the three have enjoyed within the adult attachment literature in previous work. 
Indeed, much has been identified concerning differences in baseline self-esteem and 
affect (for example, baseline positivity and negativity, emotional  reactivity, and affect 
regulation) across attachment classifications (e.g., Barry et al., 2007; Bylsma et al., 
1997; Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney & Noller, 1990; Fraley & Shaver, 1997; Kotler et 
al., 1994; Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Pietromonaco & Feldman 
Barrett, 1997; Simpson et al., 2007; Van Buran & Cooley, 2002; Wei et al., 2004; Wei et 
al., 2005) that examination of baseline differences would be pure replication. However, 
much less understood is the influence of change in relationship circumstances on the 
experience of these well-being factors with even less understood concerning cognitive 
judgements of overall life quality. 
Previous research examining relationship dissolution has found attachment styles 
characterised by high anxiety to predict more negative affective experiences following a 
relationship ending (Feeney & Noller, 1992; Pistole, 1995; Sprecher et al., 1998). 
Specific post-relationship experiences include feelings of both self-reproach and partner-
blaming (Pistole, 1996), as well as emotional distress, guilt, and protest reactions of 
anger and hostility along with partner preoccupation and desire for the relationship to re-
continue (Davis et al., 2003). Attachment avoidance meanwhile has been found to 
negatively predict post-dissolution distress (Simpson, 1990) with such individuals 
favouring coping behaviours of self-reliance over support from family and friends 
(Davis et al., 2003). While this research clearly identifies the pattern of increased 
adverse affective experience in the weeks subsequent to a relationship breakdown as 
anxiety increases, the current study’s aim (Study 1C) was to be able to capture 
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individuals’ more immediate affective responses, that is, to measure feelings of positive 
and negative affect experienced within a week of a relationship ending. Conversely, the 
above research does not provide insight into how self-regard (as conceptualised through 
self-reported self-esteem) and overall satisfaction with life are impacted on in 
relationship dissolution circumstances and hence it was the aim of the current study to 
address this gap. 
To recapitulate the structure and nature of the analyses of Study 1C, individuals 
completed measures on a weekly basis that allowed for the monitoring of their 
relationship experiences (be they continuing on in a current relationship and their 
feelings of relationship satisfaction, entering into a new relationship, leaving a current 
relationship, or remaining out of a relationship) along with co-occurring feelings of 
well-being in the forms of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive and negative mood. 
Change scores in these well-being variables were created by subtracting ratings in the 
week a relationship status change had been reported from the last rating reported before 
the status change had occurred. To ensure immediate changes in well-being were being 
captured, only individuals whose pre- and post-relationship well-being ratings were 
within one week of each other were included. 
Examination of change in life satisfaction upon a relationship ending revealed that 
individuals fitting the attachment classification of preoccupation reported the greatest 
decrease in life satisfaction, followed by fearful-avoidance, dismissing-avoidance, and 
lastly security. Slopes analyses suggested however that the change scores for secure- and 
dismissing-types did not significantly differ from one another and similarly for 
preoccupied and fearful, suggesting that the major contributor to changes in perceptions 
of life quality lies in feelings of attachment anxiety. There are several theoretical factors 
both within, and that which can be applied to, the framework of attachment that can 
provide insight into the above findings. Earlier-discussed consideration of the 
importance placed on both partner and relationships for high-anxiety individuals would 
suggest that to no longer have that which is so valued would see such individuals’ 
ratings of satisfaction decrease the most. Indeed, Diener et al.’s (1985) Satisfaction with 
Life Scale includes items capturing individuals’ feelings regarding having what is 
judged important in life and the extent to which a chance to relive one’s life experiences 
would see a desire to make changes. For high-anxiety individuals then, the termination 
of a relationship (which the findings of Study 1A suggested to be a significant 
contributor to such individuals’ increased life satisfaction over their single counterparts) 
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would see a change in a central aspect of their lives that was a source of cognitive 
contentment. That previous research examining post-relationship feelings found high 
anxiety to be predictive of wishing to regain the lost relationship (Davis et al., 2003) 
draws parallels to the desire to change life circumstances encapsulated within the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale and offers further insight into the observed decreased life 
satisfaction on the basis of increased anxiety. 
A second possible perspective accounting for the observation that individuals 
characterised by high anxiety (that is, fitting into either preoccupied or fearful-avoidant 
classifications) report greater decreases in life satisfaction comes from consideration of 
the cognitive organisation of mental schema addressed by Linville’s (1985, 1987) self-
complexity model. This model sees individuals’ knowledge and awareness of self to be 
organised into multiple self-aspects that form a larger associative network, and that the 
degree of complexity, that is, the number and distinctiveness of those aspects, differs 
across individuals. Greater complexity then can be conceptualised as comprising a 
greater number of self-aspects that are highly distinctive from one another, with lower 
complexity comprising fewer self-aspects that are more enmeshed and poorly 
distinguishable. The importance this has regarding well-being changes in response to 
relationship dissolution lies in the earlier-discussed “Spillover Process” (Linville, 1987, 
p. 664) in which a negative situation that is encountered by the individual activates the 
self-aspect in their associative network that most strongly relates to it contextually. The 
consequence of this activation at such a time is that the negative cognitions and affect 
that have arisen as a result of the encounter become associated with that self-aspect. 
Further problematic for individuals whose associative networks are less complex in their 
structure with fewer, overlapping self-aspects, is that due to these less differentiated self-
aspects, a negative event experienced in one ‘spills over’ and affects the cognitive and 
affective contexts of others neighbouring them. Mikulincer (1995) identified that secure 
individuals’ self-structure comprised highly differentiated positive self-aspects, while 
avoidant individuals’ were similarly complex but their level of differentiation suggested 
low accessibility to negative self-aspects due to having fragmented, less well-connected 
associative networks. Anxious-ambivalent individuals’ networks meanwhile comprised 
fewer, poorly differentiated negative self-aspects, characterising such individuals as 
having a self-representation based only on a few highly-related entangled self attributes. 
For such individuals then, a setback relevant to one self-aspect would be expected to 
colour the cognitions of those self-aspects that overlap with it, producing stronger 
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cognitive and affective reactions than would otherwise be evident in individuals with 
more complex associative networks. When considered in the context of romantic 
relationships, an interpersonal setback presents an especially problematic situation for 
highly-anxious individuals; the hyperactivation of the attachment system in which 
models of self and other are chronically accessible should see their relationship-oriented 
self-aspects be more centralised within their associative networks, suggesting that for 
such individuals, their overall sense of self is strongly tied to their understanding of self 
within interpersonal contexts. In experiencing a relationship breakdown then, due to its 
centralised positioning, not only should highly anxious individuals’ cognitive reactions 
be greater due to the importance of their interpersonal selves in defining who they are, 
but such individuals’ negative cognitive responses should see a ‘spill over’ into 
overlapping self-aspects with the consequence of negatively influencing perceptions and 
judgements of those aspects also. In other words, having the feelings of being unlovable 
and of lesser worth confirmed through a relationship breakdown would see high-anxiety 
individuals’ negative beliefs of lesser worth arise regarding themselves in other aspects 
of their lives, producing an evaluation of greater dissatisfaction with their life overall. 
For individuals fitting secure and dismissing-avoidant classifications, meanwhile, 
self-complexity is greater; as described above, such individuals have been found to be 
characterised by highly-differentiated and numerous self-aspects. As such, a setback 
relevant to one aspect of self would be expected to impact less on overall well-being due 
to aspect distinctiveness preventing cognitive and affective spreading. In the current 
study, for individuals fitting the secure attachment classification, the experience of a 
relationship breakdown would be less detrimental to life satisfaction judgements because 
of both the level of importance placed on romantic partners and relationships as well as 
cognitive inhibition of the ‘spillover process’. That is, secure individuals’ attachment 
systems are not chronically activated as high-anxiety individuals’ systems are; while 
models of self and other are easily accessible, secure individuals do not engage in the 
hypervigilant strategies that their high-anxiety counterparts do and so it is argued that 
their aspect of self within interpersonal contexts is less centralised within their 
associative networks. As such, their sense of self is less strongly tied to their relationship 
experiences and roles and so a negative event within this context should impact less on 
their well-being overall both due to the lesser importance it has in their sense of self and 
due to their network-distinctiveness inhibiting spreading into other self-aspects. 
Furthermore, because secure individuals’ associative networks comprise a greater 
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number of self-aspects, any negative cognitions that would arise from the experience of 
a relationship breakdown could be counterbalanced by the numerous unaffected self-
aspects within their associative network. That is, other self-aspects relevant to secure 
individuals’ definition of self can serve as a cognitive buffer by the individual increasing 
the salience of the positive properties within these other aspects that contribute to their 
self-worth in which there are no current setbacks (for a general summary, see Kunda, 
1999), thus protecting against feelings of diminishing life satisfaction. 
With their more fragmented associative networks in which accessibility to self-
aspects is more limited due to greater differentiation, individuals fitting the dismissing-
avoidant classification would be expected to report the smallest decrease in life 
satisfaction when exiting a current relationship. Such individuals’ defensive suppression 
of the attachment system (in which models of self and other are denied cognitive and 
affective attention) should result in definitions of self that are not tied to their 
interpersonal self-aspects, which due to their cognitive suppression would not be 
centralised within the associative network. As such, setbacks occurring within this less 
personally significant aspect of self would be expected to have minimal impact on 
overall life satisfaction judgements, both due to the limited self-relevance of 
interpersonally-oriented self roles (with research identifying that other aspects of self, 
such as competency- and independence-related facets, are afforded more weight in self-
importance (e.g., Brennan & Morris, 1997; Mikulincer, 1998b)) and due to the 
fragmented nature of their associative networks preventing cognitive and emotional 
spreading of any negative reactions should they have arisen. However, what was 
evidenced via slopes analyses in Study 1C was that individuals’ fitting secure and 
dismissing-avoidant classifications did not significantly differ in the decrease in life 
satisfaction ratings reported subsequent to a relationship breakup (although it should be 
noted that the trend indicated that dismissing-avoidance-type attachment ratings 
produced a greater decrease than security). What is offered as a possible suggestion to 
account for this unanticipated finding is that the decrease in life satisfaction is in part a 
by-product of dismissing-avoidant individuals’ discomfort with intimacy during an 
increased-intimacy, emotion-intense situation. The dissolution of a current relationship 
is typically wrought with feelings of distress. Indeed, drawing upon attachment research 
within the developmental tradition, loss of an attachment figure is divided into three 
stages, with the immediate response to loss being one of affect-driven protest where 
crying, anxiety, and aggressiveness predominate (Bowlby, 1980). The aforementioned 
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research examining the adult experience of romantic relationship loss highlights high-
intensity feelings typically experienced during a relationship breakdown (e.g., Davis et 
al., 2003; Feeney & Noller, 1992; Sprecher et al., 1998). Avoidant individuals’ 
discomfort with situations in which level of emotional distance between self and other is 
reduced produces feelings of stress (e.g. Rholes et al., 1999). On this basis then, during a 
potentially highly stressful romantic relationship event, dismissing-avoidant individuals’ 
perceptions of the quality of their life circumstances would be expected to decrease due 
to facing an event that might force a compromise on their preference for emotional 
distance. This perspective contends then that the influencing factor on feelings of life 
satisfaction for individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant classification lies less with the 
loss represented by the separation from a significant other and more with the process of 
that separation. 
However, this speculation highlights a limitation of the current study. The above 
discussion hints at factors (i.e. the extent to which the event was stressful and 
distressing) that are relevant to relationship dissolution that might account for the 
findings of differences in change in life satisfaction judgements that are not able to be 
directly tested for. Previous research has identified that factors such as the controllability 
of the relationship breakup, which partner initiated it, and understanding of why it has 
happened are all predictive of feelings of post-dissolution distress (e.g., Collins & Clark, 
1989; Frazier & Cook, 1993; Sprecher, 1994). The data collected for the current study 
does not provide information on the nature of the relationship breakup, only that one 
took place. As such, factors likely to have an impact on well-being, such as mutuality of 
the decision, the circumstances that led to the breakup (for example, whether the 
termination was a result of gradual decline or an abrupt triggering event such as 
infidelity) are unable to be examined for their additive predictive value. As such, all 
discussion should be considered with this limitation in mind. 
The findings on changes in self-esteem were similar to those identified for life 
satisfaction; visual presentation of the slopes suggested that individuals fitting 
preoccupied and fearful-avoidant attachment classifications reported the greatest 
decrease in self-esteem (with slopes analyses suggesting the two ‘groups’ to not 
significantly differ from one another) while individuals fitting dismissing-avoidant 
reported only a slight decrease. Individuals reporting anxiety and avoidance levels 
capturing attachment security however appeared to report a slight increase (although it 
should be noted that this increase was minimal and close to zero). Given the importance 
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high anxiety individuals are suggested to place on partners and relationships for personal 
well-being (e.g., Carnelley et al., 2007; Park et al., In Press; Simpson & Rholes, 2004), 
the finding of greater decrease in self-esteem for individuals scoring high in attachment 
anxiety is theoretically consistent. As earlier discussed, high-anxiety individuals rely on 
positively-valued others’ approval and acceptance as a source of self-validation that, due 
to inconsistent caregiver responsiveness in early life, they themselves are unable to do 
autonomously. A further consequence of early caregiver inconsistency is a chronic 
activation of the attachment system (and the models of self and other therein) in which 
anxious individuals demonstrate a hypervigilance to signs of availability manifesting a 
greater sensitivity and vulnerability to partner rejection. It is the combination of 
vulnerability to rejection and reliance on significant others for validation that is 
suggested as contributing towards the decrease in self-esteem evidenced in Study 1C. 
With their negative models of self, the rejection inherent in a relationship breakdown 
and therefore loss of a romantic partner would serve to confirm feelings of lesser worth 
and lovability, resulting in the decrease in the esteem they place in themselves in the 
immediate days following the dissolution. Indeed self-esteem as conceptualised by 
Rosenberg (1965) includes sentiments of equality of worth with others, satisfaction with 
personal qualities, and feelings of being a failure that a perceived personal rejection by a 
highly-valued other would call into question. 
Given the earlier-described qualities that characterise individuals high in 
avoidance and low in anxiety (i.e. fitting dismissing-avoidance) it is perhaps surprising 
to see a romantic relationship breakdown be predictive of a decrease in feelings of self-
esteem. As with the consideration of theoretical and empirical factors that might account 
for the observed change in life satisfaction, dismissing-avoidant individuals’ suppression 
of attachment-related cognitions would suggest their sense of self to be less based on 
their interpersonally-oriented self-aspects, limiting the impact on well-being. The 
smaller decrease in self-esteem when compared to individuals fitting preoccupied and 
fearful-avoidant is indeed suggestive of the lesser importance to their definition of self. 
However, a decrease in self-esteem was still evidenced and so it is offered here then that 
perhaps in the immediate days following a relationship breakdown, dismissing-avoidant-
type individuals’ self-esteem decreases slightly not on the basis of the perceived 
rejection and confirmation of an unlovable self that is inherent in the loss of a romantic 
partner for high-anxiety individuals, but decreases due to such an event providing an 
incongruence to the positive views they hold of themselves as high in worth. 
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Lastly, the finding of individuals fitting a secure classification reporting a slight 
increase in self-esteem is perhaps a confusing one. However, as earlier stated, this 
change is slight, suggesting that relationship dissolution has limited impact on the 
evaluation of self-worth for low anxiety/avoidance individuals and is consistent with 
attachment theorising that such individuals who fit into a secure classification do not 
rely on significant others for self-validation in the way that highly anxious individuals 
do. For secure individuals with a positive view of self as worthy of love and 
responsiveness to needs, a loss of a romantic partner should not represent the personal 
rejection via confirmation of an unlovable self that it is for high-anxiety individuals. 
Indeed, secure individuals’ positive perceptions of self directly contradict such a 
possibility. Instead, the results are suggestive of the notion that in relationship 
dissolution circumstances, for securely-attached individuals, the focus of any distress 
experienced is less on what the breakup might indicate regarding the quality of their 
personal dispositions than it is on the loss of a significant other and the relationship with 
them. 
The extent to which emotional distress differs on the basis of attachment 
orientations was next examined in the form of changes in positive and negative affect. 
The results indicated that greater attachment anxiety predicted a greater decrease in 
positive mood upon a current relationship ending, while both greater anxiety and 
avoidance predicted a greater increase in negative mood. As earlier summarised, highly-
anxious individuals are less able to suppress negative affect, reporting a hypervigilance 
to sources of distress (Mikulincer et al., 1998), the experience of which is thus 
heightened (Meyer et al., 2005), which when combined with poorer abilities to regulate 
and manage emotional states (e.g., Gilliath et al., 2005; Mikulincer, 1998a; Mikulincer 
& Orbach, 1995; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005; Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004) characterises a 
general maladaptive affective experience as well as strategy in managing that 
experience. With previous research thus identifying anxious individuals’ general 
propensity for increased emotional reactivity, the current study (1C) is consistent with 
this precedent: individuals reporting increased feelings of attachment-related anxiety 
reported feeling a greater decrease in affective positivity and greater increase in affective 
negativity, reinforcing the notion of such individuals as more emotionally vulnerable to 
significant interpersonal events. Earlier theorising here of the importance placed on 
interpersonal relationships for individuals characterised by high anxiety, as well as less 
clearly defined associative networks with overlapping self-aspects allowing for 
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emotional spreading, are highly relevant in this instance in accounting for the observed 
increased emotional reactivity. For high-anxiety individuals who are characterised by a 
fear of rejection and abandonment in an aspect of their lives that is of central importance 
to them (both in terms of how they define themselves and in what is the focus of their 
cognitive attention), a greater initial emotional response would be expected, with 
“spillover” effects resultant from poorer self-complexity (Mikulincer, 1995) amplifying 
their affective experience. Conversely, for individuals low in anxiety who are 
characterised by less reactive and intense affective profiles and greater self-complexity 
than their high-anxiety counterparts (e.g., Mikulincer, 1995; Mikulincer & Orbach, 
1995), a relationship breakdown would not be expected to produce as intense an 
emotional reaction, which is supported by the lesser decrease in positive and increase in 
negative affect reported in the present study.  
It is surprising that greater attachment avoidance was found to predict a greater 
increase in negative affect after having experienced a relationship breakdown. 
Individuals high in attachment avoidance are characterised by defensive emotional 
suppression (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997), demonstrating a restrictive control of 
emotions (Kotler et al., 1994) that limits access to negative thoughts (Mikulincer & 
Orbach, 1995). In the current study then, that individuals who report feelings of 
avoidance that are typically associated with an affective strategy that suppresses 
negative emotional experience reported a greater increase in negative affect seems 
theoretically counterintuitive. However, such a finding does appear to be empirically 
consistent with previous research revealing highly-avoidant individuals to report 
increased distress during high-intimacy interpersonal interactions (e.g., Rholes et al., 
1998; Rholes et al., 1999). The relationship dissolution circumstances examined in 
Study 1C indeed encapsulate the situational properties that would provoke such feelings 
of distress and therefore may account for the increased negative mood observed.  
A limitation highlighted earlier spoke of a lack of ability to empirically examine 
the nature of the relationship breakdown captured within the data for Study 1C. 
However, two factors that were able to be empirically considered were relationship 
length and level of satisfaction with the relationship before its dissolution. It had been 
hypothesised that satisfaction with, and length of the terminated relationship, would 
moderate the association between changes in attachment anxiety and well-being 
(namely, each of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive and negative moods). The 
main effect of attachment anxiety as predictor for each of the well-being factors had 
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already been identified in earlier analyses; relationship satisfaction meanwhile was 
found only to significantly predict affective well-being, suggesting increases in 
relationship satisfaction to be predictive of greater decrease in positive and greater 
increase in negative moods. Interestingly, anxiety did not interact with relationship 
satisfaction to predict changes in any of the well-being outcome variables while no 
direct or moderated effects for length of relationship were identified either. The finding 
of relationship satisfaction’s role in influencing post-dissolution affective experience is 
intuitive; for relationships experienced as highly satisfying it would be expected that the 
loss of such a relationship would be emotionally harder for individuals due to their 
severing from a source of rewarding experiences. While it could be argued that 
separation from dissatisfying relationships might produce feelings of relief, the findings 
of the current study do not support this; that less satisfying relationships also provoked 
an increase in negative and decrease in positive moods but simply to a lesser extent is 
counterintuitive to the above notion and suggests that even separation from relationships 
that fall short of ideal can be detrimental for feelings of affective well-being. The lack of 
statistical significance in predicting changes in life satisfaction and self-esteem 
characterises relationship satisfaction’s role in the relationship breakup process as being 
influential only in the moods individuals experience. Losing a highly satisfying romantic 
relationship therefore may make an individual feel affectively worse, but their self-
regard and perceptions of overall life quality would be no different than if the 
relationship that had ended had been highly dissatisfying. 
Anxiety’s lack of interaction with relationship satisfaction in predicting changes in 
post-dissolution well-being is in keeping with the findings previously identified in the 
current series of studies. In these previous studies, anxiety did not interact with 
relationship satisfaction to predict differences in well-being when currently in a 
relationship, suggesting that when considered with the observed finding of high anxiety 
producing reports of increased life satisfaction when in a relationship, for high anxiety 
individuals the experience of being in a relationship is more important for well-being 
than experiences within that relationship. Similarly here, the results of analyses suggest 
that for high anxiety individuals, who experience greater decreases in well-being during 
relationship dissolution circumstances, the cognitive and emotional sequelae are the 
same regardless of how satisfying a relationship experience it was for them. 
The finding that length of relationship was not a significant predictor of changes in 
well-being in response to a relationship breakdown is surprising and is not consistent 
122 
 
with previous research (e.g., Simpson, 1987). Limitations in the method of relationship-
length measurement used in the current study may be attributable to the lack of 
statistically significant findings evidenced in Study 1C. Relationship length was 
measured categorically with the periods of time defined as falling into either 0-3 months, 
3-6 months, 6-12 months, 12-24 months, or ‘Longer than 24 months’ (requiring further 
specification on the length of time within this category). Forced assignment into 
categories such as these is problematic on the basis that there is no differentiation able to 
be made for inter-category variability; individuals who have been together for 6 months 
are treated the same as individuals who have been together for a year. Measuring 
relationship duration dimensionally rather than categorically is suggested to be a much 
more sensitive methodological approach that may have produced results consistent with 
previous research that the investment in a romantic relationship that is represented by 
greater duration would be an influencing factor in the level of well-being distress 
experienced upon its dissolution. 
The next focus in Study 1C was on changes in well-being upon entering into a new 
relationship. Firstly, lower anxiety and avoidance independently predicted greater 
increases in life satisfaction upon a new relationship beginning. It is interesting to note 
that it is lower insecurity (in this instance, anxiety and avoidance) that predicted less of 
an increase in feelings of life satisfaction; while for attachment avoidance such a finding 
is theoretically consistent due to high avoidance being characterised by a downplaying 
of attachment-related cognitions, affect, and experiences, for attachment anxiety it is 
perhaps at first glance intuitively counter to expectations. As earlier summarised, high 
anxiety individuals place greater importance on their relationships, with romantic 
partners being relied upon as a source of self-validation. As such, the benefit from 
perceived approval through a relationship starting with a new romantic partner would be 
expected to produce more favourable increases in life satisfaction (due to such 
interpersonal circumstances closer matching ideal conditions as captured by the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985)) than for low anxiety individuals who, 
while still value their interpersonal experiences, place less importance on them. 
However, further consideration of this finding suggests this result can be interpreted in a 
way that is in fact in keeping with previous research. Within the adult attachment 
literature it has been identified that individuals high in anxiety demonstrate a negative 
cognitive bias (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003 for discussion of negative biases in social 
judgements). With regards to interpersonally-oriented situations, such individuals’ 
123 
 
hypervigilance resulting from chronically-activated attachment systems result in greater 
sensitivity to partners’ behaviours and, due to their negative models of self, to signs of 
rejection and disapproval. As such, it may be that the lesser increase in life satisfaction 
may be a result of higher-anxiety individuals’ negative biases emerging at this initial 
stage of the new relationship serving to limit the benefit to life quality perceptions that 
low-anxiety individuals are able to enjoy. 
Worthy of note upon examination of the slopes is that the patterns for anxiety and 
avoidance are similar: high anxiety predicted a similar increase in life satisfaction as 
high avoidance, while low anxiety evidenced the same as low avoidance also. On the 
basis of earlier theorising in which greater affective and cognitive reactivity should be 
expected on the basis of increased anxiety, the current results suggest that life 
satisfaction judgments in response to a positive interpersonal event are equivalent on the 
bases of anxiety and avoidance.  However, while the life satisfaction outcomes may be 
equivalent, the underlying processes accounting for these similarities in increases are 
suggested as originating from differing cognitive sources. Indeed, both theoretically and 
empirically these two attachment dimensions differ markedly from one another and 
therefore inherent in this is the notion that the psychological routes from interpersonal 
experience to cognitive reaction should differ. It may be that for high anxiety 
individuals, the importance of relationship and partner experiences to them would see a 
benefit to life satisfaction judgements, but that this benefit would be tempered by the 
very anxiety about such experiences that characterises their attachment profile. That 
individuals lower in attachment anxiety reported a greater comparative increase is 
supportive of this notion. For individuals high in avoidance meanwhile, their smaller 
increase in comparison to low-avoidance individuals is argued instead to be reflective of 
their defensive lesser importance placed on romantic relationship and partner 
experiences. Future research would benefit from examining the underlying mechanics of 
the observed changes here to gain further insight into the processes governing 
individuals’ anxiety- and avoidance-based differences in life satisfaction changes. As 
earlier discussed, the aim of the current series of studies was an exploration into 
interpersonal factors that might serve to moderate the underexplored association 
between adult attachment and life satisfaction, as well as further explore the moderating 
effect on the more established well-being factors of self-esteem and positive and 
negative moods. As such, the discussion here, while theoretically and empirically 
tenable, is speculative. The predictive value of romantic relationship experiences 
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identified here (thus far, relationship status, satisfaction, dissolution and 
commencement) provide insight into the cognitive and affective well-being processes 
taking place and the subsequent discussion should therefore be used to provide direction 
for future empirical examination. 
Similar to life satisfaction, both attachment anxiety and avoidance independently 
predicted change in self-esteem. Plotting of the slopes suggested low anxiety to predict 
an increase, but for high anxiety the change in self-esteem was close to zero.  This 
finding for attachment anxiety is particularly noteworthy when considered in 
conjunction with self-esteem change in response to relationship dissolution. In this 
circumstance, high anxiety individuals (that is, individuals fitting into either preoccupied 
or fearful-avoidant attachment classifications) reported a markedly greater decrease in 
self-esteem in response to a relationship breakdown compared to their low-anxiety 
counterparts (i.e. secure- and dismissing-avoidant-type individuals). In relationship entry 
circumstances, however, high anxiety shows minimal change in self-esteem. It appears 
then that while high anxiety individuals’ self-regard suffers upon losing a highly-valued 
other, their self-views gain little benefit from starting a new relationship with a new 
other. This pair of results then further reinforces the theoretical contention that high-
anxiety individuals demonstrate a negative cognitive bias: a negative relationship 
experience has a greater detrimental impact on perceptions of self-worth and esteem 
than a positive relationship experience has a beneficial impact. That is, despite a new 
romantic relationship in principal representing a form of ‘other’ acceptance due to the 
liking inherent in romantic interest, high anxiety individuals appear not to cognitively 
attend to and utilise this information in a way that would otherwise see a more positive 
evaluation of self-qualities. A rejection in the form of a relationship breakdown, 
however, appears to be interpreted more directly as reflecting negatively on self-value, 
producing feelings of being intrinsically a failure, of having limited worth, and being 
dissatisfied with the qualities they have to offer. Further anxiety-based limitations to 
well-being improvements were evidenced in positive and negative mood changes, with a 
lesser increase in the former and close to zero change in the latter (see Figures 14 and 
15). High-anxiety individuals have been identified in previous research to report lower 
positive and higher negative moods (e.g., Barry et al., 2007) and it appears from the 
results of Study 1C that a positive interpersonal experience such as new relationship 
formation does little to ameliorate this affective state of mind. Conversely, as with self-
esteem, as anxiety increases, a negative relationship experience impacts more on 
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affective well-being, with a greater decrease in positive mood and a greater increase in 
negative mood reported. 
The results of the remaining well-being analyses and plotting of slopes for the 
relationship entry sample indicated low avoidance to be predictive of a greater increase 
in self-esteem and a greater increase in positive mood over high avoidance; avoidance 
was not found to be significantly predictive of change in negative mood. Smaller 
decreases in positive mood and self-esteem as avoidance increases is consistent with 
theoretical expectations; highly-avoidant individuals place less importance on their 
relationship experiences and are characterised by a defensive downplaying of affective 
experience. However, the discomfort with intimacy and desire for emotional distance 
that is encapsulated within high avoidance might appear incongruent with the increases 
evidenced here, as a new relationship typically represents increased opportunity and 
expectancies of high-intimacy experiences. On this basis it could be argued then that, 
although the increases were reduced in comparison to low-avoidance, any increase is 
perhaps counter-theoretical. However, research outside of attachment theory examining 
interpersonal processes argue that early-stage relationships are typically characterised by 
physical, rather than emotional, closeness with couples desiring close contact and 
physical intimacy (e.g., Berscheid, 1985) and so perhaps it is the case that the immediate 
first few days of a new relationship see limited opportunity for avoidant individuals’ 
discomfort with emotional intimacy to arise, which would otherwise adversely impact 
on their cognitive and affective well-being. 
The final analyses of Study 1C examined the moderating effect of satisfaction with 
the new relationship in predicting anxiety-based differences in subjective well-being 
changes. Regression analyses indicated that while both attachment anxiety and 
relationship satisfaction independently predicted well-being changes when entering into 
a new relationship, their interaction did not. Specifically for relationship satisfaction, the 
beta coefficients suggested that as satisfaction with the new relationship increases, the 
patterns emerged of greater increases in life satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive mood, 
and greater decrease in negative mood. Such findings are intuitive; to enter into a new 
relationship that is highly satisfying and meets relationship ideals (concepts 
encapsulated by the relationship questionnaire utilised in the current study) should see 
perceptions of life quality (e.g., being satisfied with life conditions) increase, opinions of 
self-value improve due to the esteem gained from having a perceived high-quality 
relationship experience, and mood improve due to the rewarding nature of pleasant 
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interpersonal events. Conversely, to enter into a new relationship that is highly 
dissatisfying should produce less favourable evaluations of life quality due to 
experiencing less than ideal interpersonal circumstances, less benefit to self-esteem on 
the basis of a low quality relationship providing limited opportunity for being able to 
derive positive inferences of self-attributes, and produce unfavourable hedonic states 
due to a less pleasant romantic experience. That attachment anxiety did not interact with 
ratings of perceived relationship quality further reinforces the earlier-ascribed notion 
that, for high-anxiety individuals, the experience of a new relationship is more 
influential on well-being than experiences in a new relationship, and for low-anxiety 
individuals that experiences within a new relationship, regardless if they are satisfying 
or dissatisfying, do not contribute positively or adversely to their overall feelings of 
subjective contentment.  
Study 1D 
Once changes in well-being in response to changes in relationship status had been 
examined, the final focus of Study 1 (1D) was to examine changes in well-being over 
time. Specifically, rather than the immediate changes in subjective well-being in 
response to recent status change examined in Study 1C, this final study aimed to look at 
changes in well-being in the subsequent weeks.  
First, for ratings of life satisfaction in the weeks following relationship dissolution, 
the results of multi-level modelling analyses and plotting of slopes revealed that 
individuals fitting a secure attachment classification did not report a significant change; 
that is, their judgements concerning the overall quality of their lives remained steady in 
the weeks subsequent to their romantic relationship ending. Similarly, although 
reporting a lower level of baseline satisfaction, individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant 
classification also did not report any changes in life satisfaction judgements (with slopes 
analyses confirming the trajectories to be non-significant). Where changes in life 
satisfaction judgements did occur is with individuals fitting dismissing-avoidant and 
preoccupied attachment classifications: for both individuals high in anxiety/low in 
avoidance (preoccupied) and low in anxiety/high in avoidance (dismissing-avoidant), 
ratings of overall satisfaction with life increased over time. However, the trajectory for 
dismissing-avoidance indicated rate of increase to be greater than that plotted for 
preoccupation, suggesting the rate of cognitive well-being “recovery” from relationship 
dissolution for the former attachment group to be quicker than for the latter.  
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Insight into these findings may be provided through consideration of the earlier-
discussed research of Lyubormirsky et al. (2006) who found feelings of life satisfaction 
to differ on the basis of cognitive strategies employed in processing of personally 
significant life events, namely, writing or talking about the event in comparison to 
simply thinking about it. Research within the subjective well-being literature generally 
finds that individuals benefit from writing and talking about negative experiences they 
have encountered (e.g., Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Murray & Segal, 1994) but do not 
benefit from simply thinking about such experiences (see Lyubormirsky & Tkach, 
2004). The basis of this notion lies in the contention that openly talking or writing about 
negative experiences requires an analysis of the events and labelling of the emotions the 
event has caused in order to create a coherent narrative of it. This then provides a mental 
structure to the experience that allows for the emotional resolution, or acceptance, that 
permits recovery of well-being (e.g., Pennebaker & Graybeal, 2001; Swinkels & 
Guiliano, 1995). Conversely, the strategy of only thinking about the negative experience 
does not require the same attentional resources and depth of analysis in creating a 
structured narrative, typically resulting in intrusive, repetitive, and prolonged negative 
rumination that is aversive to subjective well-being recovery (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1994) through prolonging negative mood, exaggerating negative thoughts and 
memories, and leading to greater negative future expectations (e.g., Lyubormirsky et al., 
1998; Lyubormirsky & Nolen-Hoeksma, 1995; Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004; 
Segerstrom et al., 2003). On this basis, it was reasoned here that, due to previous 
research finding that anxious individuals tend to engage in ruminative thinking (e.g., 
Brown & Phillips, 2005; Saffrey & Ehrenberg, 2007), individuals fitting a preoccupied 
attachment classification would demonstrate a slower rate of cognitive and emotional 
recovery after experiencing a relationship breakdown. Indeed, the current results for life 
satisfaction are supportive of this argument. It may be that dwelling on the negative 
relationship event itself and ruminating on the nature of the circumstances both 
exaggerates the affective memory of it (influencing current state of mind) and prolongs 
the recovery process through self-inflicted impediment to the resolution of those 
feelings. With the focus of ruminative thought in the weeks subsequent to a negative 
relationship event being on that very experience, an individual’s feelings of satisfaction 
with their life circumstances would be expected to take longer to improve over time. 
However, for the individual fitting a dismissing-avoidant attachment classification 
whose cognitive processing style is one of defensive suppression and non-attention to 
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attachment-related feelings and experiences, the rate of recovery regarding assessment 
of life quality would be expected to be quicker due to the thoughts and feelings 
surrounding the adverse experience being given little cognitive attention and therefore 
imparting less influence on life satisfaction judgements as time progresses. Furthermore, 
for such individuals whose relationship experiences are defensively afforded little 
weight with regards to importance to the self, and the findings of Study 1A suggesting 
life satisfaction for such individuals to be higher when not in a relationship than when 
in, the greater rate of increase in comparison to preoccupied-type individuals is 
theoretically and empirically consistent. Additionally, it was earlier suggested that 
perhaps for individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant attachment classification, post-
relationship cognitive distress could be attributed more to the process of the relationship 
breakdown than to the loss of their romantic partner, which might further account for the 
quicker rate of life satisfaction increase observed. 
For individuals low in anxiety and avoidance (secure-type), the finding that life 
satisfaction remained steadily high over time is also in keeping with theory and research. 
As earlier discussed, previous research has identified that secure individuals are 
comfortable with self-disclosure and use others as a source of support (e.g., Larose et al., 
1999; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; Mikulincer et al., 1993; Simpson et al., 1992). With 
the research of Lyubormirsky et al. (2006) cited above suggesting that individuals who 
talk about their negative experiences see benefits to their life satisfaction, it is possible 
that a contributor to secure-type individuals’ steadily high life satisfaction is their 
comfort with seeking support from others and openly discussing their attachment-related 
thoughts and feelings regarding their ended relationship. A further potential possibility 
contributing to the present findings comes from the results of Study 1A. Here, secure-
type individuals were identified as reporting similar life satisfaction regardless of 
whether they were in a relationship or not, suggesting that life satisfaction does not 
hinge upon the experience of a romantic relationship. The current finding of steadily 
high life satisfaction might therefore be a further reflection of such individuals giving 
less weight to relationship experiences when considering their satisfaction with life 
circumstances. This is not to suggest that such individuals share dismissing-avoidant-
types’ lesser importance when it comes to relationships. Rather, as earlier described, 
secure-type individuals’ more complex associative networks in which their relationship 
self-concepts are suggested to not be in a centralised position result in their sense of self 
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being understood through various social contexts rather than strongly tied to their 
relationship experiences. 
Lastly, for individuals high in both anxiety and avoidance (fearful-avoidant), the 
finding that judgements of life satisfaction remained steadily low across time is 
consistent with hypotheses. With fearful-avoidant individuals’ high anxiety, it would be 
expected that, similar to preoccupied types, such individuals would engage in ruminative 
thinking, prolonging the cognitive and emotional resolution of attachment-related 
thoughts and feelings that have arisen from experiencing a relationship breakdown. 
However, unlike preoccupied-type individuals in the current study, fearful-avoidant 
reported no increase in life satisfaction across time. This difference in trajectories is 
suggested to be accountable by differing levels of avoidance producing different post-
relationship strategies with regards to support-seeking. Fearful-type individuals’ high 
avoidance suggests an aversion to self-disclosure and relying on others for support, 
whereas preoccupied-type individuals’ low avoidance suggests no such aversion. It may 
be then, that while preoccupied individuals demonstrate ruminative tendencies, their 
comfort with the closeness inherent in personal disclosure and emotional support might 
provide enough of a counterbalance to allow gradual improvements in perceptions of life 
quality over time. That is, while engaging in ruminative thought processes in the time 
period subsequent to experiencing a relationship breakdown, their comfort with 
disclosing with others may see a gradual improvement in life satisfaction as the issues 
begin to resolve. With fearful individuals’ avoidance producing a discomfort with such 
interactions, it may be that their life satisfaction perceptions remain resilient to 
improvements over time due to their distancing behaviours preventing the emotional and 
cognitive resolution that comes with disclosure. 
However, the above discussion regarding preoccupied and fearful-avoidant 
individuals’ support seeking behaviours should be considered within the context that, 
while some studies have found evidence of anxious individuals demonstrating support-
seeking behaviours, the research on this topic is inconsistent (see Feeney & Collins, 
2004) and is an area requiring more empirical attention. The above discussion therefore 
is speculative and should therefore be read as providing a potential direction for future 
work. 
The findings for self-esteem mirrored those identified for life satisfaction: 
individuals fitting a secure classification reported no change in self-esteem, remaining 
steadily high across time, while individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification 
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similarly reported no change over time, remaining steadily low. For dismissing-
avoidant- and preoccupied-type individuals, both reported increases across time, with 
the former reporting a greater rate of increase than the latter. Similarly, then, it is 
proposed that the mechanisms described above as being potential contributors to the 
observed results for life satisfaction are applicable here; for high-anxiety preoccupied- 
and fearful-types, the rate of recovery regarding feelings of self are more prolonged due 
to both the central relevance relationships have for concepts of self and the ruminative 
tendencies they engage in preventing the resolution of post-relationship feelings that are 
detrimental to their perceptions of self-worth. Furthermore, fearful-avoidant individuals’ 
self-implemented isolation from others’ emotional support is argued to further contribute 
to their steadily low self-esteem through not gaining the benefits provided by support-
seeking. It may also be that their distancing behaviours from others, although intentional 
on their own part due to their fears of being rejected, may be negatively interpreted via 
their general negative cognitive bias (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003) as reinforcing the 
negative views they hold of themselves as unlovable and unworthy of others’ 
receptiveness. Such a bias would then see feelings of self-worth remain low in the weeks 
having experienced a rejection in the form of a relationship termination and could 
further account for the lack of increase in esteem identified in Study 1D. Future work 
examining post-relationship self-esteem would benefit from directly examining the 
cognitive mechanisms taking place that might provide empirical insight into the 
observed findings here. 
Next, examination of change in positive and negative moods identified individuals 
fitting a secure attachment classification reported the highest positive mood but with a 
slight decrease across time and the lowest negative mood with no change. Individuals 
fitting a fearful-avoidant classification reported no change in either their low positive 
mood or elevated negative mood. Dismissing- and preoccupied-type individuals’ 
trajectories of positive and negative moods complemented one another; both attachment 
types reported increasing positive mood over time (with dismissing reporting a greater 
rate than preoccupied) and also each reported decreasing negative mood (with 
preoccupied-type individuals this time reporting the greater rate of change). 
Given secure-type individuals’ earlier-identified resilience with regards to life 
satisfaction and self-esteem judgements, it is perhaps surprising that such individuals 
reported a slight decrease in positive mood across time. This is counter to expectations 
of such individuals’ positive mood remaining steadily high. One possible interpretation 
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of this result could be that it is due to being an outcome of the desire for close 
relationships that is encapsulated by their low avoidance. While earlier studies here 
suggested that the experience of and desire for close relationships does not appear to 
influence cognitive well-being, the result here for secure-type individuals suggests that 
as length of time without a romantic relationship increases, positive affectivity is 
impacted upon, manifesting a slight decrease across time. That is, while perceptions of 
general life quality and self-worth are not affected and remain favourable, in the weeks 
subsequent to a relationship breakdown, positive mood, while remaining higher than 
other insecure-type classifications, slightly worsens. This suggests then that such 
individuals may miss the experience of being romantically involved with another in such 
a way to influence their general positivity in mood but not enough to affect how they see 
themselves or their life circumstances. It should be noted that the decrease in positive 
mood was slight, however, which could be suggestive of such individuals’ adaptive 
management and regulation of affective experience in which positive mood is 
maintained (e.g., Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004). Indeed, the additional finding of no change 
across time in negative mood, which was lower than each of the other insecure 
classification types, is further in keeping with a general adaptive affective regulation and 
management style. 
Individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification reported trajectories similar to 
life satisfaction and self-esteem, reporting no change across time for either of positive or 
negative mood, with the former remaining steadily low and the latter steadily high. This 
finding further reinforces the earlier identified adverse cognitive well-being states 
reported by high anxiety/avoidance individuals, suggesting that the earlier-described 
potential mechanisms of rumination and non-support-seeking may further manifest 
steady low positive and high negative moods. 
The pattern of trajectory replication continued with preoccupied- and dismissing-
type individuals, with both attachment types reporting increases in positive and 
decreases in negative moods. However what is interesting to note is that, in the case of 
negative mood change, individuals fitting a preoccupied attachment classification 
reported the greater rate of decrease over their dismissing-avoidant counterparts (with 
the reverse pattern true for positive mood change). This may be a reflection, however, of 
the findings of negative mood change evidenced in Study 1C on the basis of high 
anxiety. To recapitulate, greater anxiety predicted a greater increase in negative mood 
upon a relationship ending, which was put forward as reflecting such individuals’ 
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maladaptive affective reactivity tendencies. The greater rate of decrease in negative 
mood might therefore be a result of this immediate stronger affective response in the 
days after a relationship breakdown. 
The final sets of analyses for Study 1D examined changes in well-being scores in 
the weeks subsequent to a new relationship forming. Attachment avoidance was found 
to predict change in life satisfaction, with low avoidance predicting increases in life 
satisfaction ratings and high avoidance predicting decreases in ratings. This latter 
finding is particularly interesting as it identifies that the longer a highly-avoidant 
individual remains in a close, romantic relationship, the less satisfied they feel with their 
life circumstances. As suggested within Hypothesis 2, a reason for this finding could lie 
in the changing levels of intimacy that are typically experienced as romantic 
relationships progress. Berscheid (1985) put forward that the early stages of romantic 
relationships are typified by closeness that is physical, rather than emotional, in nature 
with couples demonstrating behaviours suggestive of desire for close physical contact 
and intimacy. It is as the relationship progresses that intimacy needs increase (e.g., 
Reedy et al., 1981). Indeed, within an adult attachment perspective specifically, Hazan 
and Zeifman (1999) draw parallels between the infant development of attachment bonds 
and that which develops between couple members. They argue that the very initial stage 
of a relationship, which is characterised by an initial attraction and subsequent flirtation, 
is less governed by individuals’ attachment systems as it is by individuals’ sexual 
mating systems. This is not to say that the attachment system has no role at this early 
period. Indeed, Hazan and Zeifman highlight that certain behavioural characteristics, 
such as warmth, responsiveness, and reciprocal liking (e.g., Aron, Dutton, Aron, & 
Iverson, 1989; Backman & Secord, 1959; Clark, Shaver, & Abrahams, 1999; Curtis & 
Miller, 1986) captured within attachment theory are highly relevant, but argue that early 
interactions are foremost governed by sexual drives, producing psychological and 
physical states of heightened arousal akin to infatuation. It is after a time that couple 
interactions become more psychologically intimate and change from arousing to 
calming. Comforting exchanges take place, and self-disclosure of personal information, 
feelings, and experiences begin to frequent (Altman & Taylor, 1973), which Hazan and 
Zeifman (1999) suggest leads to the development of the relationship serving as a safe 
haven. From this description then, the findings of decreasing life satisfaction for highly-
avoidant individuals as time in a new relationship progresses appears theoretically 
coherent. As romantic interactions progress from mainly the physical to more emotional, 
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with partners divulging personal thoughts and feelings and looking for emotional 
reassurance and support, such a transition might see the activation of highly-avoidant 
individuals’ attachment systems that then require defensive suppression because of the 
feelings of discomfort with closeness and intimacy that arise. Being presented with such 
distress-inducing situations (e.g. Rholes et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999) that avoidant 
individuals have been identified as responding negatively to and as reporting disliking 
partners who engage in such high-disclosing behaviour (Mikulincer & Nachson, 1991) 
would see perceptions of, and satisfaction with, life quality decrease. However, for low-
avoidance individuals, who rather than experience discomfort with intimacy instead 
actively desire it, the increase in the above-described intimacy-promoting behaviours 
would see judgements of life satisfaction increase due to the relationship they are 
currently in providing them with the romantic experiences they enjoy. 
The findings of analyses focusing on changes in self-esteem identified attachment 
anxiety as a significant predictor, with low anxiety individuals reporting a slight increase 
across time. While visual presentation of the slopes suggested high anxiety to 
demonstrate a slight decrease in self-esteem across time, slopes analyses revealed this 
decline to be non-significant. Considering the finding for low-anxiety individuals, it may 
be that the first few weeks of a new relationship, which sees the development of 
intimacy-promoting behaviours such as the aforementioned self-disclosure and comfort- 
and support-seeking, confirm the positive models of self such individuals hold (that is, 
beliefs of being worthy of love and responsiveness to needs). Therefore it may be that 
the finding of increases in judgements of self-esteem is a manifestation of partner 
responsiveness to attachment needs.  
No significant results were found for changes in positive mood, but an interaction 
approaching significance between anxiety and avoidance for negative mood change 
revealed that, for individuals fitting the secure classification, the first few weeks of 
being in a new relationship saw reports of a steady low negative mood with no change 
across time. Individuals fitting dismissing-avoidance reported the next lowest negative 
mood that decreased across time, with preoccupied-type individuals reporting a similar 
pattern, but at a higher baseline level. Lastly, individuals fitting the fearful-avoidant 
classification reported the highest negative mood, and that which increased across time. 
The finding that individuals fitting a dismissing-avoidant classification reported a 
decrease in negative mood is perhaps surprising and counter to earlier findings; 
individuals reporting high avoidance (that characterises dismissing-avoidance) reported 
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decreasing levels of life satisfaction, but here reported negative mood change that 
seemingly contradicts this pattern. It may be that, despite the increasing intimacy that 
typically develops as a relationship progresses being contrary to dismissing-avoidant 
individuals’ acceptable comfort levels, such behaviours still give rise to confirmation of 
a loveable self and hence produces affective changes in the form of decreasing negative 
mood. Furthermore, in their review of the attachment literature examining romantic 
partner preferences, Holmes and Johnson (2009) put forward that the motive of self-
enhancement (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Greenwald, 1980; Jones, 1973; Kaplan, 1975) 
may play a role in accounting for partner attractiveness and relationship maintenance. 
The applicability with regards to the current finding is that, while intimacy-seeking 
behaviours go against highly avoidant individuals’ low-intimacy goals, such behaviours 
could be argued to be a source of self-enhancement through the positive feedback 
implied in such behaviour. Why such self-enhancement principles would manifest only 
changes in negative mood and not produce parallel changes in self-esteem and positive 
mood is as yet unclear. Future research examining changes in well-being, in particular in 
this instance negative mood, might benefit from considering this theoretical framework 
for gaining further insight into the observed patterns here. 
That individuals fitting a preoccupied attachment classification reported a similar 
decrease in negative mood, although at a slower rate, as dismissing-avoidant-type 
individuals could further support the notion of early relationship behaviours progressing 
in levels of intimacy as being a potential contributor. Such individuals’ slower rate of 
decrease could be due to the nature of their high anxiety. As earlier described, high-
anxiety individuals have been identified as demonstrating a negative bias in their 
responses to and interpretations of interactions with others (e.g. Pietromonaco & 
Feldman Barrett, 1997; Kafetsios & Nezlek, 2002) but not to the extent that they prevent 
themselves entirely from responding positively to partners’ positive behaviours (e.g. 
Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003, as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005). Therefore, their 
slower rate of negative mood decrease could be a function of this negative tendency in 
partner behaviour construal; the developing intimacy in the new relationship would see 
negative mood decrease, but their hypervigilance and vulnerability to signs of rejection 
(e.g., Kafetsios & Nezlek, 2002; Simpson et al., 1999) could account for their negative 
mood decreasing comparatively more slowly than was evidenced by dismissing-
avoidant-types. 
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Individuals fitting a fearful-avoidant classification were the only ‘group’ to report 
an increase in negative mood. Earlier work here identified high anxiety/avoidance 
individuals to report the lowest relationship satisfaction (see Figure 4), which was 
suggested as potentially resulting from their maintaining an emotional distance despite 
desires for emotional closeness, the negative feelings regarding both themselves and 
significant others, a negative bias in the attributions they make regarding others’ 
behaviours, and maladaptive conflict resolution styles. With their romantic profile 
seemingly rife with sources of tension, this might account for the observed increase in 
negative mood. Furthermore, their distrust of the intentions of others in combination 
with their negative perceptions of self as unworthy of love might prevent them from 
gaining the same self-enhancement benefits from positive, intimacy-promoting partner 
behaviours that dismissing- and preoccupied-type individuals are argued to enjoy. 
Lastly, secure-type individuals’ steadily low negative mood is in keeping with the 
previously-identified patterns that are suggestive of a general positive state of well-being 
that seems little influenced by romantic relationship experience. 
Summary 
Taken altogether, Studies 1A through to 1D outlined an interesting romantic 
relationship experience profile for each of the attachment classifications that can be 
derived from anxiety’s interaction with avoidance. Individuals fitting a secure 
attachment classification report experiencing the most satisfying romantic relationships 
out of each of the potential classifications and while also report the highest life 
satisfaction, the extent to which they find their relationships satisfying does not interact 
with their low anxiety to influence life quality perceptions. Not only do the experiences 
within their relationships seemingly not influence their feelings of satisfaction with their 
lives but also neither does simply having a relationship. That is, their overall satisfaction 
with their lives does not appear to hinge upon having access to sources of romantic 
interaction as their life satisfaction is equally high whether in a relationship or not. Upon 
experiencing a relationship breakdown, their life satisfaction and self-esteem change 
minimally, while their low anxiety suggests they experience only little adverse change in 
positive and negative moods. When entering into a new relationship, however, their low 
anxiety and avoidance suggests their positivity in life satisfaction and self-esteem 
increase. This together seems to offer a possible interpretation of secure attachment 
representing a resilience against potential sources of cognitive and affective discontent 
and ability to enjoy the positive. That is, neither being without a romantic relationship 
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nor experiencing a dissatisfying one produces lower well-being ratings, but positive 
experiences, such as new relationship formation, see well-being improve upon already 
elevated levels. 
For individuals whose anxiety and avoidance are opposite to those characterised 
by security (i.e. fearful-avoidant), the romantic relationship profile is far less favourable. 
Individuals fitting the fearful-avoidant attachment classification report experiencing both 
the lowest relationship satisfaction and lowest life satisfaction. Despite reporting the 
lowest satisfaction in their relationships, being in a relationship saw a higher life 
satisfaction reported than when not, suggesting that despite finding romantic experiences 
less gratifying, their life circumstances are viewed more favourably for having them. 
Relatedly, similar to secure-type individuals, their level of anxiety was not found to 
significantly interact with relationship satisfaction in predicting life satisfaction, 
suggesting such individuals to demonstrate a different type of resilience to relationship 
experiences. That is, despite their high anxiety seeing them desire close relationships 
with others, regardless of the nature of their experiences within those relationships, their 
high anxiety seemingly ensures that their life satisfaction is not influenced and so 
remains low.  Upon experiencing a relationship breakdown, both their life satisfaction 
and self-esteem suffer, demonstrating the greatest decrease (alongside preoccupied-
types) in both. This is particularly noteworthy when considered in conjunction with their 
reports of self-esteem and life satisfaction in the weeks subsequent to this relationship 
event; fearful-type individuals do not report change in either of the well-being constructs 
during the time observed after relationship dissolution, suggesting that the confirmation 
of perceptions of both negative self and other that may be inferred from such an event 
sees a longer-lasting detrimental effect on cognitive well-being. That affective well-
being stays similarly steadily unfavourable reinforces this. It would be interesting for 
future work to further examine longer-term changes in well-being by following changes 
across several romantic relationships. For example, on the basis of cognitive and 
affective well-being staying steadily low for high anxiety/avoidance individuals in the 
weeks after a relationship dissolution experience, it may be that in subsequent 
relationships, having observed here that dissolution produces an immediate substantial 
decrease, baseline levels are lower still. A further possibility might also be that cognitive 
and affective recovery from romantic relationship dissolution only starts to occur at a 
time point beyond that captured within Study 1D, a conjecture that future work could 
also provide insight into. Lastly, upon entering into a new relationship, although the high 
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anxiety and avoidance that characterises this attachment classification independently 
does see increases in life satisfaction and positive mood, the minimal change in self-
esteem is an additional indication of such individuals’ attachment profile representing 
impediment to the positive experience that secure individuals enjoy. That their self-
esteem suffers upon leaving a current relationship but does not increase upon entering 
into a new one further highlights such individuals’ negative bias producing adverse 
subjective well-being profiles. 
Although preoccupied-type individuals’ well-being profiles are similar, the results 
across the four present studies indicate that individuals fitting this typology, while 
demonstrate maladaptive tendencies, do benefit from their romantic experiences also. 
Such individuals report higher life and relationship satisfaction than fearful-type 
individuals but lower than the remaining two attachment classifications. Similar to 
fearful individuals, they report higher life satisfaction when in a relationship than not, 
and their shared high anxiety produces the same lack of influence of relationship 
satisfaction on their judgements of overall life quality. However, their low avoidance 
does see life satisfaction ratings increase as time within a new relationship progresses, 
suggesting that their life perceptions do benefit as their early-stage experiences start 
increasing in the emotional intimacy they are comfortable with and desire. When 
considered together, the current set of results appear to present preoccupied-type 
individuals as able to gain life satisfaction benefits from the signs of partner 
responsiveness implied in early-stage increases in intimacy, but that whether they find 
such romantic interactions generally satisfying or not does not serve as a reference point 
for their reported life satisfaction judgements. 
Lastly, their high anxiety sees their self-esteem gain little benefit from the 
acceptance inherent in a new relationship forming with a romantic partner but sees a 
greater decrease upon losing a current partner (reinforcing that such individuals do 
appear to demonstrate a negative cognitive bias). However, despite their stronger 
cognitive and affective reactions to relationship dissolution, unlike their fearful-avoidant 
counterparts, such individuals do report recovery in mood, self, and life perceptions 
across time.  
Finally, dismissing-avoidant individuals’ relationship and well-being profiles 
reinforce previous studies’ findings that suggest such individuals find the processes 
encapsulated within romantic experience to cause discomfort. While reporting life 
satisfaction lower only to secure-type individuals, as with other insecure-types their 
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relationship experiences do appear to impact upon their cognitive and affective well-
being. Life quality is rated to be superior when not in a relationship than when in, and 
the high avoidance that characterises them suggests that the longer they remain in a 
romantic relationship, the less favourable their life satisfaction judgements become. This 
latter point is particularly interesting in considering the high avoidance and low anxiety-
based life satisfaction ratings when entering into a new relationship. This suggests that 
the low anxiety/high avoidance profile that characterises dismissing-avoidant individuals 
should see that life quality perceptions increase upon entering into a new relationship, 
but that as the experiences within that relationship give rise to their discomfort with 
closeness (as such relationships become more emotionally intimate), their judgements 
regarding how satisfied they feel in their life circumstances decrease. Upon leaving a 
current relationship, their changes in feelings of life satisfaction and self-esteem are 
similar to those reported by secure-type individuals. Previous research has identified that 
secure and dismissing-avoidant individuals report similar levels of self-esteem but, as 
earlier discussed, the findings of such research suggests that the former attachment 
group’s level represents ‘true’ self-esteem while the latter’s represents a defensive 
mechanism against their insecurity. Similar here then, dismissing-type individuals’ 
similar reports of self-esteem and life satisfaction decreases could be further evidence of 
the defensive nature of their attachment systems.  
In sum, there was much highlighted within the current set of studies regarding the 
interactions between adult attachment and relationship experiences in predicting 
differences in subjective well-being. The aim of the above studies was to explore 
interpersonal moderators in the associations between attachment and life satisfaction 
identified in previous research, and to include additional well-being factors put forward 
as important within the subjective well-being literature. The above discussion of the 
findings is hoped to provide direction for future work to further examine and test for 
which specific mechanisms might account for the observed differences. Potential 
empirical avenues earlier suggested would be beneficial. Furthermore, qualitative work 
analysing the content of individuals’ accounts of their post-relationship experiences may 
provide deeper insight in the differing bases of secure- and dismissing-type individuals’ 
cognitive and affective well-being in the immediate subsequent weeks, as well as for 
preoccupied and fearful types. 
Discussion earlier highlighted a few limitations of the current study, such as the 
issue of relationship-length measurement and the nature of measures used preventing 
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direct testing of the theoretical mechanisms put forward in the discussion section. A 
further limitation that must be considered is the method of participant recruitment 
utilised. As described in the methods section, in order to garner as large a participant 
sample as possible to be able to test for changes in relationship circumstances, a press 
release detailing types of research being carried out at the Family and Personal 
Relationships Laboratory at Heriot-Watt was used to raise awareness of the current 
study. Individuals who heard about the research in this way were provided with 
information on how to participate in this current study if they wished to. Whilst it could 
be argued that all types of psychological research rely upon participants who volunteer 
to take part on the basis of some aspect of the study appealing to them, the unique 
method of participant accrual utilised in the current study might warrant the results 
being considered with this in mind. However, that attachment dimension means for 
anxiety and avoidance appeared in keeping with previous research suggests there to be a 
level of consistency in the present samples’ participant characteristics with previous 
studies’ samples. 
With the aims of the present study reached, that is, aims of examining differences 
in subjective well-being experienced across attachment, the next step in the present 
series of studies could be made.   
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Chapter 3. Study 2: Adult Attachment and Social Comparison 
 
Study 1 put forward the theoretical suggestions of attachment 
intimacy/independence subgoals, hedonic balances between positive and negative mood, 
self-aspect complexity, and cognitive strategies (that is, rumination versus disclosure) 
for resolving issues following negative events as potentially accounting for the observed 
differences in both baseline, and changes in, subjective well-being. A cognitive process 
not highlighted at this point that is suggested as contributing towards attachment’s 
interactions with relationship experience in predicting differences in well-being is that of 
social comparison theory and the focus in the remaining studies in the current research 
series is on examination of the potential role of this theoretical principle. As suggested 
within the literature review of Chapter 1, research directly examining the associations 
between attachment and social comparisons is small in number. A review of the existing 
literature revealed that no study thus far has investigated the relationship between adult 
attachment and social comparison orientation, comparison direction and 
identification/contrast tendencies, or affective outcomes to comparison information. It is 
argued here then that before examining how social comparison might interact with 
individuals’ attachment orientations and relationship experiences, that greater 
understanding of its direct associations with adult attachment be investigated. The aim 
of Study 2A is to examine specifically the direct associations listed above, as well as 
social comparison tendencies’ roles in accounting for the differences in cognitive well-
being identified in Study 1A.  
Study 2A: Adult Attachment and Social Comparison Orientations 
There is much in attachment theory to support the contention that differences in 
social comparison should exist on the basis of anxiety and avoidance, both baseline and 
as moderated by relationship experiences. In considering a fundamental tenet of 
attachment theory, Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) original conceptualisation of internal working 
models was applied to the adult experience of attachment in which attachment-based 
differences were suggested to be characterised by variations in perceptions of self and of 
other (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). That is, it is the combination of 
positive/negative perceptions in the complementary sets of self/other models that 
account for differences in interpersonal perceptions, beliefs, interpretations, and 
experience. Further important are the differences in accessibility of these 
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complementary self/other working models. Theorising and research has identified, for 
example, high-avoidance individuals to demonstrate limited cognitive access to 
attachment working models due to a defensive suppression resulting from early 
caregiver non-responsiveness to attachment needs and high-anxiety individuals to 
demonstrate chronic access due to their hyperactivation tendencies resulting from early 
inconsistent caregiver responsiveness. In the latter case, chronic activation of the 
attachment system should increase salience of models of self and other, while in the 
former case, defensive suppression should see models remain outside of cognitive 
awareness. As described in Chapter 1, the fundamental tenets of social comparison 
theory as described by Festinger (1954) describe individuals’ perceptions of self relative 
to other, with later theorising putting forward that social comparison tendencies should 
be greater when self-related cognitions are activated and more salient to the individual 
(Stapel & Tesser, 2001) and when there is greater awareness of self in the presence of 
others (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006). On this basis alone one would expect differences in 
tendencies to engage in social comparisons (that is, social comparison orientation 
(Gibbons & Buunk, 1999)) on the basis of attachment anxiety and avoidance, however 
there are further reasons to expect attachment-based differences to exist.  
Differences in interpersonal orientation (that is, interest in the thoughts and 
feelings of others, being influenced by others’ moods and opinions, and interest in self-
disclosure), self-uncertainty, and conformity have been each suggested by Gibbons and 
Buunk (1999, 2006) as defining characteristics of social comparison orientation. When 
applying these characteristics to those evidenced by differences in attachment anxiety 
and avoidance, one would expect that as avoidance increases, interpersonal orientation 
and salience of models of self and other decrease, and as anxiety increases, self-
uncertainty and conformity (which is argued here to represent a desire for, and 
behaviour promoting, acceptance into social norms), as well as self-other working model 
salience, should also increase. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 put forward: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater social comparison 
orientation, while greater attachment avoidance will predict lesser social comparison 
orientation. 
 
 As highlighted within Chapter 1’s literature review, more research appears to find 
evidence to support Bower and colleagues’ selective affect-cognition priming model 
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(Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990) than Wills’ downward comparison theory (Wills, 
1981). To recapitulate, Wills’ downward comparison theory (1981) puts forward that 
individuals low in subjective well-being (particularly self-esteem) are in the greatest 
need of self-enhancement and so should demonstrate a downward comparison tendency 
to perceived worse-off others in an attempt to increase positivity. Meanwhile, the 
selective affect-cognition priming model, similar to Beck’s (1967, 1976) cognitive 
model of depression, puts forward that individuals low in subjective well-being and with 
negative self-perceptions should demonstrate a tendency to make upward comparisons 
to perceived better-off others due to cognitive biases perpetuating and reinforcing 
negative self-perceptions. On the basis of selective affect-cognition priming then, for 
individuals high in anxiety, whose negative models of self encapsulate feelings of lesser 
self-worth and lovability, tendencies to engage in upward comparisons to perceived 
better-off others should be greater than for individuals low in anxiety. For attachment 
avoidance, however, it is argued that no pattern with regards to comparison direction 
will be identified. The theoretical basis above for directional differences lies in 
perceptions of self, which are determined by individuals’ levels of anxiety (e.g., 
Klohnen & Luo, 2003) and not levels of avoidance. Hypothesis 2 therefore stated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater upward comparison 
orientation and lesser downward comparison orientation. Greater avoidance, meanwhile, 
will not be predictive of comparison direction. 
 
The negative cognitive bias described above is anticipated to extend to tendencies 
in identification and contrast. That is, high-anxiety individuals’ negative models of self 
are expected to produce general unfavourable comparison habits. That is, while it is 
anticipated (Hypothesis 2) that high anxiety individuals should demonstrate a greater 
tendency to engage in upward comparison and a lesser tendency to engage in downward, 
it is suggested that when comparing upward, high anxiety individuals should focus 
primarily on that which differentiates them from those perceived better-off others. That 
is, they should contrast themselves from such superior others (producing less favourable 
self-evaluations as a result). When comparing downwards, their negative cognitive bias 
should see a greater focus on that which links them to the perceived worse-off others 
they are comparing against, that is, they should identify themselves and their qualities 
with those perceived as worse-off than they are. For attachment avoidance, it is 
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anticipated that greater avoidance should be predictive of greater contrast generally and 
lesser identification, that is, contrast and identification regardless of whether the 
direction of comparison is upward or downward. Research by Mikulincer et al. (1998) 
found that attachment avoidance related to underestimation of self-other similarity, 
while Gabriel et al. (2005) found greater avoidance to predict a decrease in perceptions 
of self-other similarity across time. This may serve as further support of a cognitive 
predisposition in highly-avoidant individuals to maintain a psychological distance from 
others, in the above instances, manifesting as greater estimates of self-other 
dissimilarity. In the current study, therefore, it is anticipated that evidence of such a 
cognitive distancing should manifest in general greater tendencies to contrast from, and 
lesser tendencies to identify with, others in their social environments. Hypothesis 3 was 
therefore phrased as: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater tendencies for upward 
contrast and downward identification comparisons. Conversely, greater attachment 
avoidance will predict greater general contrast tendencies and lesser general 
identification tendencies. 
 
The final focus of Study 2A was on examination of the potential mediating roles 
of social comparison tendencies and the well-being factors of life satisfaction and self-
esteem. The social comparison literature generally finds that upward comparisons to 
perceived better-off others produce less favourable self-evaluations and decreased well-
being, while downward comparisons to perceived worse-off others produce the opposite 
pattern (e.g., Diener & Fujita, 1997; Gibbons, 1986; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Smith & 
Insko, 1987; Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 1990; Tesser, 1988; Wood, Taylor, & 
Lichtman, 1985). For research examining processes suggestive of identification and 
contrast, evidence emerges to suggest that the more favourable comparisons (that is, 
upward identification and downward contrast) to be more beneficial for well-being (both 
cognitive and affective) than the less favourable comparisons of upward contrast and 
downward identification (e.g., Brown et al, 1992; Buunk et al., 1990; Cash et al., 1983; 
Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Swallow & Kuiper, 1987; VanderZee et al., 
1996; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). The focus of the final aspect of Study 2A was on 
examining general tendencies in upward/downward identification/contrast comparisons 
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as potential mediators for the associations between attachment anxiety and avoidance 
and cognitive well-being. The final Hypothesis for this study was therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Upward contrast and downward identification will mediate the 
relationship between attachment anxiety and the well-being factors of life satisfaction 
and self-esteem. Specifically, upward contrast and downward identification will mediate 
between attachment anxiety and both life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The current study comprised 140 participants of whom 118 were female (84.3%) 
and 22 (15.7%) were male. Age ranged from 18 to 75 (M = 34.0, SD = 13.3). The 
majority of participants resided in the United Kingdom and United States (41.4% and 
42.1% respectively) with the remaining sample being spread internationally. 
Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire comprising questions regarding gender, age, countries of origin and 
residence, relationship status, sexual orientation, and length of relationship if applicable 
(in years and months). 
Adult Attachment. Participants’ attachment orientation was measured using the 
Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised scale (Fraley et al., 2000). Cronbach’s 
alphas for attachment anxiety and avoidance were both .94. 
Social Comparison Orientation. Participants’ general social comparison 
tendencies were measured using a slightly modified version of the Iowa-Netherlands 
Social Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) adapted by 
Butzer and Kuiper (2006). In its original form, the INCOM is a Likert-type scale and 
consists of 11 items assessing how often individuals generally compare themselves and 
their situations with others. Sample items include “I always pay attention to how I do 
things compared with how others do things” and “I often try to find out what others 
think who face similar problems as I face”. Responses range from 1 (“Strongly 
Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”), with the mean of participants’ responses used to 
indicate general social comparison orientation. The slight modification concerned 
removing words pertaining to frequency from the items (in the two examples provided 
above, the modified items read as “I pay attention to how I do things compared with 
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how others do things” and “I try to find out what others think who face similar problems 
as I face”) and altering the responses to ranging from 1 “Never” to 5 “Always”. The 
scale in its original form has been well-validated and has been shown in previous 
research to have good reliability (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk 1999). In Butzer and Kuiper’s 
(2006) study, reliability for the modified measure (COMPG) was high; Cronbach’s 
alpha for the current study was .88. 
In order to assess participants’ upward and downward social comparison 
tendencies, two subscales created by Butzer and Kuiper (2006) were employed. The 
upward social comparison subscale, labelled COMPU, consists of 6 items with 
responses ranging from 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Always”). Example items include “When I 
consider how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity), I compare with others 
who are more socially skilled than I am” and “When things are going poorly, I think of 
others who have it better than I do”. As with the COMPG, reliability for this subscale 
was high; Cronbach’s alpha in the current study was .88. The downward social 
comparison subscale, labelled COMPD, also consists of 6 items with responses ranging 
from 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Always”). Example items include “When I wonder how good I 
am at something, I compare myself with others who are worse at it than I am” and 
“When evaluating my current performance (e.g., how I am doing at home, work, 
university etc.), I compare with others who are doing worse than I am”. As with the 
COMPU, previous reliability has been high (Butzer & Kuiper, 2006); in the current 
study, Cronbach’s alpha was .88. 
The final measure used to assess social comparison tendencies was a slightly 
modified version of the identification-contrast social comparison scales developed by 
Van der Zee and colleages (Van der Zee, Buunk, Sanderman, Botke, & Van den Bergh, 
1999, 2000). The identification-contrast scales include in total 12 items that assess 
upward and downward identification-contrast comparison processes, with 3 items for 
each of upward identification, downward identification, upward contrast, and downward 
contrast. Select items were slightly reworded to move away from the scales’ original 
health-orientated focus to allow for a more generalised assessment (e.g., “health status” 
to “situation”). As with the original scales, responses ranged from 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 
(“Strongly”). Example items include: for upward-identification “When I meet others 
who are experiencing fewer problems than I am, it makes me happy realising that it is 
possible for me to improve”; for downward-identification “When I see others who are 
doing worse, I fear that my own situation could decline”; for upward-contrast “When I 
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think about others who are doing better than I am, I feel frustrated about my own 
situation”; and for downward-contrast “When I see others who experience more 
difficulties than I do, I am happy that I am doing so well myself”. Cronbach’s alpha for 
each of the subscales has been high in previous studies (Van der Zee et al., 1999, 2000); 
in the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for upward-identification, downward-
identification, upward-contrast, and downward-contrast were .81, .81, .82, and .80 
respectively. 
Life Satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed using the Satisfaction with Life 
Scale (SWLS) in its original form. Cronbach’s alpha was .90. 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965), with Cronbach’s alpha revealed as .89.  
Procedure 
The current study was carried out online. Participants were recruited through 
online advertisement (for example, Hanover Psychological Research on the Net) where 
they could read information on the nature of the study, provide informed consent to take 
part and complete the measures. Upon completion, participants were debriefed on the 
aims of the study. 
Results 
Factor Analysis. 
Because the identification-contrast social comparison measure was adapted from 
one created by van der Zee et al. (1999, 2000), a factor analysis was carried out to 
confirm there were four clear factors representing upward identification, downward 
identification, upward contrast, and downward contrast. A principal components factor 
analysis with varimax rotation indicated that the data was best described by a 4-factor 
solution that accounted for 66.9% of the total variance. 
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Table 26. Identification and Contrast Factor Loadings 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Downward Contrast 1   .65  
Downward Contrast 2   .82  
Downward Contrast 3   .86  
Downward Contrast 4   .65  
Upward Contrast 1 .78    
Upward Contrast 2 .54    
Upward Contrast 3 .83    
Upward Contrast 4 .75    
Downward Identification 1    .79 
Downward Identification 2    .74 
Downward Identification 3    .82 
Downward Identification 4    .64 
Upward Identification 1  .73   
Upward Identification 2  .83   
Upward Identification 3  .78   
Upward Identification 4  .77   
 
 
Examination of the rotated component matrix (see Table 26) confirmed that each 
factor was defined by high loadings on the corresponding items. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The means and standard deviations for each of the variables of interest are 
presented in Table 27. 
 
Table 27. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment Anxiety 3.06 1.27 
Attachment Avoidance 2.94 1.15 
Social Comparison Orientation 3.20 .67 
Upward Comparison Orientation 2.89 .83 
Downward Comparison Orientation 2.39 .71 
Upward Identification 2.66 .79 
Downward Identification 1.87 .69 
Upward Contrast 2.66 .89 
Downward Contrast 2.81 .82 
Life Satisfaction 23.79 6.87 
Self-Esteem 16.03 2.51 
 
 
The mean score for attachment avoidance appears in keeping with that identified 
with previous research, while attachment anxiety appears to be slightly lower (Fraley, 
2011), even when considering the mean age of the current sample. Standard deviations 
for both attachment dimensions however are consistent with those that have been 
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previously identified. The mean for life satisfaction, as in Study 1, appeared to be 
slightly elevated in comparison to previous research (e.g., Hwang et al., 2009; Perrone, 
Webb, & Vance, 2007). Lastly, the means for the social comparison, upward 
comparison, and downward comparison scales are similar to those reported by Butzer 
and Kuiper (2006), with the former two slightly lower and the latter slightly higher. 
Attachment and Social Comparison 
Hypothesis 1 put forward that greater attachment anxiety would predict a greater 
general social comparison orientation while greater attachment avoidance would predict 
a lesser orientation. General social comparison scores were regressed onto the two 
attachment dimensions at the first step and their interaction term at the second step using 
multiple linear regression. As in previous studies, the interaction term was created using 
the methods outlined by Aiken and West (1991). 
The model was significant (F = 4.81 (3, 139) p <.01) and accounted for 7.6% of 
the total variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β = .32, p = .001) and 
avoidance (β = -.19, p <.05) were significant predictors of general social comparison 
orientation, however, their interaction was not. Examination of the coefficients suggests 
that as anxiety increases, general tendency to make comparisons also increases while as 
avoidance increases, general tendency to make comparisons with others decreases. 
Hypothesis 1 was therefore supported. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted differences in upward and downward social comparisons 
on the basis of attachment anxiety. First, upward social comparison orientation was 
examined; the model was significant (F = 9.46 (3, 138) p <.001) with the adjusted R² 
revealing it to account for 15.5% of the variance. Attachment anxiety was a significant 
predictor (β = .41, p <.001), suggesting that as anxiety increases, so too does the 
tendency to make upward comparisons. Neither avoidance nor its interaction with 
anxiety were significant predictors however. Hypothesis 2 was therefore supported also. 
Next, downward social comparison orientation was examined; surprisingly the 
anxiety, avoidance, and interaction model was not significant (F = .746 (3, 138) p = 
.527) with none of the attachment variables predicting downward social comparison 
orientation. Hypothesis 2 was therefore only partially supported; while greater 
attachment anxiety significantly predicted a greater tendency to compare upward, no 
further significant predictors were identified. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted greater tendencies towards upward contrast and downward 
identification as anxiety increases, while greater contrast and lesser identification 
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comparison tendencies were predicted as avoidance increases. For each of the four 
different identification-contrast social comparisons, anxiety, avoidance, and their 
interaction term were entered into the regression equation. Table 28 presents the results 
of these analyses. 
 
Table 28. Attachment nxiety, avoidance, and identification-contrast comparisons 
 Model B SE B β R² 
Change 
F Change 
Upward Contrast  Anxiety .01 .07 .01   
(20.2%) Avoidance -.84 .07 -.64*** .22 18.84*** 
F = 12.66 (3, 138) p <.001 Anx*Avd .19 .04 .22*** .00 .44 
Downward Identification Anxiety .01 .07 .01   
(12.4%) Avoidance -.84 .07 -.64*** .13 10.34*** 
F = 7.49 (3, 138) p <.001 Anx*Avd .19 .04 .22*** .01 1.70 
Downward Contrast Anxiety .01 .07 .01   
(4.3%) Avoidance -.84 .07 -.64*** .05 3.55* 
F = 3.07 (3, 138) p <.05 Anx*Avd .19 .04 .22*** .01 2.05 
Upward Identification Anxiety .01 .07 .01   
 Avoidance -.84 .07 -.64*** .01 .80 
F = 1.21 (3, 138) p = .310 Anx*Avd .19 .04 .22*** .02 2.02 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 28, only the model predicting upward identification was 
non-significant with none of the anxiety, avoidance, and interaction variables predicting 
differences in upward identification comparisons.  For the remaining social comparison 
tendencies, greater attachment anxiety predicted increased tendencies to contrast from 
perceived better-off others, and to both contrast from and identify with perceived worse-
off others. Greater attachment avoidance meanwhile was found to predict a lesser 
tendency to contrast from worse-off others only.  
Next, separate general identification and contrast variables were calculated (a 
mean score comprising both upward and downward identification items for the former, 
and similarly for upward and downward contrast items for the latter) to test Hypothesis 
3’s prediction of greater avoidance predicting greater contrast and lesser identification. 
Attachment avoidance was found not to be a significant predictor for either contrast (β = 
-.11, p = .191) or identification (β = -.08, p = .391), however for the latter variable, the 
interaction between anxiety and avoidance was approaching significance (β = .14, p 
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<.09) with the model being marginally significant (F = 2.56 (3, 138) p <.06). Slopes 
were plotted to examine the emerging trend and are presented in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of General 
Identification 
 
The above Figure (which must be interpreted in the context that the interaction did 
not quite reach significance and so is only an indication of emerging trends) appears to 
suggest that individuals fitting a dismissing-avoidant attachment classification (high 
avoidance/low anxiety) report the lowest tendency to identify with others, with the 
remaining attachment classification groups reporting similar levels. 
Hypothesis 3 was therefore only partially supported. 
Adult Attachment, Identification/Contrast Comparisons, and Well-Being 
Hypothesis 4 next predicted identification and contrast comparisons to partially 
mediate between both anxiety and avoidance and well-being outcomes life satisfaction 
and self-esteem. Specifically it was predicted that upward contrast and downward 
identification would serve as mediators for anxiety. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), in order to identify a mediation effect, four 
conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the independent variable must be identified as 
significantly predicting the dependent variable.  Next, it must be established that the 
independent variable significantly predicts the mediator. The third condition to be met is 
that the mediating variable must predict the dependent variable when both the 
independent and mediating variables are predictors (that is, whilst controlling for the 
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independent variable). The final condition is that, with the addition of the mediating 
variable in the model, the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable must either reduce (suggesting partial mediation) or become non-
significant. Sobel tests can then be performed to determine whether this reduction is 
significant. 
First, upward contrast comparison tendency was tested as a mediator between 
attachment anxiety (independent variable) and life satisfaction (dependent variable). 
Linear regression revealed attachment anxiety to significantly predict life satisfaction (β 
= -.40, p = <.001, Adjusted R² = .15), such that increases in attachment anxiety predicted 
decreases in life satisfaction, satisfying the first condition. Satisfying the second 
condition, attachment anxiety significantly predicted upward contrast comparison 
tendency (β = .47, p <.001, Adjusted R² = .21), such that increases in attachment anxiety 
predicted increases in tendency to contrast from perceived better-off others. Next, 
attachment anxiety and upward contrast tendency were both entered into the regression 
equation to test their predictive quality for life satisfaction; upward contrast tendency 
was still a significant predictor of life satisfaction whilst controlling for attachment 
anxiety (β = -.26, p <.01, Adjusted R² = .19), thus satisfying the third condition. Finally, 
examination of the attachment anxiety variable revealed a reduction did indeed occur 
(see Figure 23) with Sobel testing confirming this reduction to be significant (t = -2.70, 
p <.01). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Upward Comparison Tendency as Partial Mediator between Anxiety and Life 
Satisfaction 
 
The above analyses support Hypothesis 4; upward contrast comparison tendency 
was identified as a partial mediator between attachment anxiety and satisfaction with 
life, suggesting that tendency to contrast from perceived better-off others (and hence, 
Upward Contrast  
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       β = .47 (p <.001) 
β = -.40 (p <.001) 
β = -.27 (p <.01) 
β = -.38 (p <.001) 
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focus on the differences between the self and higher-regarded others) contributes 
towards the observed differences in overall satisfaction with life. 
Next, downward identification tendency was examined as a mediator. The same 
analytic strategy as employed above was utilised. With attachment anxiety already 
revealed as a significant predictor of life satisfaction, its predictive value for downward 
identification was next examined; the relationship was indeed significant (β = .37, p 
<.001, Adjusted R² = .13) suggesting that as anxiety increases, so too does tendency to 
identify with perceived worse-off others. When both anxiety and downward 
identification tendency were entered into the regression equation, however, the latter 
was no longer significant and hence was ruled out as a possible mediator at this point. 
Next, the potential mediating role of upward contrast and downward identification 
comparison tendencies for the association between attachment anxiety and self-esteem 
were examined. Regression analyses revealed upward contrast did indeed serve as a 
partial mediator (see Figure 24) with Sobel tests confirming this (t = -2.29, p <.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Upward Contrast Orientation as Mediator between Anxiety and Self-Esteem 
 
Similar to life satisfaction, upward contrast tendency proved to be the only 
mediating variable predicted in Hypothesis 4 to satisfy the conditions put forward by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Although not hypothesised, to counter the possibility of the relationship between 
upward contrast and attachment anxiety being attributable to the differences in self-
esteem associated with attachment anxiety rather than attachment anxiety itself, self-
esteem was examined as a mediator. Mediation analyses revealed the significance of the 
standardised beta coefficients did not reduce upon inclusion of both the independent and 
mediating variables, suggesting that rather than high-anxiety individuals’ lower self-
esteem (and conversely low-anxiety individuals’ higher self-esteem) contributing 
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towards their tendencies to engage in adverse upward comparisons, it is such 
comparisons instead that are contributing towards their self-esteem. 
 
Study 2B: Adult Attachment and Social Comparison: A Diary Study 
With the findings of Study 2A revealing attachment anxiety and, to a lesser extent, 
attachment avoidance as predictors of social comparison orientation as well as the types 
of comparisons typically made, the aim of Study 2B was to examine the affective 
circumstances surrounding actual comparisons individuals make on a day-to-day basis. 
More specifically, the aim of this current study was, through the use of diary-study 
methodology, to examine the predictive value of attachment regarding individuals’ 
mood both before and after naturalistic comparisons are made, as well as reported mood 
change in response to the comparison information encountered. Further examination of 
the roles of upward and downward comparisons in predicting differences in affective 
experience was also included. 
The first focus of Study 2B was on examining attachment-based differences in 
individuals’ self-reported mood before they engage in a comparison. The findings of 
Study 2A provided support for the selective affect-cognition priming model (Bower, 
1991; Forgas et al., 1990) rather than Wills’ downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981), 
suggesting that poorer subjective well-being leads to making adverse comparisons 
(rather than leading to self-benefitting favourable comparisons) that will serve to 
maintain such individuals’ poorer state of mind. As discussed within Study 2A, 
individuals high in attachment anxiety are characterised by maladaptive cognitive 
biases; such individuals’ working models of self give rise to perceptions of 
worthlessness and as being unlovable, leave them vulnerable to negative interpretation 
of both interpersonal situations and the significant others such situations concern, and to 
report a reduced self-concept complexity (with reduced clarity amongst the aspects of 
self within their associative networks (Mikulincer, 1995)), a characteristic found in 
previous research to be associated with poorer subjective well-being (see Rafaeli-Mor & 
Steinberg, 2002)). Furthermore, research has consistently identified high-anxiety 
individuals to report poorer mood states in comparison to secure individuals (e.g., Barry 
et al., 2007; Simpson et al., 2007; VanBuran & Cooley, 2002; Wei et al., 2004). With 
research (e.g., Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) generally finding evidence to contradict Wills’ 
downward comparison theory (that it is individuals low in well-being who will engage 
in comparisons to perceived worse-off others in an attempt to improve their subjective 
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states), it is argued here that it will be individuals who are low in anxiety who will report 
lower pre-comparison mood. The basis of this reasoning lies in the findings of research 
examining social comparisons and subjective well-being finding the opposite pattern to 
that put forward in Wills’ downward comparison theory (1981); individuals low in 
anxiety, by virtue of their attachment-based characteristics that see positive working 
models of self and more favourable interpretations in the interpersonal situations they 
experience, should be more likely to use social comparison to try to improve feelings of 
subjective well-being. This expectation is further supported by the earlier findings 
identified in Study 2A that showed lower anxiety to be predictive of lesser tendency to 
engage in unfavourable upward contrast and downward identification comparisons, 
suggesting such individuals to be able to use social comparison to their advantage and to 
improve current state of well-being. As such, it was first hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Irrespective of comparison direction, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of pre-comparison mood, such that as anxiety decreases, pre-comparison 
mood decreases also. 
 
It was also anticipated that post-comparison mood differences should exist on the 
basis of attachment anxiety. The findings of Study 2A focusing on identification and 
contrast suggested high-anxiety individuals to differ in the nature of the information 
gleaned from social comparison processes; higher-anxiety individuals demonstrated a 
propensity to focus on comparison information in such a way as to promote inferior self-
views, while lower-anxiety individuals demonstrated a lesser propensity. As such, one 
would expect high anxiety, when not specifying the direction of the comparison being 
made (because such comparison information can be construed in a way to maintain their 
negative perceptions), to be predictive of reporting a lower post-comparison mood than 
for low anxiety. It was therefore hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Irrespective of comparison direction, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of post-comparison mood, such that as anxiety increases, post-comparison 
mood decreases. 
 
The next focus of empirical consideration was on whether comparison direction 
did indeed serve to further influence attachment-based differences in affective 
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experience surrounding social comparison. The first point of interest was on examining 
the predictive value of upward comparison and attachment anxiety on individuals’ pre-
comparison moods. The nature of the anticipated associations surrounding pre-upward 
comparison mood was a less clear one. On the one hand, high-anxiety individuals’ less 
favourable cognitive biases in comparison to their low-anxiety counterparts could see 
the latter report lower moods before engaging in an upward comparison because they are 
argued to use comparison information to boost their subjective (in this case, affective) 
well-being. However, the findings of Study 2A did not indicate anxiety-based 
differences in upward identification comparisons, suggesting that low-anxiety 
individuals are no more or less likely to engage in this advantageous type of comparison 
than their high-anxiety counterparts. However, low-anxiety individuals did demonstrate 
a tendency away from upward contrast and, although not further reinforced by a 
significant finding for increased upward identification, this pattern may hint at a general 
ability within such individuals to focus less on disadvantageous information and more 
on information that is beneficial to the self. Indeed, research within the adult attachment 
literature suggests low anxiety to be predictive of and associated with a more positive 
cognitive bias (see Shaver and Mikulincer’s (2003) discussion of the negative cognitive 
bias evidenced in high-anxiety individuals). On this basis then, the following hypothesis 
was formed: 
  
Hypothesis 2a: Before upward comparison, attachment anxiety will be predictive of pre-
comparison mood, such that as anxiety decreases, pre-comparison mood decreases also. 
 
In considering anxiety-based differences in the moods individuals report after 
having engaged in upward comparison, it was anticipated that high-anxiety individuals’ 
greater reliance on others for validation of the self (which social comparison is argued to 
be a cognitive strategy to judge self-worth or -ability on a given characteristic) as well as 
greater affective reactivity (e.g., Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Meyer et al., 1998) should, 
when coupled with the earlier identified greater tendency to contrast from perceived 
better-off others, produce a lower mood in comparison to low-anxiety individuals. As 
such, it was anticipated that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: After upward comparison, attachment anxiety will be predictive of post-
comparison mood, such that as anxiety increases, post-comparison mood decreases. 
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Having focused on the potential influence of upward comparison, the next aim of 
the present study was to examine the additive effect of downward social comparison on 
individuals’ attachment-based differences in affective experience. Study 2A revealed 
there to be no attachment-based differences in tendencies to engage in general 
downward comparison (that is, regardless of consideration of any identification and 
contrast processes that may be occurring). However, the later findings examining 
specifically the differences in the nature of downward comparisons individuals typically 
engage in revealed high anxiety to be predictive of greater tendencies to make 
downward identification and, to a lesser extent, downward contrast comparisons also. 
Based on these identified differences it should be expected that anxiety-based 
differences in the affective factors surrounding downward social comparison should 
exist also. In considering pre-downward comparison mood, as indicated in the theorising 
leading to Hypothesis 2a, the nature of anxiety’s predictive value is a less clear one. 
Study 2A revealed that low-anxiety individuals demonstrated a lesser tendency to 
identify with downward comparison targets. However, also revealed was a lesser 
tendency (though to a lesser extent) to contrast from downward comparison targets, 
suggesting an overall tendency for low-anxiety individuals not to compare the self with 
perceived worse-off others. On the basis of these two non-complementary patterns in 
downward comparison, predicting anxiety-based differences in pre-downward 
comparison mood is problematic. Low-anxiety individuals’ suggested ability to utilise 
social comparison information to their advantage and improve subjective well-being 
may see a lower pre-downward comparison mood because their lesser tendency to 
identify with perceived worse-off targets may allow them to gain well-being benefits. 
However, their additional lesser tendency to contrast from downward targets may limit 
such targets’ ability to serve as a potential source of self-enhancement. Because no clear 
association could be discerned, attachment anxiety as a predictor of pre-downward 
comparison mood was still chosen to be investigated but the direction of the association 
(that is, either negative or positive) was not specifically hypothesised. 
 
Research Question 1: Before downward comparison, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of pre-comparison mood. 
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As highlighted above, Study 2A revealed there to be no attachment-based 
differences in tendencies to engage in comparison with perceived worse-off others (that 
is, downward comparison), however the differences identified in downward contrast and 
identification further reinforce the notion that differences should exist in how 
individuals construe and therefore respond to downward comparison information. 
Greater attachment anxiety was found to predict greater tendency to engage in 
downward identification, that is, to focus on similarities between the self and the 
perceived worse-off target other. On this basis it could be expected that greater 
attachment anxiety predicts a poorer post-downward comparison mood. However, 
greater attachment anxiety was also found to predict (although to a lesser extent) a 
greater tendency towards downward contrast also, that is, to focus on the differences 
between self and other. On this different basis then, it could also be expected that greater 
attachment anxiety predicts a higher post-downward comparison mood due to high-
anxiety individuals’ greater reliance on others for self-validation and greater positive 
affective experience in response to being presented with favourable comparison 
information. However, even this potentiality must be followed by the theoretical caveat 
that, due to high-anxiety individuals’ negative biases, although they might benefit from 
downward comparison information, they may demonstrate a self-disserving reluctance 
to accept the positive information that would see a benefit to self-evaluation, reducing 
the positive effect such information would have on their mood.  
Due to the above conflicting possibilities each being theoretically viable, similar to 
Research Question 1, a hypothesis was formed on the predictive value of attachment 
anxiety on post-downward comparison mood but without focus on the direction of the 
anxiety/post-mood association: 
 
Research Question 2: After downward comparison, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of post-comparison mood. 
 
The final focus of Study 2B was on anxiety-based differences in mood change in 
response to the naturalistic comparisons individuals engage in. In considering mood 
change in response to general comparison, that is, regardless of upward or downward 
direction, it was believed that, based on both theory and findings of Study 2A, greater 
anxiety would be predictive of a greater decrease in mood. As earlier highlighted, the 
adult attachment literature has generally found evidence to support the theoretical 
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contention that greater attachment anxiety is characterised by negative cognitive biases 
that manifest adverse reactions to their social environments and experiences. This bias 
was further supported by the Study 2A findings of increased tendency to identify with 
downward and contrast from upward targets, the cognitive consequences of which 
would serve to maintain negative self-perceptions and reduced subjective well-being. 
With regards to the affective consequences, it was anticipated that, because of the 
negative bias in comparison interpretation, affective response to general comparisons 
would be negative. Furthermore, research has previously identified high-anxiety 
individuals to be characterised by heightened emotional experience, such that they are 
more emotionally reactive with a lesser ability to suppress negative affect and inhibit 
emotional spreading (e.g., Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995), the latter point being suggested 
here as resulting from less clearly-defined associative networks (Mikulincer, 1995) 
leading to the affective ‘spill-over’ encapsulated within Linville’s (1985, 1987) self-
complexity model. With all of these theoretical principles considered together, 
Hypothesis 3a read as: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Irrespective of comparison direction, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of mood change, such that greater attachment anxiety will predict a greater 
decrease in mood. 
 
The next focus of empirical consideration was the role of comparison direction in 
interacting with anxiety in predicting differences in mood change. Greater attachment 
anxiety was found to predict increased upward contrast in Study 2A, suggesting a 
propensity for high-anxiety individuals to focus on that which differentiates them from 
perceived better-off others. As such, when presented with an upward comparison target, 
it was anticipated that high-anxiety individuals would experience a greater decrease in 
mood both due to such comparison information resulting in negative self-evaluations as 
inferior (thus confirming the negative self-views determined by their negative working 
models of self) and to their greater affective reactivity. For low-anxiety individuals who 
demonstrate a lesser tendency to contrast from perceived better-off others and have 
shown moderate affective reactivity in previous research (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995), 
mood change in response to upward comparison information would be smaller. As such, 
it was hypothesised that: 
 
159 
 
Hypothesis 3b: After having engaged in upward comparison, attachment anxiety will be 
predictive of mood change, such that greater anxiety will predict a greater decrease in 
mood. 
 
The final area of focus in Study 2B was on mood change in response to downward 
comparison. As in previous hypotheses, the anticipated association between anxiety’s 
interaction with downward comparison in predicting change in mood was not clear-cut. 
Due to high-anxiety individuals being revealed to report greater tendencies to engage in 
downward identification and, to a lesser extent, downward contrast, this suggests that 
such individuals may indeed construe downward comparison information in both 
beneficial and adverse ways. If a hypothesis were made on the basis of downward 
identification tendencies, it would be anticipated that for high-anxiety individuals, 
downward comparison would produce a decrease in mood; if a hypothesis meanwhile 
were to be made on the basis of downward contrast, high-anxiety individuals’ mood 
should benefit, although due to such individuals’ negative biases it would be expected 
that their increase in mood would be to a lesser extent than that reported by low-anxiety 
individuals. Due to the strength of the association between anxiety and downward 
identification being greater than the association for downward contrast, it was reasoned 
that this pair of associations suggested a greater tendency towards more adverse (i.e. 
identification) style of downward comparison and as such, it was hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 3c: After having engaged in downward comparison, attachment anxiety will 
be predictive of mood change, such that greater anxiety will predict a decrease in mood. 
 
All of the above hypotheses focused on the predictive value of attachment anxiety 
only; attachment avoidance was not anticipated to be predictive of either pre-/post-
comparison mood or mood change in response to comparison information. The 
reasoning behind this expectation was due to the theoretical contention that it is 
individuals’ perceptions regarding the positivity or negativity of their self-worth (i.e. 
their working models of self) that should be a major influence in how they use and 
respond to comparison information. To recapitulate the discussion considering 
attachment-based qualities that would provide theoretical bases to expect differences in 
social comparison, the dispositional quality put forward by Gibbons and Buunk (2006) 
that was most relevant to avoidance-based differences was that of interpersonal 
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orientation. Specifically, Gibbons and Buunk (2006) put forward that individuals who 
are interested in the thoughts and feelings of others and demonstrate interest in self- and 
other-disclosure should engage in comparisons more. Other dispositional qualities (such 
as self-uncertainty) were more relevant to attachment anxiety. It was reasoned that the 
interpersonal orientation that applies to attachment avoidance (that is, greater orientation 
with lower avoidance) would not allow for avoidance-based differences in affective 
experience surrounding individuals’ naturalistic social comparisons to be predictable. 
However, it could be argued that, due to high-avoidance individuals’ defensive 
suppression of emotional experience (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 1997; Kotler et al., 1994; 
Wei et al., 2005) that greater avoidance should predict lesser mood change in response 
to comparison information. However, whether this mood change would be in an upward 
or downward direction is unclear on the basis of the dispositional features that 
characterise attachment avoidance and hence the decision was made to focus hypotheses 
and therefore empirical examination on anxiety’s predictive value.  
Method 
Participants 
The current study had a sample size of 89 participants, 52 (58.4%) of whom were 
female and 37 (41.6%) were male. Age ranged from 18 to 45 (M = 23.5, SD = 4.7). All 
participants were students attending Heriot-Watt University; 32 (36.0%) identified 
themselves as White Scottish, 7 (7.9%) as White Irish, 16 (18.0%) as White English, 27 
(30.3%) as White Other, 5 (5.6%) as Asian Chinese, with the remaining 2 participants 
identifying themselves as Black African and Other Ethnic Background respectively. 
Eighty-four (94.4%) of the participants identified themselves as Heterosexual, with the 
remaining 5 (5.6%) participants identifying themselves as Bisexual. With regards to 
relationship status, 5 participants (5.6%) reported themselves to be Married, 23 (25.6%) 
as With a Partner and Cohabiting, 18 (20.0%) as With a Partner but Not Cohabiting, 41 
(45.6%) as Single and 2 (2.2%) as Other.  
Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire comprising questions regarding gender, age, ethnic background, sexual 
orientation, relationship status, and length of relationship if applicable (in years and 
months). 
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Adult Attachment. Participants’ attachment orientation was measured using the 
Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised scale (Fraley et al., 2000). Cronbach’s 
alphas for attachment anxiety and avoidance were .89 and .93 respectively. 
Self-Esteem. Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(1965; Cronbach’s alpha = .88). 
Naturalistic Social Comparisons. In order to assess participants’ naturalistic social 
comparisons, an event-contingent self-recording procedure (Wheeler & Reis, 1991) was 
employed. This methodological approach has been used in numerous social comparisons 
studies (e.g., Bogart et al., 2004; Giordano et al., 2000; Locke, 2003, 2005, 2007; Locke 
& Nekich, 2000; Olson & Evans, 1999; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wood et al., 2000). 
Consistent with these studies’ previous methodologies, in the present study participants 
were required to complete a Social Comparison Record (similar in structure and content 
to that which was employed by Wheeler and Miyake (1992)) each time they noticed 
themselves making a comparison over the course of 1 week.  
The first 4 items of the Social Comparison Record were in multiple-choice format, 
with the latter 3 in Likert-type format. The first item required participants to specify the 
type of social contact for the comparison with response options being social interaction, 
visual (no contact), telephone/email conversation, and daythought (specifically, that the 
participant merely thought about the comparison other).  
The second item required participants to specify what characteristic was 
compared. Options included Academic/Work matter, Personality, Abilities (other than 
academic/work and social skills), Lifestyle (not related to wealth), Physical Appearance, 
Wealth (money and other things), Relationship, Opinion, and Other, with the latter 
option requiring specification on the participant’s part. Participants were provided with 
full instructions for each of the above options with scenarios provided. For example, 
‘Abilities’ was described as including aspects such as creative (music, art) or sporting 
(football, horse riding) abilities, while ‘Lifestyle’ included aspects such as frequency 
and nature of social engagements or the extent to which they lead a healthy lifestyle 
(smoking, drinking, eating). Participants were advised that on occasion they may feel as 
though a comparison could fall under more than one category and in these instances they 
should make a judgment on which single category best represented what they had 
compared. 
The third item concerned who the comparison target was. The response options 
here were Romantic Partner, Close Friend, Acquaintance, Imaginary Person, Ordinary 
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Friend, Stranger, Oneself, Family Member, Famous Person, and Other, with the latter 
option again requesting the participants specify. Similar to the second item, although 
instructions were given for each of the possible response options, for those that may 
have been ambiguous in their meaning, participants were provided with examples to aid 
understanding, such as options ‘Imaginary Person’ and ‘Oneself’. For the former it was 
specified that this included hypothetical others that participants might find themselves 
making comparisons against, for example, to general others of their age, gender, or 
occupation (“the typical University student” or “women my age”). The latter response 
option of ‘Oneself’ was specified as including comparisons made against the self, such 
as comparisons to previous performances at University or a previous weight. 
The final multiple choice item was designed to identify whether the comparison 
was intentional (that is, the comparison was made specifically to find out information 
about the self) or unintentional (such that a comparison was made in reaction to seeing 
or hearing information of another without conscious deliberation on the participant’s 
part). 
The fifth item aimed to assess the perceived similarity between the participant and 
their comparison target and was designed to assess comparison direction (that is, 
whether upward or downward). The response was structured in a Likert-type format 
ranging from -3 (Inferior/Poor/Undesirable) to +3 (Superior/Better/Desirable), with 0, 
the middle point, representing equal positioning. This item was phrased to focus on the 
position of the target relative to that of the participant, such that if a comparison other 
was perceived to be much worse on a particular attribute, the participant would record a 
-3 rating, and if perceived to be much better, a +3 rating. 
The final two sections were designed to assess participants’ mood both before 
making a comparison and afterwards. Mood items utilised by Wood et al. (2000) were 
used for the current study to measure both pre- and post-comparison mood states. This 
consisted of 7 pairs of mood adjectives (for example, sad-happy, discouraged- 
encouraged, rejected-accepted) in which participants were required to indicate their 
mood on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most negative mood end of the scale 
(e.g. 1 = sad) and 7 representing the most positive end of the scale (e.g. 7 = Happy); 4 in 
each of the 7 mood adjective scales represented neutral mood. 
Participants were lastly reminded of the anonymous nature of their data (that is, 
each participant had been randomly assigned an ID number that would only enable the 
researchers to link diary records to initial questionnaires and not identify them 
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personally) and therefore were asked to be as accurate in their reporting as possible. 
Furthermore, participants were advised that during times when a comparison had been 
made but they were unable to complete a diary record that they try to complete the 
record at their earliest convenience to ensure the information they provided was as 
representative of the comparison experience as possible. 
Control Measure. A control measure to assess participants’ perceptions of the 
accuracy of their social comparison records was included in the current study (as done 
previously by Wheeler and Miyake (1991)). In addition to questions on perceived 
accuracy (e.g., “To what extent do you feel this study made you more sensitive to 
comparisons so that you changed the number of comparisons you usually make?”) and 
difficulty (e.g., “How much did keeping the comparison record interfere with your daily 
life?”), items also focused on factors that may have contributed to any difficulties and 
inaccuracies experienced (e.g., comparisons being too subtle to be noticed, feeling an 
obligation to make comparisons, feeling hesitant in reporting comparisons due to guilt or 
embarrassment, and not noticing or forgetting comparisons had been made). 
Procedure 
The current study was carried out in the Psychology Laboratory at the Heriot-Watt 
University campus. Students within the University were informed of a “Social 
Comparison Study” via e-mail advertising that briefly outlined the details of the study 
and provided a contact address should they be interested in taking part. Students who 
responded as being interested in participating were invited to come to the Psychology 
Laboratory at pre-arranged specified times (to ensure that no more than 4 participants 
were in the Lab at a time so that each individual would have enough space for privacy in 
answering questionnaires). Students were then fully informed of the aims of the study 
and what participation would entail: they would be asked to complete an initial set of 
questionnaires and then, commencing immediately upon the set’s completion, for the 
time period of 1 week they would be asked to complete a social comparison record each 
time they noticed themselves making a comparison. Full instructions as outlined in the 
above Measures section were provided for how to complete the social comparison 
records and any questions participants had at that time were answered. Dated consent 
forms asked participants to leave an e-mail contact address; this was so that participants 
could be contacted 1 week later to remind them that their week-long participation was 
completed and that they were to stop recording their comparisons and could arrange to 
return their records. It was re-iterated here that their e-mail addresses were kept separate 
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from all of their completed measures to ensure their anonymity be retained. Participants 
were provided with 20 social comparison records and were informed that if more sheets 
were needed they could contact the primary researcher. 
Once the completed social comparison records were returned, participants were 
invited to fill in the control measure (although were reassured this was not required of 
them and was therefore completely voluntary), bringing an end to their participation in 
the current study. 
Analytic Strategy 
Whereas in Study 1 a linear change model was adopted, the current study utilised 
a no change or unconditional means model in which, rather than describing change in 
outcome variables over time, outcome variation is the focus (Singer & Willett, 2003). In 
general terms, within a social comparison context, the level 1 no change submodel 
equation should read as: 
Yij = β0i + εij 
where Yij represents the variable of interest for participant j’s ith comparison, β0i 
represents the mean across all comparisons (i.e. person-specific mean), and εij represents 
random error. For each parameter in the level 1 submodel, there is a level 2 submodel; in 
the above example there is only 1 parameter, the mean (β0i), and so its accompanying 
level 2 submodel equation would read as: 
β0i = γ00 + ζ0i 
where γ00 represents the variable of interest’s mean across all participants (i.e. grand 
mean) and ζ0i represents random error. As identified earlier, in the current study, the 
level 1 submodels concerned individuals’ social comparisons while the level 2 
submodels comprised self-reported attachment orientations. More specifically, MLM 
was utilised to predict level 1 pre- and post-social comparison mood on the basis of level 
2 adult attachment (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b and Research Questions 1 and 1) and to 
predict changes in mood in response to social comparison information (Hypotheses 3a, 
3b, and 3c). 
For hypothesis 1a, the level 1 submodel equation was: 
(1a) P-Mi = β0iP-M + εi 
where P-Mi represents the pre-comparison mood for participant ith, β0iP-M represents the 
beta co-efficient for mean pre-comparison mood score across all comparisons, and εi 
represents random error.  
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The accompanying level 2 submodel for the above 1a equation was: 
(1a) β0i = γ00 + γ01SE + γ02Anx + γ03Avd + γ04Anx*Avd + ζ0i 
where γ00 represents the mean pre-comparison mood score across participants, γ01SE 
represents the effect of self-esteem on pre-comparison mood, γ02Anx, γ03Avd, and 
γ04Anx*Avd represent the effects of anxiety, avoidance and their interaction, and ζ0i 
represents random error. 
For hypothesis 1b, the level 1 submodel equation was: 
(1b) Po-Mi = β1iPo-M + εi 
where Po-Mi represents post-comparison mood for the ith participant, β1iPo-M represents 
the co-efficient for mean post-comparison mood, and represents εi random error. 
The accompanying level 2 submodel equation was the same as that used for 
Hypothesis 1a: 
(1b) β0i = γ10 + γ11SE + γ12Anx + γ13Avd + γ14Anx*Avd + ζ1i 
where γ10 represents the mean pre-comparison mood score across participants, γ11SE 
represents the effect of self-esteem on pre-comparison mood, γ12Anx, γ13Avd, and 
γ14Anx*Avd represent the effects of anxiety, avoidance and their interaction, and ζ1i 
represents random error. 
For hypothesis 2a, the level 1 submodel equation was: 
(2a) P-Mi = β2iP-M + εi 
where P-Mi represents the pre-comparison mood for participant ith, β2iP-M represents the 
beta co-efficient for mean pre-comparison mood score across all comparisons, and εi 
represents random error.  
The accompanying level 2 submodel equation was: 
(2a) β2i = γ20 + γ21SE + γ22UC + γ23Anx + γ24Avd + γ25Anx*Avd + γ26Anx*UC + 
γ27Avd*UC + γ28Anx*Avd*UC + ζ2i 
where γ20 represents the mean pre-comparison mood score across participants, gamma 
coefficient γ21SE represents the effect of self-esteem on participants’ mean pre-
comparison mood score, co-efficients γ22, γ23, γ24 represent the effect of upward 
comparison, anxiety and avoidance respectively, γ25, γ26, and γ27 represent the two-way 
interactions, γ28 represents the final three-way interaction, and ζ2i represents random 
error. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Olson & Evans, 1999), upward and 
166 
 
downward comparisons were dummy-coded; for upward comparison, +1, +2, and +3 
scores were dummy-coded as 1 with all other scores coded as 0, while for downward 
comparison, -1, -2, and -3 scores were dummy-coded as 1 with the remaining scores 
coded as 0. 
The level 1 equation for Hypothesis 2b was: 
(2b) Po-Mi = β3iPo-M + εi 
where Po-Mi represents post-comparison mood for the ith participant, β3iPo-M represents 
the co-efficient for mean post-comparison mood, and represents εi random error. 
The accompanying level 2 submodel equation was the same as that used for Hypothesis 
1c: 
(2b) β3i = γ30 + γ31SE + γ32UC + γ33Anx + γ34Avd + γ35Anx*Avd + γ36Anx*UC + 
γ37Avd*UC + γ38Anx*Avd*UC + ζ3i 
where γ30 represents the mean pre-comparison mood score across participants, gamma 
coefficient γ31SE represents the effect of self-esteem on participants’ mean pre-
comparison mood score, co-efficients γ32, γ33, γ34 represent the effect of upward 
comparison, anxiety and avoidance respectively, γ35, γ36, and γ37 represent the two-way 
interactions, γ38 represents the final three-way interaction, and ζ3i represents random 
error. 
The level 1 equation for Research Question 1 was: 
(RQ1) P-Mi = β4iP-M + εi 
where P-Mi represents the pre-comparison mood for participant ith, β4iP-M represents the 
beta co-efficient for mean pre-comparison mood score across all comparisons, and εi 
represents random error.  
The accompanying level 2 submodel equation was: 
(RQ1) β3i = γ30 + γ31SE + γ32DC + γ33Anx + γ34Avd + γ35Anx*Avd + γ36Anx*DC + 
γ37Avd*DC + γ38Anx*Avd*DC + ζ3i 
where γ30 represents the mean pre-comparison mood score across participants, gamma 
coefficient γ31SE represents the effect of self-esteem on participants’ mean pre-
comparison mood score, co-efficients γ32, γ33, γ34 represent the effect of downward 
comparison, anxiety and avoidance respectively, γ35, γ36, and γ37 represent the two-way 
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interactions, γ38 represents the final three-way interaction, and ζ3i represents random 
error. 
The level 1 submodel equation for Research Question 2 was: 
(RQ2) Po-Mi = β4iPo-M + εi 
where Po-Mi represents post-comparison mood for the ith participant, β3iPo-M represents 
the co-efficient for mean post-comparison mood, and represents εi random error. 
Its accompanying level 2 submodel equation was: 
(RQ2) β3i = γ30 + γ31SE + γ32DC + γ33Anx + γ34Avd + γ35Anx*Avd + γ36Anx*DC + 
γ37Avd*DC + γ38Anx*Avd*DC + ζ3i 
where γ30 represents the mean post-comparison mood score across participants, gamma 
coefficient γ31SE represents the effect of self-esteem on participants’ mean pre-
comparison mood score, co-efficients γ32, γ33, γ34 represent the effect of downward 
comparison, anxiety and avoidance respectively, γ35, γ36, and γ37 represent the two-way 
interactions, γ38 represents the final three-way interaction, and ζ3i represents random 
error. 
Interpreted in their contexts, the level 2 submodel equations test for whether 
attachment dimensions anxiety, avoidance, their interaction, upward comparison, 
downward comparison, their interactions with attachment dimensions, and the final 
three-way interactions predict differences in pre- and post-comparison mood while 
controlling for self-esteem. The inclusion of self-esteem in the equation model allows 
for the controlling of its influence on pre-social comparison mood, that is, to carry a 
statistical check that it is indeed attachment influencing pre-comparison mood and not 
the co-occurring levels of self-esteem associated with it. Furthermore, although 
hypotheses focused on attachment anxiety only (with avoidance not anticipated to 
significantly predict differences in pre-comparison mood), the analyses were carried out 
on both of the attachment dimensions and their interaction to confirm these expectations. 
For hypothesis 3a, in which attachment predicts differences in changes in mood, 
the level 1 submodel equation was: 
(3a) MCi = β4iMMC + β4iP-M + εi 
where MCi represents mood change for the ith participant, β4i MMC is the mean mood 
change, β4iP-M represents pre-comparison mood, and εi represents random error. As in 
the analyses in Study 1C examining change scores, residualised mood change scores 
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were utilised in the current analyses (specifically, both pre-comparison mood and mood 
change were entered into the level 1 submodel). 
The level 2 submodel equations for the above level 1 mood change equation were: 
(3a) β4iMMC = γ40 + γ41Self-Esteem + γ42Anxiety + γ43Avoidance + γ44Anxiety*Avoidance 
+ ζ4i 
β4iP-M = γ50 + γ51Self-Esteem + γ52Anxiety + γ53Avoidance + γ54Anxiety*Avoidance + ζ5i 
in which γ40 and γ50 represent mean changes in mood, gamma co-efficients γ41 and γ51 
represent the effect of self-esteem, co-efficients γ42, γ43, γ44 and γ52, γ53, γ54 represent the 
effect of attachment orientation (specifically, anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction) 
on participants’ mean mood change, and ζ4i and ζ5i represents random error. 
Lastly, for hypotheses 3b and 3c in which attachment orientation predicts 
differences in changes in mood after either upward (4b) or downward (4c) comparison, 
the level 1 submodel equations read as: 
(3b) MCi = β5iMMC + β6iP-M + εi 
(3c) MCi = β7iMMC + β8iP-M + εi 
where MCi represents mood change for the ith participant, β5iMMC and β7iMMC represent 
mean changes in mood, co-efficients β6iP-M and β8iP-M represent pre-comparison mood, 
and εi represents random error. 
The accompanying level 2 submodel equations read as: 
(3b) β5iMMC = γ60 + γ61SE + γ62UC + γ63Anx + γ64Avd + γ65Anx*Avd + γ66Anx*UC + 
γ67Avd*UC + γ68Anx*Avd*UC + ζ6i 
β6iP-M = γ70 + γ71SE + γ72UC + γ73Anx + γ74Avd + γ75Anx*Avd + γ76Anx*UC + 
γ77Avd*UC + γ78Anx*Avd*UC + ζ7i 
(3c) β7iMMC = γ80 + γ81SE + γ82DC + γ83Anx + γ84Avd + γ85Anx*Avd + γ86Anx*DC + 
γ87Avd*DC + γ88Anx*Avd*DC + ζ8i 
β8iP-M = γ80 + γ81SE + γ82DC + γ83Anx + γ84Avd + γ85Anx*Avd + γ86Anx*DC + 
γ87Avd*DC + γ88Anx*Avd*DC + ζ8i 
where γ60, γ70, γ80, and γ90 represent mean change in mood scores, γ61 through to γ91 
represent the effect of self-esteem, γ62 and γ72 represent the effect of upward 
comparison, γ82 and γ92 represent the effect of downward comparison, gamma co-
efficients γ63 through to γ94 represent the effects of anxiety and avoidance, co-efficients 
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γ65 through to γ97 represent the two-way interactions between anxiety, avoidance and 
upward/downward comparison, γ68 through to γ98  represent the final three-way 
interactions, and finally ζ6i through to ζ9i  represent random error. 
Upward and downward comparisons were dummy-coded as in the level 1 submodel 
equations for Hypothesis 1c, and for each of the level 2 submodels, self-esteem was 
added as a control variable. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
The means and standard deviations for attachment anxiety, avoidance, and self-
esteem are presented in Table 29. 
 
Table 29. Level 2 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment anxiety 3.33 1.01 
Attachment avoidance 3.07 1.14 
Self-Esteem 19.27 5.41 
 
Regarding the social comparison records themselves, there were a total of 649 
comparisons completed by participants. Two hundred and thirty-six comparisons were 
made when participants were socially interacting with the comparison target, 143 
comparisons were visual-based (that is, no social contact was made but the comparison 
target was seen), 65 comparisons were made either through telephone or online 
conversation, and 204 comparisons were made by participants thinking about a 
comparison target. 
The most commonly compared characteristics were physical appearance (140 
comparisons) followed by academic matters (103 comparisons), personality (93 
comparisons), lifestyle (80 comparisons), abilities (72 comparisons), and romantic 
relationships (55 comparisons). The smallest numbers of comparisons were categorised 
under ‘Other’ (18 comparisons in total, with participant specification examples 
including age, job, and child discipline), opinions (20 comparisons), wealth (32 
comparisons) and social skills (36 comparisons). 
Regarding who participants compared with, the most commonly reported 
comparison targets were acquaintances (125) and close friends (123). Strangers (97) and 
ordinary friends (82) were also common comparison targets. Sixty-seven comparisons 
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were recorded as having been made against participants themselves, suggesting that 
reflecting on past experiences or performances by the self to be important in current self-
evaluations. The fewest comparisons were made against ‘Others’ (25, with examples 
including lecturer, colleague, and presentation group), imaginary others (31), family 
members (32), famous people (34) and romantic partners (35). 
Three-hundred and eighty-nine comparisons were reported as involuntary, with 
256 comparisons reported as intentional (that is, specifically with the intention to find 
out information about the self). 
The scale for degree of comparison target similarity ranged from -3 (the most 
undesirable or inferior) to +3 (the most desirable or superior). Of the total 649 
comparisons made, 39 comparison targets were categorised as -3, 103 targets as -2, and 
90 targets as -1, totalling 232 downward comparisons. One-hundred and fourteen 
comparison targets were categorised as 0, representing lateral comparisons. Lastly, 104 
targets were categorised as +1, 130 as +2, and 69 as +3, totalling 303 upward 
comparisons, therefore suggesting a greater overall tendency for the current sample to 
compare upwards to perceived better-off others than downwards to perceived worse-off 
others. 
Lastly, the mean pre-comparison mood score was 4.42 (SD = .86) and the mean 
post-comparison mood score was 4.26 (SD = 1.03). A paired samples t-test was carried 
out to examine whether this difference in pre- and post-comparison mood scores was 
significant. The results of this analysis revealed this difference to indeed be significant (t 
= 3.99, p = <.001), suggesting that regardless of the specifics of comparisons being 
made, or dispositional (i.e. attachment) variables, engaging in comparisons generally 
saw a slight decrease in individuals’ moods. 
Control Measure. 
Table 30 presents the means and standard deviations from the control measure 
testing for participants’ perceived accuracy and difficulty in recording their social 
comparisons. The means are comparable to those reported by Wheeler and Miyake 
(1991), suggesting that participants generally found their records to be fairly accurate 
and difficulty to be fairly low. 
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Table 30. Means and Standard Deviations for Control Measure Items 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Difficulty in recording comparisons 3.56 1.70 
Comparison record inaccuracy 3.90 1.58 
Interference of records in daily life 2.29 1.59 
Increased sensitivity increasing number of comparisons made 4.13 1.58 
Forgetting 3.87 1.78 
Difficulty in being attentive 3.70 1.60 
Lack of clarity in instructions 1.75 1.11 
Felt an obligation to make comparisons 3.05 1.74 
Hesitate to report comparisons due to feelings of guilt 2.22 1.55 
Comparison too subtle to be noticed 4.05 1.68 
 
Adult Attachment and Pre- and Post-Comparison Mood. 
Hypothesis 1a put forward that irrespective of comparison direction, lower 
attachment anxiety would be predictive of lower pre-comparison mood. Multi-level 
analysis was carried out, with anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction entered into the 
regression equation; self-esteem was also entered into the equation to control for its 
effects. The results are presented in Table 31. 
 
Table 31. Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Pre-Comparison Mood (Controlling 
for Self-Esteem) 
Model Coefficient Standard Error t 
Pre-comparison mood    
Intercept 3.65 .33 11.16*** 
Self-esteem .04 .02 2.42* 
Anxiety .18 .09 1.98* 
Avoidance -.02 .07 -.26 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.01 .07 -.21 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
As can be seen in Table 31, anxiety was revealed to be a significant predictor of 
pre-comparison mood (with avoidance and its interaction with anxiety revealed not to be 
significant predictors). That anxiety was significant while controlling for self-esteem 
suggests this result to indicate attachment anxiety to be predictive of individuals’ mood 
before making comparisons beyond the co-occurring perceptions of self-worth. Figure 
25 provides a visual representation of the above results. 
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Figure 25.  Attachment Anxiety as Predictor of Pre-Comparison Mood 
(Controlling for Self-Esteem). 
 
The above figure suggests that individuals low in attachment anxiety reported a 
less positive mood before engaging in social comparison than individuals low in 
attachment anxiety. This is consistent with expectations and so Hypothesis 1a was 
supported. 
Hypothesis 1b put forward that, irrespective of comparison direction, greater 
attachment anxiety would be predictive of lower post-comparison mood. As for 
Hypothesis 1a, anxiety, avoidance and their two-way interaction were entered into the 
regression equation along with self-esteem. The results identified that none of anxiety, 
avoidance, nor their interaction were significant predictors while self-esteem was (t = 
2.67, p <.01). The regression equation was carried out a second time without controlling 
for self-esteem to identify whether self-esteem’s removal saw anxiety be a significant 
predictor; the results confirmed this (t = -2.18, p <.05); Figure 26 presents the results. 
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Figure 26. Attachment Anxiety as Predictor of Post-Comparison Mood 
 
The above results suggest that individuals higher in attachment anxiety report 
decreased post-comparison mood compared to their low-anxiety counterparts, which is 
in keeping with expectations and therefore supports Hypothesis 1b. However, with the 
inclusion of self-esteem causing this result to become non-significant, this relationship is 
fully mediated by self-esteem, suggesting that it is high-anxiety individuals’ decreased 
self-esteem and low-anxiety individuals’ increased self-esteem only that produces their 
different post-comparison mood levels. 
The next hypothesis (2a) put forward that before making an upward comparison, 
decreased attachment anxiety would be predictive of decreased pre-comparison mood. 
Anxiety, avoidance and upward comparison direction were entered into the regression 
equation as well as their two-way interactions and final three-way interaction. As 
previously, self-esteem was additionally entered as a control variable. Table 32 presents 
the results of this analysis. 
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Table 32. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Upward Comparison as Predictors of 
Pre-Comparison Mood 
Model Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t 
Pre-comparison mood    
Intercept 3.66 .33 11.13*** 
Self-Esteem .04 .02 2.52* 
Anxiety .17 .09 1.85ª 
Avoidance .02 .07 .34 
Upward Comparison -.09 .06 -1.39 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.07 .07 -.95 
Upward*Anxiety .02 .06 .26 
Upward*Avoidance -.11 .06 -1.77ª 
Upward*Anxiety*Avoidance .14 .06 2.26* 
ªp = marginal 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
As shown in Table 32, even when controlling for the effects of self-esteem, the 
three-way interaction between upward comparison, anxiety, and avoidance was revealed 
to be a significant predictor of individuals’ pre-comparison mood. Figure 27 presents the 
results visually. 
 
 
Figure 27. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Upward Comparison as 
Predictors of Pre-Comparison Mood. 
 
The results appear to indicate that, before making an upward comparison (that is, 
comparison to a perceived better-off other), individuals low in anxiety and high in 
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avoidance (fitting the dismissing-avoidant attachment classification) report the lowest 
mood. Individuals fitting preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) and fearful-avoidant 
(high anxiety and avoidance) attachment classifications report similarly increased mood 
before making an upward comparison, while individuals fitting a secure (low anxiety 
and avoidance) attachment classification report mood higher than dismissing-types but 
lower than their high-anxiety counterparts. The results therefore suggest when making 
less favourable upward comparisons to perceived better-off others, high-anxiety 
individuals’ mood is more positive. 
Included also in Figure 28 is pre-non-upward comparison mood (that is, lateral and 
downward comparisons). When considered in conjunction with the pre-upward 
comparison findings, the results suggest dismissing-avoidant-type individuals’ pre-non-
upward comparison mood to be higher than when about to compare upward, with a 
similar pattern emerging for preoccupied- and fearful-avoidant-type individuals. Secure-
type individuals however report differently, with lateral and downward comparisons 
evidencing a lower mood than upward comparisons. 
Hypothesis 2a predicted differences on the basis of attachment anxiety; that high-
anxiety individuals (preoccupied and fearful) reported higher pre-upward-comparison 
moods than their low anxiety counterparts is consistent with expectations and therefore 
Hypothesis 2a was supported. 
Hypothesis 2b put forward that, after upward comparison, increased attachment 
anxiety would predict lower post-comparison mood. As in the above analyses, 
attachment anxiety, avoidance, and upward comparison, as well as their two-way and 
three-way interactions were entered into the regression equation, with self-esteem added 
as a control variable and post-comparison mood entered as the dependent variable. In 
this instance however, none of the variables included in the regression equation (with 
exception of self-esteem) was identified as a significant predictor of post-upward 
comparison mood. Hypothesis 2b was therefore not supported. 
Research Question 1 argued for the notion that before downward comparison, 
attachment anxiety would predict pre-comparison mood. The level 2 submodel equation 
included the same variables as listed for the Hypothesis 2a equation but with the single 
difference of including downward comparison rather than upward. The results of the 
analyses indicated that none of the two-way interactions between attachment dimensions 
and downward comparison were significant predictors of pre-comparison mood. 
Research Question 1 was therefore also not supported. 
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The final research question to test examining post-comparison mood (2) put 
forward that, after downward comparison, attachment anxiety would predict post-
comparison mood. As in the above analyses, self-esteem was included in the regression 
equation along with anxiety, avoidance, downward comparison, their two-way 
interactions, and the final three-way interaction. Table 33 presents the results. 
 
Table 33. Attachment Anxiety, Avoidance, and Downward Comparison as Predictors of 
Post-Comparison Mood 
Model Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t 
Post-comparison mood    
Intercept 3.25 .34 9.56*** 
Self-Esteem .05 .02 2.79** 
Anxiety -.06 .10 -.63 
Avoidance -.02 .07 -.26 
Downward Comparison .41 .08 4.87*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.11 .07 -1.43 
Downward*Anxiety .15 .08 1.87ª 
Downward*Avoidance -.01 .08 -.11 
Downward*Anxiety*Avoidance .02 .08 .30 
ªp <.06 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
The results of the multi-level model regressions revealed that the interaction 
between attachment anxiety and downward comparison was closely approaching 
significance. To identify the nature of this trend, visual presentation was utilised (see 
Figure 28 below). 
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Figure 28. Attachment Anxiety and Downward/Non-downward Comparison as 
Predictors of Post-comparison Mood 
 
 
The above slopes appear to suggest that after having engaged in downward 
comparison to perceived worse-off others, individuals high in attachment anxiety report 
increased mood compared to their low-anxiety counterparts. However these slopes must 
be interpreted within the context that the regression result did not quite reach the 
significance threshold. 
In examining the differences in post-comparison mood between the two high/low 
anxiety groups after engaging in non-downward (i.e. lateral and upward) comparisons, 
Figure 28 shows that high-anxiety individuals report a lower post-comparison mood 
than low-anxiety individuals, a pattern that differs to the slopes representing mood after 
having engaged in downward comparison. 
Adult Attachment and Mood Change. 
Hypothesis 3a put forward that, irrespective of comparison direction, greater 
attachment anxiety would predict a greater decrease in mood. Self-esteem and pre-
comparison mood were added as control variables, followed by anxiety, avoidance and 
their interaction. Multi-level analyses revealed that, while controlling for self-esteem, 
attachment anxiety was not a significant predictor of mood change (t = 2.04, p = .16). 
However, as with analyses testing Hypothesis 1b, a second regression analysis was 
carried out removing self-esteem as a control variable; this revealed anxiety to be a 
significant predictor (t = 9.93, p <.05). Figure 29 visually presents these findings. 
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Figure 29. Attachment Anxiety as Predictor of Mood Change 
 
Figure 29 suggests that, regardless of the type of comparison made (that is, either 
upward to a perceived better-off other or downward to a perceived worse-off other), 
high-anxiety individuals report a decrease in mood, while low-anxiety individuals report 
a slight increase. However, as entering self-esteem into the regression equation causes 
anxiety to become a non-significant predictor, this finding appears to be fully mediated 
by individuals’ co-occurring perceptions of self-worth. Hypothesis 4a was therefore 
partially supported; it was correctly anticipated that greater anxiety would predict a 
greater decrease in change of mood however it had not been anticipated that this pattern 
would be fully accounted for by feelings of self-esteem. 
Hypothesis 3b put forward that after upward comparison, greater attachment 
anxiety would predict a greater decrease in mood. As done in previous analyses, self-
esteem and pre-comparison mood were entered into the level 2 regression equation, 
followed by anxiety, avoidance, upward comparison, their two-way interactions, and the 
final three-way interaction. Analyses revealed that neither of the anxiety (t = -.43, p = 
.67) nor avoidance (t = -.28, p = .78) interactions with upward comparison were 
significant predictors of mood change and this was similarly the case with the three-way 
interaction (t = .32, p = .75). The removal of self-esteem from the level 2 submodel 
equation did not see the anxiety-upward comparison interaction become significant, 
therefore Hypothesis 4b was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3c put forward that after downward comparison, greater attachment 
anxiety would predict a lesser decrease in mood. As in previous regression equations 
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here, self-esteem and pre-comparison mood were entered as control variables followed 
by anxiety, avoidance, downward comparison, their two-way interactions and the final 
three-way interaction. Table 34 presents the results. 
 
Table 34. Anxiety, Avoidance, and Downward Comparison as Predictors of Mood 
Change 
Model Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t 
Mood Change    
Intercept 1.60 .32 4.99*** 
Self-Esteem .03 .01 2.11* 
Pre-Comparison Mood -.55 .04 -12.34*** 
Anxiety -.14 .08 -1.78ª 
Avoidance -.00 .06 -.03 
Downward  .40 .08 5.02*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance -.10 .06 -1.59 
Anxiety*Downward .15 .07 1.98* 
Avoidance*Downward -.04 .08 -.54 
Anxiety*Avoidance*Downward .02 .07 .27 
ªp = marginal 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
As indicated in Table 34, while the three-way interaction between anxiety, 
avoidance, and downward comparison was not a significant predictor of mood change, 
the two-way interaction between anxiety and downward comparison was. This result is 
presented in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30. Anxiety and Downward Comparison as Predictors of Mood Change 
 
The above figure appears to suggest that after engaging in a downward 
comparison, individuals low in anxiety report a slightly greater change in mood than 
high-anxiety individuals do. However, this difference is indeed very slight. Upon 
looking at mood change differences in non-downward comparisons (that is, lateral and 
upward comparisons), a bigger difference between the high- and low-anxiety groups 
emerges: individuals high in attachment anxiety report a greater decrease in mood than 
low-anxiety individuals upon comparing with others perceived as either better than or 
similar to themselves. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the above two studies was to address the gap in the literature 
regarding associations between social comparison habits and adult attachment. While 
research has previously examined the issues of perceptions of self-other similarity 
(Gabriel et al., 2005; Mikulincer et al., 1998) and social standing in adolescence (Gilbert 
et al., 2007; Irons & Gilbert, 2005), none has examined directional and 
identification/contrast tendencies. Furthermore, although diary study methodologies 
have been utilised in a number of studies examining social comparisons (e.g., Bogart et 
al., 2004; Giordano, Wood, & Michaela, 2000; Locke, 2003, 2005, 2007; Locke & 
Nekich, 2000; Olson & Evans, 1999; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wood et al., 2000), this 
method of data collection had not previously been applied to the examination of the 
attachment-based differences in social comparisons individuals make. 
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The findings of Study 2A identified that as attachment anxiety increases, tendency 
to engage in social comparison increases also, while as attachment avoidance increases, 
tendency to compare oneself with others decreases. As indicated earlier, there are 
several theoretical and empirical reasons to support why this finding should emerge, the 
first of which relates to one of the fundamental principles originally outlined by 
Festinger (1954) and that is desire to engage in social comparisons on the basis of 
feelings of uncertainty. Outside the framework of attachment, uncertainty in several 
areas has been found to be associated with greater tendency to engage in social 
comparisons, such as self-concept clarity (Butzer & Kuiper, 2005), emotional 
uncertainty (Gerard, 1963), uncertainty at work (Buunk et al., 1994), within romantic 
relationships (Buunk & VanYperen, 1991; Buunk et al., 1991) and of personal 
judgements and opinions (Weary et al., 1994). Within the framework of attachment, 
several studies have found evidence to indicate that differences in attachment-based 
thoughts and feelings predict differences in self-concept clarity and accuracy.  For 
example, using the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), Kobak and Sceery (1988) 
revealed findings suggesting an incongruence between self-reports and peer-reports 
among avoidant individuals regarding their social competence, while Dozier and Lee 
(1995) in their study examining self-other discrepancies within individuals experiencing 
psychopathological disorders found both avoidant- and ambivalent-type individuals to 
report inaccurate understanding of the self and their experiences. Berger (2001) 
additionally found self-perception inaccuracies in both preoccupied- and dismissing-type 
individuals in comparison to parent and peer reports. In studies using self-report adult 
attachment measures, Wu (2009) found both avoidance and anxiety to predict self-
uncertainty and reduced self-concept clarity. Foster, Kernis, and Goldman (2007) 
meanwhile found reports of self-esteem to fluctuate and be less stable for high anxiety, 
suggesting a less stable perception of self (and therefore a reduced self-concept clarity 
and certainty) in high-anxiety individuals. Furthermore, Davila and Cobb (2004) in their 
discussion of the individual-difference model in accounting for and describing changes 
in feelings of attachment security put forward that attachment insecurity (that is, higher 
levels of anxiety and/or avoidance) may represent a lack of clarity in both self- and 
other-perceptions. They state that early negative experiences that often lead to the 
formation of an insecure attachment orientation (such as parental divorce (e.g., Nair & 
Murray, 2005) or psychopathology (e.g., Eiden, Edwards, & Leonard, 2002; Hammen & 
Brennan, 2001)) impede the development of clear and stable models of self and other. In 
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this sense then, attachment insecurity reflects a lack of self-concept clarity and certainty 
that is characteristic of attachment security. 
As earlier discussed, in testing the structure and complexity of individuals’ self-
concepts within the framework of adult attachment directly, Mikulincer (1995) 
identified secure individuals’ self-structure to comprise several self-schema that were 
highly differentiated but easily accessible. This differentiation between accessible self-
aspects suggests such individuals to have a clear understanding of self in their various 
social contexts, that is, to have a clear self-certainty and -clarity. Anxious-ambivalent 
individuals, however, were revealed to have a self-concept structure that was 
characterised by fewer self-aspects that were poorly differentiated from one another. In 
this instance then, such individuals’ self-clarity and -certainty would be lower than their 
secure counterparts with less clear definitions and understanding of the self and would 
account for the findings above of high anxiety as predictive of reduced self-certainty. 
Lastly, avoidant individuals’ self-structure was found to consist of several highly 
differentiated self-aspects that were fragmented in structure, that is, self-aspects that are 
poorly integrated and therefore less well-connected. Suggesting such individuals to have 
poorer access to their various aspects of self, the structure identified by Mikulincer 
(1995) suggests that avoidant individuals should demonstrate a similar self-uncertainty 
to anxious-ambivalent/preoccupied-type individuals but as arising from a different 
cognitive source. 
On the basis of the outlined differences in self-uncertainty, the finding of increased 
anxiety predicting an increased tendency to engage in social comparisons in the present 
study is theoretically and empirically consistent; with such individuals having greater 
feelings of self-uncertainty, the need and tendency to try to derive self-evaluative 
information provided through comparison with others should be greater. That greater 
attachment avoidance, however, was predictive of decreased social comparison 
orientation is perhaps counterintuitive to the above findings that high-avoidance 
individuals seem to be also characterised by cognitive structures indicating lesser self-
certainty. However, salience of self-other models might account for why such 
individuals report a lesser tendency to engage in social comparisons and provides further 
support for why high-anxiety individuals were found to report a greater tendency. Stapel 
and Tesser’s (2001) self-activation hypothesis states that because the goal of social 
comparison is information-gathering about the self, desire to engage in social 
comparison should be greater when self-related cognitions are activated and more salient 
183 
 
to the individual. For the highly-avoidant individual who is characterised by a 
deactivating strategy of inhibition of attachment working models of self and other 
(Cassidy & Kobak, 1988), self-related cognitions are defensively denied attention. This 
defensive suppression process mirrors the low activation put forward by Stapel and 
Tesser (2001) and may be a contributor to the observed findings of lower social 
comparison orientation. For the highly-anxious individual meanwhile, who is 
characterised by a hyperactivation of the attachment system in which models of self and 
other are chronically activated and therefore more salient to them, the greater cognisance 
of both self and other should encourage engagement in social comparisons; that greater 
anxiety predicted greater social comparison orientation is in support of this theoretical 
contention. 
Further accountable for both of the anxiety and avoidance findings is the earlier-
discussed interpersonal orientation put forward by Gibbons and Buunk (2006) when 
describing the typical characteristics that serve to define social comparison orientation. 
To recapitulate, interpersonal orientation can be understood as a strong interest in the 
thoughts and feelings of others, being influenced by others’ moods and opinions, and a 
greater interest in mutual self-disclosure, a definition that appears counter to that which 
characterises avoidant individuals. For such individuals, self-disclosure creates feelings 
of discomfort and distress and their need for self-reliance sees an emotional distancing 
from others, both of which should naturally manifest a disinterest in others’ thoughts, 
feelings, and affective states (research has indeed identified avoidant individuals to 
report liking individuals less who self-disclose to them (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 
1991)). With such a lesser interpersonal interest, individuals characterised by high 
avoidance should therefore demonstrate a lesser interest in relative standing of self in 
comparison to others and would further account for why such individuals report a lesser 
comparison orientation. 
Study 2A next examined differences in tendencies to compare upward to perceived 
better-off others and downward to perceived worse-off others. Regression analyses 
revealed that as attachment anxiety increases, tendency to engage in upward 
comparisons also increases. This finding is consistent with Bower and colleagues’ 
(Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990) selective affect-cognition priming model in which it 
is argued that individuals lower in subjective well-being should demonstrate a negative 
cognitive bias and engage in social comparisons that provide information consistent with 
their reduced well-being. That is, they should engage in adverse comparisons and attend 
184 
 
to comparison information that may be interpreted in a way to reflect less favourably on 
them, reinforcing their feelings of negativity and maintaining their poorer state of 
subjective well-being. As earlier described, high-anxiety individuals are characterised by 
negative models of self as unworthy of others’ responsiveness and love and have been 
discussed within the adult attachment literature as demonstrating a negative cognitive 
bias (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). For example, in their romantic relationships, such 
high-anxiety individuals rely on hypervigilent strategies for indications of partner 
acceptance but their negative models of self leave them vulnerable to signs of rejection 
(e.g., Simpson et al., 1999), to interpret relationship events more negatively (Collins, 
1996) and to perceive there to be more tensions in their relationships than there are in 
reality (e.g., Campbell et al., 2005). These negative biases extend beyond romantic 
relationship contexts into contexts concerning social judgements (see Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003); it is therefore argued that the greater tendency to engage in upward 
comparisons is an extension and reflection of this bias in social cognitions. From the 
approach of contrast-typically-as-default in the social comparisons individuals make, for 
high anxiety individuals with more negative perceptions of self, engaging in 
comparisons with perceived better-off others would produce unfavourable self-
evaluations that are consistent with their negative views of self.  
It is surprising that attachment anxiety was not predictive of downward 
comparison, suggesting that high-anxiety and low-anxiety individuals do not differ in 
their tendencies to engage in downward comparisons to perceived worse-off others. It 
was anticipated that as anxiety increases, tendency to compare downwards would 
decrease due to the above-described negative bias encapsulated within the selective 
affect-cognition priming model (Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990). Furthermore, for 
such high-anxiety individuals with more negative models of self, a lesser orientation 
towards downward comparison might also be reflective of such individuals’ negative 
self-perceptions preventing them from perceiving others as being worse-off than they 
themselves are. Considering this latter point in particular then, it may be that anxiety 
was not predictive of downward comparisons because both high-anxiety and low-
anxiety individuals demonstrate little tendency to make such comparisons, but the 
psychological bases differ. That is, for individuals low in anxiety (who are characterised 
by more positive models of self and greater self-certainty), need to compare generally is 
small and therefore tendency to engage in comparisons of any direction is minimal. For 
individuals high in anxiety, the negative models of self that characterises them may 
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produce their lesser tendency to compare downward due to the difficulty they would 
face in perceiving others as being in a worse position than they are on the trait under 
comparative scrutiny.  
Consistent with hypotheses, attachment avoidance was not found to be a 
significant predictor of either upward or downward comparison tendencies. It was 
argued here that, in accordance with the selective affect-cognition priming model 
(Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990), whether individuals engaged in upward or downward 
comparisons would be determined by their perceptions of self, and that negative 
perceptions would produce the less favourable comparison orientation towards 
perceived better-off others. Because model of self is more strongly tied to attachment 
anxiety (e.g., Klohnen & Luo, 2003), it was not believed that avoidance should influence 
comparison direction. That attachment avoidance was indeed predictive of neither 
upward nor downward comparison is supportive of the notion that the extent to which an 
individual perceives themselves positively or negatively is what contributes to 
determining the general direction of the comparisons they make. 
Once general comparison directions were examined, the next focus of Study 2A 
was on examining specific types of upward and downward comparisons, that is, on 
examining tendencies to engage in either identification or contrast comparisons with 
perceived superior others and perceived inferior others. Analyses revealed that as 
anxiety increases, tendency to contrast from perceived better-off others increases and 
tendency to identify with perceived worse-off others also increases. These findings 
suggest then, that when individuals high in attachment anxiety compare themselves with 
others who appear to be doing better than they are, they tend to focus on what makes 
them different, providing the specific circumstances to lead to unfavourable self-
evaluations. Furthermore, when such high anxiety individuals do compare themselves 
with others perceived as not doing as well as they are, they attend to this information in 
such a way as to focus on their similarities, that is, what qualities they share that might 
suggest they are vulnerable to also experiencing the comparison target’s undesirable 
situation or position. 
Counter to expectations, the analyses further identified attachment anxiety to be 
predictive of downward contrast, such that as anxiety increases, so too does tendency to 
engage in downward contrast comparisons. Further counter to expectations was the 
finding of avoidance also as a significant predictor; in this case, as attachment avoidance 
increases, tendency to contrast downwards decreases. In this latter finding, although 
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avoidance-based differences for downward contrast were not predicted, it was 
hypothesised that greater avoidance would be a predictor of general increased contrast 
comparison tendencies and so this finding appears to contradict that which was 
anticipated. Why highly-avoidant individuals should demonstrate this decreased 
tendency at this point remains unclear. It could be argued that an observation of 
decreased comparison orientation of any kind could be reflective of an overall tendency 
to not compare the self with others however that this finding emerged for downward 
contrast only (with avoidance not identified as a significant predictor for any of the 
remaining upward/downward identification/contrast comparison tendencies) renders this 
possibility questionable. Future research would therefore benefit from further 
examination of comparison tendencies on the basis of attachment avoidance to 
determine whether this result is replicable and, if so, provide insight into the 
psychological mechanisms that might account for it. 
The counterintuitive finding for attachment anxiety (that is, increased anxiety 
predicting increased downward contrast tendency) meanwhile might indeed be a 
reflection of such individuals’ increased tendencies overall in comparing the self to 
others.  Both upward contrast and downward identification were significantly predicted 
by anxiety. That the strength of both these co-efficients was greater than for downward 
contrast may reinforce the notion that, while high-anxiety individuals may be 
particularly vulnerable to engaging in adverse comparisons (i.e. upward contrast and 
downward identification), the psychological qualities that characterise them (that is, 
increased interpersonal orientation, self-uncertainty, and chronic activation of models of 
self and other) may manifest additional, less adverse comparison tendencies also. 
Conversely, the greater increase in downward contrast as anxiety increases could further 
be an indication of low-anxiety individuals’ overall propensity to engage in fewer social 
comparisons.  
Having identified such comparison tendencies on the basis of anxiety, future 
research is needed to further explore the anxiety-based differences in comparison 
tendencies observed here. In particular, the greater tendency to engage in less favourable 
comparisons (that is, to focus on the similarities to perceived worse-off others and the 
differences in perceived better-off others) revealed in the current analyses, while still to 
a lesser extent engaging in more favourable (downward contrast) comparisons could be 
further explored by examining the ‘weight’ given to the different types of comparison 
information gathered. That is, although high-anxiety individuals appear to engage in 
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downward contrast comparisons, the disconfirming information obtained may be 
cognitively construed in such a way to prevent psychological benefit. Outside the 
framework of attachment theory, for example, Gibbons and McCoy (1991) in their study 
examining reactions to comparison information on the basis of self-esteem found that 
high self-esteem individuals, when threatened, derogated the comparison target as a 
means of attenuating adverse feelings. It may be then that high-anxiety individuals’ 
negative cognitive bias would manifest a reluctance to accept the favourable self-
evaluative information that arises from a downward contrast comparison. Instead they 
may demonstrate, for example, a form of derogation of the social comparison 
information itself or of the comparison target that might allow them to dismiss the 
resultant positive self-evaluative information. Upward contrast/downward identification 
comparison information meanwhile, which would be consistent with negative 
perceptions of self and therefore confirm already-held negative self-beliefs, may be 
more readily accepted by such individuals, serving to maintain their poorer subjective 
well-being. A further potential influence in the way in which high-anxiety individuals 
process comparison information may be found in previous research examining 
differences in attachment-based recall of positive and negative cognitions. Mikulincer 
and Orbach (1995) identified that anxious individuals took less time to retrieve 
memories of negative childhood experiences than they did to retrieve positive ones, 
suggesting such individuals to have a ready access to more negative cognitions. That 
secure individuals demonstrate the opposite pattern (that is, less time to retrieve positive 
than negative memories) reinforces the negative, maladaptive bias that characterises 
high anxiety. It may be then, that while high-anxiety individuals may make comparisons 
that are more favourable to their self-views (that is, downward contrast), the 
comparisons they engage in that are more negative in the subsequent self-evaluations 
that emerge (i.e. downward identification and upward contrast) may be more salient to 
them and readily accessible when considering self-worth such as negative childhood 
memories were more readily accessible in Mikulincer and Orbach’s (1995) study.  In 
this way, future research may benefit from examining the importance individuals place 
on different types of comparison information and the extent to which each different type 
of information is cognitively integrated into existing self-concepts and in how it is 
subsequently attended to, influencing self-evaluations.  
Although not examining these issues directly, the final step in Study 2A was to 
examine the mediating potential of social comparison tendencies in accounting for the 
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earlier-identified associations between attachment and feelings of subjective well-being 
(namely, life satisfaction and self-esteem). That is, do differences in tendencies to 
engage in adverse or favourable social comparisons provide insight into the findings that 
low-anxiety individuals tend to report increased subjective well-being over their high-
anxiety counterparts? 
The results of mediation analyses revealed upward contrast tendency to partially 
mediate the association between attachment anxiety and both life satisfaction and self-
esteem. For high anxiety individuals then, the observed decreased satisfaction with life 
and self-esteem can be partially explained by such individuals’ greater tendency to 
engage in unfavourable upward contrast comparisons, that is, their tendency to focus on 
the differences between themselves and others perceived as having desirable traits or in 
appealing circumstances. Conversely, for individuals low in attachment anxiety, their 
greater life satisfaction and self-esteem can be partially explained by their lesser 
tendencies to engage in such adverse comparisons. Further examination of the self-
esteem partial mediation sought to clarify the nature of the mediation, specifically, that it 
is high-anxiety individuals’ tendency to engage in upward contrast that partially 
accounts for their decreased self-esteem rather than their decreased self-esteem 
accounting for their comparison tendencies. That self-esteem was identified not to be a 
mediator supports that it is the tendency to contrast from perceived better-off others that 
contributes to lower self-esteem rather than such individuals’ lower self-esteem 
influencing tendency to contrast upward. As discussed earlier, the social comparison 
literature generally finds that comparison habits indicative of downward contrast and 
upward identification are more beneficial to subjective well-being than comparisons 
indicative of upward contrast and downward identification (e.g., Brown et al, 1992; 
Buunk et al., 1990; Cash et al., 1983; Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; 
Swallow & Kuiper, 1987; VanderZee et al., 1996; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). For the 
current findings then, high-anxiety individuals’ tendency to engage in contrast-type 
comparisons with perceived better-off others is in keeping with the above established 
literature by contributing towards their less positive perceptions of both their self-worth 
and the quality of their life circumstances. For feelings of self-esteem, high-anxiety 
individuals’ self-uncertainty leaves them vulnerable to using others as a source of self-
evaluative information (compared to low-anxiety individuals whose early attachment 
experiences have allowed them to form an autonomous, coherent sense of self). In 
tending to contrast themselves from others perceived as superior to themselves, such 
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individuals, whose self-uncertainty should make them more reliant on others as sources 
of self-evaluative information, would interpret this information in such a way to 
perceive themselves as inferior in the characteristic under scrutiny. This resultant 
perceived inferiority would then account for high-anxiety individuals’ lower self-
esteem; to repeatedly engage in comparisons in which the self is perceived as inferior to 
others would see evaluations of self-worth and -esteem be lower. For low-anxiety 
individuals meanwhile, who the results here suggest demonstrate a lesser tendency to 
engage in such comparisons, the lesser tendency to contrast upwards from others may 
similarly contribute towards their higher self-esteem through their lesser attention given 
to such adverse comparison information. 
With regards to life satisfaction not only should the feelings of inferiority that 
result from upward contrast contribute to a lower satisfaction with life circumstances 
through serving to reinforce that one’s own situation is poorer than others, but so too 
could it contribute via issues surrounding acceptance. As earlier discussed, Gibbons and 
Buunk (2006) stated that individuals higher in social comparison orientation should be 
higher in levels of conformity, as indicated by lower scores on Big Five trait ‘openness 
to experience’). It was argued earlier here that greater desire for conformity to social 
group norms echoes principles similar to the desire for acceptance that characterises 
high-anxiety individuals, as to conform to socially-prescribed group norms suggests 
social acceptance. By more often engaging in contrast comparisons to perceived better-
off others, a high-anxiety individual may cognitively interpret this gap between inferior 
self and superior other as an indication that they do not meet the standards set by others 
and therefore fall short of the criteria for the acceptance they desire. By serving to 
reinforce the doubts of acceptance held by high-anxiety individuals, it may be then that 
this upward contrast comparison information contributes towards decreased satisfaction 
with life due to life circumstances falling short of such individuals’ ideal. 
With upward contrast revealed as the only partial mediator for the association 
between attachment anxiety and well-being factors life satisfaction and self-esteem, this 
may provide insight into the earlier discussion of the different psychological ‘weights’ 
given to different types of comparison information. Although further empirical 
clarification will be required in future research, the results here hint that upward contrast 
comparison tendencies play the bigger role in influencing individuals’ post-comparison 
self-evaluative inferences. None of upward identification, downward contrast, or 
downward identification comparison tendencies was revealed as a partial mediator 
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between attachment anxiety and life satisfaction and self-esteem. Inherent in this, 
therefore, is the implication that the self-relevant information gleaned in these ways does 
not impact on the feelings of satisfaction and worth predicted by individuals’ levels of 
anxiety and so may not have the same level of importance that upward contrast 
information has in informing cognitive well-being judgements. As earlier stated, future 
research would benefit from further examination of this issue.  
However, important to consider in the above discussion is that, because of the 
nature of mediation analyses, the interpretation regarding causation is one that must be 
made with caution as such analyses do not allow for a concrete determination of which 
variable in fact serves as mediator. Theoretical derivation must guide interpretation, 
such that the mediation model that makes most logical sense within its theoretical 
context should provide the basis for inferences made. In the current mediation analyses, 
the more logical of interpretations of the current results would suggest, for example, that 
it is their greater tendency to contrast from perceived-better off others that partially 
explains why highly-anxious individuals report lower life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
Whilst it may instead be that it is attachment anxiety in higher upward-contrasting 
individuals that partially explains why greater tendency to engage in upward contrast 
comparisons is predictive of lesser life satisfaction and self-esteem, the steps in the 
analyses that allow for such mediations to be identified make this interpretation less 
logical. Specifically, such an inference would require upward contrast comparison 
tendency to be predictive of attachment anxiety, that is, propensity to engage in adverse 
comparisons to perceived better-off others to be predictive of how individuals perceive 
themselves and others (either positively or negatively) within interpersonal contexts and 
the extent to which they worry both over the quality and nature of their interpersonal 
experiences and others’ regard of them. On this basis then, it is argued (although cannot 
be confirmed) that it is upward contrast tendency that serves as the partial mediator and 
not attachment anxiety. 
In sum, the results of Study 2A revealed much about the roles of attachment 
anxiety and avoidance in predicting differences in social comparison tendencies. In 
considering the results together, it appears that attachment anxiety (which more strongly 
relates to model of self) is the stronger predictor of comparison tendencies, suggesting 
anxiety’s role to be more influential in determining differences in comparison practices. 
Anxiety was found to be predictive of increased general social comparison orientation, 
upward comparison, increased downward contrast, downward identification, and upward 
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contrast, with the latter found to serve as partial mediators for the associations between 
anxiety and each of life satisfaction and self-esteem. Attachment avoidance meanwhile 
was found to be predictive of lesser general social comparison orientation and lesser 
downward contrast. This would appear to suggest that it is individuals’ perceptions of 
self (that is, positivity or negativity in model of self), level of hyperactivation of the 
attachment system, the self-certainty that arises from self-concept complexity 
(Mikulincer, 1995), and desire for social acceptance play a greater role in influencing 
social comparison habits than does the level of interpersonal orientation (that is argued 
here to be determined by level of attachment avoidance). That is not to say that 
avoidance does not have an influence (indeed the significant findings revealed here are 
directly counter to this) but simply that it is the insecurity encapsulated by feelings of 
anxiety that appears to more comprehensively determine directional habits, as well as 
the extent to which similarities or differences in comparison information are focused on. 
While the above has provided insight, limitations of the current study must be 
considered. Sample size was quite small (N = 140) and so the lack of significant findings 
identified on the basis of attachment avoidance may not be an indication of its lesser role 
in predicting social comparison differences but rather a reflection of the lesser power 
afforded in a smaller sample size. However, examination of the p values did not indicate 
that the non-significant findings may become significant with a greater sample size (i.e. 
were not approaching significance), nor did the strength of the beta coefficients indicate 
that a pattern was emerging. 
A further limitation that must be considered when interpreting the above results 
lies with a slight ambiguity regarding what increased and decreased tendencies in 
identification and contrast comparisons actually indicate. For example, anxiety’s 
significant predictive value for upward contrast suggested high-anxiety to predict an 
increased tendency to engage in adverse contrast comparisons with perceived better off 
others (with low-anxiety therefore suggesting a decreased tendency to engage in upward 
contrast). What this may indicate are two possibilities: for low-anxiety individuals, it 
may be that such individuals do tend to engage in comparisons but upward contrast may 
represent a small proportion of the total comparisons they make; or that a lower 
tendency to engage in upward contrast is just an extension of their lesser tendency to 
make comparisons generally. It is a limitation of the current study that a differentiation 
between these two possibilities cannot be made and as such future research examining 
differences in identification and contrast processes on the basis of attachment 
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orientations should consider this factor when assessing such differences in comparison 
habits. 
A final related limitation hinted at above may be found in the simplistic nature of 
the methodology utilised; the aim of the current study was an exploratory one, that is, to 
identify previously unidentified associations between attachment dimensions anxiety 
and avoidance and social comparison tendencies. The present study has therefore 
revealed novel findings that, while perhaps rudimentary, have confirmed the predictive 
value of self-reported adult attachment that can be used as a basis to guide and inform 
future research (and indeed have been utilised here to provide theoretical guidance for 
Studies 4 and 5 in the present thesis). 
With comparison tendencies identified, the next step in the current exploration of 
attachment-based differences in social comparison was to use diary-study methodology 
to examine the nature of individuals’ affective states surrounding the comparisons made 
on a daily basis. 
Study 2B 
The findings of Study 2B found several anxiety-based differences in the affective 
experiences surrounding individuals’ naturalistic social comparisons. Firstly, it was 
found that, regardless of comparison direction, individuals high in attachment anxiety 
reported a more positive mood before engaging in social comparison than individuals 
low in attachment anxiety. This finding was consistent with that which was hypothesised 
and is therefore theoretically consistent. As reasoned when forming hypotheses, a 
combination of the findings of research testing and contradicting Will’s downward 
comparison theory (1981) and the findings of Study 2A in the current series of work led 
to the anticipation of decreased anxiety predicting decreased pre-comparison mood. 
Individuals higher in subjective well-being are argued to be better able to engage in 
favourable social comparison processes to improve state feelings of decreased well-
being (in the current study, decreased mood); the research findings examining the above 
downward comparison theory generally find that higher-subjective well-being 
individuals engage in more favourable comparisons. With low anxiety indicating a 
positive model of self as worthy of love, individuals reporting such feelings should have 
feelings of increased subjective well-being over their high-anxiety counterparts due to 
the positivity in the valence regarding their self-concepts. As such, it was argued that 
when mood is lower, low-anxiety individuals may be more likely to engage in social 
comparison in order to address this decreased state of well-being. This contention was 
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further argued on the basis that low-anxiety individuals were identified as less likely to 
engage in unfavourable comparisons, a pattern that whilst not directly assumes an 
increased tendency to engage in more favourable social comparisons, indicates a more 
positive bias in how self-other judgements are utilised. A weakness in the current 
study’s method of measurement was that there was no option for participants to state the 
nature of individuals’ upward and downward comparisons, only that comparison targets 
were perceived either as superior/more desirable or inferior/less desirable on the trait 
under comparative scrutiny. As such, any discussion of possible identification and 
contrast processes is speculative; a possible indication of the nature of individuals’ 
comparisons could be derived from their post-comparison moods and is a discussion 
point to be addressed later here. With the above limitation in mind, the results appear to 
suggest that it is a lower mood that is reported by low-anxiety individuals before making 
a comparison and may hint at a tendency to use social comparisons to their advantage.  
What is interesting to consider regarding high-anxiety individuals’ reporting of 
increased mood (over low-anxiety individuals) before engaging in social comparison is 
that this pattern may be suggestive of further reinforcement of the negative bias that 
research suggests typifies this attachment orientation (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003). 
The findings of Study 2A suggested that high-anxiety individuals demonstrate a greater 
tendency to engage in adverse downward identification and upward contrast, both of 
which should produce unfavourable self perceptions through either focusing on that 
which differentiates the self from the superior or links to the inferior other. In the current 
sample then, that high-anxiety individuals reported a more positive mood before making 
comparisons suggests that such individuals may be susceptible to cognitive processes 
that maintain poorer subjective well-being: in instances where transient well-being is 
more positive (in this case affective well-being), high-anxiety individuals engage in 
social comparisons that typically provide them with unfavourable self-evaluative 
information that should serve to return them to their poorer trait well-being. Put another 
way, whether aware of it or not, high-anxiety individuals may stop themselves from 
experiencing the improved subjective well-being their low-anxiety counterparts do. 
However, this must be understood within the context of the limited information 
regarding trait affect levels and the extent to which positivity/negativity of mood was 
experienced pre-social comparison. In examining the visual presentation of the 
regression slopes (e.g. Figure 26), with mood being on a scale of 1 (most negative) to 7 
(most positive), the moods typically reported by high-anxiety individuals was at only 
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slightly higher than the middle point; whilst this indicates mood to be more positive than 
negative, this does not indicate an overwhelming positivity. What would be useful and 
informative to know is how this pre-comparison mood differs from individuals’ baseline 
moods; previous research has identified high-anxiety individuals to typically report 
decreased mood and so it may be that this pre-comparison mood level for high-anxiety 
individuals is higher than typical baseline levels (and similarly the decreased mood 
reported by low-anxiety individuals may be lower). Future research utilising this 
methodology in assessing individuals’ moods surrounding the social comparisons they 
make would benefit from considering inclusion of baseline mood measurement. 
The results of analyses testing Hypothesis 1b revealed anxiety to be predictive of 
post-comparison mood (regardless of the direction of the comparison being made). 
Specifically, high-anxiety individuals were found to report a decreased post-comparison 
mood over their low-anxiety counterparts. However, the inclusion of self-esteem in the 
regression equation saw the predictive value of anxiety to become non-significant, 
suggesting this pattern to be entirely explainable by their differing levels of self-esteem. 
As such, high-anxiety individuals’ low self-esteem (in which perceptions of self as of 
lesser worth, an inclination to the self as a failure, and as having less to offer than peers) 
sees them experience a poorer mood in the immediate moments after having made a 
social comparison. Although model of self and self-esteem are considered similar 
constructs (indeed, model of self encapsulates feelings of worth and lovability in the 
eyes of others), they are not equivalent (as indicated in countless studies by the non-
perfect correlations and coefficients in testing the strength of their associations); whilst it 
could be argued that the predictive value of attachment anxiety may lie with the self-
perceptions encapsulated within the models of self that echo the qualities captured by 
self-esteem, this is perhaps an over-extension and as such is inaccurate. Future research 
may provide further insight through deeper examination of the characteristics of 
individuals’ self-perceptions that influence post-comparison moods. 
Individuals’ reports of mood before making upward comparisons revealed a 
significant interaction between anxiety, avoidance, and upward comparison: individuals 
fitting preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) and fearful (high anxiety/avoidance) 
attachment classifications reported the highest mood before engaging in upward 
comparison, followed by secure-type individuals and lastly, reporting the lowest pre-
comparison mood, dismissing-type individuals. These findings are in keeping with the 
general pre-comparison mood results that were tested for in Hypothesis 1a; it appears 
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that individuals high in attachment anxiety report higher pre-comparison mood than 
their low-anxiety counterparts. This once again is suggestive of a negative bias within 
such individuals that at times perhaps when their affective well-being appears slightly 
more positive, they engage in adverse self-other judgements that should produce 
unfavourable self-evaluations. Indeed that higher anxiety saw a greater tendency to 
engage in upward contrast should further reinforce high-anxiety individuals’ tendency to 
maintain poorer overall subjective well-being and is in keeping with Bower and 
colleagues’ selective affect-cognition priming model (Bower, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990) 
that puts forward that decreased well-being should produce a tendency to engage in 
unfavourable comparisons to reinforce and maintain those adverse feelings. That secure-
type individuals and dismissing-avoidant-type individuals were revealed to share a 
similar decreased pre-upward comparison mood is suggestive of the reverse pattern in 
which decreased mood may lead to making social comparisons that could see an 
affective improvement. 
What was interesting to note upon examining Figure 28 were the differences 
across the attachment ‘groups’ between pre-upward comparison moods and pre-non-
upward comparison moods (i.e. lateral and downward). While both preoccupied- and 
fearful-type individuals reported slight increased mood still (that is, at similar levels to 
their pre-upward comparison moods), most markedly, individuals fitting a dismissing-
avoidant classification reported a more substantial increased mood. For dismissing-type 
individuals then, the results appear to suggest that before engaging in upward 
comparisons, mood appears to be less favourable, but when engaging in either lateral or 
downward comparison, mood appears more positive. It may be that for high-
avoidance/low-anxiety individuals, comparison direction remains consistent with 
affective state of mind. That is, when feeling more positive, dismissing-avoidant 
individuals are more like to draw comparisons between themselves and others that 
would maintain their more positive feelings of well-being, but when in worse moods, 
similarly consistent upward comparisons in which the self may be seen as inferior are 
more likely to be made. Both these patterns may be suggestive of both the defensive 
nature that characterises their orientation as well as highlights that dismissing-avoidance 
is indeed, despite a positive model of self, a form of insecurity. When mood is more 
positive, dismissing-avoidant individuals (whose high avoidance was identified in Study 
2A to predict a greater tendency to engage in downward contrast) may attend more to 
comparison information in which the self is presented more favourably than the other, 
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suggesting a pattern of positive self-perception maintenance. When mood is less positive 
however, it may be that in this state of lesser affective well-being, the comparison 
information that is more apparent to dismissing-avoidant individuals may be that from 
perceived better-off others that is less advantageous with regards to positive-self 
maintenance (that is, suggestive of a negative bias similar to that demonstrate by anxious 
individuals). However, as indicated earlier in the discussion of Study 2A regarding high-
anxiety individuals’ tendencies to both identify with and contrast from perceived worse-
off others, it may be that for dismissing-type individuals a poorer affective state of mind 
manifests upward comparisons, but the importance placed on such information is 
defensively limited. That is, while their insecurity may make upward comparisons more 
likely when mood is poorer, the defensiveness that characterises them may produce 
derogation of that upward comparison information. While change in mood in response 
to upward comparison (the results of the present analyses examining exactly this are to 
be discussed shortly) is indicative of how individuals interpret and respond to 
comparison information, it may be useful for future research to examine attachment-
based differences in cognitive reactions to such information. For example, utilising a 
similar methodology as employed by Gibbons and McCoy (1991) in which self-esteem-
based differences in comparison target derogation were identified would be informative. 
Specifically, Gibbons and McCoy were able to identify that men high in self-esteem, 
when threatened, derogated target others’ competence while women’s derogation 
manifested disliking. Deeper examination of (in the current instance) dismissing-
avoidant-type individuals’ cognitive responses to potentially threatening comparison 
information may provide further insight into the current findings. 
That individuals fitting the secure attachment classification were the only ‘group’ 
to report the pattern of more positive mood before upward than non-upward suggests 
that mood consistency in upward comparisons may be a characteristic in attachment 
insecurity. Indeed, secure-type individuals’ less positive mood before making lateral and 
downward comparisons compared to their pre-upward moods suggests that 
lateral/downward comparison may be used to improve affective well-being. The more 
positive mood before upward comparison is perhaps contrary to expectation as such a 
comparison should intuitively produce less favourable outcomes. However, it must be 
noted that, similar to preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals, the difference between 
the upward and non-upward slopes are only very slight and so when considered together 
may just represent a general trend of the observed mood level being predictive of social 
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comparison (as indicated in earlier findings here). That is, secure-type individuals 
themselves are unlikely to notice a difference in mood as slight as that indicated in 
Figure 28. Indeed, as earlier highlighted, the slopes presented in Figure 28 suggest the 
levels to be only just above the middle point of the 1-7 mood scale. For individuals 
fitting the secure attachment classification this may represent a lower mood than that 
which is typically experienced and may instead be a reflection of lower mood levels 
generally being indicative of comparisons being made.  
One potential factor that must be considered in examining the differences in pre-
comparison moods is that, rather than individuals’ moods influencing them to make 
certain types of comparison (that is, upward or non-upward comparisons), it may simply 
be that differences in mood produce differences in perceptions of targets’ positions 
relative to the self. That is, it may be that, for example, dismissing-type individuals’ 
lower mood makes them more likely to see target others as being better than them on the 
characteristic being compared, while a greater mood makes them more likely to perceive 
target others as either equal or inferior. While there are many advantages to using event-
contingent diary study methodology (see Wheeler, 2000, for a review) it is a further 
limitation of the current study that the methodology chosen to be utilised meant that this 
distinction could not be made. Indeed, to be able to consider the accuracy of 
participants’ other-judgements in terms of superiority/inferiority, ratings by independent 
third-party individuals would need to be employed to allow for the assessment of 
participants’ self-reported ratings. However the practicality of being able to implement 
such a course of action is somewhat limited given the naturalistic nature of the present 
comparison measurement. Such a methodology would be more practical in less 
naturalistic settings (i.e. if participants were within a laboratory setting) and so is a 
limitation that could not be accounted for in the present study. Indeed this point 
regarding the accuracy of individuals’ judgements regarding their upward and 
downward comparisons (that is, whether individuals demonstrate actual trends or what 
they report is merely a product of their differing levels of well-being) is an issue that is 
relevant to all research within the social comparison literature. However, with the 
present study identifying that such differences regarding comparison direction do 
emerge on the basis of attachment orientations, this provides direction for future 
research to further explore the highlighted issues. It would be interesting to examine 
more in-depth whether individuals’ pre-comparison moods indeed influence the types of 
comparisons they make (upward or downward) or whether those moods instead 
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influence how they perceive comparison targets (that is, in a more positive mood the 
same target could be viewed more favourably than when in a more negative mood). 
The analyses examining the predictive value of attachment anxiety for post-
downward comparison mood produced results approaching significance; high-anxiety 
individuals reported higher post-downward comparison mood than their low-anxiety 
counterparts, suggesting the trend of the former individuals benefitting more from such 
comparison information over the latter. It appears then that although earlier results 
within Study 2A identified high-anxiety individuals to demonstrate a greater tendency to 
identify with downward targets compared to their low-anxiety counterparts, the 
increased tendency also to contrast from perceived worse-off others that additionally 
emerged may have governed the current sample in their downward comparison 
responses. That high-anxiety individuals reported an increased mood does support the 
theoretical notion not only that such individuals’ have a greater reliance on others for 
self-validation (due to negative less certain self-concepts resulting in greater 
susceptibility to change in response to external information) but also is supportive of the 
findings of previous research that suggest such individuals to demonstrate a greater 
emotional reactivity (e.g., Meyer et al., 2005; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Mikulincer et 
al., 1998; see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005, for review). That is, not only might high-
anxiety individuals respond more favourably because the downward comparison 
information disconfirms negative self-perceptions of being of lesser worth, but their 
affective profiles would see a greater positive emotional response manifesting from the 
self-evaluative benefit. Their low-anxiety counterparts meanwhile may still benefit from 
information that confirms their positive self-perceptions of lovability and being worthy, 
but their lesser reliance on others for self-validation and more moderate emotional 
reactivity would be expected to produce an affective response of lesser strength.  
Further interesting concerning post-downward comparison mood were the slopes 
identified for non-downward (i.e. lateral and upward combined) comparisons. Here, the 
opposite pattern as revealed for downward comparison emerged; high-anxiety 
individuals reported a lower mood than low-anxiety individuals. The complementary 
consistency evidenced here further supports the above theoretical consideration of the 
underlying mechanisms that were put forward as perhaps accounting for post-upward 
comparison mood differences. That is, anxious individuals’ poorer self-certainty would 
result in greater vulnerability to comparison information influencing self-judgments, and 
that the less favourable non-downward comparison information would confirm their 
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negative models of self as being of lesser worth producing poorer mood. However, this 
must be considered in the context that examining of post-upward comparison mood did 
not produce significant results, that is, no anxiety-based differences in affective response 
to upward social comparison. Here then the slopes presented in Figure 29 must be 
interpreted in the context that the less positive mood presented is the result of non-
downward rather than upward per se (indeed as included in this term is both upward and 
lateral comparisons). That no significant differences emerged directly for upward 
comparison is counter to the above theorising. It remains unclear why no differences 
were revealed in post-upward comparison mood but the results considered together 
suggest that it is the information garnered from downward comparison information that 
has a greater impact on the mood individuals report as influenced by their feelings of 
attachment anxiety. 
As mentioned briefly earlier, one means of gaining insight into how individuals 
interpret social comparison information is through their affective reactions, that is, their 
change in mood in response to attending to self-other judgments. Indeed much research 
examining individuals’ responses to social comparison information concentrate on self-
reported mood as a means of identifying whether individuals perceive themselves as 
inferior or superior to the comparison target (e.g., Buunk & Ybema, 2003) and so the 
final focus of Study 2B was to extend this form of examination to gain insight into 
attachment-based social comparison processes. 
Firstly, affective reactions were examined in response to having made a social 
comparison generally (that is, regardless of whether the information gleaned was upward 
or downward in its direction). Anxiety was revealed to be a significant predictor, with 
visual presentation of the slopes suggesting high anxiety to be predictive of decrease in 
mood and low anxiety to be predictive of minimal change. The results then seem to 
indicate that high-anxiety individuals have a tendency to make more negative inferences 
regarding the traits they are comparing with others. This is consistent with the findings 
of Study 2A revealing anxiety-based differences in identification and contrast, 
specifically, that high-anxiety individuals reported greater tendency to identify with 
target others perceived as being in an undesirable situation or as having undesirable 
qualities while complementarily reporting a greater tendency to contrast from others 
perceived as having qualities or being in circumstances that are appealing and superior 
to themselves. In seeing similarities between the self and perceived worse-off others and 
differences between the self and perceived better-off others, self-perceptions would be 
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anticipated to be negatively impacted upon and would hence result in a decrease in 
mood. Low-anxiety individuals’ minimal change to their mood in response to having 
engaged in a social comparison meanwhile could be reflection of both the increased self-
certainty that characterises this orientation (e.g. Wu, 2009) serving as a buffer against 
cognitive and affective ill-effects (through the resilience against external informational 
influence) and because of the more moderate levels of affective reactivity in comparison 
to their high-anxiety counterparts. Conversely, any comparison information which 
would see more positive self-judgments should similarly produce more limited affective 
reaction (to those argued to be exhibited by high-anxiety individuals) due to confirming 
such individuals’ already positive models of self as worthy (as well as producing the 
lesser reliance on external information for self-evaluations).  In sum, the findings of 
mood change in response to having engaged in social comparison are theoretically 
consistent. 
Upon examining mood change in response to comparisons of specific directions 
(that is, upward and downward), similar to the analyses examining post-moods the 
findings here revealed anxiety to be predictive of mood change in response to downward 
comparison but not upward. The results suggested that both high and low anxiety 
individuals seemed to respond similarly in their mood change to downward 
comparisons, but that a greater difference between these two ‘groups’ was evidenced for 
non-downward comparisons (lateral and upward); high-anxiety individuals responded 
more negatively to such comparisons than their low-anxiety counterparts. It is 
interesting that high- and low-anxiety individuals reported similar increases in mood. 
Although only very slight, the increases in mood reported may be similar but it is argued 
that the mechanisms accounting for the changes are different. For low-anxiety 
individuals, the minimal benefit from downward comparison is argued to be the result of 
the above outlined theoretical principles; for high-anxiety individuals who should 
intuitively benefit more from such information, it may be evidence for the earlier-argued 
possibility for derogation that could prevent gaining much benefit. 
Although earlier discussion here has highlighted a few limitations in the current 
study, a further one which may account for the lack of consistent statistical findings 
could be due to the nature of the measurement of mood. Although changes in mood from 
more negative/less positive to more positive/less negative has been informative, further, 
clearer insight may have been provided through the use of measurement that would 
allow for the separate assessment of positive and negative mood. Indeed, there is much 
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in the literature examining mood constructs that suggest positive and negative mood 
should not be assumed as being two ends of the same affective spectrum but instead 
while related, they are independent (e.g., Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). The 
decision to use the current method of mood measurement was made on the basis that it 
had been used with success on previous research (Wood et al., 2000). However, other 
studies utilising a measure in which positive and negative affect are assessed separately 
(e.g., Olson & Evans, 1999) have revealed findings that may indicate that assessing 
mood change on a single mood spectrum, as in the current study, may miss certain 
affective processes taking place. As such, future research exploring attachment-based 
differences in social comparison and mood would benefit from assessing the two affect 
dimensions separately as such would provide further insight into the benefits and 
detriments of engaging in self-other evaluations. 
In sum, the current study revealed a number of findings consistent with theorising 
and therefore suggests that individuals’ attachment orientations do indeed predict 
differences in the affective antecedents and responses to social comparison information. 
With these findings identified, the next step in the current series of work was to examine 
individuals’ attachment-based differences in the comparisons they engage in regarding 
interpersonal factors, specifically, both romantic relationships and partners. Given the 
centrality of attachment proclivities in interpersonal processes, it was argued that 
comparisons within such a specific context would reveal differences both in the 
tendencies to engage in comparisons as well as the nature of the comparisons made (for 
example, whether upward or downward, identifying or contrasting, and what specific 
interpersonal qualities are typically placed under comparative scrutiny). However, 
before being able to assess such associations, the types of partner and relationship 
qualities (based on attachment anxiety and avoidance) that individuals place importance 
on, and therefore may be subject to comparison, needed to be examined. Through 
identifying which traits individuals judge to be important in their interpersonal 
experiences it was hoped to utilise this information to guide later assessment of romantic 
partner and relationship social comparisons and so the next step to be carried out was 
examination of partner and relationship ideal standards. 
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Chapter 4. Study 3: Adult Attachment and Partner and Relationship 
Ideal Standards 
 
Research by Fletcher and colleagues (Fletcher & Simpson, 2000; Fletcher, et al., 
2000; Fletcher et al., 1999) has examined the nature of individuals’ ideal standards when 
it comes to their partners and relationships. Argued to play a fundamental role in 
relationship processes, individuals’ interpersonal ideals serve as an evaluative standard 
for a current partner and relationship and are used to regulate and create cognitive and 
behavioural adjustments. Through factor analytic work, Fletcher et al. (1999) identified 
individuals’ partner ideals to be divided into three dimensions and relationship ideals 
into two dimensions. The first partner ideal, Warmth-Trustworthiness, comprises 
characteristics relevant to intimacy, warmth, trust, and loyalty and is typically the 
highest rated in terms of importance placed on by individuals (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1999). 
The second ideal was termed Attractiveness-Vitality and consists of characteristics 
describing how attractive, energetic, and healthy an ideal partner is. The final partner 
dimension, Status-Resources, includes characteristics associated with a partner’s social 
status and resources, such as a good job, financial security, and good dress sense. 
Similar to the partner ideals, the first relationship ideal of Intimacy-Loyalty 
(encompassing such characteristics as intimacy, loyalty, trust, and stability) is typically 
rated as more important than the second ideal, Passion (which pertains to qualities such 
as excitement, passion, fun, and independence). 
Previous research 
There is a substantial history of research dedicated to examining individual 
differences in partner and relationship ideals, with gender being of particular focus. 
Although not testing the dimensions identified by Fletcher et al. (1999) directly, research 
has generally identified the pattern of males prioritising partner appearance - fitting into 
the Attractiveness-Vitality dimension - and females prioritising partner material and 
financial resources - matching those characteristics defining Status-Resources (e.g., 
Buss, 1989; Hill, 1945; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002; Sprecher, Sullivan, & 
Hatfield, 1994; see Feingold 1990, 1992 for meta-analyses). It should be noted, 
however, that some studies have not identified gender-differentiated patterns in partner 
preferences and ideals (e.g., Regan & Anupama, 2003), even suggesting there to be a 
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convergence of ideals reported by males and females in recent years (Buss, Shackelford, 
Kirkpatrick, & Larsen, 2001).  
 To date, only one study has been identified as examining the association between 
attachment orientation and partner and relationship ideal standards. In their study 
utilising a Norwegian university sample, Arseth, et al. (2009) found that those 
categorised as dismissing-avoidant reported significantly lower scores on partner factor 
Warmth-Trustworthiness than those categorised as preoccupied and significantly lower 
scores on relationship factor Intimacy-Loyalty than those categorised as secure. 
Furthermore, those classified as preoccupied reported significantly lower scores on 
relationship factor Passion than those classified as dismissing-avoidant. No differences 
emerged for Attractiveness-Vitality and Partner Status-Resources factors. It should be 
noted, however, that a possible limitation within this study, and perhaps accountable for 
the limited differences found for some of the aforementioned partner and relationship 
subscales, was the utilisation of categorical assessment of adult attachment. Participants 
in this study completed the Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 
1991) by indicating the extent to which each of the four attachment descriptions were 
representative of their feelings within close relationships. Participants were subsequently 
categorised into one of the four attachment classifications on the basis of which 
description they rated as most relevant to themselves. While this methodology is one 
that has been widely used within the adult attachment literature, recent years have seen 
researchers draw attention to the limitations inherent in such categorical assessment. In 
Arseth et al.’s (2009) study, participants’ responses indicated a certain level of 
agreement with each of the four attachment descriptions, highlighting a concern voiced 
within the adult attachment literature that categorical assessment creates an overly 
simplistic and finite impression of each individual’s attachment proclivities and assumes 
reciprocal exclusivity of attachment orientations (such that endorsement of one style 
means absolute non-endorsement of others). Furthermore, this focus on creating discrete 
inter-categorical group differences seems to be at the expense of considering intra-
categorical variation, that is, each individual classified into a certain category is 
conceptualised and treated as experiencing attachment-related cognitions and feelings 
identically (see Crowell, Fraley, & Shaver, 1999, for discussion). The above finding that 
individuals in actuality tend to agree to varying extents to each attachment description 
suggests that forced assignment into one classification may be too restrictive. 
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In support of these criticisms, research has suggested that fitting attachment 
patterns into categorically distinguishable models can indeed create issues in 
measurement precision and subsequent analyses (Fraley & Waller, 1998; Waller & 
Meehl, 1998; see Fraley et al., 2000 for discussion). Furthermore, research examining 
the test-retest stability of this form of assessment finds relatively high levels of 
disagreement (Stein et al., 2002) with further research finding that the disagreement 
rates do not change as the interval between testing changes (Baldwin & Fehr, 1995), 
suggesting the discrepancies to be an artefact of measurement error rather than reflecting 
“true” change in individuals’ attachment orientations. Alternatively, dimensional 
measures of attachment orientation, in which individual differences in anxiety and 
avoidance can be placed along a continuum, allow for a more precise and accurate 
appraisal of individuals’ attachment-related feelings and cognitions. As such, 
dimensional conceptualisation and measurement of adult attachment is argued to provide 
a greater insight into the intricacies inherent in individuals’ understanding and 
experience of their attachment relationships (e.g., Fraley & Waller, 1998). 
With this in mind, the aim of the current study was to explore the association 
between adult attachment (as measured dimensionally) and romantic partner and 
relationship ideals. In identifying the partner and relationship characteristics that 
individuals rate as being important qualities to them it is the aim that this information be 
used as a basis for later examination within the current series of studies of the types of 
attachment-based social comparisons individuals typically make in their romantic 
relationships. 
The following hypotheses were made: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Greater attachment anxiety will predict higher partner warmth-
trustworthiness ratings while greater attachment avoidance will predict lower ratings. 
 
The basis of this hypothesis originates in the consideration of the insecure qualities 
that characterise high anxiety and avoidance. With regards to anxiety, high-anxiety 
individuals are characterised by uncertainty within their relationships. Such individuals 
have a negative working model of self as being of lesser worth and unlovable and gain 
validation of the self through others’ regard and responsiveness (that is, they are unable 
to validate the self autonomously). Furthermore such individuals are characterised as 
having a hyper-activated attachment system manifesting hypervigilance to partner 
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behaviours for signs of acceptance. It is argued on this basis then that as anxiety 
increases, the characteristic of partner warmth-trustworthiness should increase in 
importance also. For the high-anxiety individual, the qualities that are encapsulated 
within warmth-trustworthiness (such as supportive, communicative, reliable, and 
affectionate) are those that can be interpreted as confirming partners’ regard of them. 
For a partner to be reliably supportive, openly affectionate, and to disclose personal 
feelings while listening to their own disclosures is to meet high-anxiety individuals’ 
relationship intimacy desires whilst providing evidence of the acceptance they need for 
validation. For low-anxiety individuals whose working models of self are positive (that 
is, worthy of love), self-validation can be achieved autonomously; low-anxiety 
individuals do not share high-anxiety individuals’ need for partner acceptance and as 
such it was anticipated that they would place lesser importance on the acceptance-
indicating characteristics encapsulated with partner warmth-trustworthiness. 
With regards to avoidance, a major characteristic differentiating high-avoidance 
individuals from low-avoidance is comfort with closeness (e.g., Collins & Read, 1990). 
As earlier described, high-avoidance individuals’ discomfort with closeness is a 
manifestation of early caregiver non-responsiveness that produces within the individual 
a distrust of others and subsequent defensive self-reliance. High-avoidance has been 
found in previous research within the adult attachment literature as being associated with 
distress in high-intimacy situations (e.g., Bradford, Feeney, & Campbell, 1998; Rholes 
et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999) and in keeping with the theoretical contention that the 
need for autonomy that typifies highly-avoidant individuals produces an aversion to 
others’ perceived intimacy-seeking behaviours. The characteristics that warmth-
trustworthiness consist of are exactly those that should give rise to highly-avoidant 
individuals’ discomfort with emotional closeness and as such it was predicted that as 
avoidance increases, the importance placed on this partner factor would decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Greater attachment avoidance will predict higher partner attractiveness-
vitality ratings. 
 
No hypothesis was made on the predictive value of attachment anxiety on 
perceptions of the importance of partner attractiveness-vitality. Whilst it could be argued 
that high-anxiety individuals’ validation of self through their romantic partners might 
see them rate partner attractiveness highly due to the esteem gained from having a 
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physically desirable partner, it was reasoned that the overall appeal of a highly attractive 
partner would lie in the characteristic’s meeting with physical needs rather than anxiety-
based needs and hence attractiveness-vitality was not anticipated to differ on the basis of 
this attachment dimension. 
However, it was anticipated that ratings of the importance of partner 
attractiveness-vitality would differ on the basis of attachment avoidance. It was reasoned 
that highly-avoidant individuals, whose discomfort with closeness is argued to manifest 
lesser importance placed on intimacy-related ideals, would instead value partner 
characteristics not related to these distress-inducing traits. As such, highly-avoidant 
individuals may focus their ideals on non-intimacy traits such as the physical appearance 
of a romantic partner. That is, it is more important to such individuals that romantic 
partners have good looks and a nice body, which does not encroach upon their need for 
autonomy and emotional distance, than for romantic partners to be communicative, 
warm, and a good listener, each of which may activate the attachment system they 
defensively suppress due to the feelings of discomfort that arise. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Greater attachment avoidance will predict higher partner status-resource 
ratings. 
 
The theoretical basis for Hypothesis 3 was the same as that put forward within 
Hypothesis 2; high-avoidance individuals’ discomfort with closeness is anticipated to 
manifest a greater importance being placed on characteristics not pertaining to intimacy. 
As such, the extent to which a romantic partner is successful (that is, has a good job, 
nice home, and is financially secure) is suggested to appeal more to highly-avoidant 
individuals than their low-avoidance counterparts on the basis that it is not threatening to 
their high-independence relationship needs. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Greater attachment anxiety will predict higher relationship intimacy-
loyalty ratings, while greater attachment avoidance will predict lower ratings. 
 
As with the partner characteristic ideal of warmth-trustworthiness, a similar 
pattern was anticipated for relationship intimacy-loyalty ideal standard ratings. High-
anxiety individuals’ preoccupation with partner acceptance and fear of rejection should 
see such individuals place greater importance on intimacy-loyalty (comprising qualities 
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such as commitment, acceptance, and loyalty) than their low-anxiety counterparts. Their 
low-anxiety counterparts meanwhile with their lesser insecurity regarding their partners’ 
regard would not be expected to rate partner intimacy and loyalty as highly due to their 
positive working models of self allowing for autonomous self-validation and hence 
lesser reliance on positive partner behaviours in determining judgements regarding self-
worth. 
Also similar to Hypothesis 1 concerning partner warmth-trustworthiness, the 
differing levels of comfort with closeness that characterise the attachment avoidance 
dimension was anticipated to produce differences in the importance placed on 
relationship intimacy and loyalty. For high-avoidance individuals whose desire for 
autonomy and independence see adverse reactions to others’ high-intimacy behaviours 
(e.g., Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Rholes et al., 1998; Rholes et al., 1999), it was 
anticipated that such individuals would rate this relationship trait as less important to 
them than their low-avoidance counterparts who, with their comfort with intimacy-
inducing behaviours in others, would view such a relationship trait as appealing and 
hence greater in importance to them. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Greater attachment anxiety will predict higher relationship passion ratings 
while greater attachment avoidance will predict lower ratings. 
 
The final relationship trait Passion comprises characteristics such as exciting, 
passionate, and romantic, relationship qualities that, similar to intimacy-loyalty and 
partner warmth-trustworthiness, alludes to interpersonal closeness. As such the above 
pattern (that is, greater anxiety and lower avoidance predicting increased ratings of 
importance) was anticipated due to the aforementioned differing levels of comfort with 
closeness that characterise avoidance and the insecurity over negative self-perceptions 
and partner regard that characterise anxiety. 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 224 participants took part in the current study, of whom 176 (78.6%) were 
female and 48 (21.4%) were male. Age ranged from 18 to 64 (M = 29.03, SD = 10.96). 
Two hundred and one participants (89.7%) identified themselves as heterosexual, 5 
(2.2%) as homosexual and 15 (6.7%) as bisexual; 3 participants (1.3%) identified 
themselves as “Other”. Fifty-six (25.0%) of participants reported not currently being in a 
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relationship; of the remaining 75% who were in a relationship at the time of the study, 
66 (29.5%) were not co-habiting while 41 (18.3%) were, 6 (2.7%) were engaged, and 47 
(21.0%) were married. Of the remaining, 7 (3.1%) were separated, and 1 (0.4%) was 
divorced. Relationship length ranged from 1 month to 35 years 1 month (M = 65.36 
months, SD = 85.16 months). 
Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire. As in previous studies, participants were asked to 
complete a demographic questionnaire. Questions comprised of gender, age, countries of 
origin and residence, relationship status, sexual orientation, and length of relationship if 
applicable (in years and months). 
Adult Attachment. Participants’ attachment orientation was measured in the same 
way as in previous studies using the Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised 
(Fraley et al., 2000) scale. In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was .94 for both 
anxiety and avoidance. 
Partner and Relationship Ideal Standards Scale. Partner and relationship ideals 
were measured using the partner and relationship ideal standards scales created by 
Fletcher et al. (1999). This measure is divided into two separate scales with the partner 
scale comprising 41 traits and the relationship scale comprising 27 traits. The partner 
scale consists of three subscales: Warmth-Trustworthiness (e.g., Understanding, 
Affectionate, and Supportive); Vitality-Attractiveness (e.g., Independent, Spontaneous, 
and Attractive); and Status-Resources (e.g., Financially secure, Successful, and Dresses 
well). The relationship scale meanwhile consists of two subscales: Intimacy-Loyalty 
(e.g., Honest, Good communication, and Acceptance); and Passion (e.g., Exciting, Fun, 
and Passionate). Participants are asked to rate each listed characteristic according to the 
importance they place on it in describing either their ideal partner or relationship. 
Responses are in a Likert-type format and range from 1 (Very Unimportant) to 7 (Very 
Important) with scores for each subscale calculated as the mean of all characteristics the 
subscale comprises. The scales have been well-validated in previous research, 
demonstrating good reliability (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1999). Cronbach’s alphas of the 
factors confirmed in the present study are presented in Table 37. 
Procedure 
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants could access the study via the university’s web 
pages. Participants provided online consent to take part and completed the initial set of 
measures. Upon completion, participants were presented with a final webpage fully 
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debriefing them on the aims of the study and providing information on the measures 
included in the study. 
Results 
Factor Analysis. A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was 
carried out on the items contained within the partner and relationship scales in order to 
confirm the five factors first identified by Fletcher et al. (1999). Results of the analysis 
indicated that for the present sample, the partner ideals data was best described by a 4-
factor solution that accounted for 57.0% of the total variance.  
 
Table 35. Partner Ideals Factor Loadings and Alphas 
 Warmth-
Trustworthiness 
Fun Success Physical 
Attractiveness 
Considerate .80    
Supportive .80    
Trustworthy .79    
Understanding .79    
Kind .75    
Good Listener .72    
Honest .71    
Affectionate .71    
Warm .71    
Reliable .67    
Sensitive .65    
Communicative .57    
Stable .55    
Romantic .46    
Good Fun  .64   
Independent  .62   
Adventurous  .61   
Good Humour  .57   
Outgoing  .56   
Easy-going  .53   
Self-aware  .49   
Good Job   .83  
Successful   .79  
Financially Secure   .78  
Nice House   .71  
Dresses Well   .56  
Ambitious   .55  
Active Lifestyle   .51  
Nice Body    .75 
Attractive    .70 
Sexy    .67 
Good Lover    .49 
Cronbach’s alpha .93 .82 .89 .83 
210 
 
 
Examination of the rotated component matrix (see Table 35) revealed the first 
factor was defined by items similar to those produced by Fletcher et al (1999) and as 
such was labelled “Warmth-Trustworthiness”. The second factor was defined by high 
loadings on 7 items, including such traits as “Easy-going”, “Good Fun”, and “Good 
Sense of Humour”, which seemed to reflect fun, non-serious partner characteristics and 
as such was labelled “Fun”. The third factor was also defined by high loadings on 7 
items (e.g., “Dresses Well”, “Financially Secure”, and “Good Job”) and was labelled 
“Success”. The final factor was defined by high loadings on 4 items (e.g., Nice Body”) 
and was labelled “Physical Attractiveness”. Nine items (e.g., “Appropriate Age”, 
“Broad-minded”) did not clearly load on any of the four factors and so were dropped 
from subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 36. Relationship Ideals Factor Loadings and Alphas 
 Intimacy-Loyalty Passion 
Respect .82  
Support .77  
Loyalty .77  
Trusting .77  
Caring .76  
Honest .74  
Stability .74  
Understanding .73  
Good Communication .68  
Commitment .68  
Acceptance .62  
Monogamous .60  
Friendship .59  
Relaxed .45  
Equality .44  
Intellectual Equality .42  
Exciting  .80 
Passionate  .78 
Romantic  .69 
Fun  .68 
Challenging  .66 
Independence  .41 
Cronbach’s alpha  .92   .80 
 
 
Factor analysis of the relationship ideals scale revealed a 2-factor solution that 
accounted for 49.48% of the total variance. Both factors resembled those originally 
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produced by Fletcher et al. (1999) and as such, Factor 1, defined by loadings on 16 
items, was labelled “Intimacy-Loyalty” and Factor 2, defined by loadings on 6 items, 
was labelled “Passion” (see Table 36). Four items, “Affectionate”, “Similar 
Personalities”, “In Love”, and “Humorous” did not clearly load onto either factor and so 
were removed from further analysis. 
While the relationship ideals identified in the current study matched those first 
created by Fletcher et al. (1999), the partner ideals deviated somewhat such that the 
original partner attractiveness-vitality ideal appeared to load onto two separate factors 
(labelled “Fun” and “Physical Attractiveness”). As a result of this, Hypothesis 2 was 
amended to reflect these newer factors: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Greater attachment avoidance will predict higher partner fun and physical 
attractiveness ratings. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 37. 
 
Table 37. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment Anxiety 3.19 1.26 
Attachment Avoidance 2.80 1.11 
Warmth-Trustworthiness 5.97 .81 
Fun 5.28 .92 
Success 4.25 1.26 
Physical Attractiveness 4.85 1.14 
Intimacy-Loyalty 6.13 .77 
Passion 5.18 .98 
 
 
Examination of the anxiety and avoidance dimension means revealed both to be 
slightly lower than means established previously within the adult attachment literature 
utilising the Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised scale, suggesting the current 
sample to be lower in attachment insecurity generally. However, it should be noted that 
three-quarters of the sample for the current study were in a committed romantic 
relationship with the mean age of the sample overall to be approaching 30. Further 
findings within the adult attachment literature have indicated attachment insecurity to 
decrease as age increases and for individuals in committed romantic relationships to 
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report lower levels of anxiety and avoidance (see Fraley, 2011) and so the current means 
may be a reflection of these previously-established trends. 
Upon examining the partner and relationship ideal standards means, the scores 
appear consistent with those established previously by Fletcher et al., (1999) in their 
original article creating the scale.  
Pearson correlation coefficients were first calculated to explore the associations 
between attachment and the partner and relationship ideals identified through factor 
analysis. 
 
Table 38. Attachment and Partner and Relationship Ideals Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anxiety - .45*** -.03 -.11 -.01 -.07 -.03 .06 
2. Avoidance  - -.29*** -.18** -.11 -.18** -.19** -.15* 
3. Warmth-
Trustworthines
s 
  - .56*** .46*** .34*** .87*** .54*** 
4. Fun    - .51*** .57*** .57*** .74*** 
5. Success     - .54*** .45*** .57*** 
6. Physical 
Attractiveness 
     - .32*** .57*** 
7. Intimacy-
Loyalty 
      - .55*** 
8. Passion        - 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
Surprisingly, attachment anxiety did not correlate with any of the partner and 
relationship ideal standards. However, significant negative correlations emerged 
between attachment avoidance and all but one of the ideals (Partner Success). 
Comparing once again to the findings originally reported by Fletcher et al. (1999), the 
correlations among the partner and relationship ideal standard factors were generally 
consistent with those previously identified. One notable difference however is the 
significant positive correlation between Partner Success (similar to Fletcher and 
colleagues’ original Partner Status-Resources) and Partner Warmth-Trustworthiness and 
Relationship Intimacy-Loyalty. In their original paper, these sets of correlations were 
non-significant. A possible reason accounting for this incongruence could be due to the 
slight variations in the items that comprise each factor. However, the remaining 
significant correlations were similar and hence in keeping with established patterns. 
Adult attachment and partner ideal standards 
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Hypothesis 1 put forward that greater attachment anxiety would predict higher 
partner warmth-trustworthiness ratings while greater attachment avoidance would 
predict lower ratings. Partner warmth-trustworthiness was regressed onto anxiety and 
avoidance at the first step and their interaction term at the second; the overall model was 
significant (F = 9.31 (3, 223) p <.01) and accounted for 10.1% of the variance (Adjusted 
R²). Attachment avoidance (β = -.36, p <.001) was a significant predictor, while 
attachment anxiety was not significant (although approaching, β =.13, p <.08). 
Hypothesis 1 was therefore partially supported: greater avoidance predicts a decreased 
value placed on warmth-trustworthiness when it comes to romantic partners. While the 
pattern of increased anxiety predicting increased importance of partner warmth-
trustworthiness did emerge, it did not quite reach significance and hence Hypothesis 1 
could not be fully supported. 
The anxiety*avoidance interaction term was found to be a significant predictor (β 
= .13, p = .05) and is presented in Figure 31. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Partner Warmth-
Trustworthiness 
 
Table 39. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Partner Warmth-Trustworthiness 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant 2.6704ª 
Secure and Preoccupied .0299 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -2.573ª 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -4.8828** 
ªp < .08 
**p < .01 
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When relating the information presented in Figure 31 to attachment classifications, 
individuals fitting preoccupied (high anxiety/low avoidance) and secure (low 
anxiety/avoidance) attachment classifications placed the greatest importance on partner 
qualities encompassing warmth and trustworthiness (with slopes analyses indicating the 
difference between the two to be non-significant). Individuals fitting a dismissing-
avoidant attachment classification (that is, low anxiety/high avoidance) reported placing 
the least importance on partner warmth-trustworthiness; fearful-avoidant-type 
individuals meanwhile (high anxiety/avoidance) reported placing intermediate 
importance on this partner trait. 
Hypothesis 2 put forward that greater attachment avoidance would predict higher 
partner fun and physical attractiveness ratings. First, partner “Fun” was regressed onto 
anxiety, avoidance (first step), and their interaction term (second step). The model was 
significant (F = 2.59 (3, 223), accounting for 2.1% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Only 
attachment avoidance (β = -.17, p <.05) significantly predicted partner fun ratings and 
was contradictory to hypotheses; greater attachment avoidance predicted decreased 
importance on traits capturing fun in a romantic partner. 
Next, “Physical Attractiveness” was examined. The model was significant (F = 
3.03 (3, 223) p <.05) and accounted for 2.7% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Similar to 
“Fun”, only avoidance was a significant predictor (β = -.17, p <.05), suggesting that 
greater avoidance predicts a decreased value on partner attractiveness. Hypothesis 2 was 
therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 3 put forward that greater attachment avoidance would significantly 
predict increased importance being placed on partner status and resources (re-named 
Partner Success after the factor analysis carried out in the present study). The model was 
not significant with none of anxiety, avoidance nor their interaction term revealed to be 
a significant predictor. Hypothesis 3 was therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 suggested that greater anxiety would predict higher relationship 
intimacy-loyalty ratings while avoidance would predict lower ratings. Intimacy-loyalty 
was regressed onto anxiety, avoidance, and their interaction term; the model was 
significant (F = 4.71 (3, 222) p <.01) and accounted for 4.8% of the variance (Adjusted 
R²). Attachment anxiety was not a significant predictor, however both attachment 
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avoidance (β = -.24, p <.01) and its interaction with anxiety (β = .14, p <.05) were. 
Figure 32 presents the interaction. 
 
 
Figure 32. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Relationship 
Intimacy-Loyalty 
 
 
Table 40. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Relationship Intimacy-Loyalty 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant 2.1994ª 
Secure and Preoccupied -.6811 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -1.0517 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -3.7185* 
ªp < .09 
*p < .05 
 
Interpreting the above interaction within the context of attachment orientations, 
individuals fitting a secure attachment classification reported placing the greatest 
importance on relationship intimacy-loyalty followed by individuals fitting the 
preoccupied classification (although slopes analyses confirmed these two slopes to have 
a non-significant difference). Similar to partner warmth-trustworthiness, dismissing-
avoidant-type individuals reported placing the least importance on relationship intimacy 
and loyalty with fearful-type individuals reporting intermediate levels. 
Lastly, relationship “Passion” was examined. The model was significant (F = 3.30 
(3, 222) p <.05) and accounted for 3.0% of the variance (Adjusted R²). While their 
interaction was not significant, both attachment anxiety (β = .16, p <.05) and avoidance 
(β = -.22, p <.01) were significant predictors of the Passion ideal. Greater attachment 
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anxiety therefore predicts increased importance of intimacy and loyalty in romantic 
relationships while greater avoidance predicts decreased importance, supporting 
Hypothesis 5. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine differences in romantic partner 
and relationship ideal standards on the basis of attachment anxiety and avoidance. 
Although the predictive value of adult attachment had been examined in previous 
research (Arseth et al., 2009), the current study was carried out to examine attachment-
based influences as measured dimensionally rather than categorically in order to address 
some of the limitations inherent within the latter’s method of assessment. A further 
major aim of the current study was for the findings to be utilised in creating a measure 
of partner- and relationship-based social comparisons to be carried out in Study 4. 
The results here revealed that the interaction between anxiety and avoidance was a 
significant predictor of partner warmth-trustworthiness (comprising qualities such as 
honest, understanding, and supportive). More specifically, it was found that individuals 
fitting secure and preoccupied attachment classifications reported placing the greatest 
importance on this partner trait, followed by individuals fitting fearful-avoidance and 
lastly individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant classification. It was anticipated that 
individuals higher in attachment anxiety would report a greater endorsement of the value 
of this partner trait and so it is surprising that secure (low anxiety) and preoccupied 
(high anxiety) individuals reported similarly. However, that dismissing- and fearful-type 
individuals reported placing less importance on the warmth-trustworthiness trait is 
consistent with the expectation that greater avoidance would be predictive of decreased 
endorsement. Insight into the overall findings here may be provided by considering the 
aforementioned relationship subgoals of intimacy and independence (Pietromonaco & 
Feldman Barrett, 2000), the experiences of which help individuals to attain feelings of 
felt security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977). The low levels of attachment avoidance that 
characterise secure- and preoccupied-type individuals should see them endorse the 
relationship subgoal of high intimacy in their relationships. As such it is theoretically 
consistent that individuals fitting either of these two attachment classifications should 
place greater importance on partner qualities that capture the high-intimacy desires these 
two attachment-types share. Indeed, partners who are communicative, good listeners, 
and are supportive are displaying behaviours that promote increased intimacy in 
relationships (that is, behaviours akin to disclosure of personal thoughts and feelings as 
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well as provision of support that studies have previously identified secure- and anxious-
type individuals to utilise and respond favourably to (e.g., Larose et al., 1999; 
Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; Mikulincer et al., 1993; Simpson et al., 1992; see Feeney & 
Collins, 2004, for review)). As such, partners with these types of warmth-
trustworthiness qualities should be viewed as better able to meet attachment needs and 
hence be rated as an important romantic partner ideal. While it was anticipated that high-
anxiety individuals’ insecurities regarding partner regard and acceptance would manifest 
a stronger desire for partner qualities that address their anxiety-based concerns, it 
appears that preoccupied individuals’ anxieties do not see a greater importance being 
placed on partner warmth-trustworthiness than that reported by secure individuals. 
However, while the reported levels of importance do not differ between these two 
attachment ‘groups’, it is argued here that the bases from which these levels originate do 
differ. It may be that while preoccupied-type individuals’ ratings result from anticipated 
benefit to be gained from rejection-disconfirming partner behaviours, secure-type 
individuals ratings may instead result more simply from the high-intimacy behaviours 
themselves representing potential for actualising relationship subgoals. It is a limitation 
in the current study that the underlying mechanisms accounting for the observed 
differences in partner and relationship ideal standards cannot be examined. With the aim 
of the current study however being to identify differences in ratings of partner and 
relationship qualities on the basis of dimensionally-assessed self-reported attachment, 
the findings revealed here may be seen as providing direction for future work to further 
examine the cognitive bases that determine individuals’ ideal interpersonal qualities. 
Individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant (low anxiety/high avoidance) 
classification are argued to be driven by relationship subgoals of low intimacy and high 
independence. Due to the high avoidance that characterises dismissing-type individuals 
they experience a discomfort with closeness with others and it is this that produces the 
desire for low levels of intimacy in their relationships. The combination of low anxiety 
with their high avoidance meanwhile results in a defensive need for autonomy and 
therefore produces the subgoal of high independence so that this autonomy is not 
perceived as being infringed upon. In considering the qualities that encapsulate partner 
warmth-trustworthiness then, the exact facets that low-avoidance individuals (that is, 
secure and preoccupied) are argued to find appealing and hence rate as more important 
are the ones argued to be rated as less important to dismissing-type individuals because 
such characteristics are in direct conflict with their relationship subgoals. That is, 
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dismissing-avoidant individuals who are self-reliant (through utilising defensive 
strategies to suppress activation of their attachment systems so that others are not needed 
to attenuate any attachment-related feelings of distress which in turn allows them to 
maintain a desired emotional distance from interdependence) would see partner traits 
such as being affectionate, supportive, and communicative as intrusive to their avoidant 
orientation and therefore unpleasant to them (e.g., Brennan et al., 2002; Mikulincer & 
Nachshon, 1991) 
Interestingly, individuals fitting the fearful-avoidant attachment classification 
rated the importance of warmth-trustworthiness at a level intermediate between low-
rating dismissing individuals and high-rating secure and preoccupied (though it should 
be noted that the difference between the plotted slopes was only approaching 
significance). To recapitulate, such individuals, who are characterised by both high 
anxiety and avoidance, maintain a self-protective emotional distance from others 
because their negative models of both self and other produce cognitions that anticipate 
rejection from untrustworthy others due to their perceptions of low self-worth. In 
considering attachment subgoals, such individuals’ high anxiety and avoidance should 
see the subgoals of both high intimacy and high independence – subgoals that appear in 
direct conflict with each other. Indeed, much research has highlighted this discord 
between both desiring closeness with others and fearing the negative consequences of 
emotional investment in interpersonal experiences (e.g., Bartholomew, 1990; 
Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Guerrero, 1996; see Collins & Feeney, 2008, for a 
review). However, previous research has established that fearful-avoidant-type 
individuals do report wanting much more closeness in their romantic relationships than 
what they are currently experiencing (Mashek & Sherman, 2008) indeed suggesting that 
their high-intimacy subgoal, whilst at odds with their desire for high independence, is a 
means for attaining felt-security. Because of their fear of partner rejection, one could 
expect that fearful-avoidant individuals would place the greatest importance on partner 
warmth-trustworthiness; to have anxieties regarding partner non-responsiveness to the 
extent of maintaining distance from the very emotional connection that they desire 
should elevate the importance of partner behaviours indicative of acceptance (i.e. 
supportive, considerate and reliable characteristics that encapsulate warmth-
trustworthiness). However, that fearful-type individuals in the current study reported a 
decreased importance being placed on this partner trait in comparison to secure- and 
preoccupied-type individuals could be an indication of a cognitive strategy being utilised 
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to address the dichotomy between their high-intimacy desires and high-independence 
behaviours. Festinger’s theory of dissonance (1957) put forward that in cases of 
conflicting attitudes or beliefs, individuals undergo an attitude change in order to reduce 
the cognitive tension such dissonance produces. When applied to fearful-avoidant-type 
individuals in the current study, it may be that the conflicting cognition of desiring 
intimacy and action of maintaining distance (and hence conflict between high-intimacy 
and high-independence subgoals) produces a derogation of the importance of intimacy- 
and acceptance-related partner traits encapsulated within the warmth-trustworthiness 
ideal standard. However, that previous work (Mashek & Sherman, 2008) found fearful-
avoidant individuals to openly report discrepancies between desired levels of intimacy 
and actual levels of intimacy currently being experienced does serve as a counter to the 
above theoretical proposition. As highlighted earlier, the nature of the current study (in 
which direct associations between attachment dimensions and partner and relationship 
ideal standards were the empirical focus) does not allow for consideration beyond 
theoretical speculation of the underlying cognitive processes driving the current 
findings. As such future research on this topic would benefit from utilising 
methodologies that permit the examination of the psychological intricacies that may 
provide further insight. 
The findings concerning the relationship ideal standard intimacy-loyalty were 
similar to those discussed above: individuals fitting the dismissing-avoidant attachment 
classification reported placing the least importance on intimacy and loyalty in their 
relationships, followed by fearful-avoidant-type individuals. Also consistent with the 
findings for warmth-trustworthiness was that secure-type and preoccupied-type 
individuals did not significantly differ in the increased importance of relationship 
intimacy-loyalty reported. Indeed, that each of the two partner and relationship ideals 
comprised facets that capture the same qualities (that is, trust, support, understanding, 
communication, and acceptance) and also strongly correlated with each other (r = .87, p 
= <.001) makes this replicated pattern in attachment-based differences unsurprising. As 
such it is believed that the above discussion on the theoretical principles accounting for 
differences in partner warmth-trustworthiness (that is, differences in comfort with and 
desire for intimacy and resultant relationship subgoals) is highly applicable here also. 
Counter to hypothesised expectations in which increased attachment avoidance 
was anticipated to predict increased endorsement of partner fun and physical 
attractiveness, the results of regression analyses revealed the opposite pattern: increases 
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in attachment avoidance saw decreases in the rated importance of the physical 
attractiveness and fun concerning romantic partners. It was reasoned that greater 
endorsement would be evident in higher-avoidance individuals because of the non-
intimacy nature of such partner traits; partners who are physically attractive or out-going 
do not indicate characteristics that may suggest behaviours that infringe upon autonomy 
or compromise comfort levels with intimacy. Indeed, partner fun in particular, which is 
comprised of qualities such as being independent and easy-going, would be expected to 
be directly appealing to high-independence relationship subgoals. However, in 
considering each of the findings together that originate from attachment avoidance it 
appears then that this attachment dimension is characterised by a general lesser 
importance being placed on romantic partner and relationship qualities overall. Indeed, 
this general trend of lesser importance is further reinforced by the findings regarding 
relationship passion, also revealing that greater avoidance predicts lesser value of this 
relationship ideal. The findings of the present study then expand upon current existing 
knowledge on attachment avoidance by demonstrating that not only do individuals high 
in avoidance report a downplaying of need for interdependence (Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2005) and to report having less personal commitment in dating circumstances (Ho et al., 
In Press), high-avoidance individuals seem to also judge typically-endorsed partner and 
relationship ideal standards as less relevant to them and may be a contributory factor 
into previously-established research findings on why such individuals report decreased 
satisfaction with their interpersonal experiences. If highly-avoidant individuals do not 
find any particular partner and relationship facets to be important or appealing to them, 
then the gratification they would derive from partners and relationships who exemplify 
such characteristics would be less compared to what low-avoidance individuals may 
derive. Future research would benefit from considering partner and relationship ideals as 
a potential mediating factor in examining attachment-based differences in relationship 
satisfaction. For example, the discrepancy between ratings of ideal levels of each of the 
partner and relationship characteristics included within Fletcher et al.’s (1999) ideal 
standards scale and ratings on actual current partners and relationships may reveal the 
roles of ideal standards in contributing towards satisfaction derived from romantic 
experiences. 
An interest highlighted earlier within the current study was on whether 
dimensional assessment of attachment would provide more insight into partner and 
relationship ideal standards than the categorical assessment that had been utilised in 
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previous research (Arseth et al., 2009). To recapitulate the findings of this research, 
Arseth and colleagues identified that dismissing-avoidant individuals rated partner 
warmth-trustworthiness as less important to them than ratings provided by preoccupied 
individuals while further identifying dismissing individuals to rate relationship intimacy-
loyalty as less important than that which was reported by secures. Lastly, dismissing 
individuals reported placing greater importance on relationship passion than preoccupied 
individuals. With regards to the current findings on partner warmth-trustworthiness and 
relationship intimacy-loyalty, there is consistency in the patterns identified, however the 
further significant associations identified here between attachment avoidance and 
partner attractiveness and fun may be an indication of the benefit of utilising 
dimensional measurement methods. However, to suggest this to be the only source of 
the difference in significant findings would be overly simplistic and inaccurate. An 
obvious potential source may lie within the participant samples utilised in each study. 
The current study was conducted online and so the participant sample was a non-student 
one with a mean age of 29 years with a standard deviation of nearly 11. This current 
sample therefore differs from Arseth et al.’s (2009) in that the sample comprised of 
University students with a younger mean age (M = 23.2) and a more condensed age 
group (SD = 4.6); no information was provided on romantic relationship characteristics. 
It may be then that differences in age and occupation might contribute to differences in 
significant findings between these two studies. However, due to the earlier-highlighted 
limitations in categorical assessment (that is, loss of information regarding intra-
categorical variation at the creation of inter-categorical boundaries, as well as forced 
assignment into a single category despite agreement to varying extents with each of the 
four available choices), this factor cannot be discounted as a possible contributor. 
The results of the current study provided useful information on the differences in 
partner and relationship ideal standards individuals hold on the basis of their attachment 
orientations. With a major aim of this study being to identify significant associations to 
then be utilised to further examine earlier-identified differences in social comparison 
processes (Chapter 3, Study 2), the next step in the current series of work could be 
carried out. Specifically, it was the intent that the findings of the current study be used as 
a template to create a measure of partner and relationship social comparisons to identify 
attachment-based differences in the comparisons individuals engage in within 
interpersonal-specific contexts. 
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Chapter 5. Study 4: Adult Attachment, Partner and Relationship Social 
Comparisons and Well-Being 
 
Study 4A: Creation of the Partner and Relationship Social Comparison Measure 
(PRSCM) 
 
In their article examining relationship comparison tendencies, insecurity, and 
relationship satisfaction, Smith LeBeau and Buckingham (2008) utilised a Relationship 
Social Comparison Measure (RSCM) to assess general comparison tendencies within a 
relationship context. Similar in principle to Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999) Iowa-
Netherlands Social Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM), this measure consists of 
24 Likert-type relationship comparison items in which respondents must indicate the 
extent to which they perceive themselves as engaging in the behaviour described by 
each item, ranging from 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Always”). Although certain items within this 
measure are suggestive of representing differentiated factors (e.g., “I compare how 
dependable my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners” suggesting a partner 
quality focus while “When I am feeling bad about my relationship I compare my 
relationship to other people’s relationships” suggests a focus on identifying pre-
comparison antecedents), the measure is not divided into separate scales and is intended 
instead to be analysed and interpreted as a single scale.  
As with the INCOM (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), examining differences in general 
social comparison tendencies is indeed informative (Smith LeBeau and Buckingham’s 
(2008) findings of differences in relationship comparison tendencies on the basis of 
insecurity, self-esteem, and anxious and avoidant attachment is testament to this 
contention) but it is argued here that a more in-depth exploration of the nature of such 
relationship comparison tendencies (that is, examination of the specific types of qualities 
being compared) would be beneficial in identifying what factors may be predictive of 
relationship-related comparisons, as well as in advancing our understanding of what 
comparison processes are actually taking place and providing insight into associated 
differences in subjective and relationship well-being. To this end, the aim of Study 4A 
was to expand upon the Relationship Social Comparison Measure (Smith LeBeau & 
Buckingham, 2008) by utilising items from the Partner and Relationship Ideal Standards 
Scale (Fletcher et al., 1999), as well as modified upward, downward (Butzer & Kuiper, 
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2006), and identification and contrast (Van der Zee et al., 1999, 2000) comparison items 
so that specific factors could be examined.  
Method 
Participants 
The participant sample whose data was used in the creation of the partner and 
relationship social comparison measure in the current study is that which is reported in 
Chapter 4 (Study 3); the information on the demographics of this participant sample can 
therefore be located within this earlier study (p207).  
Measures 
Partner and Relationship Ideal Standards Scale. The main measure of interest in 
the current study was the partner and relationship ideal standards scales created by 
Fletcher et al. (1999). Whereas in its original format this measure consists of three 
partner subscales (Warmth-Trustworthiness, Status-Resources, and Vitality-
Attractiveness) and two relationship subscales (Intimacy-Loyalty and Passion), factor 
analysis in Study 3 identified 4 partner subscales (Warmth-Trustworthiness, Fun, 
Physical Attractiveness, and Success). Factor analysis produced two relationship 
subscales similar to those reported by Fletcher and colleagues’ and so were named the 
same. Information on Chronbach alpha scores can be located in Study 3. 
Relationship Social Comparison Scale. In its original format, the Relationship 
Social Comparison Scale (Smith LeBeau & Buckingham, 2008) is a 24-item measure in 
which participants must indicate on a 5-point Likert-type scale the extent to which they 
engage in the comparisons described by each item. Example items include ‘I think about 
how well my partner and I communicate with each other compared to how well other 
couples communicate with each other’, “I compare my relationship to other people’s 
relationships when I am in a bad mood’, and ‘I pay a lot of attention to how well my 
partner and I resolve problems compared to how well other couples solve their 
problems’. In the current study, the Relationship Social Comparison Scale was used as a 
basis to create a modified version that would permit examination of more specific 
partner and relationship comparisons as identified in the Partner and Relationship Ideal 
Standards Scale (Fletcher et al., 1999). 
Procedure 
With the aim of the current study being the creation of a measure of partner- and 
relationship-based social comparisons based on the data collected for Study 3, the 
procedure for data collection is identical to that which was reported in this earlier study.  
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Results 
Examination of the Relationship Social Comparison Scale in its original form 
revealed seven items that, while focused on aspects of relationships, were not specific to 
any characteristics or traits (e.g., “I compare how happy I am in my relationship to how 
happy I think others are in their relationships”, “I compare how satisfied I am with my 
relationship to how satisfied I think others are in their relationships”). These items were 
retained in order to examine general relationship social comparison tendencies. 
Partner and relationship characteristics were selected via the factor analysis carried 
out in Study 3 on Fletcher et al.’s (1999) Partner and Relationship Ideal Standards Scale. 
In order to not overburden participants with too many items to respond to, it was decided 
that items should be excluded according to the following steps. Firstly, only those items 
that clearly loaded onto a given factor were considered for inclusion (see Table 37). 
Next, for each partner and relationship factor, mean scores were examined. Social 
comparison theory in its original conceptualisation (Festinger, 1954) put forward that it 
is the opinions, beliefs, and abilities that are important to the individual that are most 
subjected to evaluation through comparative reflection. On this basis it was reasoned 
that items with the highest mean scores should be selected; for each of partner warmth-
trustworthiness, fun, and success, and relationship intimacy-loyalty, four items were 
selected. Factor analysis had revealed partner physical attractiveness and relationship 
passion factors to have fewer items (four and six respectively) and so three items for 
each of these two final factors were selected. Table 41 presents the means and standard 
deviations for each of the items selected for inclusion in the current study. 
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Table 41. Partner and Relationship Ideals Means and Standard Deviations 
 Warmth-
Trustworth
iness 
Fun Success Physical 
Attractiven
ess 
Intimacy-
Loyalty 
Passion 
Partner       
Trustworthy 6.66 ± .89      
Honest 6.54 ± .98      
Understanding 6.25 ± .1.03      
Reliable 6.17 ± 1.16      
Humour  6.05 ± 1.18     
Fun  5.63 ± 1.27     
Independent  5.42 ± 1.23     
Self-aware  5.33 ± 1.26     
Ambitious   4.76 ± 1.65    
Active-Lifestyle   4.57 ± 1.65    
Successful   4.50 ± 1.61    
Good Job   4.26 ± 1.63    
Attractive    4.89 ± 1.35   
Sexy    4.82 ± 1.45   
Good Body    4.23 ± 1.46   
Relationship       
Honest     6.58 ± .93  
Trust     6.56 ± .92  
Loyalty     6.44 ± 1.02  
Respect     6.42 ± .96  
Fun      5.68 ± 1.22 
Passionate      5.56 ± 1.45 
Romantic      5.22 ± 1.37 
 
Two items from the relationship social comparison scale (“When I am feeling 
good about my relationship I compare my relationship with other people’s relationships” 
and “When I am feeling bad I compare my relationship to other people’s relationships”) 
were suggestive of assessing pre-comparison antecedents; two items adapted from 
Buunk et al. (1990) were added to further examine conditions in which tendencies to 
compare may arise (“I compare my relationship to other people’s relationships when I 
am in a bad mood” and “I compare my relationship to other people’s relationships when 
I am in a good mood”).  
The above steps resulted in a total of thirty-four items, listed in Table 42. 
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Table 42. Partner and Relationship Social Comparison Measure Items 
1. I compare how happy I am in my relationship to how happy I think others are in their 
relationships 
2. I pay attention to how well my partner and I resolve problems compared to how well 
other couples solve their problems 
3. I think about what types of activities my partner and I participate in together 
compared to what other couples do together 
4. I compare how my partner and I treat each other to how other couples treat each 
other 
5. I compare how satisfied I am with my relationship to how satisfied I think others are 
in their relationships 
6. I compare how much time my partner and I spend together to how much time other 
couples spend together 
7. I think about how often my partner and I argue compared to how often other couples 
argue 
8. When I am feeling bad about my relationship, I compare it to other people’s 
relationships 
9. When I am feeling good about my relationship, I compare it to other people’s 
relationships 
10. I compare my relationship to other people’s relationships when I am in a bad mood 
11. I compare my relationship to other people’s relationships when I am in a good mood 
12. I think about how trustworthy my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners 
13. I compare how independent my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners 
14. I think about how active my partner’s lifestyle is in comparison to other people’s 
partners 
15. I think about how attractive my partner is compared to how attractive other people’s 
partners are 
16. I think about how honest my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners 
17. I compare how good my partner’s sense of humour is to other people’s partners 
18. I compare how ambitious my partner is to how ambitious other people’s partners are 
19. I compare how understanding my partner is to how understanding other people’s 
partners are 
20. I think about how much fun my partner is compared to other people’s partners 
21. I compare how successful my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners 
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22. I compare my partner’s body to other people’s partners 
23. I compare how reliable my partner is to how reliable other people’s partners are 
24. I compare how self-aware my partner is compared to other people’s partners 
25. I think about how good my partner’s job is in comparison to other people’s partners’ 
job 
26. I think about how sexy my partner is in comparison to other people’s partners 
27. I compare how honest my partner and I are in our relationship to how honest other 
couples are with each other 
28. I compare how passionate my relationship is to how passionate other couples’ 
relationships are 
29. I think about the level of respect there is in my relationship compared to the respect I 
think other relationships have 
30. I think about how much fun my partner and I have together in comparison to how 
much fun I think other couples have with each other 
31. I think about how loyal my partner and I are to each other in comparison to how 
loyal other couples are to each other 
32. I think about how romantic my relationship is compared to how romantic I think 
other couples’ relationships are 
33. I compare the level of trust between my partner and I to the trust I think other 
couples have in their relationships 
34. I compare how much independence there is in my relationship to the independence in 
others’ relationships 
 
Study 4B: Adult Attachment, Relationship Comparisons, and Well-Being 
The results of Study 2A revealed anxiety to be a significant predictor of social 
comparison orientation, such that as anxiety increases, so too does the tendency to 
engage in social comparison. The theoretical basis for this finding was argued to be due 
to high-anxiety individuals’ hyperactivation of their attachment systems in which 
working models of self and other are chronically accessible (which findings by Stapel 
and Tesser (2001) indicated that greater salience of self-related cognitions was 
associated with increased social comparison tendencies while Buunk and Gibbons 
(2006) put forward that greater awareness of self in the presence of others should 
produce a similar increased tendency). Further reasoned as a basis to believe high-
anxiety to be predictive of increased social comparisons was high-anxiety individuals’ 
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less clear self-concepts. To recapitulate, Mikulincer (1995) identified that individuals 
reporting as anxiously attached had less clearly defined associative networks, that is, 
they consisted of poorly differentiated self-schema. More recent findings by Wu (2009) 
of anxiety as a significant predictor of self-uncertainty and reduced self-concept clarity 
provide further support of this. With a fundamental tenet of Festinger’s (1954) social 
comparison theory being occasions of uncertainty producing the desire to compare the 
self to others (a tenet also characterising Gibbon’s and Buunk (1999) social comparison 
orientation), the lack of self-concept clarity and certainty associated with anxious 
individuals provides a final insight into why increased comparison tendencies should be 
evidenced by such individuals. But what of social comparisons within a specific 
interpersonal context? While individuals’ self-concept clarity may indeed contribute 
towards a greater orientation for romantic relationship comparisons, it is argued here 
that relationship uncertainty plays a bigger role. 
Individuals high in attachment anxiety (and therefore with more negative working 
models of self) have been found to report greater feelings of emotional jealousy in their 
interpersonal experiences (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Guerrero, 2005; Marazziti et al., 
2010), feelings argued to stem from uncertainty and lack of confidence in the strength of 
the current relationship (e.g., Knobloch, Solomon, & Cruz, 2001).  Such individuals’ 
negative working models of self as unworthy of love produces the feelings of insecurity 
over their partners’ regard as well as hypervigilance to signs of partner availability and 
rejection. As such, highly anxious individuals’ relationship experiences have been found 
to be characterised by both emotional highs and lows (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). As 
earlier highlighted, high-anxiety individuals’ negative affective and cognitive reactions 
to partner behaviours that do not meet their unrealistic relationship expectations 
(Simpsons & Rholes, 2004) and hence perceived as potential rejection would produce 
feelings of discontent. However, their positive reactions to perceived partner acceptance 
would produce feelings of happiness also (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003, as cited in 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005). It is argued here therefore that this combination of both 
emotional highs from perceived acceptance and lows from perceived rejection, as well 
as negative model of self in which partner regard of worth and lovability are questioned, 
contribute to feelings of relational uncertainty and therefore should produce greater 
tendency to use social comparisons to evaluate partner and relationship quality.  
With regards to attachment avoidance, the opposite tendency was anticipated, that 
is, greater avoidance would predict lesser tendency to compare partners and 
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relationships with others. Although research has identified avoidance to be associated 
with greater relationship insecurity (argued to be indicative of uncertainty (Smith 
LeBeau & Buckingham, 2009), it is argued that the defensive disregarding and 
downplaying of relational processes and experiences (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005, 
for review) that is characteristic of high avoidance (resulting from discomfort with 
closeness and intimacy) would produce a lesser desire and need to engage in social 
comparison. Indeed, the lesser interpersonal orientation discussed earlier within the 
broader context of general comparisons between the self and other is applicable here 
also.  
Taken altogether, Hypothesis 1 put forward: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater relationship comparison 
orientation, while greater attachment avoidance will predict lesser relationship 
comparison orientation. 
 
It should be noted that the hypothesised prediction for attachment avoidance seems 
to counter the findings of Smith LeBeau and Buckingham (2009) in which both 
increased anxiety and avoidance were associated with higher scores on their relationship 
social comparison measure and so perhaps the associations anticipated here should be 
reframed to reflect these earlier findings. However, to predict increased partner and 
relationship comparison tendencies would conflict with the above theorising and hence 
the hypothesis was formed as is. 
The next focus of empirical examination in the current study was on specific 
partner and relationship qualities that were investigated in Study 3 and incorporated into 
the PRSCM measure created in Study 4A. Partner warmth-trustworthiness is defined by 
characteristics such as reliable, understanding, and honest, while relationship intimacy-
loyalty is defined by characteristics such as loyalty, respect, and trust, characteristics 
that were argued to be highly appealing to anxious individuals and less appealing to 
avoidant individuals. The interaction between anxiety and avoidance was identified to 
significantly predict both partner warmth-trustworthiness and relationship intimacy-
loyalty, suggesting that high-avoidance individuals (that is, those fitting into dismissing- 
and fearful-type attachment classifications) indeed reported placing lesser importance on 
these traits than their low-avoidance counterparts. In examining the anxiety and 
avoidance dimensions included in the regression models testing the warmth-
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trustworthiness and intimacy-loyalty traits however, while greater avoidance was 
identified to predict a lesser endorsement of the importance of such qualities (Study 3), 
anxiety was not found to be significantly predictive.  
For avoidance then, due to both lesser inclination to engage in relationship 
comparisons and perceived lesser importance of partner warmth and trustworthiness and 
relationship intimacy loyalty, it was reasoned that high-avoidance individuals would 
report a decreased tendency to compare this partner trait. On the basis of the greater 
relational uncertainty that is argued to characterise high-anxiety individuals, however, it 
was reasoned that, despite high-anxiety individuals reporting no greater perceived 
importance of partner warmth-trustworthiness and relationship intimacy-loyalty than 
their low-anxiety counterparts, such individuals’ insecurities and uncertainties regarding 
their relationships generally would produce a greater tendency to compare this partner 
trait. 
Although neither partner fun nor physical attractiveness were found to be 
significantly predicted by attachment anxiety in Study 3, it was anticipated that the 
earlier described relationship uncertainty would produce greater tendencies to draw 
comparisons between one’s own partner and relationship with others’ with regards to 
these two traits. On this basis also, anxiety was further anticipated to predict greater 
tendency to engage in comparisons relating to each of the additional remaining partner 
and relationship qualities (that is, partner success and relationship passion). Conversely, 
greater attachment avoidance was anticipated to replicate the above hypothesised 
patterns for warmth-trustworthiness and intimacy-loyalty; as such, Hypothesis 2 read as: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater tendencies to compare 
partner warmth-trustworthiness, fun, physical attractiveness, and success, and 
relationship intimacy-loyalty and passion qualities, while greater attachment avoidance 
will predict lesser tendencies to engage in partner warmth-trustworthiness, partner fun, 
and physical attractiveness comparisons, as well as relationship intimacy-loyalty and 
passion. 
 
Consistent with Study 2A in which tendencies to make general upward and 
downward comparisons were examined, it was anticipated in the current study that 
anxiety would be predictive of tendency to engage in comparisons with perceived 
desirable relationships but not tendency to compare with perceived undesirable 
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relationships. As avoidance was predictive of neither upward nor downward general 
comparison tendencies, it was anticipated that, within an interpersonal-specific context, 
a similar pattern would emerge. Hypothesis 3 therefore read as: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Greater attachment anxiety will predict greater upward relationship 
comparison orientation. 
 
The next focus in the current study was on examining anxiety- and avoidance-
based differences in tendencies to identify with and contrast from upward and downward 
relationship targets. To summarise the findings of Study 2A, anxiety was found to 
significantly predict upward contrast, downward identification, and downward contrast 
tendencies, while avoidance was found to predict downward contrast only. Upward 
contrast and downward identification were indeed indicative of the general negative 
cognitive bias that has been described as characterising high-anxiety individuals and so 
the results together for attachment anxiety appeared to suggest that while anxiety is 
characterised by a general tendency to compare the self with others, that much of this 
tendency itself is characterised by a focus on information that may be adverse to 
personal well-being.  
It was reasoned for the current study that the pattern of findings that emerged 
within Study 2A would be evidenced here also. That is, it was anticipated that high-
anxiety individuals would demonstrate a similar negative cognitive bias in their 
comparisons by focusing on that which differs between their own relationships and 
perceived desirable others (i.e. upward contrast) and that which is similar between their 
relationships and perceived undesirable others (i.e. downward identification).  Similarly 
for attachment avoidance, it was anticipated that the patterns that were identified in 
Study 2A would be demonstrated here also, such that as avoidance increases, tendency 
to contrast from perceived less desirable relationships would increase. Although this 
finding was counterintuitive with the psychological mechanisms accounting for this 
finding unclear, it was believed that the tendencies regarding general social comparisons 
would be relevant to comparison tendencies made within the more interpersonal context 
examined in the current study. As such, Hypothesis 4 read as: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Greater attachment anxiety will predict a greater tendency towards 
upward contrast, downward contrast, and downward identification relationship 
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comparisons. Greater attachment avoidance will predict greater tendencies for 
downward contrast comparison tendency. 
 
The final focus in the current study, and thus the focus of the final two hypotheses, 
was on examining the identified differences in identification and contrast as potential 
mediators between attachment dimensions and relationship satisfaction and well-being 
factor life satisfaction. 
The results of Study 1B confirmed the associations between anxiety and avoidance 
and relationship satisfaction that have been well established within the adult attachment 
literature. To recapitulate, Study 1B revealed that both increases in anxiety and 
avoidance predicted decreases in relationship satisfaction. The two-way interaction term 
also significantly predicted relationship satisfaction, suggesting that individuals fitting a 
secure attachment classification reported the highest satisfaction, followed by 
dismissing- and preoccupied-type individuals, with fearful-type individuals reporting the 
lowest relationship satisfaction. Within the discussion of these results, it was suggested 
that contributory causes for these differences in satisfaction with current relationship 
experiences was due to differences in comfort with intimacy (and related disclosure and 
support-seeking and provision), conflict resolution strategies, and actualisation of 
relationship goals resulting from working models of self and other. It is put forward here 
that an additional source for the differing experiences of relationship satisfaction could 
be found in differences in comparison tendencies. For example, if the anticipated 
adverse associations regarding anxiety within Hypothesis 4 is supported (that is, greater 
tendencies toward upward contrast and downward identification), one would expect the 
information gleaned in these ways to impact upon the feelings of relationship 
satisfaction. For the high-anxiety individual who attends to comparison information that 
produces perceptions that own relationships have similarities to perceived undesirable 
other relationships and differ from perceived desirable ones, that the own relationships 
will be viewed poorly in these comparisons should influence the level of satisfaction felt 
regarding their quality. As such, it was hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Upward contrast and downward identification will partially mediate the 
association between attachment anxiety and relationship satisfaction. 
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Lastly, as indicated above, the potential role of identification and contrast for the 
association between anxiety and life satisfaction was examined. The findings of Study 
1A revealed anxiety to be significantly predictive of life satisfaction ratings, such that as 
anxiety increases, life satisfaction decreases. High-anxiety individuals’ negative models 
of self as unworthy of love, negative biases regarding interpersonal interpretation, 
emotional reactivity producing a greater frequency and intensity of negative affect, 
maladaptive cognitive processing of negative events (specifically, rumination), and 
unrealistic conditions in attaining happiness in their relationships with well-being too 
heavily placed upon actualising these conditions were all suggested as contributory 
mechanisms for this association.  Similar to the above-hypothesised partial mediations 
for anxiety and relationship satisfaction, it is further suggested here that the anticipated 
adverse relationship comparisons (that is, upward contrast and downward identification) 
will partially mediate the association between anxiety and life satisfaction. 
As suggested above, previous theorising within the adult attachment literature has 
put forward that high-anxiety individuals may place much importance on their 
interpersonal experiences for their feelings of subjective well-being (Simpson & Rholes, 
2004). The findings of Study 1A examining attachment-based differences in life 
satisfaction when moderated by relationship status were supportive of this: low-anxiety 
secure-type individuals’ ratings of life satisfaction did not differ regardless of whether 
they were in a relationship or not, while high-anxiety fearful- and preoccupied-type 
individuals’ ratings did differ, with those in relationships reporting higher life 
satisfaction than their single counterparts. These results were argued here to represent 
high-anxiety individuals placing greater importance on being in a relationship for their 
judgments on the overall quality of their lives (and thus consistent with the theoretical 
arguments put forward by Simpson and Rholes (2004)). In keeping with the above then, 
it was anticipated that the adverse relationship judgments that would result from 
tendencies to contrast from desirable and identify with undesirable relationships would 
partially contribute towards high-anxiety individuals’ ratings of lesser satisfaction with 
life (and conversely, that low-anxiety individuals’ lesser tendencies to engage in such 
adverse comparisons would contribute towards their increased life satisfaction ratings). 
As such, the final hypothesis for Study 4 was: 
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Hypothesis 6: Upward contrast and downward identification relationship comparisons 
will mediate the association between attachment anxiety and well-being (life 
satisfaction). 
Method 
Participants 
265 participants took part in the current study, 204 (77.0%) of whom were female 
and 61 (23.0%) were male. Age ranged from 18 to 69 (M = 36.08, SD = 10.51). The vast 
majority of participants resided in the United Kingdom (115, 43.4%) and United States 
(77, 29.1%) with the remaining sample being spread internationally. Two hundred and 
forty (90.6%) identified themselves as heterosexual, 7 (2.6%) as homosexual, 17 (6.4%) 
as bisexual, and 1 (0.4%) as “Other”. Fifty-five (20.8%) participants identified the 
nature of their relationship as one of together and not co-habiting, 66 (24.9%) as co-
habiting, 13 (4.9%) as engaged, and 131 (49.4%) as married. Relationship length ranged 
from 1 month to 42 years 9 months (M = 104.1 months, SD = 103.5 months). 
Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire. As in previous studies, participants were asked to 
complete a demographic questionnaire. Questions included those of gender, age, 
countries of residence and origin, relationship status, sexual orientation, and length of 
relationship if applicable (in years and months). 
Adult Attachment. Participants’ attachment orientations were measured in the same 
way as in previous studies using the Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised scale 
(Fraley et al., 2000). Cronbach’s alpha was .92 for anxiety and .93 for avoidance. 
Social Comparison. Participants’ relationship social comparison tendencies were 
measured using the Partner and Relationship Social Comparison Measure (PRSCM) 
created in Study 4A. Item responses are in Likert-type format in which participants are 
required to rate the extent to which they feel they engage in the behaviour described by 
each item (from 1 “Never” to 5 “Always”). Cronbach’s alpha was .96. 
In order to examine differences in relationship comparison direction, Butzer and 
Kuiper’s (2006) upward (COMPU) and downward (COMPD) social comparison scales 
were utilised. In their original formats, each scale consists of Likert-type six items in 
which respondents must indicate the extent to which they engage in the behaviour being 
described (e.g., “When I consider how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, 
popularity), I compare with others who are more socially skilled than I am”, “When I 
consider how good I am at something, I compare myself with others who are worse at it 
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than I am”). The items were modified to reflect a romantic relationship-oriented focus 
(e.g., “ When I consider how satisfied I am in my relationship, I think of other 
relationships that are worse than mine”, “When I consider how good my relationship is, 
I think of other couples whose relationships I feel are better than mine”. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .93 for upward relationship comparisons and .92 for downward. 
Next, in order to examine differences in identification and contrast relationship 
comparisons, Van der Zee et al.’s (1999, 2000) identification/contrast scales were 
adapted in a similar way to the COMPU and COMPD scales above to reflect a romantic 
relationship-oriented focus. A principal components factor analysis with varimax 
rotation confirmed a 4-factor solution (accounting for 79.61% of the variance) in 
keeping with the conceptualised upward/downward identification/contrast comparisons. 
Example items for upward identification include “When  I see other couples who are 
very happy in their relationship, I feel good about my own relationship” (α = .87); for 
upward contrast “When I see other relationships that appear to be doing better than my 
own, it is threatening to notice that mine is not doing as well” (α = .89); for downward 
identification “When I see others who are having problems in their relationships, I worry 
that my partner and I could experience problems also” (α = .88); and for downward 
contrast “When I compare my relationship to others that appear to be not as good as 
mine, I feel happy and pleased about my own relationship” (α = .80). 
Life Satisfaction. Diener et al.’s (1985) Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) was 
used to assess participants’ evaluations of their satisfaction with their lives. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .91. 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Cronbach’s alpha was .91 
Relationship Satisfaction. Relationship satisfaction was measured using Buunk et 
al.’s (2001) 4-question measure utilised previously (see Study 1). Cronbach’s alpha was 
.97 
Procedure 
As in previous studies, participants could access the current study via the 
University’s web pages. Participants provided online consent to take part and completed 
each of the above listed measures in a fixed order. Upon completion, participants were 
presented with a final webpage detailing the aims of the study and providing information 
on the measures included. 
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Results 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that greater attachment anxiety would predict greater 
relationship social comparison orientation, while greater attachment avoidance would 
predict the opposite. A total relationship social comparison orientation variable was 
created in which a mean of all items was calculated, which was then regressed onto 
anxiety and avoidance at the first step and their interaction term at the second. The 
overall model was significant (F = 11.38 (3, 264) p = <.001) and accounted for 10.6% of 
the variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β = .38, p = <.001) and avoidance 
(β = -.14, p = <.05) were significant predictors of relationship social comparison 
orientation (their interaction was non-significant), supporting Hypothesis 1. As anxiety 
increases, so too does the tendency to engage in interpersonally-oriented comparisons 
while as avoidance increases, the tendency to engage in such comparisons decreases. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted differences in partner- and relationship-related 
comparisons, specifically greater anxiety predicting greater tendency to compare partner 
qualities reflective of warmth-trustworthiness and intimacy-loyalty as well as 
relationship quality passion, and greater avoidance predicting decreased tendencies to 
engage in the above comparison types as well as partner fun and physical attractiveness. 
Each of the four partner and two relationship comparison types were separately 
regressed onto anxiety, avoidance and their interaction term to test Hypothesis 2. 
The model for partner Warmth-Trustworthiness was significant (F = 10.75 (3, 262) 
p <.001), accounting for 10.0% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Attachment anxiety (β = 
.35, p <.001) and avoidance (β = -.20, p <.01) were both significant predictors while 
their interaction was not. As anxiety increases, the tendency to compare partner qualities 
capturing warmth and trustworthiness increases, while as avoidance increases, such a 
tendency decreases. 
Next, partner Fun was entered as the dependent variable. The model was 
significant (F = 6.33 (3, 262) p = .001) and accounted for 5.7% of the variance. Here, 
only attachment anxiety was a significant predictor (β = .29, p <.001), suggesting that as 
anxiety increases, the tendency to compare how fun one’s partner is to other people’s 
partners increases also. 
The model for partner Physical Attractiveness was also significant (F = 5.87 (3, 
262) p <.001, Adjusted R² = .05), with attachment anxiety as the sole significant 
predictor (β = .26, p <.001). Similar to partner Fun, as anxiety increases, the tendency to 
compare how attractive one’s romantic partner is also increases. 
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The model for the final partner comparison factor, Success, was also significant (F 
= 7.81 (3, 262) p <.001, Adjusted R² = .07). Attachment anxiety (β = .30, p <.001) was a 
significant predictor, however avoidance was not; the interaction term was approaching 
significance (β = -.12, p =.06; R² change = .01, F change = 3.45, p = .06). Figure 33 
presents the emerging trends. 
 
 
Figure 33. Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Partner Success Social 
Comparisons 
 
As is indicated in the above figure, it appears that individuals fitting preoccupied- 
and fearful-type attachment classifications reported greater tendencies to compare their 
romantic partners’ success with other partners’ success, suggesting that the main 
dimension driving individuals’ partner success comparisons is anxiety. However, as 
indicated above, the interaction between anxiety and avoidance was only approaching 
significance and so the above figure should be interpreted with this in mind. 
Focusing on what was identified as a significant predictor then, the results of 
analyses suggest that for partner qualities that capture a romantic partner’s success, as an 
individual’s feelings of attachment anxiety increase, their tendency to engage in 
comparisons concerning this partner quality increases also. 
Next, comparisons focusing on relationship qualities were examined. Relationship 
Intimacy-Loyalty was entered as the dependent variable, with anxiety and avoidance 
(first step), and their interaction term (second step) entered into the regression equation. 
The overall model was significant (F = 6.08 (3, 262) p = .001) and accounted for 5.5% 
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of the variance (Adjusted R²). Both anxiety (β = .26, p <.001) and avoidance (β = -.14, p 
<.05) were significant predictors; the interaction term however was not. As attachment 
anxiety increases, tendency to compare relationship qualities that encapsulate 
relationship intimacy and loyalty qualities increase, while as avoidance increases, 
tendency decreases. 
Lastly, the model for Passion was significant (F = 11.10 (3, 262) p <.001) and 
accounted for 10.3% of the total variance (Adjusted R²). Attachment anxiety (β = .38, p 
<.001) and avoidance (β = -.17, p = .01) were both significant predictors with the beta 
coefficients suggesting that as anxiety increases, and avoidance decreases, tendency to 
compare qualities suggestive of relationship passion increase. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that as attachment anxiety increases, so too will the 
tendency to engage in upward comparisons (that is, comparisons to relationships 
perceived as better off). Attachment avoidance was not hypothesised to predict 
differences in comparison direction. 
Upward comparison was regressed onto anxiety, avoidance (first step) and its 
interaction term (second step); the overall model was significant (F = 16.81 (3, 252) p 
<.001, Adjusted R² = .16). Attachment anxiety was revealed to be the sole significant 
predictor of upward comparison (β = .41, p <.01), suggesting that as anxiety increases, 
so too does the tendency to engage in comparison to perceived better-off relationships. 
Next, downward comparison was examined. The model (that is, anxiety, 
avoidance, and their interaction term) was significant (F = 5.13 (3, 252) p <.01) and 
accounted for 3.6% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β = .18, p = 
.01) and avoidance (β = -.22, p <.01) were significant predictors (their interaction, 
however, was not). As anxiety increases, and avoidance (independently) decreases, 
tendency to engage in comparisons with perceived worse-off relationships increases. 
Hypothesis 3 was therefore only partially supported 
Hypothesis 4 focused on examining attachment-based differences in identification 
and contrast. Specifically it was hypothesised that greater anxiety would predict a 
greater tendency towards upward contrast and downward identification relationship 
comparisons while, consistent with the findings of general identification/contrast 
comparisons identified in Study 2, avoidance was hypothesised to predict downward 
contrast only. Each of the four upward/downward identification/contrast comparison 
tendencies were entered separately as dependent variables to be regressed onto anxiety, 
avoidance, and their interaction term. 
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First, the model predicting upward contrast was significant (F = 21.55 (3, 262) p 
<.001), accounting for 19.1% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Both attachment anxiety (β 
= .37, p <.001), and avoidance (β = .15, p <.05) were significant predictors of upward 
contrast, suggesting that as anxiety and avoidance increase, the tendency to contrast 
from perceived better-off relationships increases also.  
The model for downward identification was also significant (F = 16.16 (3, 262) p 
<.001, Adjusted R² = .15). Neither attachment avoidance nor the anxiety*avoidance 
interaction were significant predictors of tendency to identify with perceived worse-off 
relationships, however anxiety was a significant predictor (β = .41, p <.001), suggesting 
that as anxiety increases, so too does the tendency to identify with downward 
relationship targets. 
The next model for upward identification was significant also (F = 14.41 (3, 262) 
p <.001) and accounted for 13.3% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Attachment avoidance 
alone was identified as a significant predictor (β = -.40, p <.001), suggesting that as 
avoidance increases, tendency to identify with perceived better-off relationships 
decreases. 
Lastly, the model for tendency to engage in downward contrast relationship 
comparisons was significant (F = 11.09 (3, 262) p <.001) with an Adjusted R² of .10. 
While the anxiety*avoidance interaction was not significant, anxiety (β = .19, p = .01) 
and avoidance (β = -.38, p <.001) were both independent significant predictors, with 
increases in the former predicting an increased tendency, and increases in the latter 
predicting decreased tendency.  
Hypothesis 5 predicted identification and contrast comparisons to partially mediate 
the association between attachment and relationship satisfaction. Before examining this 
potential association, relationship satisfaction itself was examined. Relationship 
satisfaction was regressed onto the attachment dimensions (first step) and their 
interaction (second step), the results of which are presented in Table 43. 
 
Table 43. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Relationship Satisfaction 
Attachment B SE B β R² Change F of 
Change 
Anxiety .01 .07 .01   
Avoidance -.84 .07 -.64*** .34 66.79*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .19 .04 .22*** .06 18.91*** 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
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The overall model was significant (F = 53.88 (3,262) p = <.001) and accounted for 
37.5% of the variance (Adjusted R²). Surprisingly, and inconsistent with previous 
research, anxiety was not predictive of relationship satisfaction within the model, while 
avoidance was. The interaction term was also a significant predictor and is presented in 
Figure 34. 
 
 
Table 34. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Relationship 
Satisfaction 
 
Table 44. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Relationship Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant 2.79* 
Secure and Preoccupied -2.18 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -7.88** 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -11.20*** 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
Individuals fitting a secure attachment classification (low anxiety/avoidance) 
reported the highest relationship satisfaction, while individuals fitting a dismissing (low 
anxiety/high avoidance) reported the lowest, with fearful-type individuals (high 
anxiety/avoidance) reported intermediate satisfaction. Simple slopes analyses revealed 
only the trajectories of secure and preoccupied to non-significantly differ from one 
another. 
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Establishing the associations between attachment and relationship satisfaction, the 
potential for partial mediations was next examined. As discussed in Study 2, according 
to Baron and Kenny (1986), four conditions must be satisfied in order to establish the 
existence of mediations: the independent variable must significantly predict the 
dependent variable; the independent variable must significantly predict the mediating 
variable; the mediating variable must predict the dependent variable when both the 
independent and mediating variables are predictors; and, after adding the mediating 
variable, the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable 
must either reduce (partial mediation) or become non-significant (total mediation).  
First, attachment anxiety and relationship satisfaction were examined, with upward 
contrast tendency the first to be tested for. Attachment anxiety was entered into the 
regression equation to examine its direct predictive value for relationship satisfaction; 
anxiety was indeed a significant predictor (β = -.22, p <.001), thus meeting the first 
condition for mediation. The condition was also met, with anxiety significantly 
predicting the mediating variable upward contrast (β = .43, p <.001). The third and 
fourth conditions were also met; when both anxiety and upward contrast were entered 
into the regression equation, the latter remained significant. Examination of the beta for 
anxiety revealed a reduction did indeed occur; the beta for anxiety was close to zero and 
became non-significant, suggesting that for the current sample, upward contrast is a 
mediator for the association between attachment anxiety and relationship satisfaction 
(with Sobel tests confirming the reduction to be significant (t = -5.00, p <.001)). Put 
another way, it is high-anxiety individuals’ greater tendency to contrast their 
relationships from those perceived as superior that contributes to their decreased 
relationship satisfaction. Conversely, it is therefore low-anxiety individuals’ lesser 
tendency to engage in such unfavourable comparisons that contributes to their increased 
relationship satisfaction. Figure 35 presents the mediation. 
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Figure 35. Upward Contrast as a Mediator between Anxiety and Relationship 
Satisfaction 
 
Next, each of downward contrast, downward identification, and upward 
identification were examined for their potential as full or partial mediators. For each, the 
above steps suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) were carried out; while downward 
identification and contrast did not meet the outlined conditions for mediation, the results 
of regression analyses revealed upward identification as a partial mediator (supported by 
Sobel test confirmation, t = -1.99, p = .05). Figure 36 presents the results visually. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Upward Identification as a Mediator between Anxiety and Relationship 
Satisfaction 
 
Interpreted within a high/low anxiety context, the above partial mediation analysis 
suggests that high-anxiety individuals’ lesser tendency to identify their current 
relationship with those perceived as desirable contributes towards their decreased 
relationship satisfaction, while the opposite tendency reported by low-anxiety 
individuals contributes to their increased relationship satisfaction. 
Potential mediations were next examined for the association between attachment 
avoidance and relationship satisfaction. However, for each of the four identification and 
contrast social comparison tendencies, the criteria put forward by Baron and Kenny 
Upward Contrast  
Tendency 
Attachment Anxiety Relationship Satisfaction 
       β = .43 (p <.001) 
β = -.22 (p <.001) 
β = -.05 (p = .46) 
β = -.43 (p <.001) 
Upward Identification  
Tendency 
Attachment Anxiety Relationship Satisfaction 
       β = -.13 (p <.05) 
β = -.22 (p <.001) 
β = -.16 (p = .01) 
β = .48 (p <.001) 
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(1986) were not met and so differences in the above social comparison tendencies were 
revealed not to contribute as mediators. 
The next focus was on well-being factor life satisfaction. Before examination of 
potential mediators could commence, the direct predictive value of attachment 
dimensions was explored. Anxiety, avoidance and their interaction term were entered 
into the regression equation (the former two at the first step and the latter one at the 
second) with life satisfaction as the dependent variable. The results are presented in 
Table 45. 
 
Table 45. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Life Satisfaction 
Attachment B SE B β R² Change F of 
Change 
Anxiety -1.32 .35 -.23***   
Avoidance -2.37 .38 -.38*** .20 32.46*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance 1.02 .24 .24*** .05 18.92*** 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
 
The overall model was significant (F = 29.43 (3, 264) p <.001) accounting for 
24.4% of the variance (Adjusted R²). The results presented in Table 47 suggest that as 
anxiety and avoidance independently increase, life satisfaction decreases. With the 
interaction being identified as a significant predictor also, the slopes were plotted and 
are presented visually in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Life Satisfaction. 
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Table 46. Simple Slopes Analyses for Attachment and Life Satisfaction 
Slopes Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -.66* 
Secure and Preoccupied -5.18** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -2.97* 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -7.04** 
*p = / < .05 
**p < .01 
 
Consistent with previous findings, individuals fitting the secure attachment 
classification reported the greatest life satisfaction. However, slight variation was 
revealed in life satisfaction reported across the insecure ‘groups’; preoccupied-type 
individuals reported the next greatest life satisfaction followed by dismissing-type and 
lastly fearful-type individuals. Slopes analyses revealed the trajectories to significantly 
differ from one another (see Table 46). 
The first comparison tendency to be examined as a mediator between anxiety and 
life satisfaction was upward contrast. Following the steps of regression analyses outlined 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) revealed upward contrast as a partial mediator (with Sobel 
tests serving to confirm the significance of this partial mediation, t = -3.70, p = <.001). 
Figure 38 presents these results visually. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Upward Identification as a Mediator between Anxiety and 
Relationship Satisfaction 
 
Interpreted within a high/low anxiety context, the above partial mediation suggests 
that high-anxiety individuals’ greater tendency to see the differences between perceived 
desirable relationships and their own (that is, perceiving their own romantic relationship 
as worse-off) contributes to their lower satisfaction with life. High-anxiety individuals’ 
lesser tendency to engage in such adverse romantic relationship comparisons meanwhile 
contributes towards their increased life satisfaction. 
Upward Contrast  
Tendency 
Attachment Anxiety Life Satisfaction 
       β = .43 (p <.001) 
β = -.33 (p <.001) 
β = -.22 (p <.01) 
β = -.36 (p <.001) 
245 
 
Examination of each of the remaining three identification/contrast comparison 
tendencies revealed no further full or partial mediations between anxiety and life 
satisfaction nor for avoidance and life satisfaction. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine differences in the nature of 
comparisons individuals engage in based on attachment anxiety and avoidance. While 
Study 2A examined differences in general social comparisons, the current study aimed 
its examination to a specific interpersonal context, that is, to examine the nature of the 
relationship and partner social comparisons individuals tend to make, as well as 
differences in tendencies to compare current relationships to perceived desirable or 
undesirable others and finally whether there are differences in tendency to contrast or 
identify with these comparison others. 
The first set of analyses was carried out examining general relationship social 
comparison orientation and found that as anxiety increases, tendency to compare one’s 
own relationship to others increases also, while as avoidance increases, tendency to 
compare decreases. This finding was consistent with hypotheses that put forward that 
high-anxiety individuals’ greater relational uncertainty and more negative models of self 
would account for a greater need or desire to compare partner characteristics, the quality 
of their relationship, and the nature of the interactions experienced therein. What is 
particularly interesting about the finding of increasing avoidance predicting decreasing 
relationship social comparison tendency is that this finding contradicts Smith LeBeau 
and Buckingham’s (2009) finding of increasing avoidance correlating with increasing 
tendency. Although the measure used in the current study differs to that utilised in Smith 
LeBeau and Buckingham’s study, both share a small number of items (e.g., ‘I compare 
how happy I am in my relationship to how happy I think others are in their 
relationships’) while the PRSCM used in the current study included items examining 
specific partner and relationship qualities. However, these slight differences are unlikely 
to account for the opposite trends emerging for attachment avoidance since both 
measures examine the same construct. The theorising here for considering the nature of 
the anticipated association between avoidance and relationship comparison tendency put 
forward that discomfort with closeness and intimacy that characterises high avoidance 
would see a psychological distancing from interpersonal issues (that is, a lesser 
interpersonal orientation that Gibbons and Buunk (1999) described as being 
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characteristic of social comparison orientation) that in turn would produce the lesser 
tendency to engage in relationship-based social comparisons.  
It may be then that the difference found between the two sets of results could be 
due to participant samples: the current sample was conducted online and was therefore a 
non-student sample with an age range of 18 to 69 (with a mean age of 36.08 years). 
Relationship length ranged from 1 month to nearly 43 years. The sample of Smith 
LeBeau and Buckingham’s study was a student one and although no information was 
provided on age, it can be assumed that given its undergraduate basis, ages would be on 
average younger. Relationship length was also considerably shorter (3 months to 9 years 
with a median length of 18 months) and so the difference in findings may be a product 
of either of these factors. For example, it may be that in earlier stages of romantic 
relationships (which typically provide fewer opportunities for emotional intimacy that 
longer-term relationships allow), more avoidant individuals’ defensive distancing from 
interpersonal experiences does not arise and their insecurity produces a greater tendency 
to compare. The emotional intimacy processes that characterise later stages of romantic 
relationships would be more likely to produce the defensive distancing in highly 
avoidant individuals and would account for the lesser attention given to interpersonal 
issues and hence lesser tendency to compare partner and relationship qualities. Future 
research would benefit from examining more directly the potential influence of 
relationship length on comparison processes. 
The results of analyses examining comparisons of specific partner and relationship 
qualities were consistent with the patterns of general relationship comparison tendencies 
identified for anxiety; greater anxiety predicted increased tendencies to compare partner 
warmth-trustworthiness, physical attractiveness, and success, as well as relationship 
intimacy-loyalty and passion. That all factors apart from partner fun were revealed to 
come under greater comparative scrutiny in high-anxiety individuals highlights the 
insecurity and uncertainty such individuals feel regarding their interpersonal 
experiences. As Festinger (1954) stated it is in cases of uncertainty that the drive to 
evaluate self-qualities (in this instance, partner and relationship qualities) arises. That 
high-anxiety individuals appear to demonstrate a greater tendency to subject to 
comparative evaluation a broad range of qualities suggests that both their greater 
activation of working models (that is, hyperactivation of the attachment system) in 
which models of self and other are chronically accessible and more greatly salient to 
them, along with their relational uncertainty (argued to stem from both their negative 
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models of self of questionable lovability and hypervigilance to signs of rejection and 
acceptance producing emotional highs and lows when each are perceived) produces a 
vulnerability to seeing others’ relationships not just for what they are but for what they 
indicate for their own interpersonal experiences. 
The significance of this overall tendency to compare several partner and 
relationship qualities is emphasised when considered in conjunction with the findings of 
Study 3 examining partner and relationship ideal standards. Attachment anxiety was not 
found to significantly correlate with any of the partner and relationship ideal standards, 
with regression analyses further indicating attachment anxiety to not significantly 
predict any of the tested ideals. That high-anxiety individuals do not rate any of the 
tested for partner and relationship ideal standards to be more important to them than 
what low-anxiety individuals rate and yet still more often subject such standards to 
evaluation through social comparison emphasises that such greater tendencies to 
compare may be a maladaptive manifestation of the insecurities surrounding both their 
own lovability and their partners’ regard of them. That is, social comparison may 
represent a further avenue for high-anxiety individuals to be vigilant to the signs of 
perceived rejection and acceptance by observing and comparing any apparent 
discrepancies or correspondences (even in facets that are not central to their relationship 
needs) between their own relationship experiences and that of others’. 
The specific partner and relationship comparison tendencies reported on the basis 
of avoidance were similarly consistent with the finding concerning general relationship 
comparison tendency; greater attachment avoidance was found to be predictive of 
decreased tendency to compare partner warmth-trustworthiness as well as relationship 
intimacy-loyalty and passion. Although hypotheses predicted there to be a significant 
lesser tendency for all of the partner and relationship ideals, the findings that emerged 
from regression analyses did indicate at least consistency with the anticipated direction 
of the trends (that is, as avoidance increases, tendency to compare decreases) and overall 
reinforces the general theoretical contention within the adult attachment literature that 
greater avoidance is associated with a distancing from interpersonal involvement. It 
remains unclear why greater avoidance would not significantly predict partner success 
and physical attractiveness but would do so for partner fun. Partner warmth-
trustworthiness and relationship intimacy-loyalty and passion each capture qualities 
indicative of greater emotional intimacy within a romantic relationship (identified in 
Study 2A to be of lesser importance for high-avoidance individuals) and so that they 
248 
 
would be subjected to social comparison less is intuitive both on the basis of high 
avoidance being characterised by a lesser interpersonal orientation and that such 
qualities should be unappealing (indeed to the extent of giving rise to feelings of 
discomfort if experienced) and therefore afforded less cognitive attention. 
The next focus of analysis was on comparison direction, namely whether there 
were any attachment-based differences in tendency to compare to perceived desirable 
relationships or perceived undesirable relationships. The results indicated that as anxiety 
increases, tendency to compare with upward targets increases while as both anxiety and 
avoidance (independently) increase, the former predicts increase and the latter predicts 
decrease in tendency to compare downward. Although observing merely comparison 
direction does not indicate what information is gleaned (examined later through 
consideration of identification and contrast), that high-anxiety individuals demonstrate 
greater tendencies to look to both upward and downward targets when evaluating the 
quality of their relationships is consistent with the earlier proposition that high-anxiety 
individuals’ hyperactivation of the attachment system and their associated 
hypervigilance to signs of acceptance and rejection leaves them vulnerable to 
comparison information from varying sources. Indeed the variety inherent with greater 
tendencies to compare both upward and downward is consistent with the arguments and 
findings of Smith LeBeau and Buckingham (2009) that encountering both upward and 
downward relationship comparison information should be associated with greater 
relational uncertainty because of the differences in positivity and negativity in the 
information both types of sources present.  
The finding for attachment avoidance regarding downward comparison (that is, as 
avoidance increases, tendency to engage in comparisons with perceived undesirable 
relationships decreases) may be indicative of highly-avoidant individuals’ suggested 
general lesser tendency to engage in social comparisons. Why highly-avoidant 
individuals would demonstrate a lesser tendency to engage in downward but not for 
upward comparison remains at present unclear but a possibility could be that such 
tendency to not cognitively attend to perceived undesirable relationships may be a 
manifestation of their defensive nature (that is, turning attention away from perceiving 
unpleasant relationship experiences, even those of others). However, that the findings of 
Study 2A did not appear to indicate such defensive comparison patterns (that is, in the 
differences reported in direction and identification and contrast) does not support this. 
These earlier findings do not rule out this possibility though, as comparisons within a 
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specific interpersonal context may be more likely to give rise to highly-avoidant 
individuals’ defensiveness regarding their relationships. 
However, regarding the directional tendencies found in the current study, it is 
interesting to note that the current findings of tendencies towards relationship 
comparisons differed to the findings of Study 2A of general social comparisons: for 
general comparisons only a single significant finding emerged, that of as anxiety 
increased, tendency to engage in upward comparison increased also. For relationship-
based social comparisons, anxiety was significantly predictive of both upward and 
downward relationship comparisons, while avoidance was significantly predictive of 
downward comparison. For general comparisons, it was reasoned that a major 
psychological contributor to determining the direction of social comparison made on the 
basis of attachment was the extent to which an individual perceives themselves 
positively or negatively (that is, determined by their internal working models of self), 
that is, more greatly determined by feelings of attachment anxiety. That both anxiety and 
avoidance were predictive of upward and downward comparisons suggests attachment 
avoidance to play a bigger contributory role within comparisons that focus specifically 
on partner and relationship qualities than for general social comparisons. Although much 
has been discussed here on the theoretical contention of greater attachment anxiety being 
characterised by a negative cognitive bias, it should be highlighted that greater 
attachment avoidance may be considered as demonstrating a negativity in bias also and 
so might be a contributor to the current observed findings. As greater attachment anxiety 
is indicative of negative working models of self as unlovable, greater attachment 
avoidance is considered indicative of negative working models of other as untrustworthy 
and unresponsive to needs (as based on work by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991)). As 
such, that the current study demonstrated attachment avoidance to exert a greater 
predictive influence on relationship comparison outcomes (not just in direction but in 
identification and contrast to be discussed below) suggests that the attachment 
mechanisms that influence relationship-focused comparisons originate not only from 
just the working models themselves (as suggested for general comparisons) but with the 
activation of those models. 
In their study examining self-activation and social comparison, Stapel and Tesser 
(2001) found that activation of self-constructs led to greater desire to engage in social 
comparison (that is, subsequent higher social comparison orientation scores). On this 
basis then it was highlighted earlier here that high-anxiety individuals’ hyperactivation 
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of the attachment system produces greater salience of self and other models due to their 
chronic accessibility which may in turn lead such individuals to have a vulnerability to 
engage in social comparisons. Conversely, high-avoidance individuals’ defensive 
suppression of the attachment system in which models of self and other are denied 
cognitive attention would lead to a lesser propensity to engage in social comparison. 
These differences in attachment system activation may account for the observed 
differences in tendencies to compare upwards and downwards and indeed for the 
differences in findings between the current study and Study 2A. The interpersonal focus 
surrounding individuals’ internal working models (that is, model of self is not just 
perceptions of lovability but perceptions of lovability in the eyes of significant others, 
and model of other is not just perceptions of others’ trustworthiness but of their 
anticipated responsiveness to the self’s needs) may be why activation of attachment 
systems might contribute more to differences in relationship comparisons than general 
comparisons. It is working-model-activation and relationship comparison’s shared 
interpersonal focus that is argued to link their observed associations. That is, it is the 
extent to which models of self and other are cognitively salient to individuals that serves 
as a contributory determinant in engaging in relationship comparison, and it is the extent 
to which cognitive bias is negative that provides direction for those relationship 
comparisons to be made.  
The findings of analyses examining differences in identification and contrast are in 
keeping with the above theoretical contentions. While individuals high in attachment 
avoidance overall report a general tendency to compare their relationships with others’ 
relationships less often, when they do compare, their tendencies are towards greater 
upward contrast (that is, more adverse comparisons) and lesser downward contrast and 
upward identification (that is, more favourable comparisons). For high-anxiety 
individuals, a greater tendency to compare own relationships with others overall is 
reported and of the comparisons made, their tendencies are towards greater upward 
contrast, downward identification, and greater downward contrast. Although downward 
contrast (that is, seeing the differences between the perceived undesirable relationships 
of others and one’s own relationship) is a comparison type that should produce 
favourable own-relationship evaluations, the strength of the regression coefficient was 
much weaker when examined next to the coefficients of upward contrast and downward 
identification. Both observed patterns for each of anxiety and avoidance are generally 
consistent with the theoretical discussion above that both attachment-system activation 
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and negative cognitive biases may govern comparison tendencies, with the latter 
findings for attachment anxiety consistent with the theorising of Smith Le Beau and 
Buckingham (2009) that insecurity and uncertainty (that characterises this attachment 
orientation) may relate to a greater comparison tendency because of the greater amount 
of varying information (both from positive and negative sources) garnered. 
As highlighted within the discussion of Study 2A, while the above results are 
informative in providing insight into anxiety- and avoidance-based relationship 
comparison profiles, a logical next step for future research examining the issue of 
upward and downward identification and contrast comparisons would be to examine 
how the gathered information is cognitively attended to, interpreted, integrated into 
existing self-knowledge schema and subsequently utilised. For example, although the 
results for attachment avoidance suggest individuals scoring highly in this orientation to 
demonstrate a negative bias in the comparison targets they typically compare against, as 
put forward in Study 2A, it may be that their cognitive response to this adverse 
information is in keeping with the defensive nature that characterises them. That is, their 
insecurity produces tendencies to be drawn to unfavourable comparison opportunities, 
but that same insecurity then produces a certain resilience in which defensive derogation  
of either the comparison source or information itself that ordinarily may give rise to 
negative self-quality (in this instance, romantic relationship) assessment. However, with 
the focus of the current study being on examination of the nature of comparisons 
individuals report typically making on the basis of anxiety and avoidance, this 
consideration of post-comparison cognitive interpretation is speculative and will require 
further empirical investigation in future research to ascertain what cognitive reactions 
may indeed take place. 
The final focus of Study 4 was on the potential mediating roles of 
upward/downward identification/contrast comparison tendencies on both interpersonal 
well-being (relationship satisfaction) and subjective well-being (life satisfaction). Within 
Study 1 it was identified that as anxiety increases, relationship satisfaction and life 
satisfaction decreases (with similar findings revealed for avoidance also). Although the 
main reasons put forward accounting for this finding were based on high-anxiety 
individuals’ negative models of self, negative biases regarding interpersonal 
interpretation and maladaptive conflict resolution strategies, the current study argued 
that a further contributory factor to the decreased relationship satisfaction reported in 
higher-anxiety individuals was due to the less favourable relationship comparisons they 
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report typically engaging in. That is, to more regularly compare one’s own relationship 
unfavourably against perceived desirable others (or indeed perceived undesirable others 
also) would produce lower feelings of relationship satisfaction from the inferiority 
suggested within such a comparison. Furthermore, for life satisfaction, the theoretical 
arguments put forward by Simpson and Rholes (2004) suggested that for high-anxiety 
individuals, greater importance is placed on romantic relationship experiences (that are 
subjected to too-stringent and often unrealistic standards that actuality cannot meet) for 
feelings of subjective well-being. This too was supported by the finding of preoccupied- 
and fearful-type individuals reporting increased life satisfaction when in a relationship 
than when not (a pattern not replicated for their low-anxiety secure- and dismissing-type 
counterparts). As such it was anticipated that high-anxiety individuals’ tendency to 
engage in unfavourable comparisons (and conversely low-anxiety individuals lesser 
tendency) would contribute towards and therefore partially account for their reporting of 
lower satisfaction with life. 
The first finding of analyses examining the association between attachment 
anxiety and relationship satisfaction revealed that inclusion of upward contrast tendency 
as a potential mediating variable reduced the p value of the anxiety/relationship 
satisfaction association to non-significance, suggesting upward contrast to serve as a full 
mediator. It was not anticipated that tendency to contrast one’s own relationship from 
desirable others would serve as a full mediator and so the results of these regression 
analyses are surprising. There is much within attachment theory itself that directly 
accounts for the consistent differences in relationship satisfaction identified in previous 
research (see Chapter 1 for discussion) and so that for the current study the results of this 
first set of mediation analyses is perhaps one that should be viewed with caution. The 
earlier regression analyses testing the predictive value of anxiety, avoidance, and their 
interaction term might provide some insight into why such caution in interpretation of 
this mediation should be demonstrated. While the direct association between attachment 
anxiety and relationship satisfaction was significant (that is, when entered as a single 
independent variable), when anxiety was entered as part of the 
anxiety/avoidance/interaction term model, anxiety was revealed to be a non-significant 
predictor (a finding that is not consistent either here within earlier studies or in previous 
research using dimensional assessment of attachment). Although for the current study 
reliability for both of the attachment dimensions was high, that anxiety on its own was a 
significant predictor but not when included in the wider attachment model may mean 
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that this variable lacks a stability that would allow for greater confidence in the 
mediation results presented. 
However, with this in mind the results do suggest that tendency to focus on that 
which differs between own relationship and perceived desirable others accounts for the 
finding of increasing anxiety predicting decreasing relationship satisfaction. For high-
anxiety individuals who demonstrate hypervigilant behaviours for signs of acceptance 
and rejection, more often being presented with comparison information in which the 
relationship they are currently in is seen as worse-off would contribute to feelings of 
dissatisfaction because of the unfavourable discrepancy inherent within such a contrast. 
For the low-anxiety individual who demonstrates a lesser tendency and therefore 
engages in upward contrast less often there is a lack of presentation of comparison 
information that is unfavourable to the quality of their own relationships and as such 
through attending less to such adverse information, levels of relationship satisfaction 
would remain positive. 
The second mediation found for the association between anxiety and relationship 
satisfaction was upward identification (that is, seeing similarities between one’s own 
relationship and perceived desirable others). The partial mediation that was revealed 
suggested that high-anxiety individuals’ lesser tendency to engage in this relationship-
boosting comparison tendency contributes to their decreased relationship satisfaction, 
while low-anxiety individuals’ greater tendency to make positive links between own and 
others’ appealing relationship contributes to their increased relationship satisfaction. The 
theoretical logic behind this mediation echoes that which was put forward for upward 
contrast; to more often see that a current relationship resembles others’ relationships that 
are characterised by appealing qualities would give rise to feelings of gratification at the 
quality of the relationship being personally experienced, whereas to less often see this 
favourable link would not allow for the same gratification and satisfaction to arise. 
The two findings regarding anxiety and relationship satisfaction are 
complementary to one another and paint an overall picture that a greater tendency to 
engage in adverse social comparisons and lesser tendency to engage in more favourable 
ones can indeed predict and contribute to judgements regarding the quality of a current 
relationship and the feelings of gratification individuals derive from it. 
That no mediations (full or partial) were found for the association between 
attachment avoidance and relationship satisfaction may be suggestive of the earlier-
mentioned theorising that highly-avoidant individuals’ defensive nature may offer a 
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form of resilience against detrimental relationship comparison information. Similar to 
high-anxiety individuals, although the general tendency to make relationship 
comparisons overall was less for high-avoidance individuals, when they do engage in 
social comparisons it is typically to contrast from others’ superior relationships more 
(and identify less with such relationship targets whilst additionally contrasting less from 
perceived inferior relationship targets). That both high-anxiety and high-avoidance 
individuals report lower relationship satisfaction, but only high-anxiety individuals’ 
ratings appear to be contributed by their adverse comparison habits suggests that high-
avoidance individuals indeed do not use the presented information in the same way as 
their high-anxiety counterparts. That is, although high-avoidance individuals tend to 
engage in upward contrast, their lower levels of relationship satisfaction are not 
attributable to this tendency (and conversely, low-avoidance individuals higher 
relationship satisfaction is not attributable to their lesser tendencies). However, while 
this may be indicative of a certain defensiveness in how such comparison information is 
attended to and utilised, it may instead be a reflection of high-avoidance individuals 
general lesser tendency to engage in relationship comparisons overall. That is, while 
such individuals do report contrasting from upward relationship targets, the fact that 
they compare their relationships less overall might mean that this decreased frequency is 
not enough to impact upon their relationship evaluations. With the results as they are it 
is difficult to ascertain which of these two possibilities is the likely contributor to 
explain the current sets of results. It is a limitation of the structure of the current study 
that future research more directly examining the effects of social comparisons may 
address. For example, it may be that employing a diary study methodology in which not 
only positive and negative mood can be reported subsequent to having made a social 
comparison but also additional feelings of well-being (either cognitive or relational). 
Adopting such a methodological approach may further provide insight into the broader 
impact of the types of comparisons individuals typically make on their well-being 
beyond the affective experience examined in Study 2B. 
Lastly, the findings regarding potential mediators for the association between 
avoidance and life satisfaction was similar to those found for relationship satisfaction, 
that is, none of the upward/downward identification/contrast social comparisons was 
found to serve as a mediator for the observed findings of decreasing life satisfaction as 
avoidance increases. Similar to above, this finding may be reflective of a defensive trend 
in which comparison information is derogated in such a way to limit its impact on well-
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being or it may be that the observed adverse comparison habits do not occur frequently 
enough (due to high-avoidance individuals’ lesser tendency to engage in comparisons 
overall) in order to exert an influence. 
Only one partial mediation was revealed for the association between increasing 
anxiety predicting decreasing life satisfaction and that was upward contrast tendency. To 
interpret this within a high-anxiety/low-anxiety context, high-anxiety individuals’ 
greater tendency to contrast their own relationships from perceived desirable ones 
contributes towards their feelings of lesser life satisfaction while conversely low-anxiety 
individuals’ lesser tendency contributes to their greater life satisfaction. This finding is 
particularly interesting when considered in conjunction with the previous findings 
identified here in the current series of work. In Study 1 when examining associations 
between attachment, relationship satisfaction and life satisfaction, it was revealed that 
relationship status served as a moderator for the association between the 
anxiety/avoidance interaction and life satisfaction. However, relationship satisfaction did 
not similarly serve as a moderator, with results revealing relationship satisfaction to 
serve as a moderator for attachment avoidance only (that is, did not moderate for 
anxiety). To concentrate on attachment anxiety, it was argued that for the distinction 
between high-anxiety and low-anxiety, experiences within a romantic relationship were 
not important for feelings of life satisfaction, only that, given the moderating effect of 
relationship status, individuals were actually experiencing a relationship. The anxiety-
based results revealed in the current study seem to further suggest that, while 
experiences within a current relationship do not appear to impact on subjective well-
being on the basis of anxiety, the perceptions of the quality of those experiences do. 
That is, low-anxiety individuals’ high relationship satisfaction and high-anxiety 
individuals’ low relationship satisfaction do not serve to moderate their differences in 
their experiences of satisfaction with life, but how they view their relationship 
experiences within the context of how they appear in comparison to others’ experiences 
does account for their differences in life satisfaction judgments.  
At this point it is important to emphasise that the moderating effect identified in 
Studies 1A and 1B are not considered interchangeable with the mediating effect 
identified in the current study (see Baron & Kenny, 1986 for consideration of the 
conceptual and statistical distinctions made between these two variable types). In this 
way it is understood that the processes being captured by the moderating and mediating 
models are different, but together they provide insight into an overall perspective of how 
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individuals’ experiences within their relationships and the judgments they make in 
understanding those experiences impact upon and contribute towards their overall 
feelings of subjective well-being. 
The aim of the current study was to examine whether attachment anxiety and 
avoidance significantly predicted differences in relationship- and partner-based social 
comparisons (that is, to expand upon the findings of Study 2 that revealed significant 
differences in general social comparisons) and whether differences in such comparisons 
made might provide further insight into the findings of Study 1 of attachment-based 
differences in life satisfaction and relationship satisfaction. The findings discussed 
above indeed appeared to indicate that individuals’ partner- and relationship-based 
social comparisons contribute towards differences in subjective well-being experience, 
suggesting social comparison processes to be a further avenue to investigate how 
attachment orientations may influence perceptions of and experiences in their social 
environments and those significant others within. The next and final step in the current 
series of studies was to further explore the role of social comparison in providing further 
understanding of the findings of Study 1 of differences in well-being experience and 
relationship experience. Specifically, Study 1D revealed that changes in well-being 
occurred across time after individuals had experienced a change in relationship status 
(that is, they had entered into a new relationship or left an ongoing one). The final study 
then focused its examination on differences in social comparison (in this instance, social 
ranking judgments that indicate the positivity or negativity of self-perceptions in relation 
to others) as interacting with length of time in a current romantic relationship or length 
of time since having experienced a previous one. As such, it was hoped that individuals’ 
attachment-based social judgments regarding how self is viewed in relation to others 
may provide further insight into previously identified well-being judgments (namely, 
life satisfaction). 
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Chapter 6. Study 5: Adult Attachment, Relationship Experience, and 
Social Ranking 
 
Study 1D examined attachment-based changes in well-being (namely, life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, and positive and negative moods) across time within the first 
few weeks of having left a current relationship or entered into a new one. The results of 
multi-level modelling revealed that changes in subjective well-being did indeed occur on 
the basis of attachment anxiety and avoidance highlighting overall that attachment 
insecurity reflects an adverse well-being profile surrounding interpersonal experiences. 
Having established differences in attachment-based experience of well-being in a 
number of contexts (that is, baseline, moderated by relationship status, and cognitive and 
affective response to relationship status change), the subsequent studies carried out here 
sought to examine the role of social comparison in providing further insight into the 
observed well-being differences. The final study here sought to examine how attachment 
orientation might interact with length of time since being in a romantic relationship, as 
well as length of a current relationship, in predicting differences in social comparison 
judgments (specifically, social ranking in which perceptions of self-positivity or -
negativity are weighed against perceptions of others to ascertain a certain subjective 
hierarchy). A further, final aim was to then examine how such social comparison 
judgments may mediate the earlier-identified associations between adult attachment and 
subjective well-being in the form of life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
Based on work within an evolutionary psychology perspective, social ranking 
theory put forward that perceptions of social inferiority, in which individuals perceive 
themselves as being looked down on by others, produce submissive and non-assertive 
behaviours (e.g., Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Arrindell et al., 1990; Gilbert & McGuire, 
1998). Within this perspective, Allan and Gilbert (1995) created a scale to assess 
ranking judgments, called the Social Comparison Scale (SCS), that includes judgments 
all relevant to the evolution theoretical roots from which it was derived, namely, those of 
social rank, attractiveness and group fit. The vast majority of research utilising the SCS 
has focused on social ranking in psychopathological-type tendencies such as anxiety, 
depression and depressive symptoms, and eating disorders, (Allan & Gilbert, 1995; 
Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004; Connan, Troop, Landau, Campbell, & Treasure, 2007; 
Gilbert, 2000; Gilbert, Allan, Brough, Melley, & Miles, 2002). Further, non-
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psychopathological individual differences such as neuroticism and extraversion (Gilbert 
& Allan, 1994), anger expression and feelings of entrapment (Allan & Gilbert, 2002) 
and perfectionism (Wyatt & Gilbert, 1998) have also been examined within a social 
ranking context, demonstrating the social comparison scale’s applicability to non-
clinical samples.  
As highlighted within the literature review on social comparison and adult 
attachment, only one study thus far has been carried out examining social ranking on the 
basis of self-reported attachment style. In their work investigating social ranking in 
adolescents, Irons and Gilbert (2005) found that those who categorised themselves as 
secure ranked themselves equally to others, that is, they perceived themselves as neither 
superior nor inferior. Avoidant adolescents ranked themselves as being inferior 
compared to secure adolescents while anxious-ambivalent adolescents’ rankings did not 
differ from secures’. As well as utilise categorical assessment of attachment, the authors 
used a dimensional approach also (that is, participants were required to indicate the 
extent to which each classification was indicative of their own attachment-related 
feelings). From this more dimensional form of assessment, pearson analyses revealed a 
small positive correlation between security and social ranking and negative correlations 
for anxious-ambivalence and avoidance. Further mediation analyses revealed that, for 
insecure attachment, social ranking served as a mediator for the association between that 
insecurity and anxiety and depression. What this study demonstrated therefore was that 
adolescents’ perceptions of inferiority or superiority in comparison to others in their 
social environments both differed on the basis of their attachment-based feelings, and 
that these ranking judgments partially explained differences in depressive and anxious 
symptoms. However, while the authors did utilise a form of dimensional assessment 
(that is, a Likert-type measurement of agreement with each of the attachment 
classification descriptions that comprised the attachment scale they used), the focus of 
this assessment was still on a tripartite classification which omits a classification 
characteristic of fearful-avoidance (that is, one that is typified by both high anxiety and 
avoidance). Therefore while this study was greatly informative, it may have missed 
further potential attachment-based differences that direct dimensional measurement of 
anxiety and avoidance may better allow and therefore the first aim of the current study 
was to examine the direct predictive value of these two attachment dimensions on social 
ranking judgments. It was anticipated that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Greater attachment anxiety will predict decreased social rankings (both 
overall and belongingness), while greater attachment avoidance will predict increased 
overall social rankings but decreased belongingness. 
 
It was anticipated that increased anxiety would predict decreased social rankings 
due to the negative model of self that characterises high-anxiety individuals. Indeed as 
earlier discussed, attachment anxiety (rather than avoidance) is what indicates the extent 
of positivity or negativity of self-perceptions (based on the theorising of Bartholomew 
and Horowtiz, (1991)), with high-anxiety individuals perceiving themselves as 
unlovable and unworthy of others’ responsiveness, while low-avoidance individuals 
perceive themselves more favourably as lovable and worthy of others’ attention. As such 
this difference in inferiority of self would see differences emerge in perceptions of social 
positioning (both overall and in terms of feelings regarding group belongingness) and 
hence formed the basis for the above hypothesis. 
The basis for predictions for attachment avoidance’s predictive value for 
differences in ranking judgments lies in their perceptions of others in their social and 
interpersonal environments (that is, their working models of other). Similar to the 
theoretical consideration of anxiety’s role in model of self, avoidance is argued to reflect 
models of other; individuals high in avoidance are reasoned to have more negative 
models of other in which others are perceived as untrustworthy and unlikely to be 
responsive to needs, whereas individuals low in avoidance have more positive models of 
other in which perceptions are characterised by a belief in the trustworthiness and 
responsiveness of significant others. With high-avoidance individuals then being 
characterised by negative perceptions and beliefs of others, it was anticipated that 
overall self-ranking judgments would be higher due to the negativity that surrounds their 
evaluations of others. This is not to say however that their hypothesised more favourable 
perceptions of self in comparison to others reflect the same evaluative outcomes as low-
anxiety individuals’ anticipated judgments. Indeed, low-anxiety individuals’ judgments 
are reasoned to be the result of their positive perceptions of self, which is suggestive of 
more direct positive self-ranking evaluations rather than the indirect judgment outcomes 
for high-avoidance individuals that are based on their negative-other perceptions. 
A manifestation of high-avoidance is an emotional distancing from others; in 
infancy, a lack of parental responsiveness to attachment needs produces within the infant 
a development of self-reliance that in adulthood sees a discomfort with closeness and 
260 
 
intimacy to be reported. It is because of this emotional distancing that decreased 
belongingness was anticipated to be reported;  inherent within the maintaining of 
emotional distance is withdrawal from others and as such it was reasoned that highly 
avoidant individuals would not see themselves as fitting in and belonging as much as 
their low-avoidance counterparts. Indeed, research by Mikulincer et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that avoidance was related to underestimation of self-other similarity 
suggesting high-avoidance to be characterised not just by an emotional distancing from 
interpersonal experience but a cognitive distancing of dispositional characteristics also. 
On the above basis then it was reasoned that this cognitive distancing would produce a 
decreased belongingness rank score for increased avoidance.  
The next focus of the current study was on how relationship status interacts with 
attachment in predicting social ranking. Study 1A revealed relationship status to 
moderate the association between anxiety, avoidance and their interaction on ratings of 
satisfaction with life and so the current study sought to identify whether relationship 
status would have a similar moderating effect for positivity or negativity in social 
ranking judgments. Firstly, the direct effect of relationship status was to be examined, 
with the following hypothesis formed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant difference in social ranking ratings between 
those currently in a relationship and those not currently in a relationship. 
 
Specifically it was anticipated that individuals currently in a romantic relationship 
would report more favourable social rankings, both overall and in their sense of 
belongingness, over their single counterparts. The basis of this hypothesised pattern lay 
in the findings of general interpersonal research providing evidence to suggest that 
romantic involvement provides a number of psychological benefits (e.g., Campbell et 
al., 1976; Demir, 2008; Diener et al., 2000; Gove et al., 1983; Lee et al., 1991; Waite, 
1995). As such it was anticipated that a further benefit of romantic relationship 
experience would be increased positivity in social ranking self-perceptions. To have a 
romantic partner should suggest to an individual that they have personal qualities that 
are socially desirable and therefore the esteem gained from such romantic involvement 
would be expected to produce the anticipated more favourable ratings. With regards to 
feelings of belongingness, the acceptance inherent within romantic relationship 
experience should see perceptions of self be rated more favourably and thus the qualities 
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captured within the belongingness subscale of the social comparison scale be rated more 
positively in comparison to individuals currently without romantic partners. 
While it was earlier anticipated (Hypothesis 1) that greater attachment anxiety 
would predict decreased social ranking judgments, it was anticipated that relationship 
status would moderate this association. While the direct effects of greater anxiety were 
expected to predict less positive social ranking and belongingness judgments, 
relationship status was anticipated to moderate the association through predicting 
increased social ranking in high-anxiety individuals in a relationship over their similarly 
anxious but single counterparts. This moderated association was anticipated on the basis 
of the above-mentioned acceptance that is suggested within romantic partner experience. 
For the high-anxiety individual whose attachment proclivities are characterised by a 
desire for acceptance by significant others which serves as a source of validation that 
they themselves are unable to achieve autonomously, the validation they would gain 
from having an emotional closeness to a significant other would see their comparative 
positivity of self-perceptions be elevated from their single counterparts who do not have 
the same, more steady access to sources of validation. For individuals low in anxiety 
however, it was not anticipated that social ranking judgments would differ across 
relationship status, that is, both low-anxiety individuals in relationships and low-anxiety 
individuals currently not in relationships would report similar social ranking judgments. 
The findings of Study 1A suggested that it was high-anxiety individuals whose life 
satisfaction benefitted from romantic relationship experience. Low-anxiety individuals’ 
positive models of self manifest a lesser reliance on others for self-validation as their 
self-models produce perceptions of lovability and worth regardless of others’ 
acceptance; that is, such individuals are able to self-validate and maintain positive self-
perceptions autonomously. On this basis, such individuals’ relationship experiences 
would be expected to impact little on their social ranking judgments as they would rank 
themselves positively regardless of whether having a romantic partner or not. 
Hypothesis 3 therefore read as: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Relationship status will moderate the association between attachment 
anxiety and social ranking (both overall and belongingness). 
 
With the findings of Study 1D revealing judgments in well-being to change across 
both the weeks of being in a new relationship and in the weeks subsequent to a previous 
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relationship ending, the next focus in the current study was to examine whether time was 
a factor in predicting differences in social ranking judgments. The following hypotheses 
were made regarding anxiety and time being single (that is, time since a previous 
relationship), as well as length of time in a current relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The interaction between attachment anxiety and length of time since 
being in a relationship will predict social rankings. 
Hypothesis 4b: The interaction between attachment anxiety and length of time in a 
current relationship will predict social rankings. 
 
While it was anticipated that high-anxiety individuals overall would report less 
positive social ranking judgments in comparison to their low-anxiety counterparts, it was 
additionally anticipated that anxiety’s interaction with length of time since last being in 
a relationship would produce further differences. Specifically, it was anticipated that 
high-anxiety individuals who reported a greater length of time since being in a 
relationship would report lower social ranking judgments compared to similarly highly 
anxious individuals reporting a shorter length of time since their last relationship. Study 
1C in the current series of studies produced results that appeared to suggest that anxious 
individuals’ relationship experiences are interpreted and understood through how such 
experiences reflect on them. For example, high-anxiety preoccupied- and fearful-
avoidant type individuals reported a sharp decrease in self-esteem in the immediate days 
after a relationship had ended whereas their low-anxiety counterparts’ self-esteem 
changed much less drastically. This was argued to suggest that high-anxiety individuals 
may see a relationship ending first and foremost as a form of rejection of who they are 
and that this rejection of their personal qualities and characteristics would see their 
already poor self-perceptions decrease in the worth they place in themselves. Similarly 
then, in the current study it was anticipated that the greater time that high-anxiety 
individuals are without a current relationship would give rise to anxieties about their 
personal worth and would result in poorer social ranking perceptions. For individuals 
low in attachment anxiety, it was anticipated that perceptions of social ranking would 
not differ across time due to the more positive self perceptions their models of self 
encompass producing a lesser reliance on others’ acceptance for self-judgments. In this 
respect, a greater length of time not having a romantic relationship would not be 
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threatening to their perceptions of self in the context of how they view others, that is, 
how they rank themselves socially. 
With regards to current relationship length, it was anticipated that for high-anxiety 
individuals, a greater relationship length would see less favourable social ranking 
judgments over their similarly high-anxiety counterparts whose relationships are newer. 
Although this might seem counterintuitive both theoretically (due to chronic access to 
acceptance-indicating partner behaviours) and to hypotheses made earlier regarding 
anxiety and relationship status, the basis of this hypothesis lies in high-anxiety 
individuals’ hypervigilance to signs to rejection leaving them vulnerable to negative 
interpersonal interpretation in their romantic experiences. Although high-anxiety 
individuals’ hypervigilance does see them identify positive partner behaviours, their 
negative cognitive bias and insecurity regarding partner acceptance tends to produce 
negative interpretations of partner behaviours of unavailability as signs of rejection of 
their needs. Repeated negative construal of partner behaviours across time is therefore 
reasoned to potentially produce more negative social ranking judgments, that is, partner 
behaviours that are repeatedly interpreted to reflect negatively on the self should 
produce judgments of self as inferior to social others. Indeed, when the results of self-
esteem change within the first few weeks of a new relationship (Study 1D) were 
presented visually, although the slope for high anxiety did not reach the significance 
level, the trend that was presented suggested that self-esteem appeared to decrease 
across the time period examined within the study. 
The anticipated association for low-anxiety individuals is expected to be converse 
to that anticipated to be reported by high-anxiety individuals, that is, low-anxiety 
individuals who have been in a relationship for longer are anticipated to report higher 
social ranking judgments in comparison to their counterparts who are have been in 
relationships for a lesser amount of time. The theorising behind this expectation is based 
on the findings that were revealed in Study 1D regarding change in self-esteem in the 
first few weeks of being in a new relationship. The interaction between anxiety and 
length of time in the relationship suggested that low-anxiety individuals reported an 
increase in self-esteem across the time period covered within the study. On the basis of 
this finding that for low-anxiety individuals’ perceptions of self-worth improve as time 
within a relationship increases, it was anticipated that length of time in a romantic 
relationship would present a further psychological benefit in the form of increased social 
ranking judgments. Indeed these two evaluative constructs both capture characteristics 
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of self-assessment (with a difference being one (social ranking) represents perceptions 
of self in the context of others’ qualities, and the other (self-esteem) represents 
perceptions outwith social hierarchical influence) and hence forms the basis for why 
social ranking judgments are anticipated to be consistent with the self-esteem findings of 
Study 1D. 
The next focus of empirical attention in the current study was to examine the 
potential mediating effect of social ranking for associations between anxiety and life 
satisfaction and self-esteem. To recapitulate, the findings within Study 1 confirmed 
associations and patterns found in previous research that as anxiety increases, life 
satisfaction and self-esteem decrease. Although there are many factors within attachment 
theory itself that can directly account for these relationships, a further factor in 
differences in well-being was anticipated to be social ranking perceptions. Hypothesis 5 
therefore read as: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Social ranking will partially mediate the association between attachment 
anxiety and life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
 
High-anxiety individuals’ expected more negative social ranking judgments (that 
is, seeing the self as more inferior to social others) would be anticipated to contribute to 
their lower life satisfaction and self-esteem. To see oneself as inferior would be 
detrimental to overall satisfaction with life due to the unfavourable discrepancy between 
self-qualities and others’ qualities, with such a discrepancy giving rise to negative 
feelings captured with Diener et al.’s (1985) scale, for example, the feeling that one’s 
life is perhaps not close to ideal and experiencing a desire to change. Furthermore, 
experiencing a feeling of not fitting into group norms or being an outsider (as indicated 
by a lower belongingness score) would be expected to contribute to a decreased 
satisfaction with life for high-anxiety individuals due to their preoccupation with 
acceptance by others. To experience a lesser feeling of acceptance, which is central to 
high-anxiety individuals’ concerns, would be anticipated to contribute to overall 
perceptions with life quality and therefore this theoretical contention provides a further 
avenue to anticipate social ranking judgments to partially mediate the association 
between anxiety and life satisfaction. 
It is further anticipated that the association between anxiety and self-esteem (that 
is, as anxiety increases, self-esteem decreases) should be partially mediated by social 
265 
 
ranking judgments. Similar to life satisfaction, perceptions of self as inferior in 
comparison to others would be expected to contribute to high-anxiety individuals’ lower 
self-esteem due to the unfavourable discrepancy evidenced by such a disadvantageous 
comparison. Furthermore the anticipated lesser sense of belongingness for high-anxiety 
individuals would be expected to contribute to decreased self-esteem because of the 
confirmation of negative self models that is inherent in the sense of not belonging to 
group norms and of perceiving oneself as being an outsider (that is, the form of rejection 
that can be inferred from a lesser social inclusion). 
However, it may be that, rather than social ranking serving to partially mediate the 
association between anxiety and self-esteem, it is in fact self-esteem that partially 
mediates the association between anxiety and social ranking. That is, it may be that 
high-anxiety individuals’ lower self-esteem (and conversely low-anxiety individuals’ 
higher self-esteem) that contributes to their social ranking perceptions rather than their 
ranking perceptions contributing to their self-esteem. As such, mediation analyses will 
be carried out to test for this possibility. 
The final focus in the current study was on examining the interactions between 
anxiety, length of time since being in a relationship/length of current relationship, and 
social ranking in predicting differences in life satisfaction and self-esteem. The nature of 
such three-way interactions is complex and so to list here each of the anticipated 
associations would be lengthy. However, it was anticipated that, in the case of 
relationship length, low-anxiety individuals whose relationships are longer established 
and report favourable social ranking judgments would report the highest life satisfaction 
and self-esteem due to the advantageous nature of their circumstances. That is, the 
positive models of self as of greater worth and lovability, a longer relationship which 
previous results in the current series of studies has identified to be beneficial, and 
favourable hierarchical perceptions of self in comparison to other should predict 
increased life satisfaction and self-esteem. It was further anticipated that individuals 
high in anxiety in more established relationships with less favourable social ranking 
judgments would report the lowest life satisfaction and self-esteem. This is anticipated 
due to high-anxiety individuals’ negative models of self, the greater potential to see 
signs of rejection in longer-term relationships that they are cognitively biased to 
perceive, and the inferiority that accompanies lower social ranking judgments would 
produce the lowest life satisfaction and self-esteem levels. 
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In the case of length of time since being in a romantic relationship, it was 
anticipated that low-anxiety individuals with more favourable social ranking judgments 
would report the highest self-esteem and life satisfaction (that is, there is not expected to 
be a difference between low-anxiety individuals who have been single a shorter or a 
longer time). High-anxiety individuals who have been out of a relationship for longer 
and report less favourable social ranking judgments would report the lowest life 
satisfaction and self-esteem. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Anxiety, length of time since being in a relationship, and social ranking 
will interact to predict differences in life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
Hypothesis 6b: Anxiety, relationship length, and social ranking will interact to predict 
differences in life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 399 participants comprised the sample of the current study, 303 of 
whom were female (75.9%) and 96 (24.1%) were male. Age ranged from 18 to 74 (M = 
34.94, SD = 10.94). Two-hundred and fifty nine participants reported themselves to be 
currently in a romantic relationship, with 140 reporting themselves to be currently 
uninvolved in a romantic relationship. Of the participants in relationships, 54 reported 
themselves as in a relationship but not co-habiting, 64 as co-habiting with their romantic 
partners, 13 as engaged, and 128 as married. Length of current relationship ranged from 
1 month to 42 years 9 months (M = 105.09 months, SD = 104.10). For individuals not 
currently in a relationship, length of time since the last relationship they had been in 
ranged from 1 week to 17 years 10 months (M = 31.09 months, SD = 10.94). 
Measures 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire including questions on gender, age, countries of residence and origin, 
sexual orientation, relationship status, relationship length if current in a relationship and 
length of time since the most recent relationship if single 
Adult Attachment. As in previous studies, attachment anxiety and avoidance were 
measured using the Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised (Fraley et al., 2000). 
Cronbach’s alphas for anxiety and avoidance in the current study were both .94. 
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Social Ranking. Participants’ views of self in comparison to others were measured 
using the Social Comparison Scale (SCS, Allan & Gilbert, 1995). This measure consists 
of 11 item scales (e.g., Inferior-Superior, Weaker-Stronger, and Unattractive-More 
Attractive), ranging from 1 to 10, in which participants indicate how they perceive 
themselves relative to others (with 1 indicating the greatest inferiority and 10the greatest 
superiority). In its original 1-10 scale, the SCS does not have a single middle point to 
allow participants to indicate perceptions of equal ranking, therefore the scales were 
adjusted slightly in the present study to range from 1 to 9 to allow for a clear middle 
point (5) to reflect perception of equality. Two scores can be calculated from the Social 
Comparison Scale: a total social ranking score, and a score Allan and Gilbert (1995) 
referred to as Belongingness (comprising items Same-Different, Insider-Outsider, and 
Left Out-Accepted). The scale has been shown to have good reliability in previous 
research in both normal and clinical populations (e.g., Allan & Gilbert, 1995, 1997; 
Irons & Gilbert, 2005); Cronbach’s alpha in the current study was .86 
Life Satisfaction. Participants’ life satisfaction was assessed using, as in previous 
studies, the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985). Cronbach’s alpha was .89. 
Procedure 
The current study was carried out online; participants were recruited through 
online advertisements (for example, research listings on the Hanover Psychological 
Research on the Net web page) where they could read information on the nature of the 
study, provide informed consent to take part, and complete the measures. Upon 
completion, participants were debriefed on the aims of the study. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The means and standard deviations for all variables of interest are presented in 
Table 47. 
 
Table 47. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
Life satisfaction 
Social Ranking 
Belongingness  
3.07 
2.96 
23.06 
59.80 
13.26 
1.20 
1.16 
6.80 
12.07 
4.43 
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Looking at the means for attachment anxiety and avoidance, attachment avoidance 
is consistent with means established in previous research (see Fraley, 2011) while 
attachment anxiety is lower (with typical means reported ranging from 3.23 in older age 
groups to 3.71 for individuals whose marital status is single (Fraley, 2011)). The means 
for social ranking and belongingness are unable to be compared against those identified 
in previous research due to the slight change in scoring (changed from a scale of 1 to 10 
for each item to 1 to 9 to allow for a clear middle point representing equality). However 
with a total possible score of 99, the mean presented in Table 47 suggests that on 
average, participants rated themselves generally quite favourably in comparison to 
others. For the belongingness variable, the mean score suggests individuals to generally 
see themselves equally in terms of how they see themselves fitting in with others. Lastly, 
the mean score for life satisfaction is consistent with earlier studies in the current series 
of work and is slightly elevated over those reported in previous research (e.g., Hwang et 
al., 2009; Perrone et al., 2007). 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the associations 
between attachment dimensions, life satisfaction, and social ranking judgements. Table 
48 presents the results. 
 
Table 48. Correlations between Attachment Dimensions, Well-Being, and Ranking 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Anxiety - .49*** -.41*** -.38*** -.28*** 
2. Avoidance  - -.44*** -.27*** -.23*** 
3. Life Satisfaction   - .39*** .35*** 
4. Social Ranking    - .73*** 
5. Belongingness     - 
***p < .001 
 
 
Consistent with previous research and with earlier studies in the current work 
series, both anxiety and avoidance were negatively correlated with life satisfaction, 
suggesting that as attachment insecurity increases, satisfaction with life decreases. 
Further negative correlations were revealed between the attachment dimensions and 
social ranking and belongingness scores suggesting that increases in both anxiety and 
avoidance are associated with decreases in perceptions of social ranking in comparison 
to others and the extent to which one feels a sense of belonging. Lastly, positive 
correlations between life satisfaction and social ranking judgments were revealed 
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suggesting that increases in life satisfaction are associated with more positive ranking 
perceptions. 
Adult Attachment and Social Rankings 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that greater attachment anxiety would predict decreased 
social ranking judgments while greater avoidance would predict an increased overall 
social ranking judgment but a decreased belongingness judgment. First, overall social 
ranking was regressed onto anxiety and avoidance at the first step and their interaction 
term at the second step; the overall model was significant (F = 24.04 (3, 398) p <.001) 
and accounted for 14.80% of the variance. Both attachment anxiety (β = -.33, p <.001) 
and avoidance (β = -.11, p <.05) were significant predictors of social ranking but their 
interaction term was not (β = .04, p = .36; F change = .83, p = .36). The results therefore 
suggest that as anxiety and avoidance independently increase, perceptions of social 
ranking (that is, views of the positivity of self in comparison to others) decrease. 
Hypothesis 1 was therefore partially supported: while anxiety followed the hypothesised 
pattern of increases predicting decreased ranking perceptions, the hypothesised pattern 
of increasing avoidance predicting increased social ranking did not, instead 
demonstrating a similar pattern as identified for anxiety. 
Next, ratings of belongingness were examined. Similar to above, anxiety and 
avoidance were entered at the first step and their interaction term into the second step of 
the regression equation while belongingness was entered as the dependent variable. The 
overall model was significant (F = 14.33 (3, 398) p <.001) and accounted for 9.10% of 
the variance. Table 49 presents the results. 
 
Table 49. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Belongingness 
Attachment B SE B β R² 
Change 
F of Change 
Anxiety -.85 .20 -.23***   
Avoidance -.48 .21 -.13* .09 19.09*** 
Anxiety*Avoidance .30 .14 .10* .01 4.48* 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
 
The findings presented in Table 51 reveal that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, as 
anxiety and avoidance independently increase, sense of belonging decreases. The 
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interaction term was also revealed as a significant predictor and is visually presented in 
Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39. Attachment Anxiety and Avoidance as Predictors of Belongingness 
 
Table 50. Simple Slopes Analyses for Belongingness Differences 
Differences t 
Fearful-avoidant and Dismissing-avoidant -1.99 
Secure and Preoccupied -4.40** 
Fearful-avoidant and Preoccupied -.46 
Secure and Dismissing-avoidant -3.01* 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
 
Interpreting the results presented in Figure 39 in the context of attachment 
classifications, individuals fitting a secure classification reported the greatest sense of 
belonging and fitting in, with dismissing-type individuals reporting the next highest 
ranking scores. Preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals both reported similar lower 
levels of feelings of belongingness. Slopes analyses were carried out and are presented 
in Table 50. 
Hypothesis 2 focused on examining differences in social ranking judgments on the 
basis of relationship status, that is, whether individuals in a romantic relationship 
reported higher social ranking judgments than those currently not in a relationship. To 
test this, an independent t-test was carried out for each of overall social ranking and 
belongingness. Table 51 presents the results of these analyses. 
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Table 51. Mean Differences across Relationship Status 
Dependent 
Variable 
Group t Mean 
Difference 
p (one-tailed) 
 
Social Ranking 
In Relationship 
 
Not in 
Relationship 
 
-1.83 
 
-2.31 
 
.03 
 
Belongingness 
In Relationship 
 
Not in 
Relationship 
 
-1.07 
 
-.50 
 
.14 
 
As can be seen in Table 51, there was a significant difference in overall social 
ranking scores between individuals currently in a relationship and those currently not, 
revealing the former group (M = 60.61, SD = 11.08) to report higher ratings than the 
latter (M = 58.30, SD = 13.64). However no significant difference was identified 
between these two groups for ratings of belongingness. Hypothesis 3 was therefore 
partially supported. 
Hypothesis 3 put forward that relationship status would moderate the association 
between attachment anxiety and social ranking judgments (both overall and 
belongingness). In order to test this hypothesis, anxiety and relationship status were 
entered at the first step of the regression equation and their interaction term entered at 
the second step for each of the social ranking variables. The model for overall social 
ranking was significant (F = 24.26 (3, 398) p <.001). The results are presented in Table 
52. 
 
Table 52. Adult Attachment as Predictor of Social Ranking 
Attachment B SE B β R² 
Change 
F of Change 
Anxiety -5.40 .83 -.54***   
Status -2.00 1.29 -1.56 .15 33.88*** 
Anxiety*Status 2.19 1.04 .16* .01 4.44* 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
 
As can be seen in Table 53, while attachment anxiety was a significant predictor of 
social ranking judgments, relationship status in the current model was not. However, the 
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interaction between these two variables was a significant predictor, the results of which 
are presented in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40. Anxiety and Relationship Status as Predictors of Social Ranking 
 
Table 53. Simple Slopes Analyses for Anxiety and Relationship Status as Predictors of 
Social Ranking 
Differences t 
High anxiety/single and Low anxiety/single -8.83*** 
High anxiety/in rel and Low anxiety/in rel -3.79** 
High anxiety/single and High anxiety/in rel .39 
Low anxiety/single and Low anxiety/in rel -2.35 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
 
As suggested by Figure 40, individuals high in anxiety appear to report similar 
social ranking judgments whether they are currently in a romantic relationship or not 
(that is, they perceive themselves in comparison to others similarly less positively than 
their low-anxiety counterparts). For low-anxiety individuals, the results suggest that 
those currently in a romantic relationship report lower social ranking judgments than 
those currently single, suggesting self-perceptions to be more positive when not in a 
relationship than when in (however slopes analyses indicate the difference to be non-
significant). Slopes analyses are presented in Table 53 revealed the trajectories for 
single, high-anxiety individuals and single, low-anxiety individuals to significantly 
differ, as well as the trajectories for high-anxiety individuals in relationships and low-
anxiety individuals in relationships to significantly differ. 
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The regression analysis for belongingness revealed that only anxiety was a 
significant predictor (β = -2.81, p = .001). Hypothesis 3 was therefore only partially 
supported. Although attachment avoidance was not anticipated to interact with 
relationship status to predict differences in social ranking judgments, regression analyses 
were carried out for each of overall social ranking and belongingness to ensure this 
anticipation was accurate. Indeed analyses revealed that only avoidance was a 
significant predictor of social ranking (β = -.39, p <.001) and similar was identified for 
belongingness (β = -.27, p <.01). 
The next hypotheses focused on length of time in a relationship as well as length 
of time since having been in a previous relationship as interacting with attachment 
anxiety in predicting differences in social ranking judgments. The aim here was to 
identify whether the above relationship experiences would see differences in self-
perceptions in relation to others within surrounding social environments. 
As indicated within the Methods section, both length of current relationship and 
length of time since having been in a relationship were measured in months. These time 
variables were centred in accordance with Aiken and West (1991) so to create 
interaction terms with anxiety. Anxiety, length of current relationship (first step) and 
their interaction term (second step) were then entered into the regression equation with 
overall social ranking as the dependent variable. The overall model was significant (F = 
10.34 (3, 257) p <.001) accounting for 9.8% of the variance. Only attachment anxiety 
was revealed as a significant predictor (β = -.33, p <.001), suggesting that, as identified 
earlier, as anxiety increases, positivity of self-perceptions in relation to others decreases. 
Next, belongingness was examined; the model was also significant (F = 9.10 (3, 
257) p <.001) accounting for 8.6% of the variance. Both anxiety (β = -.31, p <.001) and 
relationship length (β = -.13, p = .05) were significant predictors (their interaction 
however was not, β = ), suggesting that as anxiety and relationship length independently 
increase, sense of belongingness decreases.  
Length of time since single individuals’ last relationship was next explored. 
Similarly as above, anxiety and length of time single were entered at the first step and 
their interaction term entered at the second step for each of overall social ranking and 
belongingness. The model for overall social ranking was significant (F = 12.61 (3, 128) 
p <.001), accounting for 21.4% of the variance. Both anxiety (β = -.48, p <.001) and 
months single (β = -.15, p = .05) were significant predictors but their interaction was not. 
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The results therefore suggest that as anxiety and months single independently increase, 
the positivity of perceptions of social ranking decrease. 
While the model for belongingness was also significant (F = 4.54 (3, 128) p <.01), 
only attachment anxiety was revealed as a significant predictor of sense of 
belongingness (β = -.30, p = .001). 
Overall then, Hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported. 
Hypothesis 5 put forward that social ranking judgments would partially mediate 
the association between attachment anxiety and life satisfaction and self-esteem. Similar 
to Studies 2A and 4B, the regression steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) were 
carried out. The results of these regression steps revealed that neither overall social 
ranking nor belongingness met the criteria for partial or full mediation for either life 
satisfaction or self-esteem and so Hypothesis 5 was therefore not supported. 
The final hypotheses predicted differences in life satisfaction and self-esteem as 
based on interactions between anxiety, relationship circumstances (that is, length of time 
either in a current relationship or since a previous one) and social ranking. Of the eight 
regression models encapsulated by Hypotheses 6a and 6b, while each model was 
significant, only one produced a three-way interaction that was approaching 
significance; Table 55 presents the results. 
 
Table 54. Anxiety, Social Ranking, and Relationship Length as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction 
Model B SE B β 
Anxiety -1.57 2.03 -.27 
Social Ranking .13 .04 .23** 
Relationship Length -.01 .00 -.14* 
Anxiety*Ranking -.00 .03 -.00 
Anxiety*Length -.01 .00 -.20** 
Ranking*Length -.00 .00 -.06 
Anxiety*Ranking*Length -.00 .00 -.12ª 
ªp = .06 
*p <.05 
**p <.01 
 
 
Figure 41 presents the results visually. 
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Figure 41. Anxiety, Social Rank, and Relationship Length as Predictors of Life 
Satisfaction 
 
Although the above Figure must be interpreted within the context that statistical 
significance was not quite reached, the trends presented above provide an interesting 
insight into life satisfaction differences on the basis of attachment anxiety, social 
ranking judgments, and current relationship length. As can be seen above, individuals 
low in anxiety with more positive social ranking self-perceptions and in longer 
relationships reported experiencing the highest life satisfaction. High-anxiety individuals 
with more negative social ranking self-perceptions reported the lowest life satisfaction 
regardless of whether they were in a newer relationship or one more established. 
However, the most interesting pattern to emerge from the above regression analysis 
appears to be for high-anxiety individuals whose social ranking judgments are more 
positive. It appears that for such individuals who are in newer relationships, life 
satisfaction judgments are greater, but when similarly anxious individuals are in more 
established relationships, their life satisfaction judgments become similar to their high-
anxiety counterparts whose social ranking judgments are poorer. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current, final study was to examine attachment-based 
differences (as measured dimensionally) in social comparisons in the form of social 
ranking judgments, as well as examine the role of social ranking judgments in providing 
insight into well-being differences identified in earlier studies in the current work series.  
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The results of analyses examining direct attachment-based influences on social 
ranking perceptions revealed that as both anxiety and avoidance independently 
increased, overall social ranking perceptions decreased, suggesting attachment insecurity 
to manifest further disadvantageous cognitions beyond those more directly 
interpersonally focused. The above result for anxiety is consistent with hypotheses that 
reasoned high-anxiety individuals’ negative models of self would see perceptions of 
inferiority in comparison to social others; to see the self as being of lesser worth and 
lovability would intuitively produce perceptions of others as being of greater worth and 
therefore having more positive dispositional qualities that would place such others in 
more favourable hierarchical positions. However, the result for avoidance was counter to 
hypotheses that put forward that, due to highly-avoidant individuals’ negative models of 
other, social ranking self-perceptions would be more favourable. Instead, the results 
revealed that high avoidance produces a similar self-negativity with regards to social 
hierarchical judgments as that reported by high-anxiety individuals (although the 
strengths of the beta coefficients suggest negativity to a lesser extent). While this result 
is in line with those identified by Irons and Gilbert (2005) in their more dimensional 
treatment of attachment orientations, it appears counter to the theoretical notion that 
avoidance is characterised by negativity of perceptions of others. What these results may 
suggest is that early caregiver experiences of limited responsiveness (that produce 
negativity in working models of others and discomfort with closeness and intimacy) 
produce unfavourable self-perceptions that in the current study manifested as 
unfavourable self-perceptions in a social hierarchical context. Although previous work 
within the adult attachment literature has put forward that high avoidance may manifest 
a defensive positivity regarding the self that hinges on self-reliance and competency 
(e.g., Brennan & Bosson, 1997; Brennan & Morris, 1997; Mikulincer, 1998b), the result 
identified here seems to suggest that the extent of high-avoidance individuals’ 
defensiveness may not protect against perceptions of social ranking, revealing self-
perceptions of self as more negative than that reported by their low-avoidance 
counterparts. 
The results examining social ranking feelings regarding a sense of belongingness 
revealed that individuals fitting a secure attachment classification reported the highest 
ratings, followed by dismissing-type individuals, and lastly, reporting similar levels, 
preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals. That secure-type participants reported the 
greatest sense of belonging and fitting in socially is consistent with theoretical 
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expectations; for such individuals who have positive models of both self and other 
resulting from their low anxiety and avoidance, their attachment-based proclivities 
enable them to pursue the interpersonal experiences they desire (that is, closeness with 
others) and so the resultant beneficial behaviours (such as interpersonal disclosure and 
support seeking and provision) may permit the experience of feelings of inclusion. 
Furthermore, secure individuals’ more positive interpersonal interpretations in which 
they report feeling happier in their interactions and that others are more responsive to 
them and understanding (e.g., Kafetsios & Nezlak, 2002; Pietromonaco & Feldman 
Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 1996) should also provide a basis for feelings of greater 
inclusion to the greater responsiveness of others suggesting acceptance. 
The high anxiety that characterises preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals may 
account for their reporting a lesser sense of belonging. Individuals characterised by high 
anxiety place greater importance on others’ acceptance but are found to perceive more 
negativity in others’ interactions with them (e.g., Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 
1997). This greater negativity in the interpretations they make regarding their 
interpersonal interactions would form a basis for feeling a decreased sense of belonging, 
as due to perceiving others to be less responsive and positive would be suggestive of 
lesser acceptance than if others were perceived as greatly responsive and more positive 
towards them. Although the underlying mechanisms accounting for the observed levels 
of feelings of belongingness have not been explored in the current study, it would prove 
interesting if future research examining social comparison within a social ranking 
context could examine whether the perceived nature of individuals’ interactions with 
others is what contributes to their decreased social belongingness judgments. 
It is interesting to note that individuals fitting a dismissing-avoidant attachment 
classification reported an increased sense of belonging over their high-anxiety 
counterparts. While their judgements were lower than that reported by secure-types, the 
results as presented in Figure 40 appear to suggest that they feel a greater sense of 
belonging, despite typically being characterised by a lesser interpersonal orientation and 
an emotional and cognitive distancing from others, than their high-anxiety counterparts 
(preoccupied- and fearful-types) whose attachment characteristics see a greater desire 
for social inclusion. The finding that dismissing-type individuals did indeed report a 
decreased sense of social belonging in comparison to secure-type individuals does 
indeed support the theoretical notion of discomfort with closeness manifesting a 
cognitive distancing from others, but that preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals 
278 
 
reported lower belongingness further highlights the maladaptive approach to 
interpersonal experiences these two attachment ‘groups’ typify. Despite desiring 
closeness with others the most due to their reliance on acceptance for self-validation, 
their negative cognitive biases prevent them from feeling socially included to the same 
extent as secure-types and, despite having a lesser interest in such, dismissing-types.  
Overall, the above results provide evidence for the notion that individuals’ social 
comparison tendencies and judgments differ by virtue of their attachment proclivities 
and provides further support for the notion that attachment insecurity indeed reflects a 
maladaptive cognitive style in which perceptions of self and others differ in their 
positivity and negativity. Although the simplistic nature of data collection in which 
direct associations were explored does not permit exploration of the cognitive 
mechanisms accounting for the observed differences, the current study has provided 
further insight into how individuals’ attachment-related thoughts and feelings may 
influence their social comparison experiences and as such can be utilised to provide 
direction for any future empirical endeavours. 
The results of independent t-tests examining differences in social ranking on the 
basis of relationship status revealed that social ranking judgments indeed differed based 
on whether individuals were currently in a relationship or currently single. Specifically, 
individuals currently in a romantic relationship reported more positive social ranking 
ratings than their single counterparts, suggesting that, without consideration of 
dispositional factors, simply being in a romantic relationship sees self-perceptions in 
comparison to others be more favourable. Previous research examining the 
psychological benefits of interpersonal involvement has provided evidence to suggest 
romantic relationships provide boosts to subjective well-being (e.g., Campbell et al., 
1976; Demir, 2008; Diener et al., 2000; Gove et al., 1983; Lee et al., 1991; Waite, 
1995); the current study therefore adds to this empirical precedent by providing results 
suggesting that a further psychological benefit to being in a romantic relationship 
emerges in the form of more positive comparative self-perceptions. It may be that 
perceptions of improved hierarchical esteem arise due to the importance placed on 
romantic relationships. The topic of romantic relationships is a socially significant one, 
for example, the ubiquitous coverage of interpersonal advice and presentations of that 
which is appealing and ideal within mass media outlets (e.g., Carpenter, 1998; Duran & 
Prusank, 1997; Heintz-Knowles, 1996; Johnson & Holmes, 2009; Kidd, 1975; Kim et 
al., 2007; Pardun, 2002; Prusank, Duran, & DeLillo, 1993; Signorielli, 1991, 1997; 
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Tanner, Haddock, Schindler Zimmerman, & Lund, 2003; Wray & Steele, 2002) that 
perpetuate the importance of finding a significant other. Achieving the socially-
prescribed life goal of interpersonal success may then see perceptions of ranking 
improve because of the associated social prestige. It is interesting to note that the 
significant difference found for relationship status refers to overall social ranking 
perceptions only and does not extend to feelings of belongingness. One would expect 
that feelings of belongingness would increase upon sharing romantic experiences with a 
partner; the acceptance alluded to in belongingness that is provided by gratifying 
experiences such as partner responsiveness and positive feedback would intuitively 
produce feelings of belonging. However, it may be that the factors comprising this social 
ranking sub-factor (that is, feeling accepted or left out, feeling the self to be an insider or 
outsider, and being similar or different to others) are more relevant to feelings regarding 
social others rather than romantic others. That is, having a romantic partner may 
influence feelings of being accepted, but may have less influence on how much of an 
outsider an individual feels and how different they feel themselves to be (as both these 
latter factors could be argued to be intuitively tied to issues of group norm conformity). 
That is, while this social ranking sub-factor does capture elements of other-acceptance, 
the overall implied focus on group norms might account for why no difference in 
judgments occurs on the basis of relationship status. The fact that later analyses carried 
out exploring anxiety’s interaction with relationship status was not predictive of feelings 
of belongingness further supports this notion. 
The addition of considering attachment anxiety’s interaction with relationship 
status produced interesting results. The results of the regression analysis suggested that, 
for high-anxiety individuals, overall social ranking judgments did not differ; whether in 
a relationship or not their judgments regarding their perceived social hierarchical 
positioning remained lower than their low-anxiety counterparts. This appears to suggest 
then that high-anxiety individuals, who in previous analyses here were revealed to report 
decreased social ranking judgments, do not benefit from romantic involvement with 
regards to how they view themselves in comparison to others in their social 
environments. For such individuals who highly value romantic partners and 
relationships (indeed, their high-anxiety sees hyperactivation of the attachment system 
in which working models are chronically accessible and hence associated schema are 
argued to be centralised within their associative networks, as well as demonstrating 
greater dependence on others’ esteem for validation), it could be expected that romantic 
280 
 
involvement would see improvement to social ranking perceptions. However, high-
anxiety individuals are, as previously discussed, governed by a negative cognitive bias 
and so it may be that such individuals’ propensity to make negative inferences about 
their interpersonal experiences might serve as a cognitive barrier to self-perception 
improvement. Indeed, the results of Study 1C in the current work series with regards to 
self-esteem change in response to new relationship formation saw little improvement in 
self-esteem perceptions upon entering into a new relationship and so high-anxiety may 
represent a maladaptive resilience to increases in self-value. It should be noted, 
however, that Study 1A also revealed that high-anxiety individuals (that is, preoccupied- 
and fearful-types) who were currently in relationships reported improved life satisfaction 
over their single counterparts, a finding that is counter to the resilience perspective 
offered here. However, these two seemingly incongruous sets of findings may not 
necessarily be contradictory, instead such findings may paint an overall picture of high-
anxiety individuals being able to derive positivity from their romantic experiences in the 
form of general cognitive judgments (as represented by life satisfaction judgments) but 
that their less favourable perceptions of self (namely, those that are captured within their 
negative internal working models of self) remain steadily resilient and chronically lower. 
A major focus of empirical attention within the current study was examining the 
interactions between anxiety and both length of time since a previous relationship and 
current relationship length in predicting differences in social ranking judgments. 
Surprisingly, and counter to hypotheses, each of the regression analyses produced non-
significant results, suggesting that while relationship status does appear to make a 
difference to individuals’ self-other ranking perceptions on the basis of levels of anxiety, 
neither how long individuals have been in their current relationship nor how long it has 
been since their last relationship appear to have an influence. The reasons for this lack of 
significant findings could be theoretically or methodologically based. Methodologically, 
it may be that issues of sample demography resulted in an inadequacy to capture the 
hypothesised processes. Mean relationship length in the current study was 105 months 
(equating to roughly 8 years). While there was a broad range of different relationship 
lengths (ranging from 1 month to 42 years and a standard deviation of 104 months), the 
generally greater length of relationships sampled may have been problematic as the 
greater anxiety-based changes to social ranking perceptions may occur within the first 
months of a relationship (and indeed first months of being single) rather than after years. 
However, that the regression analyses revealed that months since an individual’s last 
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relationship was an independent significant predictor of social ranking perceptions is 
counter to this. Theoretically then, the argument that may explain the lack of significant 
findings may lie in the stability of internal working models of self. As earlier described, 
attachment anxiety more governs positivity and negativity of working models of self, 
while avoidance more governs positivity and negativity of working models of other. As 
such, it may be that anxiety does not interact with time to produce differences in social 
ranking judgments because low-anxiety individuals’ positive perceptions and high-
anxiety individuals’ negative perceptions that are captured within their working models 
of self are resilient to change and hence perceptions of superiority and inferiority remain 
steady. For example, high-anxiety individuals’ chronic perceptions of self as of lesser 
worth and lovability may not be influenced by being single for a length of time because 
such a single status may simply serve to support their already negative self-perceptions. 
As such, regardless of whether high-anxiety individuals have been single for a few 
months or many, perceptions of self will be steadily negative. 
At this point it must be emphasised that the above discussion does not assume that 
the negative and positive perceptions encapsulated within individuals’ internal working 
models are equivalent to the self-concepts that are captured within favourable or 
unfavourable social ranking judgments. Rather it is suggested that the working models 
of self captured by attachment anxiety consist of cognitive elements that are indicative 
of social hierarchical positioning, that is, high-anxiety individuals’ model of self as of 
lesser worth are cognitively akin to ranking perceptions of social inferiority. 
A further non-significant set of results that is interesting are the findings of social 
ranking judgments not serving as mediators (either full or partial) for the associations 
between attachment anxiety and well-being factors life satisfaction and self-esteem. It 
was anticipated that high-anxiety individuals’ lower levels of life satisfaction and self-
esteem and low-anxiety individuals’ higher levels would be partially contributed to by 
their social ranking judgments but, at least for the current sample, this does not appear to 
be the case. Focusing on high-anxiety individuals, it may be that such individuals’ lower 
subjective well-being is not partially attributable to their social ranking judgments 
because their less favourable ranking perceptions are already consistent with their 
negative internal working models. As such, the more negative well-being levels are not 
accounted for by social ranking perceptions because the negative self-models, which are 
argued to be akin to and therefore capture cognitions represented by these hierarchical 
judgments, are directly predictive in and of themselves. 
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Although the mediation analyses indicated that social ranking judgments do not 
serve as a mediator for the relationship between anxiety and well-being, the results of 
regression analyses revealed that social ranking may act as a moderator instead, with 
findings for the three-way interaction between anxiety, relationship length, and social 
ranking producing a marginally significant result for judgments of life satisfaction. As 
indicated earlier, although the results of the above three-way interaction did not quite 
reach the significance threshold (indeed a larger sample size may have allowed the 
results to reach an acceptable significance level), the results did reveal some interesting 
patterns, most notably for high-anxiety individuals with more favourable social ranking 
judgments. For such individuals the pattern emerged of reporting life satisfaction that 
was similar to their low-anxiety/high-ranking counterparts when in newer relationships, 
but their life satisfaction when in longer-term relationships is nearly equal to individuals 
high in anxiety and with unfavourable social ranking perceptions. Although the results 
suggest nothing of causation, a possible reason for this difference in life satisfaction 
ratings may be that early partner behaviours, such as desire for physical closeness, may 
provide a boost to life satisfaction because of the gratification derived from perceived 
partner acceptance. Because of high-anxiety individuals’ negative cognitive biases that 
often manifest perceptions of rejection in partner behaviours, life satisfaction judgments 
may be lower in longer-term, more established relationships because of being more 
chronically presented with such negative-model-of-self-confirming acts. Why this 
suggested pattern would be evidenced for high-anxiety individuals with more favourable 
social ranking perceptions and not high-anxiety individuals with less favourable 
perceptions may be due to whether negatively-interpreted partner behaviours confirm or 
disconfirm social ranking judgments. For high-anxiety individuals who, despite the 
negative models of self that typify them report a more favourable social ranking, the 
usually negative interpersonal interpretations that characterises their orientation would 
be counter to those more favourable ranking perceptions and as such may reduce their 
overall satisfaction with life. For the high-anxiety individuals who report more 
congruous negative social ranking perceptions, partner behaviours that are construed 
negatively are in keeping with their general negative sense of self and so would be less 
likely to influence their overall feelings of satisfaction with life. The fact that high-
anxiety individuals with less favourable social ranking perceptions report similar levels 
of life satisfaction whether they are in more newly established relationships or longer-
term ones is supportive of this theoretical contention. 
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Low-anxiety individuals, both those with more and less favourable social ranking 
perceptions reported higher life satisfaction in longer, more established relationships 
than those who were in newer relationships. This converse pattern in comparison to 
high-anxiety, favourably-ranked individuals may be a manifestation of the less negative 
cognitive bias such low-anxiety individuals demonstrate. Instead of being governed by a 
negative bias that produces negative interpersonal interpretations, low-anxiety 
individuals’ more positive interpersonal dispositions may allow them to derive benefit in 
the form of increased life satisfaction in longer-term relationships in which personally 
gratifying partner behaviours, such as disclosure and support seeking and provision, are 
more prevalent. This would appear to be the case for both low-anxiety individuals with 
more and less favourable social ranking perceptions; although the slopes appear to 
suggest a greater difference between the two low-anxiety/high-ranking groups than for 
the low-anxiety/low-ranking groups, the trends seems to suggest that generally low-
anxiety individuals gain cognitive well-being benefit from their longer-term 
relationships. 
In sum, the results of the current study suggest that social ranking (a form of social 
comparison due to social hierarchical positioning judgments that are based on how 
positively or negatively the self rates compared to others within individuals’ social 
environments) does differ on the basis of attachment anxiety and avoidance. However, a 
major aim of this final study was to determine whether this ranking form of social 
comparison would provide insight into the well-being differences identified in earlier 
studies within the current work series, that is, both the findings of differences in life 
satisfaction as well as changes in well-being in the months since a relationship 
breakdown or formation was experienced. The results of this current study appear to 
suggest that social ranking judgments do not contribute to the attachment-based 
differences in well-being experienced as predicted by differences in interpersonal 
experience. However, that anxiety and avoidance did predict differences in self-other 
positivity and negativity perceptions, as well as interactions between anxiety, social 
ranking and relationship length appearing to suggest interesting patterns of life 
satisfaction experience, while the results observed here do not serve to provide insight 
into earlier-identified findings, they do suggest that further exploration in future 
empirical endeavours on this topic may be warranted. 
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Chapter 7: General Conclusion 
 
The aim of the current series of studies was to examine attachment anxiety- and 
avoidance-based differences in subjective well-being experience, and to examine the 
moderating and mediating effects of both relationship experience and social comparison. 
Study 1 sought to address a gap in the subjective well-being and attachment 
literatures by examining the role of interpersonal factors in moderating previously-
identified baseline differences in life satisfaction, but also in other factors relevant to 
subjective well-being in the forms of self-esteem, and positive and negative moods. The 
results of baseline life satisfaction differences were in keeping with those previously 
identified, suggesting life satisfaction judgments to decrease as anxiety and avoidance 
increase. Furthermore, the attachment ‘classifications’ created by anxiety’s interaction 
with avoidance produced results similar to those identified by Hwang et al (2009) in 
which categorical assessment of attachment saw secure individuals report the highest 
life satisfaction and fearful-avoidant individuals the lowest. However, Study 1A here 
further found dismissing- and preoccupied-type individuals’ life satisfaction ratings to 
significantly differ. These further results might be a reflection of the larger sample size 
obtained for Study 1 than for Hwang et al.’s (2009) study, or it may be a reflection of the 
benefits of utilising dimensional assessment of attachment over categorical however the 
findings of Study 1A added further support to previous studies’ work demonstrating 
secure-type individuals experience the greatest subjective well-being (in this case, life 
satisfaction) with insecure-type individuals experiencing decreased well-being. Study 
1A also expanded upon previous findings by identifying that individuals’ relationship 
experiences (that is, whether they were currently in a relationship or not) have a 
moderating effect on feelings of life satisfaction. The results revealed that high-anxiety 
preoccupied- and fearful-type individuals report greater satisfaction when in a 
relationship than when not, that secure-type individuals report life satisfaction equally 
high regardless of their relationship status, and that dismissing-type individuals’ life 
satisfaction judgments are lower when in a relationship than when single, suggesting 
that having a romantic partner can alter life quality perceptions for insecure individuals. 
Study 2 sought to investigate possible further social psychological bases for the 
observed differences in life satisfaction experienced by examining differences in social 
comparison tendencies. Indeed Diener and Fujita (1997) have highlighted social 
285 
 
comparison as an important determinant of subjective well-being and life satisfaction in 
particular and hence formed a basis for inclusion of this social cognitive factor as a 
potential factor in accounting for attachment-based differences in life satisfaction 
judgments. As identified in Chapter 1’s literature review, social comparison had rarely 
been considered within an attachment theoretical context; both Gabriel et al. (2005) and 
Mikulincer et al. (1998) found evidence to suggest a cognitive distancing (that is, 
perceptions of dissimilarity of self in comparison to other) for high avoidance and the 
opposite pattern for low avoidance. Social ranking in adolescence was also found to be 
predicted by and correlate with self-reported attachment (Irons & Gilbert, 2005) 
however actual tendencies to engage in social comparison, as well as affective 
antecedents and consequences of social comparison, had not been explored previously. 
Having identified that social comparison tendencies do indeed differ by virtue of 
individuals’ anxiety- and avoidance-based feelings and cognitions, further mediation 
analyses found that tendency to contrast from superior-perceived others partially 
mediated the association between anxiety and satisfaction with life, suggesting that high-
anxiety individuals’ lesser satisfaction with life is partially accounted for by their 
tendency to focus on that which differentiates them from perceived better-off others. 
Conversely this mediation analysis suggests also that low-anxiety individuals’ lesser 
tendency to focus on the differences between themselves and perceived better-off others 
partially accounts for their greater life satisfaction. Although the specific attachment 
theoretical bases for life satisfaction differences was thoroughly considered within Study 
1A, the results of Study 2A suggested that social comparison processes serve a further 
social cognitive role in life satisfaction differences. In further examining social 
comparison differences within a specific interpersonal context (that is, partner and 
relationship social comparison tendencies), a similar mediating pattern emerged. Here, 
high-anxiety individuals’ greater tendency to contrast and therefore see differences in 
their own relationship from perceived desirable others contributed to their lesser life 
satisfaction (and conversely then, low-anxiety individuals’ lesser upward contrast 
tendency contributes to their higher life satisfaction).   
Study 2A explored only a small number of social comparison factors (namely, 
directional and identification and contrast tendencies) in examining well-being 
associations for self-reported attachment. Having identified that certain comparison 
proclivities (namely, adverse upward contrast) contribute to feelings of life satisfaction 
(as well as self-esteem) on the basis of individuals’ anxiety, the findings of Study 2A 
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have highlighted this social cognitive topic as worthy of empirical focus and therefore 
might serve to provide direction for future research to explore additional aspects of 
social comparison that might have an impact on individuals’ subjective well-being 
experience. As suggested earlier within Study 2, being able to expand on the diary study 
methodology utilised in Study 2B to include immediate well-being reactions beyond 
affective change, as well as include more detailed information on the nature of the 
comparisons participants report, would provide further insight into this research area. 
Experimental work also may be beneficial in gaining further understanding of 
individuals’ attachment-based cognitive and affective reactions to being presented with 
social comparison information. For example, a possibility may be to bring couples to a 
laboratory, have each couple member complete an attachment measure, and then explain 
to them that they need to wait in a separate area briefly while the next stage of the study 
is being prepared. During this time a second couple (working with the experimenter) 
who are also ‘waiting’ would be required to either act warmly and positively towards 
each other, or coldly and negatively towards each other (thus each of these conditions 
representing potential upward or downward comparison targets). The actual 
participating couple could then be brought into the lab, asked to complete measures that 
assess well-being (namely positive and negative mood and life satisfaction) and then 
presented with a basic cognitive task that they have been told is what the study is 
focusing on so to distract from what the study is actual examining. An experiment in this 
way might then serve to provide further information on individuals’ actual well-being 
reactions when being confronted with potential interpersonal comparison information. 
The above example is only one possibility for further exploration of this topic, 
however as previously put forward, the current series of studies identified an 
underexplored research area in the form of self-reported attachment, social comparison, 
and subjective well-being and the significant findings observed herein may serve to 
encourage future empirical attention. 
A further aspect explored was relationship satisfaction differences and the role of 
social comparison. Study 1B replicated the findings of a larger body of self-report adult 
attachment research that has found individuals reporting as secure to report the greatest 
satisfaction with their relationships and insecure individuals to report lesser satisfaction. 
Analytic consideration of relationship satisfaction did not prove it to be a moderator for 
the association between anxiety and avoidance and life satisfaction however 
interpersonal social comparison tendency was identified in Study 4 to be a mediator for 
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the association between attachment anxiety and relationship satisfaction. Similar to the 
findings for life satisfaction, while there is much in attachment theory itself that can 
account for the observed differences in experience of relationship satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, the current series of studies revealed social cognitive factors in the form 
of social comparison tendencies to provide further insight into this research area. Similar 
to the above discussion, having identified that social comparison of romantic 
relationships may contribute to differences in interpersonal and subjective well-being, 
there is potential for expansion of this underexplored research topic. 
A further possible role of social comparison in interpersonal processes was put 
forward on the basis of the combined findings of Study 3 and Study 4B; high-anxiety 
individuals were found to report more often comparing several partner and relationship 
qualities, even those not reported to be more important to them than their low-anxiety 
counterparts. On this basis it was reasoned that the demonstrated greater propensity to 
compare own relationship and partner to others’ may represent a further cognitive 
strategy utilised by high-anxiety individuals to be vigilant to signs of rejection or 
acceptance. Previous research within the self-reported adult attachment literature has 
examined high-anxiety individuals’ hypervigilant behaviours and negative biases in 
interpretation of partner behaviours that result from desire for acceptance and worry of 
rejection, however the social cognitive strategy of social comparison has not been 
considered previously as a further cognitive avenue for monitoring of the acceptance and 
rejection such individuals are described as preoccupied with. Much of previous research 
has focused on intra-relationship processes, such as affective experiences of jealousy 
and controlling and possessive behaviours, but not of inter-relationship processes, such 
as those encapsulated by social comparison. The combined results of Study 3 and 4B 
might then have provided an empirical basis for consideration of social comparison as 
an extension of anxious individuals’ hypervigilance. Through such individuals’ greater 
propensity to compare their own partners’ behaviours with other couples’ behaviours 
towards each other, anxious individuals might see contrasts in which their own 
relationships are perceived as inferior (which the results of Study 4B found to be more 
typically engaged in by high-anxiety individuals) to represent confirmation of partners’ 
lesser regard of them and as such representing a lacking of the acceptance they desire. 
While interesting, this theoretical consideration is speculative; the combined results of 
Studies 3 and 4B may be suggestive of indicating hypervigilance but further research 
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should now be carried out to further examine this notion and attempt to find significant 
results to provide support. 
A further adult attachment and well-being pattern not examined previously is that 
of changes in well-being in response to relationship status change. While highly-
informative previous research has empirically explored affective and cognitive 
experience following relationship dissolution (e.g., Barbara & Dion, 2000; Davis et al., 
2003; Feeney & Noller, 1992; Pistole, 1995; Sprecher et al., 1998), the prospective 
nature of the longitudinal studies 1C and 1D enabled a perhaps unique insight into well-
being experiences during interpersonally significant events. That is, with participants 
reporting their weekly feelings of well-being across the 6-month study duration, Study 
1C was able to capture more naturalistic participant reports of well-being both in the few 
days before their current relationship ended (or indeed conversely the few days before a 
new relationship commenced) and in the immediate few days after this event occurred. 
The results of this study therefore do not rely upon retrospective reports of relationship 
events experienced weeks or months previously that may have a certain amount of 
limited accuracy due to passage of time skewing memory, current cognitions influencing 
remembrance of previous cognitions, or individuals’ reliance on a priori assumptions of 
how they believe they may have felt rather than performing a form of introspective 
analysis to determine how they actually felt (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As such, with 
each weekly set of data completed by participants representing (at the time) current 
cognitive and affective assessment, the results of Studies 1C and 1D are advantageous in 
that they are less subject to time-related declines in accuracy. 
What was revealed from regression and multi-level modelling analyses was that 
secure-type individuals appear better cognitively tuned to cope with negative 
interpersonal events. Such individuals reported minimal changes in life satisfaction and 
self-esteem in the week subsequent to a relationship breakdown, providing further 
evidence to that presented previously within the adult attachment literature that such 
individuals rely on cognitive strategies that see potentially negative responses be 
processed in such a way to prevent cognitive escalation. Indeed cognitive and affective 
escalation is a trait associated with high-anxiety individuals (that is, both preoccupied- 
and fearful-types) and this too was demonstrated within Study 1C through the greater 
decreases in life satisfaction and self-esteem judgments, as well as adverse changes in 
positive and negative moods. What was further interesting in the findings of Study 1C in 
particular regarding high-anxiety individuals’ cognitive reactions to change in 
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interpersonal circumstances was the combination of results suggesting high-anxiety 
individuals’ self-esteem to suffer from relationship breakdown but not to benefit from 
the starting of a new relationship. That is, while high-anxiety individuals may interpret 
relationship termination to reflect negatively on them, they are unable to interpret 
relationship commencement as reflecting positively on them, providing further support 
with attachment theorising of anxiety manifesting a negative cognitive bias. 
Limitations in the studies’ methodologies, for example the nature of individuals’ 
relationship breakdown experiences was not recorded, might be addressed in future 
research in which consideration of whether relationship terminations were amicable 
and/or mutual, the result of gradual decline and dissatisfaction or were abrupt and 
sudden, as well as who initiated the breakup, might allow for greater understanding of 
individuals’ attachment-based reactions to their interpersonal circumstances. 
Furthermore future research’s expansion on the findings identified here might also 
consider social comparison perceptions in the more immediate days or weeks 
subsequent to relationship status changes. While it was the aim of Study 5 to be able to 
examine social comparison in the form of ranking perceptions across time, it may be that 
the lack of statistically significant findings obtained for the interactions between anxiety 
and time are due to the typical relationship length (as well as length of time single) being 
long. It may be that capturing social ranking feelings within the more immediate weeks 
of either being in a new relationship or being without one would reveal the hypothesised 
differences in social hierarchical perceptions. 
A further potential limitation that will need to addressed and considered in future 
empirical endeavours is that the nature of the data collection, whilst useful in the novel 
information gathered, did not permit the direct testing of the psychological mechanisms 
discussed as potentially accounting for the observed attachment-based differences in 
subjective well-being experience. The theoretical reasoning that formed the basis for 
expectations and hypotheses was that of self-aspect structure and complexity 
(encapsulated within Linville’s (1985, 1987) self-complexity model and related to 
Mikulincer’s (1995) exploration of attachment-based complexity and positivity of self-
schema), cognitive processing styles of oral and written evaluation of significant events 
versus ruminative-style processing strategies (e.g., Lyubormirsky et al., 2006), and 
maladaptive placing of greater importance on relationship quality for well-being as well 
as unrealistic relationship standards (e.g., Simpson & Rholes, 2004). As such, while the 
results obtained within Study 1 were consistent with these proposed theoretical 
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contentions (and therefore provided a solid basis for carrying out the study), the 
structure of the study did not permit direct testing of these principles. Having considered 
these theoretical perspectives within the context of attachment-based experience of 
subjective well-being and identified theoretically-consistent results, it is recommended 
that future research utilise methodologies that can directly capture whether the above 
cognitive strategies do indeed serve as contributors.  
As earlier mentioned, while Study 5 did not reveal anxiety to interact with time to 
predict differences in social ranking judgments, the results of regression analyses did 
indicate there to be differences in baseline social ranking perceptions both on the basis 
of anxiety and avoidance, as well as identify differences in belongingness on the basis of 
anxiety’s interaction with avoidance. Although Irons and Gilbert (2005) have previously 
explored baseline differences in social ranking within an adolescent sample, the current 
method of measurement of attachment (that is, dimensional that permits the calculation 
of four ‘classification’ types representative of the four-category attachment classification 
system put forward by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991)) is argued to have a greater 
accuracy advantage. Although Irons and Gilbert (2005) did calculate more dimensional 
scores from their categorical measure (calculated from participants’ Likert-type ratings 
of their level of agreement with each description), the tripartite nature of the scale they 
used means that no consideration of adolescents whose feelings of anxiety and 
avoidance correspond to Bartholomew and Horowitz’ (1991) fearful-avoidance could be 
examined. By utilising a dimensional measurement of attachment, Study 5 was able to 
determine that as anxiety and avoidance independently increase, social ranking 
perceptions decrease (that is, become less favourable), while anxiety’s interaction with 
avoidance could identify ‘classification’-based differences in individuals’ sense of group 
belonging. 
A further novel finding identified in Study 5 was that which revealed social 
ranking perceptions to differ on the basis of relationship status. This study then is the 
first to examine and identify that whether individuals are currently in a romantic 
relationship or currently single sees differences in how positively or negatively they rate 
themselves in the context of self-other perceptions. The additional finding that anxiety 
and relationship status interacted to predict differences in social ranking judgments 
produced perhaps unintuitive results (that is, that low anxiety individuals currently 
single reported higher self-ranking ratings than their romantically-involved 
counterparts). While counter to that which could be expected on the basis of attachment 
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theory, this result highlights that further empirical investigation into the nature of 
individuals’ anxiety-based social hierarchical ratings may provide further insight into the 
influence of attachment orientation on social cognitive judgments. 
In summary, the current series of work has contributed to the existing body of 
research examining attachment-based differences in interpersonal and subjective well-
being by examining moderating factors of interpersonal experiences and the mediating 
influences of social comparison (both general and within specific interpersonal 
contexts). The significant results identified, with exception of those testing Hypothesis 3 
within Study 5, were theoretically consistent and therefore further contributed to current 
understanding by providing insight into how attachment-based cognitions can have 
broader influences that extend beyond interpersonal understanding and experience. The 
principles encapsulated within attachment theory (that is, the way individuals understand 
themselves and others through perceptions of self-worth and others’ availability and 
reliability, that early experiences with caregivers have a longevity into adult experiences 
with significant others, and that biases in interpersonal interpretation influence cognitive 
and affective reactivity) have been observed here to influence self-other comparative 
judgments and the positivity and negativity in the inferences made, and to influence 
overall well-being, both due to interpersonal experiences and those positive and negative 
social comparison proclivities. The current series of studies produced results therefore 
that suggest that an avenue for advancement of further understanding of the intricacies 
of attachment theory and how such intricacies may influence how positively or 
negatively individuals experience their social worlds may be via the consideration of 
additional cognitive and social cognitive theoretical perspectives that encapsulate 
processes that may work in conjunction with those encapsulated within attachment 
theory. The direct testing of social comparison theory and social ranking, the indirect 
testing of cognitive theories pertaining to self-complexity and cognitive processing style 
(e.g. Linville, 1985, 1987; Lyubormirsky et al., 2006), and the additional consideration 
of interpersonal circumstances appear to form a more complex gestalt that together 
allowed for the identification of new findings to contribute to the existing adult 
attachment literature. 
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